

Discussion Paper

An Assessment of Collaborative Challenges and Possibilities for Emergency Services and Homeland Security at the Local Level

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Executive Summary

Local providers of homeland security and emergency services and programs face an increasingly complex system of federal and state oversight, operational structures, grant programs, and regulatory requirements. In April of 2006, a focus group of experienced and recognized professionals was formed to discuss local challenges and possibilities related to administration and operation of homeland security and emergency management efforts. Experiences, perspectives, and recommendations were shared during the four-hour focus group session. Subsequent interviews were conducted with additional participants.

Our purpose of this discussion paper is to help local governments better address the complexities of emergency services and homeland security through the use of the emerging and relevant tools of collaborative planning, management and problem solving, multi-stakeholder consensus building, and strategies for public involvement. While this assessment does not evaluate a specific program, it is intended to reveal stakeholder insights on where public participation and collaborative techniques have potential to support the challenges faced by local-level emergency managers. We also offer recommendations that draw on these insights provide a foundation for discussions with interested organizations about how to respond the identified challenges.

The focus group workshop and subsequent interviews uncovered widely and deeply-felt concerns that the administrative apparatus at the federal and state levels currently does not adequately support the broad mandate of local governments for all-hazards emergency management. A summary of their comments include the following issues:

- Local jurisdictions are burdened by an inconsistent and confusing framework for oversight structures, including programmatic funding, and reporting requirements.
- Roles, responsibilities, and authorities among agencies need to be more clearly defined.
- Command structures and systems must be integrated vertically and horizontally; management “silos” result from agency isolation from other stakeholders in both pre-event and post-event efforts.
- Conflicting directives from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Agency (FEMA) at the federal level and between the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) and the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security (OHS) at the state level contribute to “trickle-down” confusion and misdirection for lower levels of government.
- Grant funding priorities are imbalanced, inflexible, and overly-complicated.
 - Funding allocations and guidance tend to focus too heavily on acquisition of equipment and should be balanced to help cover personnel costs (including training and development).
 - The limited funding that is eligible for training exercises tends to over-emphasize terrorism scenarios and should be broadened to address the entire range of potential emergencies.
 - Absence of long-term funding streams can lead to reactive incentives to satisfy independent grant requirements even to the detriment of fulfilling strategic end-goals for resilient, all-hazard, all-phase emergency management.

- Grant applications are overly complicated, repetitive, and place overwhelming burden on the grantees that pulls critical time away from strategic and operational applications.
- Cross-coordination, cross-guidance, and co-training among the federal, state, local government, private, and non-governmental organization sectors of emergency management need greater attention.

Taken together, these findings paint a daunting picture. Yet, the same group of experts who related these day-to-day difficulties also expressed hope for improvement, urging that innovation, stakeholder outreach, joint problem-solving, and collaborative interaction were essential to move forward with remedies. Discussions focused on how collaborative approaches could be incorporated into implementation of suggested next steps, especially for those activities designed to improve coordination among existing programs and efforts. To address issues of governance, coordination, funding, and capacity building, the focus group participants proposed the following eight areas for further elaboration and action:

1. Consider convening a diverse statewide group to address issues of emergency management and homeland security across jurisdictions and levels of government. This forum would ideally have support and involvement from top elected officials, the legislature, Governor staff, key Associations (e.g., CSAC, LCC), as well as others.
2. Develop a template for public/ stakeholder involvement that covers many, if not all, of the grants in one collaborative format that utilizes economies of scale to engage with many stakeholders at once; similarly create a template to allow for integrated and coordinated strategic plans, rather than many that seem to compete across grants and programs.
3. Support the use of public forums, town halls or other forms of engagement hosted (or endorsed) by elected leaders, to raise awareness of emergency preparedness and homeland security issues, to enhance the preparation, readiness and immediate response capacities of communities, and to plan for community recovery. Ensure documentation of best practice land design to engage poor, marginalized, and/or heavily impacted communities.
4. Explore opportunities to develop a regular series of interactive training and networking seminars, possibly involving State associations of local government, to promote the mutual education and coordinated efforts of political leaders and emergency services practitioners.
5. Develop innovative communication methodologies that link together new and existing networks of staff in the emergency/homeland field through strategic outreach and recruitment.
6. Prepare and provide information and tools to help those in the emergency management/homeland security fields to better utilize collaborative policy development and/or dispute resolution strategies.
7. Collaboratively develop comprehensive and integrated strategic templates at each level of government that accommodate public involvement into Emergency Management and Homeland Security efforts.
8. Explore interest in initiating a dialogue among statewide associations of public officials to discuss the findings of this report and to develop actionable recommendations.

While the challenges recognized are considerable, the participating parties – local, state, federal, non-profit, and business – believe that now is the time to move forward together to support the most appropriate and effective approaches to emergency management and homeland security for California.

Chapter 1

Project Setting

Overview

Emergency management and homeland security is based on the ability to prevent or mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural or human-caused disasters, acts of terrorism, or failed infrastructure (such as levee breaks). Regardless of scope – be it local emergencies, regional disasters, or catastrophic events – and regardless of cause, local agencies and jurisdictions provide the initial response to all emergency situations. Local response is shaped by federal and state policies, programs, and priorities, as well as local capacity.

Local capacity to provide homeland security and emergency management services involves equipment, readiness (planning and training), multi-disciplinary coordination, and staffing. In addition to overseeing day-to-day operations and maintaining equipment, vehicles, facilities, and staffing levels, local responders are increasingly required to:

- Plan for and develop complex emergency response plans,
- address significant grant requirements for funded initiatives,
- interact with the public directly regarding preparedness,
- reconcile guidance from local, state, and federal program leaders,
- comply with changing statutory and programmatic regulations,
- coordinate response activities during disasters and emergencies,
- reconcile long-term recovery and subsequent mitigation needs.

Typically, these responsibilities call for specific strategic and operations plans, regional coordination, multi-agency oversight bodies, and information sharing with a broad spectrum of stakeholders.

Policy Challenge

Cities and counties must develop increasingly complex emergency response plans – as well as address multiple grant and program requirements – that call for active involvement with a diverse array of stakeholders crossing emergency response disciplines, political jurisdictions, government departments, and societal sectors. Many independent grant applications and programs call for their own strategic planning, regional coordination, joint oversight bodies and information sharing. With these challenges, municipalities often struggle to meet minimum planning requirements and rushed grant application deadlines, let alone to properly design projects that involve an inclusive set of stakeholders and the collaborative management strategies to ensure proper and lasting implementation.

The expanding complexity and scope of federal and state funding and programmatic requirements result from the desire to better implement emergency prevention, response, and recovery measures – in response to hard lessons learned from events such as 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. Newly evolving federal and state management structures, support resources, and priorities have consequences for local emergency managers and agencies in terms of programmatic direction and reporting and grant application requirements. These local level impacts need to be conveyed to lawmakers, so that legislation and executive orders can best support local emergency providers in addressing state and federal policy priorities.

Purpose of Assessment

The purpose of this assessment is to explore opportunities for local governments to better meet the complicated demands of emergency services and homeland security through the use of the emerging and relevant tools of collaborative planning, management and problem solving, multi-stakeholder consensus building, and strategies for public involvement. User perspectives were solicited from the emergency management community at the local level, along with input from key state and federal agencies as well as others outside government. Their feedback was used to help discover and define the needs of local officials who must cope with multiple emergency management and homeland security challenges—specifically with regard to requirements for engagement with the public and other key stakeholder interaction across diverse planning needs, multiple grant requirements and jurisdictions of cultures.

To identify local level impacts and strategies, a focus group was convened to discuss emergency services and homeland security issues. The dialogue was convened by the Center for Collaborative Policy (CCP), California State University, Sacramento, with support from the Institute for Local Government (ILG). The Institute for Local Government is the non-profit research affiliate of the League of California Cities and the California State Association of Counties.

The focus group session targeted local perspectives regarding the implementation of emergency services and homeland security programs and efforts. This assessment summarizes key findings and recommendations for optimizing emergency services and homeland security measures and programs at the local level, based on the focus group session and subsequent interviews.

Chapter 2

Assessment Approach

Description of Assessment Process

Typically, the Center for Collaborative Policy (CCP) undertakes stakeholder assessments to evaluate the organizational systems and people to be involved in a specific program design and suggest the best possible options for moving forward. While this assessment does not evaluate a specific program or process, it is intended to reveal stakeholder insights on where public participation and collaborative techniques have potential to support the challenges faced by local-level emergency managers.

