POWER AT THE POLLS:
ELECTION-DAY AND SAME-DAY VOTER REGISTRATION LAWS AND YOUTH
VOTER TURNOUT IN U.S. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS


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ELECTION-DAY AND SAME-DAY VOTER REGISTRATION LAWS AND YOUTH
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A Thesis


by


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Abstract

of

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*Statement of Problem*
*Youth voter turnout is typically low in U.S. elections. Lowering registration barriers is one method of increasing voter turnout. Many states have begun to implement voter registration requirements that allow qualified citizens to register and vote on the same day, typically on Election Day. While we know something about the impact of these measures generally, it has been less clear how they affect young voters specifically.*

*Data and Methodology*
*This analysis focuses on the effect of Election-Day (EDR) and Same-Day (SDR) voter registration laws on youth voter turnout in the 2006 Congressional Election using voter data from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. I conducted a crosstabulation and a multivariate logistic regression in order to analyze the effects of living in an EDR or SDR state on voter turnout across age groups while controlling for other variables.*

*Conclusions and Implications*
*My analysis shows that young individuals are more likely to vote in EDR and SDR states, however, these states have lower overall voter turnout. While my model includes individual-level variables that have been shown to influence voter turnout, other factors may also explain these results. According to my analysis, states with low youth voter turnout may consider adopting EDR or SDR laws in order to increase youth political participation and influence on elected representatives.*

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_____
Date

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Youth voters in the United States traditionally have low voter turnout in presidential and congressional elections. However, over the last two presidential elections, the number of youth voters has increased significantly, drawing national attention to this voting group and their impact on elections. Reducing barriers to registration and voting has long been a goal of election reform campaigns that aim to increase voter turnout. With the recent attention given to the youth electorate, these types of reforms could prove especially significant for certain voter demographics.

Election-day registration (EDR) is one form of election reform that has been slowly spreading across the United States over the last 20 years. Election-day registration allows an eligible voter to register and vote on Election Day. The purpose of election-day registration is to reduce the barriers to voter registration by streamlining the registration and voting process so voters can both register and vote in one process, or with one trip to the polls. This reduces the time and effort usually required to register prior to Election Day. Most states currently have registration deadlines in order to allow sufficient time to process new registrants and confirm voter eligibility prior to Election Day. Many states are opposed to election-day registration due to increased administrative tasks on Election Day and the higher possibility of voter fraud. A similar form of election reform is same-day registration (SDR), which allows an eligible voter to register and vote on the same day prior to Election Day, but not on Election Day.

This type of registration has similar benefits to election-day registration, where the registration and voting process is streamlined to allow voters to complete both processes at the same time, thereby reducing time and effort costs.

The purpose of my analysis is to determine whether or not EDR/SDR laws have an impact on youth voters. I will use a multivariate logistic regression in order to isolate the effects of EDR/SDR laws on youth voters while holding other possible determinants constant. Based on prior research, other possible determinants of youth voter turnout include voter demographic and other individual characteristics as well as state characteristics, all of which will be included as independent variables in my analysis. The results of my analysis will help determine whether or not this type of political reform is a useful tool for increasing turnout among the younger electorate. My analysis will also provide a unique look at congressional elections, as prior research primarily focuses on the effects of registration reform on presidential elections.

Prior research indicates that election laws aimed at reducing barriers to registration, such as election-day registration, increase voter turnout, especially among the youth and residentially mobile individuals. Prior research also indicates that these effects are greatest amongst individuals with some political interest, but not those with extremely high or low political interest, since the likelihood that these extreme groups would vote is not significantly impacted by EDR laws.

For the purpose of this study, youth voters include individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. I chose this age range as the youth voter electorate because

eighteen is the youngest voting age for all states and twenty-five falls between the ranges used in prior research to cut-off "youth" voters from the rest of the electorate. The age cutoff for youth voters in prior research ranges from twenty-four to twenty-nine years old. I also chose twenty-five as the oldest age for youth voters because this is the age range used by the U.S. Census Bureau for Current Population Survey data tables and reports, which is commonly used for election and voter data analysis.

My analysis uses registration laws as a determinant of voter turnout and not voter registration because prior research indicates that the majority of registered voters actually vote in elections, which would make it difficult to differentiate between the registered voters that vote and registered voters that do not vote. According to Erikson's (1981) analysis of individuals that register to vote and individuals that vote among the registered, independent variables cannot discriminate very well between those that voted and those that did not vote among the registered. Individuals that traditionally have low voter turnout actually had very high turnout rates among the registered (Erikson, 1981).

One limitation of this analysis is the focus on congressional elections compared to presidential elections. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found a high correlation between age and turnout in congressional elections, where youth are less likely to vote in congressional elections compared to presidential elections. This may limit the effect of EDR/SDR on youth voters because youth are less likely to vote in congressional elections. Fenster's (1994) analysis of presidential and congressional elections in states

before and after implementation of EDR found no improvement in national turnout

ranking for congressional elections, but did find overall increases in turnout.

Another limitation is that this analysis is not a time-series analysis because the

dataset only covers one congressional election. The lack of analysis over a period of

time does not account for changes in voter turnout rates before and after EDR/SDR

implementation. If EDR/SDR states have a history of high youth voter turnout prior to

EDR/SDR implementation compared to non-EDR/SDR states, then the effect of

EDR/SDR status on youth voter turnout may not be due to implementation of

EDR/SDR laws, but rather other state characteristics that the EDR/SDR states have in

common.

Chapter 2

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The youth vote has gained significant attention over the last few presidential elections as the size of the youth electorate and youth voter turnout have increased substantially. According to a *Rock the Vote* (2008) factsheet, 4.3 million more 18-29 year old voters turned out in the 2004 presidential election compared to the 2000 election. Based on exit poll data, the number of 18-29 year olds that voted in primaries and caucuses in 2008 is 103% more than in the previous set of primary elections (Rock the Vote, 2008). Eighteen to twenty-nine year olds also made up a larger share of the vote of both Republicans and Democrats (Rock the Vote, 2008).

Youth voter turnout is even lower for congressional elections than presidential elections.  Between 1966 and 1998, youth voter turnout in congressional elections continually dropped with 31.1% of U.S. citizens ages 18-24 years voting in the 1966 election and only 16.7% voting in the 1998 election (U.S. Census Bureau). Turnout has only recently risen slightly over the last two congressional elections to 19.9% in the 2006 election (U.S. Census Bureau). Youth voters have historically had the lowest turnout rates for congressional elections. Even though overall turnout is lower for congressional elections than presidential elections, same-day and election-day registration implementation could also significantly affect voter equality in congressional election years.

As the reputation of eligible youth voters throughout the country increases as a major electorate group, states have an interest in boosting youth voter turnout in order to increase voter equality by age. Increasing voter equality by age not only ensures equal political participation across all age groups, thus securing equal representation and democratic values, but also ensures the youth have a strong voice in shaping the policies that will affect their future. While many states have introduced a variety of voting reform measures and youth voter outreach in order to boost turnout, only ten states have adopted same-day or election-day registration laws, mainly due to the possibility of increased voter fraud and insufficient resources to handle increased voter traffic on Election Day.

