

EXPLAINING THE PARADOX OF CONSERVATIVE LATINOS AND THEIR  
AFFILIATION WITH THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

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EXPLAINING THE PARADOX OF CONSERVATIVE LATINOS AND THEIR  
AFFILIATION WITH THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

A Thesis

by

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Abstract

of

EXPLAINING THE PARADOX OF CONSERVATIVE LATINOS AND THEIR  
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The Republican and Democratic Party engage the most active courtship in American politics, namely the repeated attempts to woo Latino voters. While the Latino population exhibits high levels of religiosity, presents itself as displaying more concern for family values, and evinces more conservative political attitudes around the issues of abortion, gay marriage and divorce, the majority of registered Latino voters affiliate with the Democratic Party. This paradox leaves the Republican Party having to court a population that espouses attitudes generally more reflective of its own platform. Population projections show that the Latino population will significantly grow over the coming years, increasing the Latino influence on American political institutions.

This study examines the factors causing conservative Latinos to affiliate or lean toward the Democratic Party. Using data obtained from the Pew Hispanic Center, affiliation with the Democratic Party is modeled using crosstabulation and regression analysis with various broad casual inputs (affluence, familial status, attachment to the United States, demographics, culture and political attitudes). The statistical analysis is used to test several hypotheses from social identity theory regarding whether conservative Latinos see themselves as part of an “in-group” associated with the larger

Latino population who are mostly Democrats, or if they see themselves part of an “in-group” based on religious identity.

The results of the study demonstrate that eleven explanatory variables serve as predictors of partisanship (age, respondents with a Cuban and Mexican family heritage, income, respondents opposing the death penalty, respondents downplaying Latino discrimination, respondents opposing gay marriage, respondents with exposure to a place of worship speaking out on the issue of immigration, respondents believing the poor have it easy because of government assistance, respondents asserting religion is unimportant in influencing their political thinking and respondents considering themselves to be “Hispanic/Latino” before identifying themselves in terms of their country, religion or being an American. Both the regression and crosstabulation results support the hypothesis that conservative Latinos affiliate with the Democratic Party because the Latino population as a whole does. There was no evidence suggesting that conservative Latinos form partisanship based on religious identity.

If party affiliation is based on social identity, Republican efforts to educate conservative Latinos about the Party’s platform are unlikely to succeed at recruiting more Latinos to the Republican Party.

\_\_\_\_\_, Committee Chair  
William D. Leach, Ph.D.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my husband and best friend, Alberto Esquivel. Without his support and encouragement I would have never embarked upon, nor completed this journey. He has made available his support in a number of ways including enduring a messy home, loads of dirty clothes, “Shake-n-Bake” and a sometimes stressed-out wife. Yet, his patience and love have always run concurrent. During the three years of my academic journey in the midst of what I felt was chaos, he was at times the only happiness I felt. His “listening ear,” coupled with our Friday night “date nights” alleviated much of the pressures surrounding me. Apart from his influence, I would never have cultivated my interest in examining the impact of Latinos on American political institutions, nor gained such a growing fondness for the Latino community. He will always be deserving of a heartfelt “thank you.”

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## Chapter 1

### INTRODUCTION

*The Latino community holds the election in its hands.*

Barack Obama, July 13, 2008 (Rohter, 2008, p. 1)

Both the Republican and Democratic Party engage in perhaps the most active and assiduous courtship in American politics (Coffin, 2003), that is, the continued attempts to win-over Latino voters. The 2009 presidential election witnessed both the Democratic and Republican Party trying to secure the Independent vote, comprised of many Americans considering themselves to be “middle-of the road” voters. Such advances seemed judicious, as voters in this group are by definition those who could lean either right or left. What seems incongruous at face, however, is pursuing a courtship with a population known for its conservative values more so than the general population in terms of abortion, gay marriage and family values. Yet, this courtship ensues on all levels of government with equal fervor and vigilance. One may think the question at hand is why the Democratic Party would believe this population could be courted. The more appropriate question, however, is why the Republican Party has to woo a population mirroring central components of their own party’s platform? The answer lies in the existence of the Latino voter paradox best illustrated by a copious number of conservative Latinos affiliating with the Democratic Party.

Recent data suggests that 57% of Hispanic voters are either registered or lean toward the Democratic Party, with only 23% identifying with the Republican Party (Taylor & Fry, 2007). Since 1972, this historical affinity with the Democratic Party has

been longstanding with the Democratic lead over Republicans with respect to Latino partisanship not falling below 25 percentage points (Coffin, 2003).

While Latinos are largely liberal on economic matters, they are more likely than non-Hispanic whites to believe children should live at home until they are married and view homosexuality and divorce as unacceptable (Coffin, 2003). Approximately 55% of Latinos believe abortion should be *illegal* in all or most cases, contrasted to 53% of non-Hispanic whites believing abortion should be *legal* in all or most cases (The Pew Hispanic Center, 2002). The latter suggests that socially conservative Latinos would inhibit Democratic affiliation, although Latinos heavily lean toward the Democratic Party (Barreto, De la Garza, Lee, Jaesung, & Pachon, 2002; Coffin, 2003; De la Garza & Cortina, 2007; Tanneeru, 2007), with the only notable exception being Cubans (Barreto et al., 2002; Coffin, 2003; De la Garza & Cortina, 2007; Uhlaner & Garcia, 1998).

Despite a majority of Latinos affiliating with the Democratic Party, studies show that they are “neither homogeneous nor loyal to one party” (Tanneeru, 2007, p. 1). Recently, this was widely recognized in comparing the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections. *The New York Times* (Preston, 2008) reports that a significant shift in the Latino vote contributed to Barack Obama’s victory. Nationwide, 67% of Latino voters cast their ballots for Obama, while John McCain received only 31% of the votes (Preston, 2008). This is a stark contrast in comparison to the 2004 presidential election in which Senator John Kerry received 53% of the Latino vote, while George W. Bush received 44% of the Latino vote (Preston, 2008).


This thesis sought to provide an answer to the question of what factors cause Latinos identifying their political attitudes as conservative to affiliate with the Democratic Party. A vast array of research exists on determinants of Latino partisanship. However, current research fails to explain why conservative Latinos do not see conservatism as part of their political identity as do non-Hispanic whites with commensurate views. Republican political strategists have long believed Latinos can be swayed (Dutwin, Brodie, Herrmann, & Levin, 2005) by forging new paths and persuading Latino voters that the Republican Party knows them in terms of social conservatism, work ethics and entrepreneurial spirit (De la Garza & Cortina, 2007). Yet, some believe that the Democratic Party shows more amicability toward Latinos on socioeconomic and immigration issues.