To accomplish this, the Center for Collaborative Policy (CCP) and the Institute for Local Government (ILG) invited several local emergency service and homeland security providers from jurisdictions throughout California, as well as representatives from key state and federal agencies, to a focus group workshop in April 2006. The workshop created an opportunity to identify the needs of local officials dealing with multiple emergency management and homeland security programs, priorities, and requirements. Following the workshop, CCP conducted interviews with seven other subject matter experts who did not attend the focus group workshop.

As stated in the convening materials, the task of the workshop was outlined as:

Meeting Purpose: To help local governments better address the complex area of emergency services & homeland security through the use of the emerging and relevant tools of collaborative planning, management and problem solving, multi-stakeholder consensus building, and strategies for public involvement.

The focus group session consisted of the following nine participants:

- **Chuck Arnold**, Program Manager, Grants and Training – Regions IX and X, Department of Homeland Security
- **Greg Chun**, Director, Disaster and Emergency Management, California Service Corps, Office of the Governor
- **Jerry Colivas**, Manager, Joint Office of Emergency Services and Homeland Security, City and County of Sacramento
- **Dave Driscoll**, Retired, Northern Region Chief, California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
- **Farley Howell**, Director, National Preparedness Division, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX
- **Paul Jacks**, Deputy Director, Response and Recovery Division, Governor’s Office of Emergency Services
- **Mary Moreland**, Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Services, Riverside County Fire Department
- **Michael Osur**, Deputy Director, Emergency Medical Services and Bio-Terrorism Preparedness, Riverside County Department of Public Health
- **Richard Shiraishi**, Captain, Sacramento Police Department – Homeland Security

Subsequent interviews were conducted with the following individuals:

- **Skip Batchelor**, Director of Preparedness Response and Readiness, American Red Cross, Pacific Service Area

- **Sandy Covall-Alves**, Emergency Services Coordinator, Sonoma County Department of Emergency Services
- **Frances Edwards**, Associate Professor, San Jose State University and Former Director of Emergency Preparedness, City of San Jose
- **Brian Keith**, Deputy Director, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Governor's Office of Homeland Security
- **Peter Ohtaki**, Director, Bay Area Business Force/Business Executives for National Security
- **Kelly Shivertaker**, Business and Industry Council for Emergency Planning and Preparedness (Southern California)

The focus group workshop was conducted on April 12, 2006, from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., at the League of California Cities offices in Sacramento, California (see Appendix A for the workshop agenda). The results of the dialogue, along with input obtained through subsequent interviews, serve as the basis for this assessment report. Based on a participant suggestion, the Little Hoover Commission report *Safeguarding the Golden State: Preparing for Catastrophic Events* (April 27, 2006, available online at <http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/report184.html>) and the Legislative Analyst's Office report *A Perspective on Emergencies and Disasters in California* (February 22, 2006, available online at <http://www.lao.ca.gov/PubDetails.aspx?id=1391>), along with other reference documents, were reviewed for findings relating to local emergency services.

The focus group session consisted of a small number of experienced and well-informed individuals. It is anticipated that additional discussions with others concerning the findings and proposed recommendations contained in this assessment will be important to further identify needs and refine appropriate responses in these very important areas.

To help guide the focus group workshop and interviews, CCP provided attendees with background information on the overall project (Appendix B) and a standardized questionnaire (Appendix C) prior to the workshop. Email and phone contact was initiated by CCP staff in February 2006. Following the April workshop, interviews were conducted in September/October 2006 by staff Adam Sutkus, CCP Senior Mediator/Facilitator and Terry Amsler, ILG Collaborative Governance Initiative Director. Administrative and technical support was provided by CCP staff Phyllis Cauley, Tina Chen, Crystal Fair, David Sumi, and Judie Talbot.

All interviews and workshop proceedings were confidential. The results are summarized in Chapter 3 of this paper. Information gathered has been qualitatively evaluated to identify recommendations are provided in Chapter 4.

Chapter 3

Key Perspectives and Analysis

The following perspectives and recommendations surfaced from the assessment materials. They are not presented in any prioritized order or ranking. Each major area is summarized and is followed by specific findings that emerged.

I. Organizational Stress Points: Design Challenges Exist

Oversight structures must provide consistent, coherent frameworks for homeland security and emergency services. Clear definition of the roles, responsibilities, and authorities for various agencies must be developed to effectively implement policies, programs, and priorities during both day-to-day and disaster operations. Comments specifically identified the need for defining the role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). At the state level, clarity is needed regarding the responsibilities and roles of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the Office of Emergency Services (OES).

Focus group participants believe that confusion around authorities and responsibilities at the federal level has “trickled down” and generated confusion at the state and local levels. Lack of clearly defined and coordinated agency direction can result in fragmented and piecemeal approaches to emergency services and funding programs, leading to duplication of effort in some programmatic areas and insufficient levels of effort in other areas. Clearly defined agency missions and outcomes can also contribute to identifying, assigning, and retaining the appropriate staffing expertise needed for agency success.

Unified command structures and systems must be vertically and horizontally integrated. At the field level, the Incident Command System provides clear structure; however, when response is moved to the Emergency Operations Center, the way that decisions are made and communicated is unclear due to new mandates, programs, and organizational structures. Local entities have voiced concerns that coordination, cross-guidance, and co-training among the public, private, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) sectors of emergency management is lacking. There are also concerns that specialized areas of authority and oversight lead to management “silos,” with agencies increasingly isolated and less engaged with the larger system or other key stakeholders. Dedicated time and focus for strategic capacity building is rare or non-existent.

The various levels of jurisdictional responsibility and authority can create coordination challenges, where “concentric circles” of actors do not interact with each other effectively. Examples of layered and overlapping programmatic authority include direction provided by federal and state agencies, as well as regional planning areas defined by the Urban Area Strategic Initiative (UASI) Program, Operational Areas, and Mutual Aid regions. Overarching goals, strategic plans, and outcomes must be coordinated through consultation and cooperation regarding administrative, planning, and communication processes between multiple jurisdictions.

KEY THEMES & VIEWPOINTS:

Government is increasingly inhibited by a culture of risk-aversion.

- Consensus viewpoint is that failures such as Hurricane Katrina have reinforced aversion to risk-tasking. The consequences of even one mistake are prohibitive and encourages over-reliance on administrative controls.
- Conversely, 15 years ago, after the Loma Prieta Earthquake and Hurricane Hugo, people recognized the need to be responsive. This resulted in a positive cultural change.
- Innovation, stakeholder outreach, joint problem solving, and collaborative interaction have been de-emphasized as a result of this aversion to risk.

Responsibility and authority for preparedness is bifurcated.

- Overall viewpoint is that problems began when the federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was without clear definition of its role within the new organization. “Trickle-down” confusion has been the result (Federal confusion created confusion at the State level, resulting in confusion at the local level).
- Local perspective is that complications result when trying to accomplish mandates associated with federal aid through the overlapping influence of two state departments, the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) and the Governors Office of Homeland Security (OHS): confusion results due to the competing “masters” of federal funding driving actions on one hand and pre-existing statutory/regulatory requirements and protocols driving actions on the other.
- There are bifurcated administrative, planning, and communication processes between the federal and state levels (FEMA/DHS and CA OES/OHS) and between UASI Regions and Operational Areas that lead to coordination challenges. (Example: layered and overlapping jurisdictional authority of grant program regions; traditional mutual aid regions; UASI regions; etc. Overarching challenge: are the goals, strategic plans, and outcomes coordinated?).
- The local government perception is that OES and OHS have duplicative and/or conflicting reporting requirements for funded programs and do not coordinate training, exercises, conferences, or grant applications – leaving locals to rely upon their own interpretation of how to inter-relate these varied programs as best as possible (HHS/DHS also adds to this local coordination challenge with the CDC and HRSA emergency medical/public health grants).
- Fundamental paradox as seen from local viewpoint: OHS controls most of the funding, but OES has the needed expertise and legislative authority (Emergency Services Act).
- Consensus viewpoint is that there must be clearer definitions of roles and responsibilities. All disasters begin as local events. The system breaks down when the next level up assumes they are in charge, or exercises behaviors that imply that role. As the situation escalates, soon no one is in charge and confusion can result (Katrina is an example).
- Another paradox as seen by local entities: all disasters are local; however, in day to day operations, planning and grant programs, the federal government or state agencies do not empower local jurisdictions in a manner to fulfill this large fundamental mandate—impression is that locals are ‘micro-managed’ administratively, leading to resources and emphasis being pulled away from core responsibilities of traditional response work.

