Land Use Management in Costa Rica: A Proposition for Change in the Pagos por Servicios Ambientales Program Structure
(CSU, Fullerton)
Mixed methods research in a community conservation program in Costa Rica and literature review were used to access the interaction between conservation incentives (Pagos por Servicios Ambientales) and the land-use of landowners in Limòn, Costa Rica. The results of this pilot study allowed me to construct a hypothesis of stakeholder tradeoffs, consistent with the predictions of both evolutionary theory and developmental psychology models, such as Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. I argue that due to several flaws in the structure of the Pagos por Servicios Ambientales program, conservation land-use is yet to be maximized. If future studies support my proposition for the restructuring of the PSA program, then conservation land-use in Costa Rica may be maximized, and forest fragmentation reduced, while simulatiously providing higher payments to poorer land owners, at no additional cost to the government or conservation NGO’s.
This restructuring would be accomplished by changing the payment structure of the PSA to a sliding scale system. This system would provide much higher financial payment per hectare for small amounts of land, the first 1–10 hectares, per say, and decrease for the next 11–50, 51–100, etc; however, as the price per hectare decreases, prestige based awards, and regional or national recognition, could be granted, as a more appropriate incentive for wealthier landowners, who I argue pursue conservation land-use for reasons other than minimal financial rewards currently offered.