A highly seminal work regarding partisanship, *The American Voter*, states that party identification is the best indicator for voter preferences (Barreto et al., 2002). Party identification shapes “perceptions and transmits values to attitudes to beliefs that, in turn, lead to the individual’s choice at the ballot box” (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998, p. 1). Hence, in this thesis I examined party affiliation as the dependent variable, although party identification fails to guarantee this electorate will vote along strict party lines, especially considering the presence of “swing voting.”

Despite the latter limitation, this population warrants further examination due to changing demographics within the United States largely a result of this population’s capacious size. Latinos are the largest and fastest growing ethnic minority group



surpassing blacks (Barreto et al., 2002; Coffin, 2003; Kelly & Kelly, 2007; Tanneeru, 2007). In 2008, approximately 46.8 million residents within the United States were of Latino descent (Passel & D’Vera, 2008). Population projections conducted by the United States Census Bureau and the Pew Hispanic Center forecast continued growth among this population, as depicted in Figure 1 (Nuño, 2007, p. 273).



*Figure 1.* Forecast of continued Latino population growth. (The Pew Hispanic Center, 2008)

More importantly than size, however, is the Latino population’s geographic location. Large populations of Latinos are located in five states that together hold half of the electoral votes needed to win the presidential election - Texas, New York, California, Illinois, and Florida (Nuño, 2007). Latinos comprise 37% of the eligible electorate in New Mexico (Taylor & Frye, 2007). While these numbers are smaller in Texas (25%)

(Hendericks & Garofoli, 2008), California (25%) (Goldstein, 2008), Florida (14%), Nevada (12%), Colorado (12%) (Taylor & Frye, 2007), New York (11%) (Goldstein, 2008) and Illinois (11%) (Dowd, 2001), they nevertheless remain significant. Consequently, the political behavior of Latinos cannot be overlooked when examining American political institutions.

### What is in This Thesis

For Chapter 2, the literature review, I reviewed available literature encompassing the determinants of Latino partisanship. While the literature presented several theories on partisanship and found many factors to increase the likelihood of affiliating with the Democratic or Republican Party, the paradox of conservative Latinos affiliating with the Democratic Party was touched not upon in current research.

Chapter 3 describes the research methodology. From data I obtained from the Pew Hispanic Center (2007), I re-coded the variables I chose to incorporate in this thesis based on my review of the literature. I reduced the sample to only include Latinos identifying their political attitudes as “very conservative” or “conservative” and Latinos leaning toward the Republican or Democratic Party. After testing and correcting for multicollinearity, I utilized a logistic regression with leaning toward the Democratic Party serving as the dependent variable.

In Chapter 4, I discuss how I tested and corrected for multicollinearity, in addition to presenting the descriptive statistics for each independent variable. After presenting the findings of the logistic regression and transforming them into predicted probabilities, I

run several cross-tabulations to further understand the relationship between party affiliation and conservatism. I then reexamine each of the hypotheses and conclude that while conservative Latinos do not see themselves as part of an “in-group” based upon religious identity, some evidence points toward the social identity theory in explaining why conservative Latinos affiliate with the Democratic Party.

Chapter 5 contains the conclusions of the study. Conservative political attitudes have little bearing on party affiliation among conservative Latinos, suggesting that attempts to woo conservative Latinos on such issues remains largely futile. If the demographics and political attitudes of conservative Latinos are to remain unchanged and population projections evidence as predicted, the Democratic Party is likely to retain the affinity of conservative Latinos and in increasing numbers. The recent passage of the nation’s toughest immigration law in Arizona may also engender a shift among conservative Latinos with more of them feeling discrimination is an issue. Further research is needed, however, in determining if conservative Latinos align their vote with their party affiliation, or if this sub-population is representative of the “swing voter” label attributed to members of the Latino electorate.

## Chapter 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Literature Review on Partisanship Among Latinos

The literature examining Latino partisanship primarily focuses on causative factors in explaining affiliation with the Democratic and Republican Party, although several studies do touch on Independent voters. Since most of the studies were concerned with determinants of partisanship rather than descriptive statistics, the bulk of the literature utilizes some form of a logistic regression as part of the research methodology. These studies incorporate secondary data in the form surveys, from various reputable sources such as the Pew Hispanic Center, the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute and the National Election Studies.

Each of the studies utilized a host of independent variables with demographics and socioeconomics serving mostly as control variables. Several studies primarily examine religion, race or political attitudes as the main explanatory variables. Dependent variables also differed from study to study, with some studies looking at affiliation with the Republican or Democratic Party.

Among these studies, sampling is consistently purposive. Several studies only examine particular national origins among the Latino population such as Uhlaner and Garcia (1998) who only examine Mexican, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. Dutwin et al. (2005) primarily examine Mexican Americans. Four of the incorporated studies are nationally representative (Nicholson, Pantoja, & Segura, 2005; Dutwin et al., 2005; Kelly

& Kelly, 2005; Stokes-Brown, 2006). Other studies integrate purposive sampling by looking at select states with the highest concentrations of Latino voters (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2007; De la Garza & Cortina, 2007; Nuño, 2007). As one would expect, the studies comprising national sampling contain the largest sample sizes. Overall, the sampling size varies between a range of 1,000 and 4,213 Latinos (Dutwin et al., 2005) with only registered voters included in the analyses.

### Theories

The literature examining Latino partisanship references several theories scholars commonly refer to in explaining partisanship in the United States, although I only discuss two of them in this thesis— the socialization model/stability theory and the social identity theory. While these theories are not specific to Latinos, they remain instrumental in explaining partisanship and serve as the foundation for the hypotheses tested in each study.