Not everything needs “fixing” -- Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater.

- Beware of the “Katrina Effect” – i.e. changing the system too much, too soon based on a single incident. Overreaction.
- California has had many successes, which seems to get lost in the current debate about emergency readiness—local perception is that the problems are more organizational than real.

- California’s emergency management system is admired around the world; not a week goes by when California does not host foreign delegations. Our system is not all we want it to be, but we should keep the world in perspective.
- Recognize that Hurricane Katrina was at a magnitude of 6 times what we have dealt with before; response to Katrina’s aftermath depleted the nation’s resources. We cannot expect a regular response to that kind of scenario.
- Emergency management is a constantly changing environment. Each time there is a disaster, new requirements and mandates on the field are inevitable.
- Staff is too busy in tactical operational issues and grant management now to do strategic planning. This is exacerbated by a lack of long-term funding streams; short tem ‘reactionary’ progress is done more to satisfy independent grant requirements rather than to fulfill a strategic end-goal.
- Perspective of locals is that there is deterioration in the response system due to the perceived confusion of roles between OES and OHS. There are uncertainties related to funding and operational responsibility—which comes first: fulfilling the requirements of a grant, or focusing upon the immediate needs of my jurisdiction for response planning? Corollary: they *could* be the same; but right now, due to the unclear relationship between OES and OHS, they are seen as separate tracks.
- Lack of knowledge in the middle; local jurisdictions expect the State to have the answers, and so far, there has been insufficient leadership and coordinating activity by the state agencies.

II. Grants and Funding: Best of Times/Worst of Times

Related to the issue of clearly defined agency roles and responsibilities is the need for a consistent and coherent alignment of programmatic, funding, and reporting requirements. Local concerns include what is perceived to be diverging sets of requirements, which are driven by grant funding (managed by DHS/OHS) and by pre-existing statutory/regulatory requirements (overseen by FEMA/OES). These diverging requirements can lead to funding requirements constraining or overshadowing larger programmatic objectives.

Local government perspectives include a sense that OES and OHS have duplicative or conflicting reporting requirements for funded programs. Similarly, the two agencies do not seem to coordinate training, exercises, conferences, or grant applications – leaving locals to rely upon their own interpretations of how to best relate various programs and priorities. The parallel system for public health care also adds to local coordination challenges. Grant funding from the federal Human Resources and Services Administration and Centers for Disease Control is administered by the California Health and Human Services Agency and Department of Health Services. These grant program requirements are not always coordinated with federal DHS grant programs.

Feedback loops from local agencies and jurisdictions should be incorporated into revised grant and programmatic requirements. This would help surface areas of conflicting or redundant priorities and workloads. This would also allow agency administrators to hear back how specific requirements, initiatives, and mandates relate to strategic plans and core missions associated with local programs. Deliberate discussion and analysis is needed to integrate policy objectives with implementation practices, allowing for reflective modification of federal, state, or local programs and plans.

Emergency management involves coordination of response contingencies and associated equipment, facilities, emergency staff, and volunteers. The capacity to provide emergency services also includes the ability or readiness to respond, which is enhanced by advance planning, training, and

coordination. Mutual interdependencies, between material infrastructure and the maintenance and training to support that infrastructure, require a balanced approach to maximize effectiveness and efficiencies for emergency management and homeland security systems.

There is a sense among local emergency services providers that funding allocations focus too heavily on acquisitions and purchases of equipment and material infrastructure. Grant programs that do assist in covering staff costs typically impose high match requirements. There is an interest in seeing greater attention and funding for staffing resources to support the ability to maintain and deploy equipment, including advance planning, training, and exercises. Comprehensive jurisdictional coordination should be conducted to determine the best mix of equipment and training needed to serve and protect the state, with funding programs allowing expenditures for both purchases and support of material infrastructure.

Funding allocations for training exercises must also be balanced to address the entire range of potential emergencies that could occur within the state. Currently, there is a sense that funded exercises over-emphasize terrorism scenarios. These scenarios can constrain training efforts and fail to factor in additional circumstances that could arise during a catastrophic, natural, or other human-caused event. In many ways, “catastrophic” events represent worst-case emergency scenarios with cascading events that overwhelm local and regional responses and disrupt essential infrastructure and public services. These lessons learned can be applied to all event types.

Overall, additional effort should be given to more equitable funding allocations between Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery categories of emergency management. Typically, greater funding is available during emergencies when needs are great and resources stretched thin. This may not create a situation where expenditures are made in the most prudent manner. Enhanced funding for preparedness could result in more strategic and better value expenditures. Placing greater emphasis on preparedness would also underscore the need to support the intensive “human” time commitments of personnel involved in strategic planning, cross-sector coordination, and planning.

Funding and reporting requirements are designed to assure that baseline thresholds and competencies are in place. Standardized reporting formats can use various mechanisms to assess compliance with programmatic objectives. Local administrators have described current grant application and reporting requirements as overly burdensome and frequently redundant. Some requirements are viewed as “micro-management” of local programs, which reduces the discretion of emergency managers to adopt measures and approaches that best address local and regional conditions.

A streamlined and consolidated application process would help reduce redundancies and the attendant administrative workload. Local jurisdictions would prefer that funding and regulating agencies provide operational guidelines instead of mandates. This could entail the establishment of benchmarks that provide strategic guidance on key objectives. Local jurisdictions would be given the flexibility and discretion for implementing appropriate programs and initiatives, thereby empowering emergency managers to focus on how their personnel can best be supported.

Funding and reporting requirements need to strike the right balance in creating accountability while supporting local emergency response capacity. These requirements and oversight structures should be aligned with response planning, to the extent possible. Flexible approaches and discretionary funding are important considerations in allowing emergency managers to develop adaptive programs that address local and regional needs, while considering available resources and networks.

KEY THEMES & VIEWPOINTS:

Local jurisdictions seek fewer but more focused guidelines, as well as flexibility to implement them.

- Viewpoint is that state and local jurisdictions would benefit from more self-determination with the resources they are given from the federal government. Homeland Security grants come attached with federal restrictions and priorities that prevent adaptive response to local circumstances.
- Federal DHS seems driven to send a symbolic message to the country that the federal government would not allow itself to fail again, that it would take extraordinary steps in this regard, and would be willing to take over at any time if it perceived failure (the National Response Plan, National Incident Management System, and National Preparedness Goal all gear requirements towards over-detailed and protocol-driven systems that stress federal oversight). This hands-on attitude creates tension with lower jurisdictions. State and local agencies fear that federal micromanagement in a major event will exacerbate problems.
- Perception is that—at a fundamental level—there is a lack of ‘trust’ between federal and state entities, and the local governments they support. The layering of requirements and ‘handcuffing’ locals to the constraints of the grants has disallowed adaptability to local circumstances that would ultimately allow for more innovative, and effective, preparedness programs. Locals are finding themselves “going through the motions” of doing repetitive, overly-specific grant requirements that takes critical time away from core mission needs of response planning and interaction with the public.

Grants are overly complicated and place overwhelming burden on the grantees.

- Local viewpoint is that grants typically focus on policy issues but tend to ignore the people needed to implement the policies. The time-intensive process of creating, planning, executing, and evaluating exercises or carrying out complex decision-making advisory committees are good examples of the person-power needed behind all of the current priorities in the field today. Yet, only a fraction of the federal grants allow for personnel costs. A fear is that expensive equipment purchased with federal funds will soon fall to disuse due to lack of funding to train on and maintain the equipment.
- Federal grantees are strained by high fund matching requirements when staff costs are actually covered. For example, Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG), which pays for improvements to emergency management programs, has a 50-50 match requirement.

Funding could be allocated to smarter priorities.

- There should be additional effort given to creating a greater balance in funding between Preparedness, Response, Mitigation and Recovery. Jurisdictions vie for dollars day-by-day, but once there is an emergency, there is frequently a large influx of money. In the middle of an emergency, jurisdictions do not necessarily spend the money prudently. During the Preparedness phase, jurisdictions are unable to obtain the tools that are needed, and then during Response they buy tools at the spur of the moment. An effort to address and normalize this cycle would be beneficial.
- Fundamentally, emergency management and homeland security is a “people-intensive” business – whether it is gathering intelligence on security risks or developing governance tools and protocols for better cross-sector coordination, exercising and strategic planning. Yet, the model for national and state all-hazard emergency preparedness continues to be strained with very little money going towards the critical ‘human element’ of disasters – and more and more going towards ‘bells and whistles’ that can be reported on a form and sent into congress as a “thing” that has been purchased.