Most states in the U.S. require voter registration a specified number of days prior to the election in order to be eligible to vote. However, due to historically low voter turnout, especially among certain voting groups, some states have implemented same-day registration or election-day registration in order to reduce barriers to voting and increase turnout rates. The Election-day voter registration (EDR) allows an eligible voter to register and vote on Election Day. Same-day voter registration (SDR) allows an eligible voter to register and vote on the same day within a specified number of days before Election Day. There are nine states that have election-day voter registration: Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Iowa, Montana, Rhode Island and Wyoming. Rhode Island only allows EDR for primary and presidential elections, not congressional elections. North Carolina is the only state that has SDR but not EDR. North Carolina has a registration deadline, however, eligible residents are allowed to

register and vote on the same day within a specified time period after the registration

deadline and before Election Day (North Carolina State Board of Elections, n.d.). North

Dakota does not require voter registration and allows early voting up to 40 days prior to

Election Day in addition to voting on Election Day (North Dakota Secretary of State,

n.d.). Voter eligibility in North Dakota requires U.S. citizenship, 18 years of age on

Election Day, a legal North Dakota resident and residency within the precinct for at

least 30 days prior to the election (North Dakota Secretary of State, n.d.).

Three states only recently adopted EDR before the 2008 presidential election:

Iowa, Montana and Rhode Island. The other six states allowed EDR prior to 2006.

SDR and EDR states have different voter eligibility and identification

requirements as well as different registration deadlines before Election Day. Table 1 in

Appendix A illustrates the differences in voter registration requirements, eligibility and

deadlines in all EDR and SDR states. Most states with EDR have a registration deadline

prior to Election Day. Maine does not have an in-person voter registration deadline.

Maine voters may register any day up to and on Election Day, except if registering by

mail (Bureau of Corporations, Elections & Commissions, n.d.). Maine has also

undertaken an early voting pilot program that allows in-person voting before Election

Day in the same manner as voting on Election Day (Department of the Secretary of

State, 2008).

EDR and SDR are not widely accepted election reform measures. Arguments in

the voter guide against an EDR measure on California's 2002 General Election ballot

claimed that it would be nearly impossible to detect voter fraud and prosecute those offenders because EDR ballots would be mixed in with all other ballots on Election Day, making it extremely difficult to confirm eligibility and overturn elections won by fraudulent ballots (California Secretary of State, 2002). Opponents of the measure also criticized the lack of voter identification required to register on Election Day (California Secretary of State, 2002). These arguments were based on the high number of illegal immigrants in California and the ease of registering and voting on Election Day for these groups of people (Personal Communication with Andrew Acosta, March 3, 2009). California is also less urban and more rural than most current EDR states and therefore may require additional security provisions (Brians & Grofman, 2001).

Arguments against registration reform also focus on the political effects of increasing turnout, such as which groups would benefit the most and how that would change public policy. For example, Wolfinger & Rosenstone (1980) point out some of the political arguments made against President Carter's election day registration plan. Opponents argued that this type of registration reform would increase turnout among the poor, less educated and less informed, which would result in a move towards increased welfare policies (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Opponents also argue that increased turnout among these types of groups would benefit the Democratic Party (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980).

Chapter 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a substantial body of prior research that focuses on state voter registration laws and voter turnout and a few analyses that specifically focus on election-day registration laws. All of the research that focuses on registration laws points to a significant correlation between voter registration deadlines and voter turnout, where registration deadlines closer to Election Day and the implementation of EDR or SDR increase voter turnout. Prior research also indicates that registration laws that decrease the cost of voting significantly increase voter turnout among the young. Research on voter registration deadlines and EDR laws dates back over 20 years ago; therefore some of the studies that specifically focus on states with EDR laws only include those states that had adopted EDR at the time. None of the prior research includes all states with EDR or SDR as of the present day because several states just recently implemented EDR laws as of 2008.

The bulk of the literature is written by some of the same authors, individually and as joint research projects and most of the research within this discipline reference these authors in their literature reviews. These authors include Raymond E. Wolfinger, Steven J. Rosenstone, and Benjamin Highton. Wolfinger and Rosenstone seemed to set the standard for multivariate analysis on voter turnout in the United States, including registration laws and particular voting demographics, such as the youth and residentially

mobile. Wolfinger and Rosenstone are also among the few researchers that included congressional elections in their analysis.

The majority of literature suggests that registration deadlines closer to Election Day increases overall voter turnout (Brians & Grofman, 2001; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Election-day registration also increases overall voter turnout (Brians & Grofman, 2001; Knack & White, 2000; Highton, 1997; Fenster, 1994). The main premise behind making voter registration deadlines closer to Election Day or instituting EDR is that these types of measures reduce registration costs and therefore increase voter turnout.

Brians and Grofman (2001) used Current Population Survey data to analyze the affect of election-day registration on turnout and found that EDR increases voter turnout by 7 percent in an average state. Knack and White (2000) found that EDR adoption increases turnout among the youth and residentially mobile voters. Knack and White analyzed change in turnout among three states that adopted EDR between 1990 and 1994, Knack and White found that turnout equality by age and income were very low prior to adoption of EDR, but rose dramatically in state rankings 1994 (2000). By looking at state rankings and change in turnout, Knack and White accounted for states with already high turnout rates compared to other states prior to EDR adoption, in which case high turnout rates after EDR adoption would not necessarily be a condition of adopting EDR. States that adopted EDR between 1992 and 1996 showed lower increases in turnout compared to the 1994 group, except by age (Knack & White, 2000).

Knack and White attributed this to the passage of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) of 1993. According to Knack and White, "In 1990, the relative turnout of the young and movers was far lower in the new EDR states than in the 40-state group. After implementing EDR, these gaps reversed in 1994, favoring the new EDR states" (p. 36). These results suggest that EDR increased turnout among the youth and residentially mobile in states where these groups had traditionally low turnout.

Most research indicates a positive correlation between election registration deadlines and voter turnout, where the closer the registration deadline is to Election Day, the higher the turnout. Brians and Grofman's analysis compared the change in voter turnout before and after changes in registration laws in order to account for preexisting conditions that may affect voter turnout in addition to changes in the registration laws (2001). Their analysis showed that a reduction in the number of days to register before an election increased the probability of voting (2001). Brians and Grofman (2001) also found that "EDR exerts a strong and positive influence on turnout" (p. 175). EDR adoption has a stronger effect on turnout than does registration deadlines closer to Election Day (Brians & Grofman, 2001). However, Brians and Grofman also recognized that EDR states had higher than average turnout before implementing EDR and were typically rural, small-population states. They suggested that EDR may affect states with traditionally below average turnout, more urban and with higher populations differently (2001).

Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) used the Census Bureau's 1972 voting data to analyze the effect of different registration requirements among states, including the registration closing date. Their analysis found four different registration provisions that impacted voter turnout. These were closing date, regular hours for registration offices, requiring offices to be open in the evening and/or on Saturdays, and the availability of absentee registration (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Registration closing date had the largest impact on turnout compared to the other three provisions (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Based on this analysis, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) concluded that, "if one could register until election day itself, when media coverage is widest and interest is greatest, turnout would increase by about 6.1 percentage points" (p. 78).

Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) acknowledged that as the costs and difficulty of voting decrease, the likelihood of voting increases. They stipulated that these costs decrease closer to Election Day because election information is easier to obtain when campaign publicity is at its highest (1980). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) also concluded that turnout is higher in presidential elections compared to congressional elections because information is cheaper.

Just as access to information can affect voter turnout, other variables may affect turnout depending on how critical the resource is to voter participation (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). According to this premise, voter registration deadlines may only affect voter turnout if access and ease of registration is a critical resource. Even if registration costs are reduced by shortening voter registration deadlines or adopting

EDR, there are other variables that may influence voter participation. Assuming that voters face multiple barriers to voting, some barriers other than voter registration may have high costs that exceed the benefits of voting (Brians & Grofman, 2001). Even though EDR may reduce the costs of voting, EDR may not reduce the costs enough to make the benefits of voting greater than the costs due to the impact of additional barriers to voting.