#### *Socialization Model and Stability Theory*

The first of these theories, the socialization model/stability theory, suggests that party identification inculcates in early childhood at a pre-political age due to parental influence and remains fairly stable over time (Dutwin et al., 2005). While this theory does not delineate “fairly stable,” it seems to imply that identification is constant or seldom changes. When partisanship does change, however, it emanates from great personal changes such as marriage, children and exceptional political changes (i.e. the Great Depression or the Civil War) (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2001, p. 3). While Alvarez and

Bedolla (2001) state that since exceptional political events are rare and have little if no impact on party identification, Dutwin et al. (2005) states, “Latinos can be seen to have potentially important life changes in addition to those experienced by Anglo Americans, specifically their inculcation (or lack thereof) into mainstream white culture” (p. 138). If marriage and children truly are great personal changes, this theory fails to account for the fact the latter are actually quite common and if they were to occur, they could be indicators for changes in partisanship. This actually suggests more fluidity than stability, which is counterintuitive. Other scholars echoing this theory include Lassfield, Barelsen, and Gaudet (as cited in Nuño, 2007) who assert that voters do not waiver in voting preferences because of their strong party ties.

Revisionists have argued against these traditional models, suggesting that party identification is more fluid (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2001). Partisanship is susceptible to change because of retrospective perceptions of politics, economic evaluations and policy perceptions. Some have suggested and argue against the claim that Latinos may change their partisan attachments proceeding advances in upward mobility, social conservatism and unfamiliarity with the political system (De la Garza & Cortina, 2007), the latter serving as the basis of the Republican Party’s continued recruiting attempts. Other research reverberates the latter citing that partisanship is not as stable as previously thought and that the role of the party may actually be on the decline (Nuño, 2007). Tedin and Murray (as cited in Nuño, 2007) discovered that considerable instability exists within

voter preferences in state elections. Voters are not static and preferences may change regardless of partisanship.

While both of these theories lie at opposite ends of the spectrum, their disagreement lies in the issues of stability versus fluidity and when partisanship inculcates. Dutwin et al. (2005) note that the socialization model and stability theory inadequately explain Latino partisanship, failing to consider a largely foreign-born population. This is problematic as this theory may overlook foreign-born Latinos without a leaning toward an American political party upon immigration. Likewise, if their parents are without a leaning or affiliation with an American political party, children are unlikely to form such an affiliation. Also noteworthy is the fact that a large number of Latinos are apolitical, meaning, Latino children may have parents who never affiliate or lean toward a political party. This implies that at least for foreign-born children, partisanship may form in adulthood or result from factors other than parental influence. Hence, the revisionist's theory in some cases may more accurately depict Latino partisanship especially if partisanship strength is low among the foreign-born.

#### *Social Identity Theory*

Similar to the socialization and stability theory, the social identity theory, agrees that socialization affects partisanship. However, unlike the stability model, the social identity theory includes the social psychology theory of group belonging (Greene, 2004). Under this theory, individuals pursue categorization as a group (Nicholson et al., 2005) due to the need for a sense belonging and inclusion. Though group membership is not

formal, actualization of group membership forms when other group members perceive them as being members of the same social category.

As part of the group, members attempt to maximize differences between the in-group (the group they belong to) and the out-group or opposition group (the group they do not belong) even if such differences are greatly exaggerated (Greene, 2004). The in-group may mentally exaggerate and enhance favorable qualities of the in-group because of their inclusion, while the out-group is derogated making the in-group seem superior. This suggests that individuals seeking inclusion in a group may be more likely to choose the in-group to attain positive perceptions rather than the group facing unfavorable perceptions.

Studies looking at the social identity theory and partisanship have demonstrated strong relationships between social groups and partisanship, in which perceptions of the groups associated with a particular party affect partisanship (Greene, 2004). This theory could explain why the majority of Latinos affiliate with the Democratic Party if Latinos see the Democratic Party with favorable perceptions because culturally and historically, affiliation with the Democratic Party has been the “the thing to do.”

Interestingly, the social identity theory does seem to suggest, that if applicable among Latinos, they have strong partisan society identity. Greene (2004) suggests that under this theory, a stronger partisan society identity would lead to a sharper divide between parties where defection from one party to another would be unlikely. While this may be true among Latinos with strong leanings towards either the Democratic of



Republican Party, the “swing voter” label suggests that at least among voters crossing party lines, their social identity is weak. This theory suggests that if social identity grows stronger, Latinos would vote for the party they affiliate with consistently across elections. Differences in the strength of social identity could also potentially vary among the Latino foreign-born population who may depend more on cultural cues than knowledge gained over time.

### Key Correlates of Party Identification

In examining partisanship, the literature incorporates broad casual inputs serving as key correlates of party identification within the general population of the United States. Such factors expressed below include: religion, demographics, socioeconomics and political attitudes.

#### *Religion*

Two studies in this review primarily examining religion find that denominational affiliation is a predictor of partisanship; however, despite examining multiple religious denominations, only three denominational affiliations served as predictors (Kelly & Kelly, 2005; Lee & Pachon). First, Lee and Pachon (2007) and Kelly and Kelly (2005) found that evangelicals are more likely to be Republicans. This is evident in the 2004 presidential election, where evangelicals were more likely to support George Bush (Lee & Pachon, 2007).

While Uhlaner and Garcia (1998) primarily examine national origin, they use religion as a control variable. Among Puerto Ricans, Protestantism increased the

probability of affiliation with the Republican Party. This suggests the need for inclusion of interaction variables to fully understand the determinants of partisanship.

Finally, respondents identifying as Catholics increase their likelihood of affiliating with the Democratic Party (Kelly & Kelly, 2005; Lee & Pachon, 2007; Nicholson, Pantoja, & Segura, 2006). This reiterates the Latino voting paradox since many Latino Catholics are conservatives. The literature also indicates that the number of Latinos Catholics is actually declining, while the number of non-Catholic Latinos is rising (Kelly & Kelly, 2007). Depending on the magnitude, such shifts in denominational affiliation could have implications for partisanship in the future.

#### *Age*

The literature produces mixed findings as to the predictive ability of age. Three studies found that increases in age predict affiliation with the Democratic Party (De La Garza & Cortina, 2007; Dutwin et al., 2005; Kelly & Kelly, 2007). Uhlaner and Garcia (1998) delineate Hispanics further into the category of Puerto Rican, Mexican and Cuban and find that the “age effect” differs depending on national origin. Specifically, they find that age is a strong predictor of Democratic affiliation for Mexicans, but not for Puerto Ricans or Cubans. One explanation for the differences in the interaction variable combining age and national origin may lie in differing levels of economic disparities among national origins.

### *Gender*

Among the studies incorporating gender as a control variable, two of them find that gender as a predictor on partisanship among different national origins. Specifically, Mexican men are more likely affiliate with the Democratic Party (Dutwin, et al, 2005), while Puerto Ricans men are more likely to be Republicans (Uhlaner & Garcia, 1998).

