treatment of these ideologies is typically confined today. This is true also of his treatment of leftist in today’s culture and society: briefly and succinctly, but effectively, he brings out the baselessness, and even the nihilism, that lies behind today’s typical leftist thinking. At the same time, he clearly sees the abandoning of traditional morality in some of today’s rightist thinking as well. Similarly, his view of “Indestructible Islam,” in the chapter bearing that title, is clear-sighted with regard to the true facts about Islam today, and his treatment is certainly not calculated to give much comfort to today’s multiculturalists.

“Wretched Aristotle,” the title of the book, is taken from the title of one of the chapters. It was a characterization made by the early Christian writer Tertullian (c.160-c.220), and it has represented a not untypical attitude on the part of those who have opposed the employment of philosophy or Hellenistic learning in Christian apologetics or in attempts to understand a faith believed to have been revealed. The most famous statement of this same Tertullian, of course, was his rhetorical query, “What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem?” Nor has Tertullian been alone in taking this viewpoint down through history. Martin Luther, for example, characterized Aristotle as a “swine,” and considered him an enemy of the faith, a view also encountered in later thinking such as the fideistic and “leap of faith” approach of Soren Kierkegaard.

Dougherty is decidedly not of this viewpoint and, in addition to its other virtues, this volume of his is a model of how faith questions ought to be considered in the light of reason. He is solidly grounded in both the classical and scholastic philosophical traditions, as also in, for example, Cicero and the Stoics. This relatively short and very readable book certainly makes the point, and then some, that “the perennial philosophy,” as applied by this author, is still very much alive, and truly does have much to teach us about our present situation and our future prospects.—Kenneth D. Whitehead, Falls Church, Virginia.

University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008. 288 pp. Cloth: $55.00—Professionals face a fundamental dilemma: fulfilling their various specialized tasks requires a certain degree of insulation from society, but that very insulation fosters public skepticism and distrust. Some respond to this dilemma with efforts to restore public deference to experts; others reject professional authority as nothing but ideology. A more promising response appears in attempts to involve lay publics in certain aspects of professional practice. Albert W. Dzur’s important and insightful book Democratic Professionalism offers a critical reconstruction of this “fragmented but forceful reform movement” within some contemporary professions.

As Dzur notes, political theorists have devoted little attention to the professions. Moreover, most scholars of democratic deliberation have not considered the practical question of which political actors can best promote deliberative norms and institutions. Dzur’s book fills this gap by identifying “a large reservoir of commitment among many professionals to the project of promoting citizen participation and deliberation.” These practitioners see lay participation not as a threat to their professional status or expertise, but as “essential to doing a good job.”

Early sociologists like Durkheim and Parsons viewed professionals as social trustees who provide expertise in the public interest. In return professionals receive various social privileges, including relative freedom from government regulation. Dzur argues that the social trustee ideal rightly emphasizes the importance of professional norms for resisting the commercialization and politicization of professions, but that it neglects questions of politics and democracy. Unfortunately, most critics of the trustee model have not gone beyond debunking it. In a perceptive theoretical chapter—drawing on Tocqueville, Dewey, William Sullivan, and Frank Fischer—Dzur takes ideas from both social trustee professionalism and its critics to articulate a third model that supports “patterns of task sharing, mutual respect, and transparency” between laypeople and professionals. Dzur then presents three case studies of professional reform movements that illustrate elements of democratic professionalism, as well as its limits.

The public journalism movement began in the 1990s as an effort by various local newspapers to increase public trust by organizing deliberative meetings in local settings. The aim has been to better assess and respond to public concerns, rather than just those of elites. Dzur rejects the common accusation that public journalism abandons objectivity, but he identifies a certain naïveté about the unequal power relations that often distort public deliberation. He argues that public journalists should not try to represent “the public” as such, but should facilitate and scrutinize deliberation in various kinds of other institutions.
The restorative justice movement enlists local communities in determining and applying punishments for certain kinds of crimes. It relieves an overburdened criminal justice system of selected tasks, and it addresses the effect of crime on whole communities, rather than only individual victims. Lay community members are often more effective than professionals at monitoring offenders, applying informal sanctions, and reintegrating offenders into their communities. However Dzur argues, contrary to some proponents, that restorative justice efforts have not been a response to public demands for participation, but have been largely top–down efforts. This means there is a long term need for democratic professionals to promote both specific programs and public policies to support them.

Finally, the bioethics movement has “firmly established the role of laypeople—namely, ethics consultants—into one of the most complex, fast-paced, and specialized professional domains.” Dzur’s discussion of bioethics differs somewhat from his other cases, because although bioethicists may be laypeople with respect to medicine, bioethics was founded by professional philosophers and theologians. Dzur writes, “Bioethicists are nonprofessionals who have taken charge, so to speak, of monitoring the normative dimensions of the medical practice.” But if bioethicists are nonprofessionals, it is not in the same sense as the lay citizens in Dzur’s other cases. Indeed, Dzur notes that bioethicists “have become specialists, experts, professionals in their own right,” and he goes on to argue for a view of bioethicists as democratic professionals who facilitate deliberation among (other) laypeople: “the democratic professional ethicist is not to be a proxy decision maker but a guardian of a process that allows people to make their own decisions.”

These case studies demonstrate that democratic professionalism is not utopian, but Dzur acknowledges the practical challenges involved in placing additional demands on overburdened professionals. He shows why democratic professionalism is best understood not as a matter of occasional individual heroism, but as an institutionalized approach to professional ethics and practice. Conceived in this sense, democratic professionalism holds considerable promise for improving relations between laypeople and professionals, and Dzur’s book is an indispensable guide.—Mark B. Brown, California State University, Sacramento.

FISCHER, John Martin. Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. viii + 184 pp. Cloth, $65.00—John Martin Fischer is well-known for his work on free will, the