Changes in voting costs and benefits minimally affect voters at the extreme ends of likelihood of voting. Those who are already very likely to vote and those who are already unlikely to vote are less impacted by changes in the costs and benefits (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980; Highton, 2004). This finding demonstrates that the affect of particular variables on voters is not the same for all types of people (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). According to Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), "As the probability of voting increases, the marginal effect on turnout of additional benefits, costs, or resources also begins to increase…When a person is more than 50 percent likely to vote, the effect of additional benefits, costs or resources on the probability of voting begins to decrease" (pgs. 9-10). The effects of changes in the costs of voting, such as registration laws, can be expected to have a greater influence on voters in the middle of the likelihood of voting spectrum. Individuals who do not register because they are not interested in voting are not likely to vote even when registration barriers are eliminated (Highton, 1997).

Most prior analysis of voter registration and turnout uses similar independent variables, including education, occupation, income, age, mobility, race and marital status.    Some of these variables are also correlated with one another. For example, individuals with larger incomes are likely to also have higher levels of education. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) used a probit analysis in order to isolate the effect of any single independent variable on voting, the dependent variable. Education is usually found to have the strongest correlation to voting, where the higher the level of education achieved, the more likely an individual is to vote (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found "38 percent of respondents with fewer than five years of school went to the polls, as compared with 69 percent of those who stopped with a high school diploma, 86 percent of college graduates and 91 percent of people with at least a year of graduate school" (pgs. 17-18). However, Knack and White (2000) found that EDR does not increase voter equality by education level, which suggests EDR has less effect on voters with education levels different from the average education level of the overall voting electorate. Even though Highton (1997) found that education and turnout have a stronger positive correlation in non-EDR states, Knack and White (2000) pointed out that "less than one-third of the effects of education go away when EDR is held constant, indicating that a strong educational bias would remain in the American electorate even if EDR were the rule in all states" (p. 32). Brians and Grofman (2001) found a significant association between the demographic variables age, education, income, employment, marital status, race (black) and female gender, and higher turnout.

Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) also found a positive correlation between age and voting. When all other demographic variables are held constant, aging increases turnout (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found that "people aged eighteen to twenty-four are about 28 percent less likely to vote than fifty-five-year-olds" (p. 50). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) also noted that the relationship between age and turnout is even stronger during midterm elections than presidential elections, where youth are less likely to vote in congressional elections than presidential elections.

Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) pointed out a strong relationship between youth and mobility. At age 18, the first year an individual is allowed to vote, is also the typical age of high school graduation. At this age, individuals may likely relocate due to a new job or to begin college. Youth may also experience higher mobility rates due to changing careers and are probably less likely to have family and community connections, which are strong motivating factors that keep people in the same location. Between 1972 and 1974, "nearly 60 percent of people under the age of thirty-two had moved," compared to "39 percent of those thirty-two to thirty-six, 19 percent of people aged thirty-seven to sixty-nine, and just 14 percent of those older than sixty-nine" (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980, p. 51). Since changing residence has a negative effect on the probability of voting, highly mobile youth may be less likely to vote due to the registration costs of relocating (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980; Highton & Wolfinger, 1998). According to Highton and Wolfinger (1998), "In 1992, less than 40% of Americans aged 23 to 27 had lived at the same address for over two years" (p. 81).

Midterm election years may experience lower turnout from those who have moved since the last election since midterm elections do not provide as much stimulus that encourages registration (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980).

Knack and White (2000) found that EDR increased turnout among both the youth and the mobile in the 1994 election. Knack and White (2000) looked at the change in turnout among three states that adopted EDR prior to the 1994 election: Idaho, New Hampshire and Wyoming. Since all three states showed an increase in turnout among the youth and mobile, this ruled out the possibility that these increases were attributable to particular policy items on any state's ballot that may have been especially significant to the young and mobile (Knack & White, 2000). Highton (1997) found that the turnout differences among the residentially mobile and the less mobile were greater in non-EDR states compared to EDR states (including North Dakota). However, Highton (1997) also found that there was no difference in turnout between renters and owners in EDR and non-EDR states, which shows that renters may have lower turnout than owners due to reasons other than registration barriers, such as weaker community connections.

Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found higher turnout among college students than non-students with the same level of education. They explained this finding as the result of lower registration costs for students. Students have greater access to political information and higher accessibility to registration and voting. "Among people eighteen to twenty-four years old, students vote at a much higher rate than nonstudents"

(p. 56). These findings suggest lowering registration costs among the youth may increase voter turnout among this age group.

Prior research identifies some of the arguments against voter registration reform efforts intended to increase voter turnout. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) discussed the arguments made against President Carter's election day registration plan, which claimed this type of reform would benefit the Democratic Party because turnout would be highest among the poor, less-educated and less-informed and would also lead to expanded welfare policies. However, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found that if turnout had increased in the 1972 election due to the implementation of registration provisions that made registration easier, the expanded voting population would be very similar to the actual voters. They found that the hypothetical voters in the 1972 election would have virtually identical partisan characteristics as the actual voters. Brians and Grofman's (2001) analysis of the effect of EDR on turnout also concluded that EDR's ability to increase turnout would have a modest affect on the composition of the voting electorate and no effect on partisan makeup. However, Knack and White (2000) found that youth voter turnout in Republican-leaning states was less extensive compared to other states. Knack and White (2000) also argued that since EDR proved to increase turnout among the youth and mobile, who are less left-leaning than the poor and less educated, arguments that EDR would benefit Democrats and liberals is not substantiated by their research.

Highton and Wolfinger (1998) analyzed the effects of some of the provisions of the NVRA of 1993 on voter turnout. One of the provisions of the NVRA is the motor voter program, which requires states to include voter registration applications in conjunction with vehicle license applications (Highton & Wolfinger, 1998). In order to eliminate state-specific factors that may affect turnout in states with motor voter programs, Highton and Wolfinger (1998) used election-day registration to simulate the effect of the NVRA motor voter program. They argued that EDR has the same effect as motor voter programs because they both eliminate the cost of registering by providing a "one-step process" (p. 85). The motor voter program provides individuals the opportunity to register while completing another task he/she was going to have to do anyways, which is applying for a driver's license (Highton & Wolfinger, 1998). Since the majority of individuals have to apply or renew their driver's license at some point, registering at the same time does not add any cost (Highton & Wolfinger, 1998). Highton (1997) argued that "By linking registration to an activity that over 90% of all potential voters already engage in, registration costs for people throughout the country will be significantly reduced," which would create a registration context similar to EDR states (p. 573). According to Highton (1997), registration requirements do not explain the socioeconomic inequality among voters and those with higher socioeconomic status will continue to have higher turnout, even with the provisions of the NVRA.

However, Highton and Wolfinger (1998) pointed out that the simulation may overestimate the effects of motor voter on turnout because the analysis includes residents that do not have a driver's license and license holders that either have not

renewed their licenses or failed to report a change of address. Highton and Wolfinger (1998) also pointed out that the simulation may underestimate the effect because motor voter registrants appear on registration lists during the campaign and are targets for campaign and election materials, which increases the likelihood of voting.

Even though Highton and Wolfinger (1998) pointed out these possible weaknesses in the simulation, it is possible these considerations do not make EDR an appropriate variable in place of motor voter. The overestimation effects of motor voter may be greater than the underestimation effects and could therefore produce skewed results that are not comparable to the actual effects of motor voter. If a significant number of people do not apply for a driver's license, renew their license or change their registration address, then the overestimation may be significant.