### *National Origin*

Scholars studying Latino political behavior frequently voice apprehension over aggregating all Hispanics under the “Latino umbrella” when this population is quite diverse. The heterogeneous make-up of Latinos is often cited as one reason for including national origin as a control variable. Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) find that national origin is statistically significant. Four studies found that Cubans are more likely to be Republicans (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2007; Dutwin et al., 2005; Kelly & Kelly, 2007; Nicholson et al., 2005). Two studies find that national origin (Cuban) is the strongest predictor for Republican affiliation (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2007; Kelly & Kelly 2007). Only several studies, however, found that a national origin other than Cuban was significant. Kelly and Kelly (2007) found that South Americans were more likely to support the Republican Party, while Nicholson (2005) found that Puerto Ricans and Dominicans were more likely to affiliate as Democrats (Nicholson et al., 2005).

### *Racial Identity*

Finally, Nicholson et al. (2005) examines the effect of racial identity on party affiliation by incorporating three main explanatory variables for the input of racial

identity including Latinos identifying as white, black, (also interchangeable with “Afro Latino,”) or some other race. Nicholson et al. finds that Afro-Latinos and Latinos identifying their race as neither black nor white increase their likelihood of identifying as Democrats. This parallels non-Hispanic blacks also more likely to identify with the Democratic Party. Additionally, those who identified with a racial category were also more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than those who would not identify as a category. One explanation for the latter could be that blacks see themselves closer to African-American experience than Hispanic experiences.

#### *Socioeconomics*

As expected, the literature found socioeconomic variables including education and income to be predictors of partisanship. The literature points out that the Republican Party believes advances in socioeconomics are the key to winning the Latino vote. However, the literature reflects mixed findings as to the predictive affect of socioeconomics.

First, the literature presents mixed results pertaining to partisanship and increases in education among Latinos. Dutwin et al. (2005) and Alvarez and Bedolla (2007) find education is a predictor among Latinos for the Republican Party. Only one study completed by Coffin (2003) suggests that higher levels of educational attainment are associated with the Democratic Party (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2003). Likewise, one study found that education is only a predictor among Mexicans (Uhlaner & Garcia, 1998).

A common finding in many studies is that income serves as an indicator for partisanship. Many scholars assert this is the case for Latinos as well (Dutwin et al. 2005). Surprisingly, four studies in this review, find that income has no effect on partisanship (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2003; Lee & Pachon, 2007; Uhlaner & Garcia, 1998). Among the studies finding that income is a predictor, two find increases in income increase the likelihood of affiliating with the Republican Party (Dutwin et al.; Kelly & Kelly, 2007). On the contrary, three studies find that among Latinos in the highest income brackets, the majority are Democrats (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2003; De La Garza & Cortina, 2007; Dutwin et al.). One potential explanation for these differences may be “great personal” changes referred to in the stability model that are incurred throughout an individual’s life, altering partisanship. Regardless, the Republican Party still relies on economic mobility and family values to force partisan change despite mixed findings as echoed by the Republican National Hispanic Assembly stating, “dollar and the family are the key to winning Latino support” (Coffin, 2003, p. 218).

#### *Political Attitudes*

When looking at political attitudes, Latinos with more liberal views on abortion, affirmative action and governmental health insurance were less likely to be Republicans. Alvarez and Bedolla (2007) explore in more depth the issue of abortion, as many believe that this issue moves Latino voters toward the Republican Party. They find that for a Mexican wanting to restrict abortion, the probability of affiliating with the Democratic Party only decreases by 3%. This supports claims that Latino voters, while often

perceived as concerned with family values, may not vote actually vote on them or see conservatism as part of their political identity.

More interesting, however, is the fact personal perceptions of particular candidates were predictors of respondent's feeling "much closer to Republicans." De la Garza and Cortina (2007) find that in 2000, respondents more likely to be "much closer" to Republicans included those liking Bush, while those liking Gore were less likely to be much closer to the Republicans. Similarly, with respect to the 2004 presidential election, those more likely to be "much closer" and "somewhat closer" to the Republicans included those who approved of Bush and did not like John Kerry. Conversely, those who liked John Kerry and Al Gore decreased the probability of being "much" and "somewhat closer" to the Republicans. Taken together, the findings from the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections demonstrate in part that Latinos movement toward the Republican Party during these years has resulted from personal evaluations of candidates not changes in ideology. While the latter findings seem obvious, issue congruency, or how well political preferences match a particular candidate, were not significant. This further suggests that personal evaluations may make a difference in at least feeling toward a particular party, however this is not to say that respondent's are registered to vote for the party they at one time feel "closer" to.

Another political attitude shown to be a predictor in partisanship entails economic perceptions. Two studies find that Latinos with more positive economic perceptions lead them to affiliate with the Democratic Party (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2007; De la Garza &

Cortina, 2007) and Latinos whose personal finances have improved increase the probability of being much closer to the Republicans (De la Garza & Cortina, 2007).

### Conclusion

Overall, the literature examines a variety of potential determinants of partisanship, with each study varying in the exact regression equation and dependent variable. Yet, research findings remain quite similar, largely pointing toward demographic and socioeconomic factors as predictors of partisanship, although religion and political attitudes were also significant. The most inconclusive findings relate to education and income with some studies showing education predicts affiliation with both parties and other studies showing income has no affect, or predicts affiliation between both parties. All of the research examines either a national sample of registered Latinos or the largest national origins, increasing generalizability. While the latter methodologies suit the purpose of each study well, the literature fails to examine sub-populations such as conservative Latinos. Hence, the research does little in answering why conservative Latinos affiliate and/or vote for the Democratic Party. My study seeks to shed some light on this puzzle by utilizing a national sample of Latinos identifying their political attitudes as conservative and then examining determinants of partisanship.

### Chapter 3

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

### Objective

The objective of this thesis is to answer the question “what factors lead conservative Latinos to affiliate with the Democratic Party.” While the literature on Latino partisanship shows that factors such as age, income, national origin and so forth are predictors of partisanship, the research does not address why many conservative Latinos affiliate with the Democratic Party. This question remains important due to the Latino electorate’s ability to tip national and state elections.

