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Reading Questions #4: The Problem of Evil
Philosophy of Religion
Dr. McCormick
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Reading Questions #4: The Problem of Evil
Philosophy of Religion
1. Leibniz's answer to I. Objection is best summarized as,
A. God did not choose the best in creating this world.
B. This world is actually the best of all possible worlds.
C. If God lacked knowledge, power, or goodness, then that would explain imperfections in this world.
D. It is logically possible that this is the worst of all possible worlds, but probable that it is not.
2. When Leibniz says, "a general of an army will prefer a great victory with a slight wound to a condition without wound and without victory," he is arguing that,
A. Evil proves God's perfection.
B. Evil disproves God's perfection.
C. A world with evil might be better than a world without.
D. Sometimes, the only way to achieve a greater good is by means of a lesser evil.
3. When Leibniz says, "There are certain disorders in the parts which marvelously enhance the beauty of the whole," he is elaborating on which point?
A. Sin arises from our own limitations and is not God's fault.
B. The beauty of creation depends upon our resisting sin.
C. Even the best plan could not contain more good, and it could not be exempt from evil.
D. Disorder enhances beauty, but sin does not.
4. When Hick says, "human goodness is slowly built up through personal histories of moral effort [that] has a value in the eyes of the Creator which justifies even the long travail of the soul-making process," he is arguing that:
A. suffering builds up despite increasing moral effort by humans.
B. there is value in suffering.
C. suffering produces moral struggle and growth which make the suffering worth it.
D. we cannot fathom the reasons behind the travails that build souls.
E. humanity can only achieve moral virtue through prolonged suffering.
5. When Hick says, "one who has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering temptations, and thus by rightly making responsible choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one created ab initio in a state either or innocence or of virtue," he is arguing that,
A. Given the choice between working for one's goodness, being created as innocent, or being created as virtuous, you should prefer to work for it.
B. God prefers to make us overcome temptations and difficult challenges to earn our goodness.
C. The state of a person who masters temptation to become good is better than becoming good any other way.
D. The traditional problem of evil doesn't work because Christians never thought that God's goal was to make life a comfortable paradise.
6. In Hick, What is the mistaken "conception of divine purpose," that "anti-theistic writers almost invariably assume?"
A. that humans are not God's pets.
B. that God's intent is to punish us to make us suffer.
C. that the purpose of travail and suffering is to build up moral character and virtue in humanity.
D. that an all loving, powerful, and knowing God must create a hedonistic paradise for humanity.
7. Which of these might lead God to tolerate the existence of an evil, according to Rowe?
A. An equal or greater good.
B. An equal or lesser evil.
C. A lesser evil.
D. A greater good, or avoiding another greater evil.
E. An equal or greater evil.
8. From his argument in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” it would appear that Rowe is:
A. an unfriendly atheist.
B. a theist.
C. an agnostic.
D. a friendly agnostic.
E. a friendly atheist.
9. In “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” Rowe says, "An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse." Which of these follows from his claim:
A. If there is an instance of intense suffering and it cannot be eliminated without also eliminating a greater good, or allowing an equal or worse evil, then an omniscient, wholly good being will not eliminate it.
B. If there is an instance of intense suffering and it cannot be eliminated without also eliminating a greater good, or allowing an equal or worse evil, then an omniscient, wholly good being will eliminate it.
C. Omniscient, wholly good beings never eliminate any evil unless there's a greater good to be had from it.
D. Omniscient, wholly good beings always eliminate necessary evils.
10. Rowe's example of a trapped, horribly burned fawn in a forest fire (in both articles) shows that,
A. Even non-human creatures are capable of horrible suffering.
B. In some cases, the reasons for suffering are impossible to see.
C. There are instances of evil that cannot be prevented without creating a greater evil.
D. There are instances of evil that are pointless and preventable.
E. There are instances of pointless evil that could have been prevented without losing a greater good, or permitted an equally bad or worse evil.
11. When Rowe applies the “G.E. Moore shift” to the argument for atheism (in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism”) an argument for what conclusion results:
A. God exists.
B. There are evils that appear to be pointless but they, in fact, serve a greater good or avoid a worse evil.
C. There are evils that God tolerates for the sake of a greater good or to avert an equivalent or worse evil.
D. There are no instances of pointless evil in the world.
E. The skeptic’s principles must be incorrect.
12. In “Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil,” which of these claims would the skeptical theist, as Rowe characterizes them, agree with:
A. We would expect God to produce some tangible goods in the world.
B. We would expect that an all knowing God would permit some suffering that serves some understandable good in the world.
C. That we cannot conceive of any good that some instance of suffering serves implies that there isn’t one.
D. That we cannot conceive of any good that some instance of suffering serves is exactly what we would expect to find if there were an omni-God.
13. In “Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil,” what’s the difference between restricted standard theism and expanded standard theism?
A. The restricted thesis is only that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent being exists. And the expanded view is that that being is God.
B. The restricted thesis is that an omnipotent being exists. The expanded view is that the being is omniscient and omnibenevolent too.
C. The expanded view of God includes theses beyond the claim that God exists.
D. The restricted view is that an OG exists, the expanded view is that the God of Christianity exists.
14. Consider this claim: “If there is an OG, then the characterization of God in the New Testament is true.” From “Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil,” how should we characterize Rowe’s and Wykstra’s view of the claim:
A. They both argue that it is correct, but for different reasons.
B. Rowe argues that it is correct, but Wykstra disagrees.
C. Rowe does not accept the claim, but Wykstra does.
D. Rowe argues that the New Testament God could possibly exist, but an OG does not. Wykstra argues that an OG God could possibly exist, but the New Testament one does not.
15. What does parenting have to do with this sentence, as Rowe sees it: “if there were a God he would wish to provide us with strong reasons to think that he exists, given that the horrendous evils in our world, both natural and moral, seem to provide us with reason to doubt his existence.”
A. Good parents allow their children to suffer some in order to build moral character and to growth intellectually.
B. Good parents make the best efforts to insure that their children understand the point of necessary suffering.
C. Good parenting requires permitting some suffering that is beyond comprehension.
D. Good parents seek to eliminate all suffering for their children.