Erikson (1981) separated citizens who registered to vote and those who actually voted. He stipulated that this separation was necessary in order to distinguish predictors of registration from predictors of voting (1981). Erikson (1981) argued that decreasing registration barriers would only produce an increase in voter turnout if those who are unlikely to register actually end up voting once registered; otherwise, these individuals may register and still not end up voting. Yet Erikson (1981) also pointed out that turnout is extremely high among the registered. His analysis of the 1964 SRC election survey focused on the characteristics of registered individuals who voted as opposed to registered individuals who did not vote. He concluded that among the 95.7% of the

registrants that voted, the typical non-voting groups – independents, the young and the less educated – actually voted above 90% if they were registered.

Overall, the literature covers a wide variety of possible relationships between individual and state characteristics and registration and voter turnout. Even though the exact methodologies slightly differ across analyses, the basic conclusions are somewhat similar. Most researchers conclude that easing registration laws has a positive impact on voter turnout. However, due to the timeframe when the research was conducted, none of the research includes all EDR/SDR states to-date. This timing issue also limits the effects of NVRA and EDR/SDR implementation on voter registration and turnout. Some of the research was conducted so close to the passage of new registration reform laws that these laws may not have yet taken full effect on the public to significantly impact the results. In addition, prior research does not use datasets that include both respondents from every state and a variable that captures length of residence.  My own study aims to address these problems, thereby proving a more complete picture of the potential effects of EDD/SDR on turnout among younger voters.

Chapter 4

METHODOLOGY

Objective

My central question is, "do election-day and same-day registration laws affect youth voter turnout?" According to prior research, election-day registration has a positive impact on youth voter turnout, where the implementation of election-day registration increases youth voter turnout. An analysis of the effects of election-day and same-day registration laws on youth voter turnout could provide a better understanding of the barriers to youth voting and highlight possible solutions to increase turnout among this group, which has traditionally been a low turnout group. Reducing registration barriers and increasing voter turnout translates into greater political representation, which means this group of voters is more likely to benefit from the policies created by elected officials. Since voting is the primary tool for individual political activism in order to ensure representation, groups that are not likely to vote may have less political representation. By identifying barriers to registration, researchers and political activist groups that encourage political involvement can begin to focus on policies that increase voter turnout among groups lacking political representation.

Method of Analysis

I first conducted a simple crosstabulation with the vote variable (*vote_new2*) and the *EDR* variable and controlled for age with the *Age_Young* variable. This provided a preliminary analysis of the relationship between voting and EDR status for young individuals compared to older individuals. Next, I conducted a multivariate logistic regression analysis in order to isolate the effect of election-day and same-day voter registration laws on youth voter turnout. A regression analysis provides the opportunity to test whether or not living in a state with election-day or same-day registration increases the probability that individuals between eighteen and twenty-five years old will vote. A multivariate regression analysis also allows me to eliminate the effects of other variables that may explain youth voter turnout.

<div align="center">Data</div>

I chose the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) because it included a sample representative of every state in the U.S. and a mobility variable that measured length of time at residence. Either one or both of these factors were not included in other voting behavior data sets.

The CCES pooled thirty-seven surveys from thirty-six separate research teams across the country. The individual research team developed and controlled half of each survey and the other half consisted of common content in order to measure political attitudes and behaviors at the state and congressional district level. There were three separate surveys distributed: a Profile Survey conducted in August, 2006; a Pre Election

Survey conducted in October, 2006; and a Post Election Survey conducted 2 weeks after the November, 2006 General Election.

The CCES sample is a stratified national sample of 36,500 adults. There are three types of strata in the sample: Registered and Unregistered Voters, State Size, and Competitive and Uncompetitive Congressional Districts. Stratifying registered and unregistered voters accounts for the tendency of over reporting in voting behavior surveys. Stratifying on state size ensures an adequate sample size from small population states. Stratification of competitive and uncompetitive congressional districts ensures an adequate number of districts with politically active fall campaigns. CCES employed sample matching, which entailed randomly selecting a pool of respondents from the target population and then selecting one or more matching members for each member of the target sample. The matching method provides an available respondent that is as similar as possible to the target sample and thus, representative of the target population.

<div align="center">Variables</div>

My dependent variable, *vote2006*, is a dummy variable that I created from the original CCES dataset variable *v4004* in order to identify those individuals that voted in the 2006 election. This variable is necessary in order to determine whether or not implementing EDR or SDR as state policy affects turnout among the youth holding all other variables constant. Table 2 in Appendix 1 includes a description of all dependent and independent variables.

A frequency distribution of the *v4004* variable showed 29,353 responses to the question, "Did you vote in the 2006 congressional election?" Of these respondents, 26,142 individuals answered "yes", 3,127 individuals answered "no", 84 answered "don't know" and there were 7,068 missing cases. Of all individuals that answered the question, 89.1% answered "yes" to the question, which shows a very high number of respondents voted. This percentage is much higher than voter turnout in most congressional elections. Reported voter turnout is usually much higher than actual voter turnout in the United States (Ansolabehere & Hersh, 2008). In order to correct misreporting and study the reasons for these discrepancies, the CCES researchers created a validated vote variable that checks respondents' answers with official election records (Ansolabehere & Hersh, 2008). However, the validated vote variable does not include every state, therefore, I combined "don't know" respondents and missing cases into the "no" category in order to create a sample of voters more representative of actual voter turnout. This resulted in 71.8% of all individuals with a "yes" response to the vote question, which is a more realistic statistical representation of typical voter turnout in congressional elections.

My independent variables include individual characteristics and state characteristics. Demographic variables include age, sex, education level, marital status, length of residence, ethnicity, party ID and household income. State variables include EDR/SDR status and state identifiers. These state variables will account for any state-specific characteristics that may explain youth voter turnout in EDR/SDR states compared to non-EDR/SDR states. The District of Columbia (DC) is not included in the analysis

because DC does not hold congressional elections. I included age as an independent

variable in order to isolate the effect of EDR and SDR laws on turnout by age group.

Length of residence is also an essential independent variable since prior research

indicated that residential mobility and age are highly correlated. Length of residence

must be held constant in order to make sure any perceived effects of EDR or SDR on

youth voter turnout are not also explained by the effect of length of residence. In

addition to Wolfinger and Rosenstone's (1980) conclusion that youth and mobility are

highly correlated, Knack and White (2000) and Highton (2007) found that EDR

increased turnout among the youth and the residentially mobile.

Prior research indicated that all of these independent variables have an impact on

voter turnout. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found a strong correlation between

education and income, but holding all other independent variables constant, education

had the strongest correlation to voting. Brians and Grofman (2001) found that age,

education, income, employment, marital status, race (black) and female gender are

significantly associated to higher turnout. Prior research also indicated that individuals

with very little political interest or extremely high political interest – both ends of the

political interest spectrum – are less likely to be effected by EDR (Wolfinger &

Rosenstone, 1980; Highton, 2007). I ran a frequency on the political interest variable

and found that the majority of respondents fall under the extreme ends of political

interest, with only about twenty percent of respondents representing the middle of the

political interest spectrum. I did not include the political interest variable in my analysis

because the majority of respondents fall at the extreme ends, which based on prior research, suggests that these respondents are already likely to vote.

I created a dummy variable, *EDR*, to identify all states that have either EDR or SDR, which includes Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Iowa, Montana, Wyoming and North Carolina. For this variable, all of these states have a value of 1 and all other states have a value of zero. Rhode Island is not coded as an EDR state in my analysis because it only allows EDR for primary and presidential elections and not congressional elections. I also did not include North Dakota with the EDR/SDR states because North Dakota does not require voter registration. For the purpose of this analysis, including North Dakota in the EDR/SDR group would not help identify the effect of EDR/SDR laws on youth voter turnout.