### Data

This thesis incorporates secondary data in the form of a survey conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center/Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (The Pew Hispanic Center and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life bear no responsibility for the interpretations offered, or conclusions made based on analysis of the Pew Hispanic Center/ Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life survey 'Changing Faiths: Latinos and the Transformation of American Religion'). The 2006 Life Survey of Hispanics interviewed a national sample of 4,016 Latinos, ages 18 years and older by telephone from August 10, 2006, through October 4, 2006. The survey provided respondents the opportunity to conduct the survey in English or in Spanish, incorporating both registered and non-registered voters. For this sample, the margin of error was 5.7% at the 95% confidence level. This survey seemed optimal due to the large sample size and the incorporation of a vast array of topics



allowing for the necessary “controls.” It also included variables found in the literature to predict partisanship among Latinos, and was the only survey I could find distinguishing Latinos self-identifying as conservatives.

Since this thesis is only concerned with conservative Latinos, it was necessary to delete 2,619 observations for respondents not identifying their political views as “very conservative” or “conservative.” After deleting respondents whose political attitudes were moderate, liberal, very liberal, “don’t know,” or “refused,” the sample size decreased to 1,397 respondents.

Table 1

*Frequency of “Very Conservative” and “Conservative” Latinos*

Political Attitudes	Frequency	Percent
Very conservative	237	5.9
Conservative	1160	28.9
Moderate	1086	27.0
Liberal	687	17.1
Very liberal	240	6.0
Don't know	379	9.4
Refused	227	5.7
Total	4016	100.0

Political attitudes were gauged through the survey question, “In general would you describe your political views as...very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, very liberal, don’t know?” Of those identifying as “very conservative” or “conservative,” 39% (540) identified as either Republicans or leaning towards the Republican Party, while 42% (592) identified as either Democrats or leaning towards the Democratic Party. A minority 6% (78) of respondents identified themselves as Independents, while 4% (51) identified as “something else,” 7% (103) “did not know,” and 2% (33) refused to answer. This data reinforces the literature suggesting that of the two main political parties, a large number of Latino conservatives, in this case the majority, affiliate with the Democratic Party.

Table 2

*Leaned Party & Conservative Value Descriptive Statistics*

Party Leaning	Very Conservative	Conservative	Percentage	Total
Republican	97	443	39%	540
Democrat	95	497	42%	592
Independent	9	69	6%	78
Something Else	12	39	4%	51
Don't Know	16	87	7%	103
Refused	8	25	2%	33
Total	237	1160	100	1,397

### Dependent Variable

The dichotomous dependent variable in this thesis is the respondent's affiliation toward the Democratic or Republican Party. I chose this dependent variable because political scientists generally assert that party identification serves as the best indicator of vote choice, notwithstanding the actual vote (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998). In assessing partisan affiliation, the survey utilized a standard question: "*Regardless of whether you can vote in U.S. elections, please tell me, in politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?*" Among respondents indicating they are Independents, "something else," or "don't know," they were subsequently asked, "*Do you consider yourself closer to the Republican Party or Democratic Party?*" The survey then combined responses from the latter two questions in the variable *lean*, depicting a respondent's political leaning (Republican, Democratic, Independent, "something else" or "don't know"). While respondents leaned toward parties other than the Democratic or Republican Party, a multivariate analysis including Independent voters was not feasible. A cross-tabulation showed that of the original 4,016 respondents, 4.1% affiliated with "some other" party, 7.1% leaned Independent, 10% "did not know," and 5.9% refused to identify a partisan leaning. Of the two main political parties, however, 47.1% leaned toward the Democratic Party, while 26.1% leaned toward the Republican Party. Consequently, I deleted the observations from the sample for those with a political leaning toward anything other than the Democratic or Republican Party.

Table 3

*Leaned Political Affiliation*

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Republican	1049	26.1	26.1
Democrat	1886	47.0	47.0
Independent	281	7.0	7.0
Something Else	164	4.1	4.1
Don't Know	400	10.0	10.0
Refused	236	5.9	5.9
Total	4016	100.0	100.0

## Independent Variables

While the 2006 Life Survey divided questions into corresponding sections reflecting the nature of the variables (ethnicity, religion, politics, and demographics), I further reorganized the survey questions into six sets of broad casual inputs: affluence, familial status, attachment to the United States, demographics, culture and political attitudes. Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A provide the original survey questions and variables along with a brief description of each variable.

*Affluence*

Previous studies find economic well-being affects the nature and stability of party identification (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2001). In measuring affluence, I incorporated three

questions from the original survey pertaining to economic well-being. From these, I created three dummy variables: *Homeowner*, *Bank\_Account* and *Employed*. The original categorical variable *qn81* reflects a respondent owning or renting the place in which they reside. I recoded *qn81* into the dummy variable *Homeowner*, reflecting whether the respondent is a homeowner, or not. Likewise, the original categorical variable *qn82* asks respondents if they have a bank account. I again recoded this variable into a dummy variable, with *Bank\_Account* reflecting respondents having a bank account, or not. Next, I recoded the original responses regarding employment, *qn65*, into the variable *Employed*. Respondents with a full-time or part-time job were coded 1, with homemakers/stay at home parents, retirees, students, the unemployed and the disabled coded 0. Finally, the original variable *income* identified a range of values indicated by the respondent. Based on these responses, I created an ordinal scale using the midpoint of the range of values in *Income 1*. Since the midpoint from the responses “\$50,000 or more” and “\$200,000 or more” could not be calculated, the values \$60,000 and \$220,000 were utilized. Furthermore, I coded the responses “refused” or “don’t know” as missing.

### *Familial Status*

Variables measuring familial status traditionally evidence in studies examining political attitudes and behavior. Since Latinos are thought to demonstrate more concern for family values than the general population, inputs measuring familial status should serve at minimum as a control, if not a predictor of partisanship. The measurement of familial status formulates from two dummy variables that I recoded from the original

categorical responses used in the 2006 survey. First, the original variable *qn56* was recoded into the dummy variable *Married* where the respondent is married, or not (divorced, separated, widowed, never been married served as the comparison group.)

Next, I also recoded the original variable *qn57* into a dummy variable *Parent*, where parents of a minor living at home are coded 1 (respondents not a parent of a minor living at home served as the comparison group). Again, I coded observations with responses “don’t know” or “refuse” as missing for any of the latter variables.