- General viewpoint is that the vision of a statewide strategy for homeland security is unclear and uncoordinated with the larger emergency management strategic planning for the state. Funding should go to achieve a clear and coordinated strategic end-state.

III. Effective Communication Mechanisms Are Lacking

Crisis response involves critical strategic decisions at key moments, including those related to evacuation, emergency response, notifications, communications, and media requests. Clear communication protocols, paths, and structures are needed to convey accurate and credible information in a timely matter to a variety of audiences: emergency managers, agency coordinators, affected publics, and government officials. Developing communication plans that are implemented during routine operations will help establish communication channels essential to emergency response. Governance mechanisms and networks must be in place and operational to support joint communications and interoperability.

One observation raised during focus group discussions was that marginalized populations, such as the disabled or special needs community, have not been adequately integrated into regular emergency planning. The special needs community includes those with health challenges who are dependent on support services – such as oxygen delivery, prescription access, and power supplies to run medical equipment – to maintain their current levels of health. For evacuation purposes, special needs communities include those with limited mobility and transportation options. Those with limited physical mobility may not be able to evacuate to safety, even if the distance involved is not great. Those with limited financial means may not be able to evacuate to safety during a regional emergency, as was the case with Hurricane Katrina. Special attention must be given to vulnerable populations during emergency planning.

Supporting overall homeland security and emergency management programs and capabilities requires that elected officials at all levels understand various emergency programs and needs. Information on existing structures, challenges, and opportunities should be conveyed to local, regional, and state leaders to create a baseline of knowledge for informed decision-making. One specific suggestion was that a standardized homeland security/emergency management component be added to existing training or orientation sessions for new local government officials and leaders. This would allow officials to better evaluate how allocation of resources can best support larger goals that may cross geographic or jurisdictional boundaries. Regional planning and active dialogue between key stakeholder organizations is critical to achieve these outcomes.

Accurate information must be conveyed in a timely way to local officials and the public at large to assure both preparedness and knowledge of appropriate emergency response actions. Key information will include descriptions of the: nature, scope, and potential duration of the emergency; best actions for community members to take (e.g. stay home or evacuate); and locally or regionally available resources (e.g. shelters, food banks, health services). Effective emergency communication can also help secure additional resources to meet community needs. Additional discussion on leveraging public-private partnerships is provided in another key recommendation.

KEY THEMES & VIEWPOINTS:

Both formal and informal communication can be improved.

- Too many focus areas lead to management “silos,” where agencies become isolated and do not engage with the larger system or other key stakeholders.
- Marginalized populations (such as the disabled/special needs community) during an emergency event have not been integrated nearly enough into regular emergency management planning as with other stakeholders.
- Perspective is that coordination, cross-guidance, and co-training among the public, private, and NGO sectors of emergency management is lacking.

Elected officials must be more closely engaged in emergency management issues.

- Since term limits were enacted, there has been a loss of experience and attention in the legislature. There is no longer a recognized, dedicated legislative forum dedicated to emergency management issues. No legislator has taken emergency management as a primary endeavor. An example is *The Blue Ribbon Commission* after the 2003 Southern California Firestorms generated legislator interest, but once the Commission ended, interest evaporated.
- Education should start with local elected officials. As local politicians move up to higher office, they will retain some of their institutional knowledge and training.
- Elected officials would benefit from 8-16 hours of basic training in the 4 phases of emergency management. The California State Association of Counties (CSAC) has a CSAC New Supervisors Institute, a collaborative program developed by CSAC and the Center for California Studies at California State University, Sacramento. However, the New Supervisors Institute does not include training in emergency management.
(<http://www.csac.counties.org/default.asp?id=595>)
- There is a perceived lack of trust by elected officials in the experience of the professional corps of “live” emergency management personnel.
- Too many committees lack coordination – there are local and regional planning groups that are not interconnected: UASI, mutual aid systems, grant planning teams, and others do not have a formal methodology to become complimentary (and all take time to do).
- The current system relies upon an inefficient top-down process where the federal government dictates to the State, and the State dictates to the local jurisdictions, to the extent that inexperienced administrators end up directing more experienced personnel who are closer to the problem – and there is no reverse feedback loop to work on the problem and create a responsive learning system.

IV. Resources and Personnel – The Shadow Necessity

To coordinate emergency management efforts, local jurisdictions and emergency managers should continue to develop networks that include fire, emergency medical services, law enforcement, and public works providers. These networks provide opportunities to share expertise and experience – including data, best practices, and lessons learned – in support of developing innovative, effective emergency management programs. Joint activities, such as planning and training, further familiarize agencies to working with each other, and should be encouraged.

Strategic and essential public-private partnerships can also increase emergency planning capabilities and capacities. These partnerships represent uniquely tailored arrangements within and across regions to provide for a variety of goods and services, including vehicles, earth-moving equipment and operators, personnel support, equipment, and emergency shelters. Access to and activation of these

partnered resources requires significant pre-work and planning to develop comprehensive databases, activation protocols, and contracting mechanisms. This could result in improved procurement processes that would better support emergency response contingencies, but takes time and personnel to develop.

Frustration with red tape is a contributing cause for staff burn-out. Focus group workshop participants expressed concern about an alarmingly high degree of turnover among experienced personnel and its future implications for the emergency management profession. There is an immediate need to train more young professionals the necessary skills for all-hazard, all-phase management as the current cadre of emergency managers prepares to retire or otherwise vacate their leadership positions.

Emergency managers would benefit from leveraging the work of recommendations and guidelines produced by other agencies and organizations to help inform local practices, decisions, and allocations. For example, strategies that other states have adopted in procuring and managing grants may be useful to jurisdictions in California. Federal DHS produced a document, *A Compendium of Promising Grants Management Practices Across the United States* (March 2006), that outlines strategies developed by various agencies and provides contact information for program managers. Effective approaches should be adopted, as appropriate, to help reduce administrative workloads while continuing to advocate for streamlined and consolidated grant funding programs.

KEY THEMES & VIEWPOINTS:

Staff resources are misplaced and overextended.

- Institutional knowledge is lost as the current cadre of career emergency managers retires or leaves government service. There are not enough young replacements with the experience to mitigate the loss in expertise. There is not a focused personnel design in place to address the need (Training, recruiting, job classifications, etc.).
- There are young people running the federal DHS programs who are full of energy and ideas but do not consult the experienced professional corps. Veteran professionals need a receptive audience that listens and learns – “re-creating the wheel” is at epidemic proportions now, due to lack of learning from the past.
- Emergency managers are too immersed in oversight issues to do critical strategic planning for their local jurisdictions. Their role in emergency management is being subsumed by the sheer volume of work required for grants management, communication “fire drills”, and administrative oversight.
- People are leaving the emergency management profession from burnout at an alarming rate. Many staff members are often seen working long days and weekends, compounded especially during emergency events – this is a level that is not sustainable.
- Adequate administrative staffing to handle grants and emergency management is critical. During the response to Hurricane Katrina, administration turned out to be a crucial bottleneck. Some cities and states have found ways to hire enough staff to handle the grant and paperwork workload. California should follow their example (a ‘best practices’ research exercise should be directed to this goal).
- Staffing is an issue: there is a lack of local agency capacity to fulfill all the needs coming forward and there is a loss of expertise at all levels--the “brain drain” is very real and concerning.

V. The Evolving Field of All-Hazard Emergency Management

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, federal grant funding for emergency management was prioritized for dealing with man-made threats with a heavy emphasis on equipment procurement. However, the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was a reminder of the need for training and management against all hazards, whether they are naturally-occurring, intentional, or accidental threats.

Emergency managers play a critical role in all scenarios. With responsibility spanning across all phases of emergency management, emergency managers provide the overarching structure and strategy necessary to coordinate the work of multiple emergency responders. Emergency managers organize the planning and training required before emergency events, conduct damage assessments, alert the public and coordinate response during emergencies. They provide care and shelter, support recovery, and handle much of the administrative load associated with these activities. Unlike their discipline-specific peers in fire, law-enforcement, and emergency medical services, emergency managers are involved in preparedness for all hazards and call upon their peers as required. They are the vital link that brings together the different disciplines. They are uniquely well-positioned to prepare for disasters that do not respect jurisdictional boundaries.

And yet, the special “brokering” role of the emergency manager is often overlooked and poorly understood by fiscal administrators. Emergency managers are unintentionally but significantly impeded in their ability effectively implement their programs by the sheer volume of administrative controls, self-assessment mandates, and grant requirements. Focus group workshop participants commented that operational area coordinators spend so much time managing paperwork that they risk losing sight of what is happening at the federal level or the core mission of all-hazard emergency planning.