I created a dummy variable for every state in order to control for any state-specific characteristics that may affect youth voter turnout in that state. For these variables, each state dummy variable, identified by the state's acronym, gives that state a value of 1 and all other states have a value of 0. California is the only state without a dummy variable because it is the reference group. These dummy variables were created from the original state variable, *v1002*, which is a nominal variable that identified which state the respondent resided in at the time of the survey.

I have two variables that identify the respondent's age. One variable, named *Age*, is an interval variable that identifies the respondents age, which was recoded from the original age variable that identified respondents' age by birth year rather than actual

age. This variable provides a complete description of the age breakdown of respondents. The other variable is a dummy variable that identifies young individuals, ages eighteen to twenty-five years old, created from the interval age variable. This dummy variable is named *Age_Young*. I created this dummy variable in order to identify youth voters and create an interaction variable with *EDR* and *Age_Young*. This interaction variable, named *EDR_AgeYoung*, will show whether or not the combination of being eighteen to twenty-five years old and living in an EDR/SDR state has a significant impact on the likelihood of voting.

The length of residence variable from the original data set asked respondents for a specific number of years they had lived at their current residence. Many individuals did not answer the question with a valid numerical response; therefore, I "cleaned" the data in order to eliminate any invalid entries. All responses that were an actual year, rather than a number of years, were converted into the number of years the person had lived there from the year provided up to the year of the survey, which was 2006. All responses that were greater than 112 were deleted because they were too high to realistically reflect actual length of residence. All responses that were in word format were converted to numerical format. Responses that included symbols or terms that indicated an approximate length of residence, such as the word "about", were deleted and the approximate number provided was used as the actual number of years. The length of residence variable included in my analysis is the "cleaned" version of the original length of residence variable.

I created a gender dummy variable, *female*, to identify female individuals, where females have a value of 1 and males have a value of 0.

I collapsed the original marital status variable into *Marital_collapsed* in order to combine values that were similar. I combined individuals that responded "married", "separated" and "domestic partnership" into one group because all of these marital statuses have similar characteristics, which are expected to have a similar effect on the dependent variable. I grouped "separated" with the "married" and "domestic partnership" categories because separated individuals are still legally married and are likely to maintain the same voting behavior from prior to separation. In addition, the "separated" category only consisted of 1.9% of all respondents. I combined "divorced" and "widowed" into another category, kept "single" as a separate category and coded all other responses as system-missing, which only included missing or blank responses. Then, I created two dummy variables from the *Marital_collapsed* variable because it is a nominal variable. One dummy variable, *married*, identifies married, separated and domestic partnership individuals. The other dummy variable, *divorced*, identifies divorced and widowed individuals. The reference group is single individuals.

I created three dummy variables to identify respondents' ethnicity: *white*; *black*; and *Hispanic*, which leaves all other ethnicities as the reference group. I created dummy variables for these three ethnicities because they had significantly greater frequencies than all other ethnicities identified by the original nominal variable, which included

Asian, Native American, Middle Eastern, mixed and other in addition to White, Black

and Hispanic.

I created two dummy variables from the original party ID variable, which identified

individuals' party ID based on a three point scale: Democrat, Republican and

Independent. This variable also included an option to respond "other". I created a

dummy variable that identifies Republicans and a dummy variable that identifies

Independents. This leaves Democrats as the reference group. Those who responded

"other" were coded as system-missing.

## Hypothesis

Based on prior research, I predicted that EDR/SDR status will have a positive

effect on youth voter turnout, where living in an EDR or SDR state and being between

the ages of eighteen and twenty-five increases the likelihood of voting.

However, since there are multiple barriers to voting other than registration laws,

the impact of EDR/SDR laws on voter turnout may be limited due to other high costs of

voting. According to Brians and Grofman (2001), some barriers to voting other than

voter registration may keep voting costs greater than voting benefits.

## Description of Analysis

I first conducted descriptive analyses of my independent variables in order to

determine variation and central tendency. This provided a clearer understanding of the

distribution of the variable and identified the presence of skewness in the interval-level variables.

Second, I conducted a crosstabulation with the EDR variable and my dependent variable controlling for age by using the Age_Young variable.

I then tested for multicollinearity using a correlation matrix and a linear regression in order to detect any correlations between independent variables that may limit the predictive power of any of these variables. The correlation matrix provides a Pearson coefficient and the linear regression will provide a tolerance coefficient and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), which will act as indicators of multicollinearity. If multicollinearity does exist between more than one independent variable, then it would be difficult to distinguish between the affects of each independent variable on the dependent variable. In this case, I needed to decide whether or not to include these independent variables in my regression analysis.

Once the presence of multicollinearity was resolved as necessary, I ran a multivariate logistic regression in order to isolate the affect of EDR/SDR laws on youth voter turnout. The Omnibus Test of Model Coefficient provided a chi-square statistic and a p-value, which will determine whether or not my overall model is significant. My logistic regression analysis also produced an odds ratio, which explains how much the odds of the dependent variable change for each unit change in the independent variable.

Chapter 5

FINDINGS

I conducted a crosstabulation and multivariate regression analysis in order to determine the effect of EDR and SDR laws on youth voter turnout. I included multiple independent variables in my regression analysis that might also explain voter turnout in order to hold these variables constant. This chapter highlights the major results of my analyses and how these results explain the relationship between my dependent variable and my independent variable.

The results of my crosstabulation and multivariate logistic regression analysis are consistent with each other. Both show that EDR/SDR status has a significant effect on youth voter turnout. While EDR has an overall suppressing affect on voter turnout across all ages, living in an EDR/SDR state does increase voter turnout among the youth.

Crosstabulation

I ran a crosstabulation to analyze the relationship between voting and EDR status controlling for age. I used *vote2006* as my dependent variable, *EDR* as my independent variable and *Age_Young* as my control variable. Table 4 in Appendix A displays the crosstabulation results. According to the crosstabulation, young people are less likely to vote than older people whether they live in an EDR/SDR state or not.

Living in an EDR state also suppresses voter turnout among older individuals but increases voter turnout among young people. The crosstabulation table shows that 61.5% of youth voted in EDR states compared to 54.1% of youth that voted in non-EDR states. Living in an EDR state has the opposite effect on turnout among people older than 25, where only 65.9% of older people voted in EDR states compared to 74% in non-EDR states.

<div align="center">Multivariate Logistic Regression</div>

To get a more precise measure of the effect of EDR and SDR on youth voter turnout, I regressed whether or not an individual voted in the 2006 congressional election on age, EDR/SDR status and non-EDR/SDR states (excluding DC), gender, education, ethnicity, length of residence, party identification, household income and marital status. The model is shown in Table 5 in Appendix A. Nearly all of the independent variables are statistically significant at $p<0.001$, and the model as a whole is significant, as indicated by the Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients, with a chi-square value of 2496 ($p< 0.001$). The Cox & Snell R-square of 0.081 and Nagelkerke R-square of 0.117 suggest the model fits the data reasonably well.

In my logistic regression analysis, all variables, except for the Married and Republican dummy variables and some of the state dummy variables, had a significance value less than 0.05.

The odds ratios of the *Age_Young* and *EDR* variables show how these variables independently affect the dependent variable holding all other variables constant. The

odd ratios were 0.513 for *Age_Young*  and 0.417 for *EDR*, indicating a negative

relationship between these variables and the dependent variable.  Individuals older than

twenty-five are more likely to vote, as are those living in a non-EDR or SDR state. The

exact odds ratios indicate that being young decreases the likelihood of voting by about

49% and living in an EDR or SDR state decreases the likelihood of voting by about 58

percent.

The interaction variable *EDR_AgeYoung,* which identifies young individuals

that live in an EDR or SDR state, had a p-value of 0.016 and an odds ratio of 1.442. The

odds ratio indicates a positive relationship with the dependent variable because it is

greater than one. This suggests that being between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five

years old and living in an EDR or SDR state increases the likelihood of voting.