#### *Attachment to the United States*

In measuring the impact of attachment to the United States, I created five variables: *Citizen*, *Foreign\_Born*, *Yrs\_Living\_US*, *English\_Proficient* and *English\_Primary\_Language*. I created the first variable *Citizen* from the original variable *Combo67* by creating a dummy variable where the respondent is either a citizen, or not. For *Foreign\_Born*, I recoded the original variable where those answering they were born in another country, or Puerto Rico, were coded 1. Those born in the United States were coded 0. Since Puerto Rico is a commonwealth of the United States, the variable *Foreign\_Born* denotes those actually born outside the continental United States. Next, I created *Yrs\_Living\_US*, reflecting the number of years a respondent has lived in the continental United States. In doing this, I combined two original variables, *qn6b* and *q55*. *Qn6b* asks Latinos born outside the continental United States the number of years they have lived in the United States. *Q55* asks respondents their age. For the excluded respondents (those born in the United States) in *qn6b*, I used their age to create the

interval variable *Yrs\_Living\_US*, reflecting length of residency for both natural born citizens and the foreign-born. Next, the original variable *English* combines several questions regarding English language proficiency in speaking and reading. I recoded *English* to *English\_Proficient* where, those speaking/reading English very well (1), pretty well (2), just a little (3), and not at all (4). The 2006 Life Survey created the variable *Primary Language* by combining questions regarding writing and English proficiency in both the English and Spanish language where: respondents are either English dominant, bilingual, or Spanish Dominant. From this variable, I created *English\_Primary\_Language* where respondents with English as their primary language were coded 1 (bilingual and Spanish dominant serve the reference group coded 0).

### *Demographics*

Previous studies incorporate demographic variables serving as controls, although some studies have found them to be predictors of partisanship among the greater Latino population. In this thesis, I created six variables measuring demographic inputs: *Age1*, *Educational\_Attainment*, *Female*, *White*, *Rural* and *Suburban*. First, I included the original variable *qn74* measuring levels of educational attainment, although I renamed it to *Educational\_Attainment* where: a respondent whose highest level of education was “no education” or grade 1-8 (1), high school incomplete (2), high school grad (3), GED (4), business, technical, or vocational school after high school (5), some college, no 4-year degree (6), college graduate (7) and post-graduate training or professional schooling after college (8). From the variable *qns5*, I created the dummy variable *Female* where the

respondent is either a female, or not. I also created a dummy variable *White* from the original variable *qn5* where respondents indicating they are Black/African American, Asian, some other race, or “don’t know” served as the excluded comparison group. Finally, in controlling for geographic location, I created two dummy variables: *Rural* and *Suburban*. I created *Rural* from the original variable *sample14* by re-coding Rural-Non-Metro to 1 (Urban-Center City –Metro, Urban – Center City County-Metro, Suburban-Metro and Suburban-Non-Center City-Metro serving the comparison group). Likewise, for *suburban* I coded Suburban-Metro and Suburban-Non-Center City-Metro as 1 (Rural-Non Metro, Urban-Center City-Metro and Urban-Center City County-Metro served as the excluded comparison group).

### *Culture*

Next, in measuring the impact of cultural inputs, I incorporated variables relating to: religion, family heritage, nativity, language and ethnic descent. Variables examining religion seemed important as previous studies have found them to be statistically significant. Lee and Pachon (2007) also state, “religion has never been foreign to American politics and, in particular, presidential elections in American history” (p. 252). From the original categorical variable *relig*, I created dummy variables: *Catholic*, *Secular* and *Protestant* (Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Other-Non-Christian, and Christian serving as the reference group). I also recoded the variable *qn24* asking how important religion is in the respondent’s life to *Relig\_Importance*, an ordinal scale, where: very important (1), fairly important (2), don’t know (3), not very important



(4). Then, I re-coded the variable *qn23*, measuring how often a respondent attends religious services, to *Relig\_Attendance*. I recoded *Relig\_Attendance* where: those attending services more than once a week (1), once a week (2), one or twice a month (3), a few times a year (4), seldom (5) and never (6). Thereafter, I created another dummy variable, *Relig\_Exposure* from *Relig\_Attendance*, where those who attend religious services more than once a week, only once a week, one to two times weekly were coded 1 (those answering a few times a year, seldom, or never serve as the excluded comparison group). I then created five ordinal variables from *qn49\_a* (*Clergy\_Abortion*), *qn49\_b* (*Clergy\_Homosexual*), *qn49\_c* (*Clergy\_Elections*), *qn49\_d* (*Clergy\_Voting*), *qn49\_e* (*Clergy\_Immigration*), reflecting whether a respondent's religious institution speaks out regarding the issues of abortion, homosexuality, elections, voting and immigration. I coded those answering "yes" (1), "don't know" (2) and no (3). Since the survey asked these questions only of those attending religious services, I did not incorporate the "clergy" variables into the actual regression, but used *Relig\_Exposure* (*Relig\_Exposure\*Clergy\_Abortion...*) to create five dummy variables reflecting all survey respondents' exposure to a religious institution speaking out on the latter issues. These variables include: *Exposure\_Relig\_Abortion*, *Exposure\_Relig\_Homosexual*, *Exposure\_Relig\_Elections*, *Exposure\_Relig\_Vote*, *Exposure\_Relig\_Immigration* where: those with exposure (1), "don't know" (2) and no exposure (3).

Subsequently, I incorporated variables measuring ethnicity as ethnicity potentially reflects differing perceptions of political parties (Coffin, 2003). Empirical studies

demonstrate Latinos view themselves in terms of ethnic groups, preferring identification by a specific nationality (Stokes-Brown, 2006). First, I recoded the categorical variable *qn4*, into three dummy variables: *Mexican\_Family\_Heritage*, *Puerto\_Rican\_Family\_Heritage*, and *Cuban\_Family\_Heritage*. I chose these specific ethnicities to be coded 1 because Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans represent the three largest Latino national groups in the United States (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998). For each of the family heritage dummy variables, Dominican, Salvadoran, “Other Central American,” “Other-South American,” “Europe-various countries” and “other” serve as the reference group. Next, I re-coded the original variable *qn6a* to *Birth\_Country* as the original question only asks foreign-born respondents where they were born. While I did not use *Birth\_Country* as an independent variable, I used it to create three dummy variables: *Mexico\_Foreign\_Born*, *PuertoRico\_Foreign\_Born* and *Cuban\_Foreign\_Born*. The excluded comparison group among nativity variables include respondents born in Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela, French Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad/Caribbean Islands, Italy, Africa, “Other” and the United States. The survey also asked respondents “*Do you think of yourself first as a Country first as a Hispanic/Latino, first as a Religion or first as an American?*” From this variable *qn58* I created *Hispanic\_Latino\_First* where: *Hispanic\_Latino\_First* (1) (a country, a religion, an American, “all four,” “don’t know” serving as the reference

group). I also created the dummy variable *Religion\_First*, where: religion (1) (a country, Hispanic/Latino, an American, “all four,” “don’t know” serving as the reference group).