Despite their challenges, emergency managers continue to serve their vital role and should be supported in their ongoing collaborative efforts. Impromptu networks are forming at the local and regional levels to compensate against top-down mandates and overt fiscal control. In some cases, law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services, and emergency management have gone beyond the expectations of grant programs and developed their own coordinating teams based on personal relationships. Even as the evolving field of emergency management innovates new ways of dealing with new and emerging threats, skilled emergency managers will be needed to continue their central role in creating capacity for coordinated effort across disciplines and jurisdictions.

KEY THEMES & VIEWPOINTS:

Homeland security and general emergency management program focus are out-of-synch and out-of-balance.

- Viewpoint of locals is that the infusion of federal homeland security funds arguably complicated emergency management in California, rather than helping. The State’s backbone for planning and response – the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) was weakened because federal DHS was driving national policies and theories without allowing state and locally-specific systems to apply them efficiently – became a ‘mandate’ that had to be (somehow) accommodated and incorporated. Ongoing battles with federal entities that do not readily recognize the State’s SEMS process are costly deflections in time and energy, yet, in many cases, the Feds continue to try and force “a round peg into a square hole” in California.
- Operational Area coordinators must spend significant time managing grant funds, losing sight of what is happening at the federal level or the core mission of all-hazard emergency planning. California’s emergency system is struggling to manage these new exigencies through hard work

and administrative adaptation. Question emerges: what exactly is ‘emergency management’ in CA now? (High staff turn-over and vacancies reported at both the local and state level partially reflect this role confusion).

- Local and state participants perceived grant paperwork, political oversight, and self-assessment requirements as so onerous that emergency managers are unable to act strategically or tend to their core missions. New requirements, initiatives and mandates are introduced in waves, on a continuous basis, seemingly without allowing any time for reflection or practical integration. Reactionary steps result, without a firm anchor to a specific end-state in mind. Strategic planning has become piecemeal to comply with grant requirements, rather than as a tool to integrate many programs and initiatives – causing confusion to first responder community and the public whom sometimes end up participating in multiple – very similar – committee efforts. The redundancy is frequently viewed as a waste of valuable time and energy for those involved.
- Viewpoint is that the great imbalance between funding for ‘*stuff*’ and the ‘*people*’ to make it all happen is negatively impacting implementation at all levels. The State of California received approximately \$1 billion in the last 6 years for homeland security; during the same period of time the State received approximately \$75 million for general emergency management. Most of the funding for homeland security was spent in ways that were not or only indirectly linked to coordinated emergency management purposes.
- Perception is that equipment resources have not been allocated in the most effective way possible. As a result of homeland security grants, California jurisdictions have more personal protective equipment, radio hardware, and other materials than previously imaginable, but these activities were done in the absence of an ultimate vision or comprehensive jurisdictional coordination – or without the staff resources to deploy, maintain, and exercise them for the long term. “Silos” of equipment purchasing have also been occurring across geographic and disciplinary boundaries without ultimate attention given to the fundamental question: will this make a better, safer, and stronger California as a whole?
- The challenge is to convince elected officials to understand that resources should be shifted to attain larger overall goals – sometimes across geographic or municipal boundaries. Cross-jurisdictional, regional planning, and an active dialogue between key stakeholder organizations is critical to achieve this end.

There is conflict and tension between professional disciplines.

- Overall perception is that many (especially newer) public safety officials often do not understand the role of emergency managers or the function of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). SEMS as a backbone concept has been diluted and de-emphasized by the rush to focus upon intelligence-centric planning in the wake of 9/11.
- Career-track emergency managers find themselves in conflict with administrators who do not understand the ultimate goals of the emergency management professionals. A perception exists that many executives rely upon administrators at the expense of emergency managers who need executive and administrative backing to be proactive and supportive of field personnel. With the new focus on so much money, the fiscal staffs are viewed as ‘running emergency services from their desks with calculators’ without full awareness of the impacts of their fiscal oversight decisions.
- Viewpoint is that emergency managers are not empowered. Emergency managers are not allowed to effectively implement their programs because of the controls imposed by the fiscal administrators, as well as a lack of understanding of the importance of their centralized ‘brokering’ role to coordinate multiple response priorities during events.
- Impromptu ‘networks’ are developing at the local/regional level to compensate against the top-down mandates and overt fiscal control – in some cases law, fire, EMS, and emergency management have gone beyond the expectations of grant programs and have developed their own coordinating teams based on personal relationships and local conditions.

- The field of *Emergency Management* is ‘morphing’ into a new as-yet-to-be-determined role. The interconnectedness of the ‘hard’ disciplines – law, fire, EMS, public works, etc. – still needs the multi-disciplinary perspective of a coordinating position that can build a team from all disciplines.
- There is a lack of unity in command – field response based on the Incident Command System (ICS) at the field level allows for clear structure; but when response moves to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), especially at the state/federal interaction level, how decisions are made and communicated are unclear due to new mandates, programs, and organizational structures.

Chapter 4

Recommended Action Items for Change

Innovation, stakeholder outreach, joint problem-solving, and collaborative interaction were identified as essential aspects of enhancing homeland security and emergency management services in California. These approaches should be incorporated into the following findings and recommendations that address improved coordination among existing programs and efforts:

Governance and Leadership

- A single unified governance structure would be exceptionally helpful. This would entail an understandable and clearly “mapped out” process that pursues strategic goals for the state, through the current grants programs, by using local-state collaboration. Mapped out processes would include clearly stated roles and responsibilities for federal, state, and local agencies and other entities.
- Oversight agencies need to provide broad, well-defined, flexible and consistent guidance strategy documents, while allowing local providers to implement locally and regionally appropriate programs with applicable benchmarks. Forums are needed to create feedback loops and adaptive learning system that inform development and revision of regulations and oversight mechanisms.
- Consider an oversight body, high above the day-to-day politics, with all interests at the table. This would include both top-down (state officials) and bottom-up (local participants) representation.
- Emphasis should be on customer service. To this end, there should be oversight, local empowerment, and flexible entrepreneurialism.
- Involve local elected officials more effectively and more aggressively. Either they pay little attention or they give their full attention reactively without needed background.
- “Trust” needs to be re-built into the emergency management/homeland security landscape – education, coordination and building a strategic future through a shared vision will dramatically help the state move forward effectively.

Coordination of Efforts and Public Involvement

Involve the public. So much time has been spent on reacting to the changing field of emergency management and homeland security that the main ‘client’ –the public – has frequently been left out of the loop. Whether considering pre-event preparedness, emergency response, or post-event recovery and mitigation, residents, businesses, faith-based groups, advocacy and civic organizations, and others need to have their voices heard. Multi-sector communication capacity, community forums, collaborative planning, and other forms of collaboration and participation have been insufficiently explored. Real improvements in planning, coordination and overall response could result from a broader understanding and use of these tools. The involvement of poor, marginalized and heavily at-risk communities at the local level is particularly important.

- Greater coordination is needed for local and regional planning groups. Mutual aid systems, grant planning team, UASI areas, and others need to find strategies for complementing their efforts. This will take time to do.
- Common coordination points and consolidated voices are needed. The work of existing state and local entities, such as the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) Advisory Board and Mutual Aid Regional Advisory Committees (MARACs), should be empowered to better coordinate efforts.
- Shared professional expectations could be reinforced by an institutional culture that is oriented toward collaborative action. Institute a culture of success and train for optimal performance.

- Focus on exercises and training. Jurisdictions are frequently not funded to do the exercises and training that they really should be doing, while understanding that federal DHS “required” terrorism to be a focus for exercises, a creative and more broadly – interpreted program for CA emphasizing all-hazard preparedness and response could serve to bring disciplines much closer together in a joint pursuit of comprehensive catastrophic planning.

Grant Funding Programs

- Allocations should be better balanced in addressing prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery aspects of homeland security and emergency management. Adequate funding should fully support comprehensive training and exercises.
- Additional coordination and reduced redundancy regarding grant requirements would streamline the application process. A “master” grant application that could be submitted to various funding streams would reduce duplicative work that is done for multiple grants. Similarly, provide for specific stakeholder interaction that can be applied to multiple grants. This will reduce stakeholder burnout, as well as workload for staff.
- Pursue making grants less cumbersome. Have more coordination and less redundancy to reduce the need to redo applications every year and duplicate similar work for multiple grants. Coordinate timelines and deadlines so they do not conflict; broad “bands” of benchworks with a “blockgrant” structure would greatly assist.
- Allow for decentralized guidance with broad objectives – work to end the micro-management from the federal level of planning and response activity.
- Instead of 50 requirements, have a few benchmark plans/documents that need to be done very well. Pursue broad, flexible priorities that are distinct from each other (rather than a confusing series of iterations on the same themes). It is very difficult to effectively implement hundreds of specific initiatives found in multiple grants.