Specifically, it indicates that being between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five and

living in an EDR or SDR state increases the odds of voting by 44.2 percent.

These results are consistent with the results of the crosstabulation. Young people

are less likely to vote and living in an EDR/SDR state lowers the likelihood of voting

except for young people. While living in an EDR/SDR state generally reduces voter

turnout, young people living in an EDR/SDR state are more likely to vote than young

people living in non-EDR states.

The white, divorced, residence, education, and household income variables had

a positive relationship with the dependent variable with odds ratios greater than one.

Oregon is the only state that had a p-value less than 0.05 and had a positive relationship

with the dependent variable. Living in Oregon increases the likelihood of voting. The *female, Hispanic* and *Independent* dummy variables all had negative relationships with the dependent variable, with odds ratios less than one. Table 5 in the Appendix shows the values of the model summary and the significant variables displayed in the regression analysis.

<center>Multicollinearity</center>

I conducted a bivariate correlation and a linear regression in order to determine the presence of multicollinearity. The correlation matrix showed high correlation between the white and black dummy variables and the white and Hispanic dummy variables, with a Pearson Coefficient above 0.5. The linear regression produced tolerance coefficients lower than 0.4 and VIFs greater than 2.5 for the ethnicity dummy variables, also suggesting collinearity. In order to eliminate the collinearity between these variable, I removed the black dummy variable from my regression model. This method increased the tolerance coefficients and lowered the VIFs of the white and Hispanic dummy variables. However, the Pearson Coefficient of the white and Hispanic dummy variables is very close to 0.5, with a value of 0.57, so I chose not to remove either of these dummy variables from the model because I believe removing the black dummy variable reduced the multicollinearity between these variables enough to maintain a sufficient regression model.

I also had a similar multicollinearity issue with the Married and Divorced dummy variables. The correlation matrix produced a Pearson's coefficient of -0.614 for these two variables but the linear regression produced tolerance coefficients and VIF

values that do not suggest collinearity. For this reason and because the Pearson's coefficient was reasonably low, I chose to keep both of these dummy variables.

To avoid perfect collinearity, I dropped the EDR state dummy variables – IA, ID, ME, MN, MT, NC, NH, WI, WY - because they were already accounted for in the EDR variable. This allows a more accurate comparison of voter turnout between EDR/SDR states and non-EDR/SDR states.

Descriptive Statistics

I ran frequencies on all dependent and independent variables in order to determine the degree of variation and central tendency of each variable. The frequencies also provided a measure of skewness for my interval-level variables. Table 3 in Appendix A displays descriptive statistics for each variable included in the regression analysis, as well as the interval-level age variable and a few of the original dataset variables that I used to create my collapsed and dummy variables. These original variables include the state ID, marital status, and race. Appendix A also includes bar charts of these variables and the interval age variable to provide a visual description of the variance and central tendency of these variables, which is not captured in the descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. I included the original marital status variable in order to provide a brief description of the variable in comparison to the marital dummy variables I used in my regression analysis.

A few of the nominal variables showed medium to low levels of variance. The marital status variable, *Marital_collapsed*, had a mode of 1, which was coded for

individuals who are married, separated or in a domestic partnership. These individuals

represent 68.9% of all respondents with the remainder of respondents evenly distributed

among all other values, which include divorced, widowed and single. The ethnicity

variable has very low variance, with 76% of all valid cases consisting of "white"

respondents. The EDR/SDR status variable had a mode of 0, which represents states

with neither EDR nor SDR laws. Slightly more than 10% of individuals lived in

EDR/SDR states.

Two interval-level variables had significant levels of skewness: the length of

residence variable and the household income variable. The length of residence variable

has a significant, positive skew, which pulls the mean up and makes the median a more

accurate measure of central tendency. The median is 7, which means more than 50% of

cases include respondents that have lived at their current residence for at least 7 years.

The household income variable has a significant, negative skew, which pulls the mean

down and makes the median a more accurate measure of central tendency. The median

is 9, which was coded for household income levels between $60,000 and $69,999. More

than 50% of cases are individuals with household incomes $69,999 or less.

The age variable was not significantly skewed, however, the youth dummy

variable, *Age_Young,* showed very low dispersion with only 7.6% of valid cases

representing individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.

The results of my regression analysis were overall consistent with the findings

from my crosstabulation. My crosstabulation indicated higher voter turnout among the

youth in EDR/SDR states than in non-EDR/SDR states. The crosstabulation also

showed lower voter turnout among older individuals in EDR/SDR states. My regression

results indicated a positive relationship between being young and living in an EDR/SDR

state and voting. My regression also showed a negative relationship between youth and

voting and a negative relationship between living in an EDR/SDR state and voting.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

In response to my initial research question, "do election-day and same-day registration laws affect youth voter turnout," the results of my regression analysis suggest that EDR and SDR laws significantly affect youth voter turnout. According to my analysis, being between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five years old and living in a state with EDR or SDR significantly increases the likelihood of voting compared to being older than twenty-five years old and not living in a state with EDR or SDR. As my hypothesis suggested, living in an EDR/SDR state has a positive effect on youth voter turnout.

However, there may be other state characteristics shared among the EDR/SDR states that explain voter turnout. My findings also showed a negative relationship between living in an EDR/SDR state and voting, which suggests that living in an EDR/SDR state decreases the likelihood of voting. My analysis may not have captured all state characteristics that might explain higher turnout among the youth in EDR/SDR states, such as youth voter registration outreach efforts, and low overall voter turnout in these states, such as other barriers to registering and voting. Even though I included state dummies to account for these types of state characteristics, if the majority of the EDR/SDR states share characteristics that affect voter turnout that non-EDR/SDR states do not share, then these characteristics may help explain the negative relationship

between living in an EDR/SDR state and voter turnout. In addition, my analysis did not

capture voter turnout over time, which means EDR/SDR states may have low overall

voter turnout in congressional elections compared to other states. Future analysis may

try to include more state characteristics or variables that capture voter turnout over time

and the effects of barriers to voting in order to improve the model.

In addition, my analysis showed a negative relationship between voting and

being between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five years old, which is consistent with

prior research. Youth have traditionally been less likely to vote compared to older age

groups.

Policy Implications

The results of my analysis provide a starting point for policymakers and voter

interest groups trying to increase youth voter turnout through election reform policies.

According to my analysis, EDR and SDR significantly increase the likelihood of voting

among the youth, which is traditionally a low turnout group. While there are many

arguments against EDR and SDR laws, investigating the possibility of implementing

this type of reform may provide a political avenue for increasing youth voter turnout.

These types of laws are especially important for states that have traditionally had low

youth voter turnout. EDR and SDR provide a tool for increasing turnout among a

traditionally low turnout group. Youth advocates may also find EDR and SDR laws a

useful tool for increasing the political power of the youth and increasing their influence

on policies that benefit their interests. If politicians typically respond to the demands of

their electorate, then increasing the political power of the youth through EDR and SDR laws may make politicians more responsive to the demands of the youth.

## Next Steps

The arguments against EDR and SDR laws must be addressed in order to actively pursue EDR and SDR laws that aim to increase youth voter turnout. The possibility of voter fraud and increased administrative demand should first be investigated and analyzed in order to accurately determine whether or not these issues can be remedied. In order to address the costs associated with EDR and SDR laws, such as voter fraud and increased strain on election officials and staff, a cost-benefit analysis may show whether or not the costs of EDR and SDR laws are greater than the benefits. If the costs of EDR and SDR laws are less than the benefits, then EDR and SDR implementation may have greater weight as a policy solution to low youth voter turnout and may also gain greater political support. If the costs are greater than the benefits, then policymakers may want to pursue other measures that reduce barriers to registration and voting, such as moving the registration deadline closer to Election Day.