Lastly among cultural inputs, previous research finds language to be a significant predictor of partisanship and voting behavior (Stokes-Brown, 2006). The variable *Spanish\_Proficient* follows the original variable *spanish*, in which those speaking and reading Spanish very well were coded 1, while those not speaking and reading Spanish well were coded 0. I again deleted responses such as “refused” or “don’t know” for questions relating to family heritage, country of birth, religion, *Spanish\_Proficient*, religious service attendance and those refusing to establish the importance of religion in their life.

#### *Political Attitudes*

Candidate evaluations and opinions on political issues affect political behavior as they are significant in shaping voting (Stokes-Brown, 2004). To measure the affect of political attitudes, I included questions reflective of social conservatism, religion, general issues of the day, the role of government and issues specific to Latinos such as discrimination and immigration.

First, in looking at issues where conservatives and liberals are more likely to have antithetical attitudes I re-coded the following variables: *qn11\_a* (attitude toward the death penalty for persons convicted of murder), *qn11\_b* (government health insurance), *qn11\_c* (gay marriage) and *qn34b* (Catholic Church’s restrictions on divorce) into *Oppose\_Death\_Penalty*, *Gov\_Health\_Insurance*, *Oppose\_Gay\_Marriage*,

*Oppose\_Divorce*. The latter variables reflect attitudes where: favor (1), don't know (2) and oppose (3). In measuring a respondent's views on abortion, I recoded the original variable *qn20*, into an ordinal scale for *Oppose\_Abortion\_Rights* where: legal in all cases (1), legal in most cases (2), don't know (3), illegal in most cases (4), illegal in all cases (5).

The survey asked several questions regarding political attitudes and religion. In the survey, the original variable *qn16* represents whether or not houses of worship or churches should express views on political and social matters. I recoded *qn16* to *Worship*, an ordinal scale, where: houses of worship should keep out (1), "don't know" (2), be able to express their views (3). Along these lines, I also recoded *qn17* to an ordinal scale in *Political\_Leader\_Faith*, where: those indicating that political leaders expressed too much faith (1), right amount (2), too little (3) and those who did not know were deleted from the sample. Finally, in determining the effect of religion on political thinking, I recoded *qn22* to *Relig\_Unimportant* by creating an ordinal scale where, very important (1), somewhat important (2), don't know (3), not too important (4), and not at all important (5).

Finally, in measuring political attitudes, the survey asked questions regarding the role of government and immigration. The survey provided respondents with two statements in which they had to select the statement closest to their own view. I created the dummy variable *Large\_Government* from the original variable *qn18\_a*, in which respondents preferring the statement, "*I'd rather pay higher taxes to support a larger*

*government that provides more services*” were coded 1. Respondents preferring the statement *“I’d rather pay lower taxes and have a smaller government that provides fewer services”* or answering “neither statement,” “both statements equally” or “don’t know” were coded 0. Similarly, from the original variable *qn18\_c*, I created *Poor\_Have\_It\_Easy*, reflecting respondents preferring the statement *“poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing anything in return”* over *“poor people have hard lives because government benefits don’t go far enough to help them live decently.”* Respondents preferring the latter statement or who answered “neither/both equally,” or “don’t know” serve as the reference group. Finally, among these pairs of statements, I recoded the variable *qn18\_e* to *Immigration\_Threat* where respondents preferring the statement *“The growing numbers of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values”* were coded 1. Those preferring the statement *“The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society”* were coded 0. I then recoded the variable *qn18f* to *Immigration\_Protest* where: respondents participated in protests or demonstrations in the past year, or not. The sample does not include observations where respondents answered “don't know” or “refuse.” Finally, the survey also asked respondents questions regarding Latino discrimination in *qn21*. I then recoded responses to an ordinal scale in *Downplay\_Discrimination* where: major problem (1), minor problem (2), don’t know (3) and not a problem (4).

### Hypotheses

After incorporating all of the aforementioned broad causal inputs, the general model of partisanship among conservative Latinos takes the following functional form:

$$PID = F(\textit{Affluence}, \textit{Familial Status}, \textit{Attachment to the United States}, \textit{Demographics}, \textit{Culture}, \textit{Political Attitudes})$$

According to the social identity theory, conservative Latinos may form partisanship based on favorable perceptions of the “in-group.” However, conservative Latinos hold divergent perceptions of what constitutes the “in-group.” Conservatives affiliating with the Democratic Party may develop partisanship based off cues among the broader Latino population, who predominantly affiliate with the Democratic Party. Hence, the conservative Latino voter paradox may be explained by conservative Latinos affiliating with the Democratic Party because culturally, although perhaps implicitly and subconsciously, it is expected. In testing this, I hypothesize the following:

*Hypothesis 1:* Conservative political attitudes will not serve as predictor of partisanship even among conservative Latinos.

*Hypothesis 2:* Political attitudes that are more liberal and specific to Latino issues such as discrimination and attitudes toward immigration will serve a predictor of partisanship with the Democratic Party.

*Hypothesis 3:* Conservative Latinos regarding themselves as Latino/Hispanic first, are more likely to be Democrats.

While the majority of respondents affiliated with the Democratic Party, a substantial number, nevertheless, affiliate with the Republican Party. One would expect

fewer conservative Latino Republicans if partisanship was based solely on the larger Latino community, serving as the “in-group.” I opine that conservative Latinos with higher levels of religiosity view their respective religious institution as the favorable “in-group.” Consequently, I also hypothesize the following:

*Hypothesis 4:* Conservative Latinos with exposure to a place of worship addressing conservative issues are more likely to be Republicans.

*Hypothesis 5:* Conservative Latinos evidencing higher levels of church attendance are more likely to be Republicans.

*Hypothesis 6:* Conservative Latinos identifying themselves in terms of a religion first, are less likely to be Democrats.

### Method

Since the dependent variable for partisanship is a binary variable, based on the respondent’s leaning toward the Democratic or Republican Party, I utilized a logistic regression to determine the effect of each independent variable on the likelihood of affiliating with the Democratic Party. A logistic regression is preferable for binary dependent variables coded 0 or 1. This type of regression is also preferable because it does not assume that explanatory variables are linear and additive to the population. Rather, a logistic regression produces an “S” shape curve suggesting that a one-unit change in an explanatory variable has different effects on the dependent variable depending on the value of the explanatory variable.