Capacity Building and Networking

- Support informed decision-making by local officials by getting them better and more fully involved in emergency planning and by providing background materials that highlight key issues, and educating regularly.
- Involve the League of California Cities (LCC), California State Association of Counties (CSAC), and special districts. Establish a joint body for the purposes of sharing knowledge across jurisdictions and advocacy.
- Use best practices and case studies to identify what is (or was) working and create venues to share expertise and experience. Staff should be mentored for creativity and innovation; they should be empowered to solve problems and improve current systems. Institute a culture of success. There is little if any reflection opportunities to share expertise and experiences in the current environment.
- Involve the public. Community forums, interactive planning, and creative involvement of new sectors (private sector, non-governmental organizations, and community business organizations) could significantly help the field if engaged in the process.
- Recognize staffing issues and the critical need for emergency planning personnel. Otherwise even if information is made readily available, jurisdictions won’t be able to keep up with learning all the information available and required.
- Mentor for creativity, innovation, and bravery so staff does not just sit and wait passively for permission.

Next Steps: Potential Collaborative Approaches

Collaborative approaches could be used in a variety of ways to implement focus group recommendations and address key findings. Potential applications of collaborative interaction include the following identified by the participants:

Potential Areas for Action

<p>1 ✓ Consider convening a diverse statewide group to address issues of emergency management and homeland security across jurisdictions and levels of government. This forum would ideally have support and involvement from top elected officials, the legislature, Governor staff, key Associations (e.g., CSAC, LCC), as well as others.</p>	<p>2 ✓ Develop a “template” for public/ stakeholder involvement that covers many, if not all, of the grants in one collaborative format that utilizes economies of scale to engage with many stakeholders at once; similarly create a template to allow for integrated and coordinated strategic plans, rather than many that seem to compete across grants and programs.</p>
<p>3 ✓ Support the use of public forums, town halls or other forms of resident engagement hosted (or endorsed) by elected leaders, to raise awareness of emergency preparedness and homeland security issues, to enhance the preparation, readiness and immediate response capacities of communities, and to plan for community recovery. Ensure documentation of best practices to engage poor, marginalized, and/or heavily impacted communities.</p>	<p>4 ✓ Explore opportunities to develop a regular series of interactive training and networking seminars, possibly involving State associations of local government, to promote the mutual education and coordinated efforts of political leaders and emergency services practitioners.</p>
<p>5 ✓ Develop innovative communication methodologies that link together new and existing networks of staff in the emergency/homeland field through strategic outreach and recruitment</p>	<p>6 ✓ Prepare and provide information and tools to help those in the emergency management/homeland security fields to better utilize collaborative policy development and/or dispute resolution strategies.</p>
<p>7 ✓ Collaboratively develop comprehensive and integrated strategic templates at each level of government that accommodate public involvement into Emergency Management and Homeland Security efforts.</p>	<p>8 ✓ Explore interest in initiating a dialogue among statewide associations of public officials to discuss the findings of this report and to develop actionable recommendations.</p>

Appendix A
Focus Group Workshop Agenda

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCP	Center for Collaborative Policy
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CSAC	California State Association of Counties
DHS	Department of Homeland Security (federal)
EMS	Emergency Medical Services / System
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
HHS	Health & Human Services (state or federal)
HRSA	Health Resources and Services Administration
ICS	Incident Command System
ILG	Institute for Local Government
LCC	League of California Cities
MARAC	Mutual Aid Regional Advisory Committee
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
OES	Office of Emergency Services (designated as state or local)
OHS	Office of Homeland Security, California
SEMS	Standardized Emergency Management System
UASI	Urban Area Security Initiative

Appendix A
Focus Group Workshop Agenda

Appendix of Workshop Materials

- Appendix A: Meeting Agenda
- Appendix B: Focus Group Invitation Letter
- Appendix C: Pre-Workshop Questionnaire
- Appendix D: Grant Crosswalk
- Appendix E: “Big Picture” Graphic
- Appendix F: Workshop Worksheets

Appendix A Focus Group Workshop Agenda

The Institute for Local Government & California State University, Sacramento present

Focus Group Workshop on Collaborative Possibilities: Local-Level Challenges to Emergency Services & Homeland Security

Meeting Agenda
April 12, 2006
10:00 AM – 3:00 PM
League of California Cities
1400 K Street, Suite 400
Sacramento, CA 95814

Co-Conveners/Facilitators:

Adam Sutkus, Center for Collaborative Policy, California State University, Sacramento
Terry Amsler, The Institute for Local Government

Meeting Purpose: To help local governments better address the complex area of emergency services & homeland security through the use of the emerging and relevant tools of collaborative planning, management and problem solving, multi-stakeholder consensus building, and strategies for public involvement.

Meeting Outcomes: 1) Define the gaps, problems, and challenges of the emergency/homeland user community at the local level, focusing on collaboration and public involvement; and, 2) identify potential tools, solutions, or guidance that can be developed to assist the users deal with these challenges in the future.

Item	Time	Topic	Presenter	Period
1.	10:00	Welcome & Introductions	Adam, Terry, All	10 min
2.	10:10	Agenda Review, Today's Process & Goals	Adam	5 min
3.	10:15	Project Background: Briefing and Discussion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Nationwide snapshot: the challenges facing all of government ➢ CA's unique field of emergency management & homeland security ➢ Is there a way to help local officials better engage with their public and with each other? 	Adam, All	10 min
4.	10:25	Primer on Collaboration & Public Involvement—Theory & Practice <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ What is it and how does it apply it to EM/HS? ➢ Examples & discussion 	Terry, Adam, All	10 min
PART 1: GAP ANALYSIS				
5.	10:35	Framing: Where Are We Today? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Challenges across all 4 Phases of Emergency Management (where do we run into the most problems?) ➢ Grants, time, and networks—pressure points for effective work? ➢ Are there intersections with collaborative processes? 	Adam, All	25 min
6.	11:00	Small Group Discussions – Exercise 1 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Where are the greatest needs? ➢ Can these gaps be addressed through collaborative processes? 	All, Small Groups	45 min
7.	11:45	Reporting Back—Discussions on Gap Identification <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Are patterns emerging? ➢ Can we prioritize them? 	All	45 min
8.	12:30	LUNCH		30 min
PART 2: IDENTIFY SOLUTIONS AND TOOLS				
9.	1:00	Where Do We Want to Be? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Tackling the problems: each gap has a “best case” outcome—define it ➢ How do we “cross the chasm” from problem to solution, using collaborative processes? 	Adam & Terry	30 min
10.	1:30	Small Group Discussion, – Exercise 2 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Working backwards: how do we make these changes happen? ➢ How can ILG & CCP help respond to this need? 	All, Small Groups	30 min
11.	2:00	Reporting Back—Discussions on Methods and Tools Identification <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Which approaches are likely “do-able” and realistic? ➢ Where should we start? 	All	30 min
PART 3: LOOKING FORWARD				
12.	2:30	Round-table Discussion on Today's Findings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ What has been heard today? ➢ What will happen next, and in what order? 	All	20 min
13.	2:50	Next Steps, Meeting Evaluation/feedback	All	10 min
14.	3:00	Adjourn		

Appendix B:
Focus Group Invitation Letter

Center for Collaborative Policy

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SACRAMENTO

PRINCIPALS

Susan Sherry
Founder and
Executive Director

Lisa Beutler
Associate Director

R. Gregory Bourne

Dave Ceppos

John Folk-Williams

J. Michael Hartly

William D. Leach, Ph.D.

Dale Schafer

Adam Sutkus

ASSOCIATES

Gina Bartlett
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Susan Carpenter
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Deborah Clark
Michael Ciruolo
Roger Dhesi
Tracy Grubbs
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Julie Lee
Jeff Loux, Ph.D.
Deb Marois
Catherine McCracken
Austin McInerny
Larry Norton
Carolyn Lott
Judie Panneton
Susan Schiller
Mary Selkirk
Judith Talbot
Betsy Watson, Ph.D.
Gregory S. Weber, J.D.
Sue Woods

Dear Prospective Focus Group Members:

I have spoken to most of you over the last several months regarding an innovative and exciting project taking shape between California State University, Sacramento's Center for Collaborative Policy and the Institute for Local Government. (The Institute, historically affiliated with the League of California Cities, is presently guided by a board of city and county leaders and directs its information, research and other services to all local public officials in California.)