Analysis of voter fraud levels is also necessary in order to determine whether or not voter fraud cases increase as a result of EDR or SDR implementation. If so, then measures must be taken to reduce the effects of EDR/SDR laws on voter fraud. In addition, lawmakers may pursue methods that decrease the costs of prevention and enforcement of voter fraud.

Further analysis of states that have EDR and SDR may also provide a better understanding of how these states manage voter fraud and administrative issues. First, one must analyze whether or not EDR and SDR laws have significantly increased voter turnout in the state/s. Next, one must analyze the effect of EDR/SDR implementation on voter fraud cases and administrative workload. If EDR/SDR implementation negatively affects voter fraud and administrative workloads, then one must look at the measures taken, if any, to reduce the costs associated with increased voter fraud and administrative workload as a result of EDR/SDR implementation. This type of research would provide an overall look at whether or not EDR/SDR laws are an efficient and politically plausible policy solution to increasing voter turnout among the youth.

By holding constant some of the variables that may explain voter turnout, my analysis shows that living in a state with EDR or SDR significantly and positively affects youth voter turnout, but suppresses overall voter turnout. Even though my analysis may not include state specific characteristics that may prove to significantly affect youth voter turnout, my results provide an adequate model of the effects of EDR and SDR implementation on youth voter turnout. These findings provide an argument for the adoption of EDR and SDR in order to increase youth voter turnout, which can be extremely useful for youth advocate groups and election reform advocates. By increasing the likelihood of voting among the youth, EDR and SDR have the potential to increase the political power of the youth, which may be especially significant in states where the youth lack political influence.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Background Data and Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: EDR and SDR State Registration Requirements Comparison

| State | EDR/SDR ID Requirements | Eligibility Requirements | Registration Deadline |
|---|---|---|---|
| ID | • Proof of residence<br>• photo ID | • At least 18 years old on election day<br>• U.S. citizen<br>• Resident in state and county for at least 30 days | • 25$^{th}$ day prior to election |
| IA | • Proof of residence<br>• Photo ID | • At least 18 years old on election day<br>• U.S. citizen<br>• Iowa resident | • 10 days prior to primary and general election<br>• 11 days prior to all other elections |
| ME | • No special requirements | • At least 18 years old on election day<br>• U.S. citizen<br>• Resident of municipality in state | • No deadline |
| MN | • Proof of residence | • At least 18 years old on election day<br>• U.S. citizen<br>• Resident in state for at least 20 days prior to election day<br>• Eligible legal standing | • 20 days prior to election day |
| MT | • Proof of residence | • At least 18 years old on election day<br>• U.S. citizen<br>• Lived in Montana for at least 30 days | • 30 days prior to election day |
| NH | • Proof of age, | • At least 18 years old on election day | • 7 days prior to primary |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | citizenship and domicile | • U.S. citizen<br>• Lived in New Hampshire for at least 10 days before election | election<br>• 25th day prior to general election |
| WI | • Proof of residence for at least 10 days prior to election | • One of the following: Wisconsin Driver's License number; last four digits of SS number; Wisconsin state ID card number | • 20th day before the election |
| WY | • Photo ID | • At least 18 years old on election day<br>• U.S. citizen<br>• Resident of WY and the precinct<br>• No felony convictions<br>• Not mentally incompetent | • 30 days before election |
| NC | • Proof of residency<br>• Must register and vote at One-Stop Absentee Voting Site | • At least 18 years old on election day<br>• U.S. citizen<br>• Resident of state and county at least 30 days prior to election<br>• Not a felon | • Registration only: 25 days prior to election<br>• Same-day Registration and Voting: 19 to 3 days prior to election |

Table 2: List of Variables

| Variable Name | Description |
|---|---|
| vote2006 | 0 = did not vote, don't know, system-missing; 1 = voted |
| EDR | 0 = non-EDR/SDR state; 1 = EDR/SDR state |
| Age | Interval age variable |
| Age_Young | 0 = 26 and older; 1 = 25 and younger |
| EDR_AgeYoung | Interaction between EDR and Age_Young |
| Female | 0 = male; 1 = female |
| Marital_collapsed | 1 = married, separated, domestic partnership; 2 = divorced, widowed; 3 = single |
| Married | 1 = married, separated, domestic partnership; 0 = divorced, widowed, single |
| Divorced | 1 = divorced, widowed; 0 = married, separated, domestic partnership, single |
| v2018 (Education) | 1 = no hs; 2 = high school graduate; 3 = some college; 4 = 2-year; 5 = 4-year; 6 = post-grad (from v2018) |
| Black | 1 = black; 0 = white, Hispanic, Asian, native American, middle eastern, mixed and other |
| Hispanic | 1 = Hispanic; 0 = Black, White, Asian, Native American, middle eastern, mixed and other |
| White | 1 = white; 0 = black, Hispanic, Asian, native American, middle eastern, mixed, other |
| Residence | Interval - number of years at current residence |
| Republican | 1 = Republican; 0 = Democrat, Independent |
| Independent | 1 = Independent; 0 = Democrat, Republican |
| v2032 (Household income) | 1 = less than $10,000; 2 = $10,000 - $14,999; 3 = $15,000 - $19,999; 4 = $20,000 - $24,999; 5 = $25,000 - $29,999; 6 = $30,000 - $39,999; 7 = $40,000 - $49,999; 8 = $50,000 - $59,999; 9 = $60,000 - $69,999; 10 = $70,000 - $79,999; 11 = $80,000 - $99,999; 12 = $100,000 - $119,999; 13 = $120,000 - $149,999; 14 = $150,000 or more |
| v2042 (level of interest in politics/current events) | 1 = very much interested; 2 = somewhat interested; 3 = not much interested; 4 = not sure |

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

| | N | Range | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | Variance | Skewness | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Statistic | Statistic | Statistic | Statistic | Statistic | Statistic | Statistic | Statistic | Std. Error |
| vote2006 | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .7178 | .45009 | .203 | -.968 | .013 |
| Age_Young | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0756 | .26430 | .070 | 3.212 | .013 |
| Age | 36421 | 77.00 | 18.00 | 95.00 | 49.0905 | 15.30347 | 234.196 | .008 | .013 |
| EDR | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .1045 | .30591 | .094 | 2.586 | .013 |
| EDR_AgeYoung | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0089 | .09404 | .009 | 10.444 | .013 |
| v2005 | 36421 | 7 | 1 | 8 | 1.52 | 1.199 | 1.438 | 3.072 | .013 |
| black | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .1014 | .30186 | .091 | 2.641 | .013 |
| Hispanic | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0931 | .29051 | .084 | 2.802 | .013 |
| white | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .7598 | .42724 | .183 | -1.216 | .013 |
| Marital_collapsed | 35181 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 3.00 | 1.4767 | .76206 | .581 | 1.201 | .013 |
| Divorced | 35181 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .1455 | .35259 | .124 | 2.011 | .013 |
| Married | 35181 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .6889 | .46295 | .214 | -.816 | .013 |
| female | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .5218 | .49953 | .250 | -.087 | .013 |
| Republican | 34351 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .3271 | .46917 | .220 | .737 | .013 |
| Independent | 34351 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .3301 | .47024 | .221 | .723 | .013 |
| Residence | 33326 | 112.00 | .00 | 112.00 | 11.3043 | 11.10712 | 123.368 | 1.504 | .013 |
| v2018 | 36354 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 3.31 | 1.382 | 1.910 | .564 | .013 |
| v2032 | 35557 | 14 | 1 | 15 | 9.03 | 3.845 | 14.782 | -.079 | .013 |
| AK | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0036 | .05987 | .004 | 16.585 | .013 |
| AL | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0136 | .11579 | .013 | 8.402 | .013 |
| AR | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0098 | .09838 | .010 | 9.966 | .013 |
| AZ | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0264 | .16044 | .026 | 5.903 | .013 |
| CO | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0172 | .12987 | .017 | 7.436 | .013 |
| CT | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0102 | .10028 | .010 | 9.770 | .013 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------|------|-----|------|-------|--------|------|--------|------|
| DE | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0030 | .05463 | .003 | 18.198 | .013 |
| FL | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0641 | .24491 | .060 | 3.560 | .013 |
| GA | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0326 | .17764 | .032 | 5.262 | .013 |
| HI | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0027 | .05154 | .003 | 19.300 | .013 |
| IA | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0097 | .09797 | .010 | 10.010 | .013 |
| ID | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0068 | .08207 | .007 | 12.020 | .013 |
| IL | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0438 | .20464 | .042 | 4.459 | .013 |
| IN | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0244 | .15440 | .024 | 6.160 | .013 |
| KS | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0128 | .11251 | .013 | 8.661 | .013 |
| KY | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0126 | .11167 | .012 | 8.729 | .013 |
| LA | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0099 | .09920 | .010 | 9.881 | .013 |
| MA | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0150 | .12152 | .015 | 7.983 | .013 |
| MD | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0195 | .13845 | .019 | 6.941 | .013 |
| ME | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0062 | .07853 | .006 | 12.577 | .013 |
| MI | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0422 | .20105 | .040 | 4.554 | .013 |
| MN | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0191 | .13701 | .019 | 7.020 | .013 |
| MO | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0227 | .14879 | .022 | 6.417 | .013 |
| MS | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0055 | .07390 | .005 | 13.384 | .013 |
| MT | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0041 | .06383 | .004 | 15.539 | .013 |
| NC | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0259 | .15890 | .025 | 5.968 | .013 |
| ND | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0026 | .05127 | .003 | 19.402 | .013 |
| NEB | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0048 | .06876 | .005 | 14.407 | .013 |
| NH | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0054 | .07316 | .005 | 13.522 | .013 |
| NJ | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0228 | .14932 | .022 | 6.392 | .013 |
| NM | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0088 | .09347 | .009 | 10.511 | .013 |
| NV | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0106 | .10227 | .010 | 9.572 | .013 |
| NY | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0488 | .21543 | .046 | 4.189 | .013 |
| OH | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0418 | .20024 | .040 | 4.576 | .013 |
| OK | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0113 | .10576 | .011 | 9.242 | .013 |
| ORE | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0202 | .14062 | .020 | 6.825 | .013 |
| PA | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0414 | .19916 | .040 | 4.606 | .013 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RI | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0033 | .05778 | .003 | 17.192 | .013 |
| SC | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0125 | .11095 | .012 | 8.789 | .013 |
| SD | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0035 | .05872 | .003 | 16.914 | .013 |
| TN | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0187 | .13536 | .018 | 7.112 | .013 |
| TX | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0765 | .26588 | .071 | 3.185 | .013 |
| UT | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0098 | .09838 | .010 | 9.966 | .013 |
| VA | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0246 | .15482 | .024 | 6.142 | .013 |
| VT | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0021 | .04533 | .002 | 21.969 | .013 |
| WA | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0317 | .17509 | .031 | 5.350 | .013 |
| WI | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0248 | .15566 | .024 | 6.105 | .013 |
| WV | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0079 | .08857 | .008 | 11.112 | .013 |
| WY | 36421 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | .0024 | .04937 | .002 | 20.156 | .013 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 29716 | | | | | | | | |

APPENDIX B

Frequency Bar Charts

**state of residence**



Figure 1: State ID Variable (v1002) Frequency

Figure 2: Marital Status Variable (v2019) Frequency

Figure 3: Race Variable (v2005) Frequency

Figure 4: Age Variable Frequency

APPENDIX C

Results Tables

Table 4: Crosstabulation of Voting and EDR/SDR status controlling for Age.

**vote2006 * EDR * Age_Young Crosstabulation**

| Age_Young | | | | EDR 0 | EDR 1 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | vote2006 | 0 | Count | 7843 | 1195 | 9038 |
| | | | % within EDR | 26.0% | 34.1% | 26.8% |
| | | 1 | Count | 22324 | 2307 | 24631 |
| | | | % within EDR | 74.0% | 65.9% | 73.2% |
| | Total | | Count | 30167 | 3502 | 33669 |
| | | | % within EDR | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| 1 | vote2006 | 0 | Count | 1124 | 117 | 1241 |
| | | | % within EDR | 45.9% | 38.5% | 45.1% |
| | | 1 | Count | 1324 | 187 | 1511 |
| | | | % within EDR | 54.1% | 61.5% | 54.9% |
| | Total | | Count | 2448 | 304 | 2752 |
| | | | % within EDR | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

| Table 5: Logistic Regression Results - Significant Variables Only | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Model Summary** | **Value** | **Significance** | |
| Chi-square | 2496.4 | .00 | |
| Cox & Snell R-square | .081 | | |
| Nagelkerke R-square | .117 | | |
| **Model Estimates** | **Significance** | **Exp(B)** | **% increase/decrease in odds** |
| Age_Young | .000 | .513 | 48.70% decrease |
| EDR | .000 | .417 | 58.30% decrease |
| EDR_AgeYoung | .016 | 1.442 | 44.20% increase |
| Hispanic | .000 | .598 | 40.20% decrease |
| white | .000 | 1.937 | 93.70% increase |
| Divorced | .001 | 1.195 | 19.50% increase |
| Female | .000 | .814 | 18.60% decrease |
| Independent | .000 | .868 | 13.20% decrease |
| Residence | .000 | 1.017 | 1.70% increase |
| v2018 (Education) | .000 | 1.355 | 35.50% increase |
| v3005 (Party ID) | .000 | 1.024 | 2.40% increase |
| v2032 (household income) | .000 | .868 | 13.20% increase |
| AL | .000 | .498 | 50.20% increase |
| AR | .000 | .531 | 46.90% decrease |
| DE | .004 | .493 | 50.70% decrease |
| FL | .000 | .603 | 39.70% decrease |

| GA | .000 | .468 | 53.20% decrease |
|---|---|---|---|
| HI | .011 | .524 | 47.60% decrease |
| IL | .000 | .335 | 66.50% decrease |
| IN | .000 | .391 | 60.90% decrease |
| KS | .013 | .720 | 28.00% decrease |
| KY | .001 | .641 | 35.90% decrease |
| LA | .000 | .425 | 57.50% decrease |
| MA | .004 | .699 | 30.10% decrease |
| MD | .000 | .666 | 33.40% decrease |
| MI | .000 | .397 | 60.30% decrease |
| MS | .000 | .488 | 51.20% decrease |
| NJ | .002 | .719 | 28.10% decrease |
| NY | .000 | .603 | 39.70% decrease |
| OH | .000 | .294 | 70.60% decrease |
| OK | .015 | .715 | 28.50% decrease |
| ORE | .001 | 1.577 | 57.70% increase |
| PA | .001 | .745 | 25.50% decrease |
| SC | .000 | .565 | 43.50% decrease |
| TN | .000 | .596 | 40.40% decrease |
| TX | .000 | .772 | 22.80% decrease |
| UT | .000 | .530 | 47.00% decrease |
| VA | .004 | .742 | 25.80% decrease |
| WV | .000 | .426 | 57.40% decrease |

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