Our interest is to help local governments better address the complex area of emergency services & homeland security through the use of the emerging and relevant tools of collaborative planning, management and problem solving, multi-stakeholder consensus building, and strategies for public involvement. As we've discussed, I am actively planning the workshop/focus group portion of the event and would like to formally invite you to participate.

First, a short review of our project. Cities and counties are increasingly having to develop complex emergency response plans – as well as address multiple grant and program requirements - that call for active involvement with a diverse array of stakeholders crossing emergency response disciplines, political jurisdictions, government departments, and societal sectors (Note: I dropped info here.). Many independent grant applications and programs call for their own strategic planning, regional coordination, joint oversight bodies and information sharing. The need for better approaches to longer term, post-disaster planning and management is also increasingly a factor.

With these challenges, municipalities are struggling to just to meet minimum planning requirements and rushed grant application deadlines, let alone to properly design projects that involve an inclusive set of stakeholders and the collaborative management strategies to ensure follow through.

The ILG/CSUS effort was initiated to hear from the user community at the local level, with key state and federal agency input, to help discover & define the needs of local officials dealing with multiple emergency management and homeland security challenges—specifically with regards to requirements for engagement with the public and other key stakeholder interaction across multiple grants & jurisdictions.

Through initial discussions with several of you, possible beneficial “products” that would assist local officials may include the following list, which we will discuss further at the workshop/focus group meeting:

Networking academy of homeland security and emergency services. This approach has been pursued in other policy venues and it has the potential to coordinate like-minded professionals that may not have the opportunity to address joint concerns. A North-South state focus could be pursued, bringing key stakeholders together to discuss new methodologies—such as collaborative techniques—into the emergency management and homeland security arena.

Appendix B:
Focus Group Invitation Letter

“Template” development for emergency/homeland governance. A strong potential exists to craft a collaborative governance model that addresses the key challenges of a local government implementing complex emergency management/homeland grants and projects. A “gap analysis” would be developed, assessed, and ultimately fashioned into a boilerplate model to help locals work through their issues in a more organized and collaborative manner—and potentially address multiple stakeholder challenges with one “tool.”

Strategic intervention for policy mediation. With a mandate built into several homeland security grants to include the public and key stakeholders in the policy development and strategic planning process (Citizen Corps, Urban Area Security Initiative, Homeland Security Grant Program, bioterrorism grants, etc.), the need is evident for short duration, expert policy mediation and facilitation to fulfill time-sensitive local mandates. A model or toolkit could potentially be crafted that would allow locals this governance methodology and be accessed quickly for immediate program development needs.

Direct communication and education through the local networks. Utilizing a directed outreach campaign outlining new collaborative mechanisms to address local government emergency services and homeland security challenges could be very useful to key local personnel.

Partner with key associations and training programs. The emergency services and homeland security field is a diverse group of planners, law enforcement, fire, emergency medical, and public health personnel. Key groups could be identified where a receptive audience could begin addressing collaborate techniques towards implementing complex public safety policy issues. Similarly, professionally recognized certificates and training programs could be accessed through sponsoring organizations to include collaborative governance elements in their requirements.

Some of these ideas could be pursued quickly and others are more long term. In either case, the Institute for Local Government and CSUS/CCP look forward to working with local government partners to begin the development of key new collaborative mechanisms in the pursuit of local public safety.

The outcome of our focus group effort and what it seeks to achieve is two-fold: 1. to define the gaps, problems, and challenges of the emergency/homeland user community at the local level; and, 2. identify potential tools, solutions, or guidance that the can be developed to assist the users deal with these challenges.

The time commitment for the focus group will be one day, 10:00 to 3:00 in Sacramento. Currently, the date of April 12th has been identified as a probable time. We will provide lunch and the meeting will take place at the League of Cities offices. Although travel costs are not included, the possibility for local grant funds (CDC/HRSA/HSGP/UASI, etc.) to be used to travel to the meeting is being investigated.

Terry Amsler, Director of the Institute’s Collaborative Governance Initiative, and I hope you will be able to join us and lend us your expertise and guidance. Please let us know of your ability to participate by replying to this email or telephoning the Center for Collaborative Policy (916.445.2079).

In the coming weeks a more detailed agenda with further logistical information will be forthcoming; additionally, if there are other individuals that you feel would be valuable to this dialogue, please feel free to suggest more participants. I look forward to our work together.

Sincerely,

Electronically transmitted by

Adam Sutkus
Senior Mediator/Facilitator
Homeland Security & Emergency Services Program
(Please also visit <http://www.csus.edu/ccp/> and <http://www.ilsg.org/>)

(Findings were discussed verbally at the workshop.)

Additional Questions for Consideration at the
Focus Group Workshop on Collaborative Possibilities

Numerous observers have pointed to the benefits that derive from more “open,” “adaptive,” “functional” and “networked” approaches to the work of public organizations, including those organizations with responsibilities for emergency management and homeland security. Among the characteristics of these less hierarchical and more networked systems are: flexibility, decentralized control, openness to learning and to “incoming messages,” and organizational forms generated by functions rather than by structures of command and control.

Somewhat along these lines, public officials at many levels have been increasingly exploring the means and methods of involving members of the public in efforts leading to more collaborative public decisions and policy making – and more transparent, adaptive and responsive governance. The **Institute for Local Government** (the nonprofit research arm of the League of California Cities and more recently of the California State Association of Counties) has developed a new **Collaborative Governance Initiative** to support effective civic engagement in public decision-making and to help local officials navigate among the array of public involvement options that bring the public’s voice to the table on important issues.

The Institute is particularly interested in if and how the tools of public participation and engagement can be useful to emergency management and homeland security professionals and others in carrying out successful response and recovery tasks at the local level.

More specifically, we have these three questions:

1. Is there more that can be usefully done to help ensure appropriate participation and feedback from local residents in the planning, coordination and delivery of emergency response-related tasks? This may include input and feedback regarding specific emergency response actions and services, or relating to possible tensions between the need to accomplish tasks while also attempting to maintain information dissemination and community relationships.
2. Would emergency management and homeland security professionals, as well as other appropriate local officials, benefit from more knowledge and skills relating to public engagement options that can help assess needs and more collaboratively plan for post-disaster social and economic recovery and renewal?
3. Are there any special needs for training and models that would ensure the participation of poor and other potentially marginalized groups, including immigrant and refugee communities, in the above two areas?

Ideas and responses by those attending the April 12th meeting would be gratefully received

Appendix D:
Pre-meeting Grant Crosswalk Reference Tool Comparing Collaborative/Public Involvement Requirements

Homeland Security and Emergency Management Grants & Programs: Public Involvement/Stakeholder Interaction Review

Grant or Program	Calls for public involvement?	Calls for multi-stakeholder collaboration?	Calls for a strategic plan?	State or General Items of Note	Local Government Items of Note
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)				<p>Funding for the UASI Program is determined by a formula using a combination of current threat estimates, critical assets within the urban area, and population density. States that contain the selected cities will be notified of their eligibility to apply for this grant. At least 80 percent of all urban area funding provided through the UASI Program must be obligated by the State to the designated urban area within 60 days after the receipt of funds.</p>	<p>The objective is to enhance local emergency, prevention and response agencies' ability to prepare for and respond to threats or incidents of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This program will also enhance selected mass transit authorities' protection of critical infrastructure and emergency preparedness activities. Funds provided under this grant are designed to address the unique needs of large urban areas and mass transit authorities. Funds can be used for equipment, training, exercises and planning. No more than 3 percent of the grant award may be used for management and administrative purposes. Urban areas must submit a valid jurisdictional assessment and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy to ODP, as well as apply online using the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Grants Management System (GMS).</p>
State Homeland Security Grant (SHSG)				<p>The objective of this program is to enhance the capacity of State and local emergency responders to prevent, respond to, and recover from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) devices and cyber attacks.</p>	<p>SHSP funds will be provided to enhance homeland security and emergency operations planning; the purchase of specialized equipment to enhance the capability of State and local agencies to prevent, respond to, and mitigate incidents of terrorism involving the use of CBRNE weapons and cyber attacks; for costs related to the design, development, and conduct of a State CBRNE and cyber security training programs and attendance at CBRNE training courses; for costs related to the design, development, conduct, and evaluation of CBRNE and cyber security exercises; and for costs associated with implementing State Homeland Security Assessments and Strategies (SHSAS). There are no restrictions on allocation across these categories except for a 3 percent cap on management and administrative funds.</p>
Law Enforcement Terrorism Protection Program (LETPP)				<p>States, the District of Columbia, and the Territories of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands. References to "States" include all eligible applicants.</p>	<p>LETPP funds will support law enforcement terrorism prevention activities through planning, organization, training, exercises, and equipment.</p>

**Appendix D:
Pre-meeting Grant Crosswalk Reference Tool Comparing Collaborative/Public Involvement Requirements**

<p style="text-align: center;">Citizen Corps Program (CCP)</p>				<p>States are eligible to apply for the assistance under this program. For purposes of this program and consistent with the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. 5122(4), "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Local governments may receive assistance as subgrantees to the States in which they are located. The term "local government" as used in this program has the meaning set forth in the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. 5122(6), and includes any county, city, village, town, district, or other political subdivision of any State, any Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization, or Alaska Native village or organization, including any rural community or unincorporated town or village or any other public entity</p>	<p>The purpose of Citizen Corps is to supplement and assist State and local efforts to expand Citizen Corps. This includes Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) training, establishing Citizen Corps Councils and supporting the oversight and outreach responsibilities of the councils. The program supports and promotes efforts to involve a wide range of volunteer groups in activities that enhance individual, community, and family preparedness and contribute to the strengthening of homeland security.</p> <p>Citizen Corps funds currently available must be used for activities described in the Citizen Corps guidance materials provided to each State's designated point of contact. Grantees will be expected to develop a jurisdiction-wide strategic plan for the Citizen Corps initiative and to implement the elements of that plan. Of the funding provided for Citizen Corps activities, 75 percent must be passed through by the grantees to local governments. Localities receiving grants may use the funding for Citizen Corps Council organizing activities; for organizing, training, equipping, and maintaining CERTs; for defraying the added expense of liability coverage for CERT participants; and for outreach and public education campaigns to promote Citizen Corps and community and family safety measures, to include printing, marketing, advertising, and special events.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)</p>				<p>MMRS funding is noncompetitive. MMRS funding is distributed equally among all 124 MMRS jurisdictions (see page 54 of the 06 HSGP Guide) not based on population and threat. Currently established MMRS local jurisdictions are the eligible applicants.</p>	<p>The MMRS program funds highly populated jurisdictions (124 through FY 2003) to develop plans, conduct training and exercises, and acquire pharmaceuticals and personal protective equipment, to achieve the enhanced capability necessary to respond to a mass casualty event caused by a WMD with their locally controlled and operated resources, until significant external resources arrive. Key components of the program require activation/notification procedures, a concept of operations plan, the forward movement of patients (coordinated with [using] the National Disaster Medical System), hospital and healthcare system surge capacity management, the provision of specially trained responders and equipment through exercises and drills, public information dissemination, coordination response protocols, a bioterrorism plan including customized pharmaceuticals, and plans for the prophylaxis of an affected population for up to 1,000 chemical victims, and 10,000 biological victims. The grant guidance specifically details what funds may be used for based on deliverable completion.</p>


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Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG)				All States are eligible (including the District of Columbia and territories and possessions of the United States). Local government entities are not eligible to apply directly to DHS.	The objective is to assist the development, maintenance, and improvement of State and local emergency management capabilities, which are key components of a comprehensive national emergency management system for disasters and emergencies that may result from natural disasters or accidental or man-caused events. By combining former program activities into the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG), DHS is providing States the flexibility to allocate funds according to risk and to address the most urgent State and local needs in disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Working within the standard Federal government grant administration process, EMPG provides the support that State and local governments need to achieve measurable results in key functional areas of emergency management: 1.) Laws and Authorities; 2.) Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment; 3.) Hazard Management; 4.) Resource Management; 5.) Planning; 6.) Direction, Control, and Coordination; 7.) Communications and Warning; 8.) Operations and Procedures; 9.) Logistics and Facilities; 10.) Training; 11.) Exercises; 12.) Public Education and Information; and 13.) Finance and Administration. EMPG funds may be used for necessary and essential expenses involved in the development, maintenance, and improvement of State and local emergency management programs. EMPG may be used from time to time as the instrument for delivering Federal assistance for specified program activities subject to terms and conditions.
Centers for Disease Control Bioterrorism program (CDC)				Public Health Departments in all 50 States Territories (USVI, Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, N. Marianas Islands) Freely Associated States of the Pacific (Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau), New York, NY, Los Angeles County, CA, Chicago, IL, District of Columbia	CDC is providing financial assistance to authorized jurisdictions through the Cooperative Agreement on Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism to prepare for and respond to bioterrorism, other outbreaks of infectious diseases, and other public health emergencies. Awardees are required to address seven focus areas (Preparedness Planning and Readiness Assessment, Surveillance and Epidemiology Capacity, Laboratory Capacity for Biological Agents, Laboratory Capacity for Chemical Agents, Health Alert Network/ Communications and Information Technology, Risk Communication and Health Information Dissemination, Education and Training) and smallpox preparedness planning.
Health Resources & Services Administration Hospital Bioterrorism program (HRSA)				Public Health Departments in all 50 States Territories (USVI, Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, N. Marianas Islands) Freely Associated States of the Pacific (Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau) New York, NY, Los Angeles County, CA, Chicago, IL, District of Columbia	Mission: To upgrade the preparedness of the Nation's health care system to respond to bioterrorism, other outbreaks of infectious disease, and other public health threats and emergencies. Awardees are required to address the following priority areas: hospital bed capacity, isolation capacity, health care personnel, hospital-based pharmaceutical caches, mental health services, trauma and burn care capacity, communications and information technology, personal protective and decontamination equipment, emergency medical services, linkages with public health departments, education and training, and preparedness exercises.

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Port Security				Public and private ports, terminals or vessels (commuter or ferries) and state/local govt entities in strategic, controlled or economically significant ports	Port Security Grants to help finance security enhancements at critical national seaports in the areas of security assessments and mitigation strategies, enhanced facility and operational security.
Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP)				Site visits are also conducted by Federal, state and local officials to address vulnerabilities with chemical facilities owners and operators as part of the BZPP. Buffer Zone Protection planning contributes to reducing specific vulnerabilities by developing protective measures that extend from the critical infrastructure site to the surrounding community to deny terrorists an operational environment.	The BZPP is a targeted grant program that provides funding to states to purchase equipment that will enhance security measures around facilities. To date, the Department has received 54 applications for approval of grants allowing the purchase of equipment found on the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness' Approved Equipment List and identified in a facility's Buffer Zone Plan (BZP). The Department works in collaboration with state, local, and tribal entities by providing training workshops, seminars, technical assistance and a common template to standardize the BZP development process.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)				Ensure that the FEMA Regional Director has approved the State Hazard Mitigation Plan and the State's administrative plan for implementing the HMGP.	Coordinate with participating homeowners and businesses that will benefit from the grant to develop the application, and subsequently oversee distribution of grant funds to sub-recipients or contractors.
State and Local Domestic Preparedness Exercise Support				Eligible applicants are public or private organizations with the expertise and experience to provide assistance to State and local jurisdictions; to facilitate, conduct, and evaluate exercises; and/or to develop guidance, materials and publications related to the conduct of exercises or identification of lessons learned.	The objective is to enhance the capacity of State and local first responders to respond to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive devices. Funds will be used to provide support for planning and conducting exercises at the National, State, and local levels.

Appendix E:
Big Picture Graphic



Appendix F:
Workshop Worksheets

Focus Group Workshop on Collaborative Possibilities—Locals and Emergency Management/Homeland Security

- Worksheet #1 -

- From the discussion so far, where do you think the greatest needs/challenges exist??
- Can these gaps be improved or solved through collaborative processes (Public involvement strategies, coordinated stakeholder interaction, etc...)??
- Are there other areas we have not addressed yet that are candidates to improve the policy development and program implementation of EM/HS efforts at the local level??

Please self-select a: Discussion Leader, Scribe, Spokesperson, & Time-keeper

- Worksheet #2 -

- As a group, work through several of the gaps/future vision/possible solutions: How do we make these solutions happen?? What steps need to be taken, what actions??
- Are there specific tools, support mechanisms, or other resources required that would help accomplish the needed solutions??
- Are there specific steps that the Institute for Local Government & Center for Collaborative Policy can take to help respond to these needs??

Please self-select a: Discussion Leader, Scribe, Spokesperson, & Time-keeper