While a logistic regression may be preferable over other functional forms, this model produces coefficients that are difficult to interpret because the model is nonlinear. Hence the coefficients  $[\text{Exp}(b)]$ , are transformed into *odds ratios*, or the probability or likelihood of affiliating with the Democratic Party, holding all other variables constant.

Before running the regression, I utilized descriptive statistics to determine the existing sample size after excluding observations with missing values and to determine if a commensurate number of Republicans and Democrats were included in the sample. Since a logistic regression includes a dichotomous dependent variable, it must encompass a commensurate number of observations to avoid skewing the regression results. The remaining sample contained 836 Latinos, with 425 identifying as Republicans and 411 identifying as Democrats. The sample size would have been larger had there not been a significant reduction in size after deleting missing observations for *income*, in which 127 respondents answered “didn’t know” or “refused.” Likewise, due to the large number of respondents indicating they “did not know” if they were registered to vote (68 respondents) or refused to answer the question (377 respondents), this sample includes registered voters, non-registered Latinos and voters with an unknown voter registration status.

In checking for multicollinearity, I examined Pearson’s correlation coefficients through a correlation matrix in addition to the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) found by running a linear regression. I considered variables with a correlation equal or greater to the value of .800 as highly correlated and collinear. I also considered variables with a



VIF equal or greater to the value of 5 as exhibiting collinearity with another variable.

After correcting for multicollinearity by determining which variables to exclude from the regression, to increase each independent variable's predictive ability on the dependent variable, I ran a binary logistic regression.

## Chapter 4

### FINDINGS

In this chapter, I present the descriptive statistics for each of the independent variables (see Appendix A) and discuss in detail the statistics relating to conservative political attitudes. After presenting which variables I excluded after correcting for multicollinearity, I present the logistic regression results finding that 11 variables predict partisanship. Thereafter, I conduct a crosstabulation analysis to better understand the relationship between conservatism and party affiliation. Finally, I examine each of the hypotheses advanced in Chapter 3 to determine whether they can be accepted or rejected.

#### Descriptive Statistics

While this analysis is restricted to respondents identifying themselves as conservatives, the original survey obtained from the Pew Hispanic Center fails to elaborate as to what factors cause these respondents to identify as conservative (i.e. fiscal or social matters). As a result, some of the descriptive statistics discussed below are apposite in ascertaining the extent and dimension of the multi-dimensional concept of conservatism. Table A3 (see Appendix A) presents the descriptive statistics for all of the independent variables integrated into this thesis.

First, in determining conservatism from a religious perspective, the descriptive statistics overwhelmingly attest to the sample displaying high levels of religiosity, consistent with at least one dimension of conservatism. The majority of respondents maintain a denominational affiliation with a religious tradition in which 49.4% (555)

identified as Catholics and 36.1% identified as Protestants (406). While simple denominational affiliation is not necessarily connotative of the extent of a person's religiosity, it is apparent that religion is at least consequential within this sample. Approximately 77.9% of respondents (879) indicated religion is "very" important in their life compared to 15.8% (178) indicating it is "fairly" important in their life. Taken together, 93.7% of respondents believe religion is either "very" or "fairly" important compared to a marginal 6% (68) of respondents answering religion was "not very" important. Similarly, 57.6% (650) of respondents attend religious services either weekly or more than once a week. When asked about the importance of religion in influencing political thinking, 76.2% indicated it was either "very" or "somewhat" important. Only 22.4% (253) indicated it was "not too important" or "not at all important." From this data, I would expect that many respondents within this sample are socially conservative seeing the conspicuous impact of religious institutions.

More telling, however, than reiterating the affect of religious traditions on Latinos remains the political attitudes that religion, generally speaking, would impress upon. In this sample, the majority believe abortion should be *illegal* in all (36.3%) or most cases (30.2%). Only 22.8% believe it should be *legal* in most cases and 8.6% believe it should be *legal* in all cases. Taken together, 66.5% lean more toward opposing abortion, while 31.4% depict more liberal attitudes on the issue. Similarly, conservative Latinos express social conservatism through their attitudes toward gay marriage. Respondents in this sample overwhelmingly oppose gay marriage. Approximately, 73.8% oppose gay

marriage in comparison to the marginal 18.1% (200) favoring it. It is also noteworthy that while conservatives display high levels of conservatism regarding abortion and gay marriage, of those indicating they attend religious services, 65.3% (676) indicate their clergy speaks out regarding the issue of abortion, while 48% indicate their clergy speaks out on the issue of homosexuality. Those attending religious services where their clergy does not speak out about homosexuality presented a negative correlation of -0.106 between those opposing gay marriage. The same was true of those attending a religious service where the clergy did not address views on the issue of abortion. The correlation between those attending a religious service where the clergy did not speak out on the issue was negatively correlated at -0.118 with those with more conservative attitudes on the issue abortion.

While respondents in this sample overwhelmingly exhibit social conservatism with respect to abortion and gay marriage, a greater division exists regarding the Catholic Church's restrictions on divorce and attitudes involving the death penalty. In this case, 45.2% favor restrictions on divorce (504), while 42.2% oppose such restrictions (471). Likewise, 50.3% favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder (563), while 43.5% (487) oppose it.

When respondents were asked to express their view of the role of government by indicating their preference between the following statements: *"Poor people have hard lives because government benefits don't go far enough to help them live decently"* or *"Poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing*

*anything in return,*” 71.7% preferred the former statement. Only 28.3% preferred the latter statement or answered “neither/both equally” “don’t know.” This runs parallel to 64.5% of respondents preferring a larger government even if it entails paying higher taxes.

### Multicollinearity

In checking for multicollinearity, I examined Pearson’s correlation coefficients and the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) by running a linear regression. I found three sets of variables, all among cultural inputs, to exhibit multicollinearity that if uncorrected could limit the independent variable’s predictive ability on the dependent variable.

The correlation matrix indicated that *Cuban\_Foreign\_Born* was highly correlated with *Cuban\_Family\_Heritage* with a correlation coefficient of 0.947, above the cut-off value of 0.800. Hence, I dropped *Cuban\_Foreign\_Born* from the equation, as *Cuban\_Family\_Heritage* captures both foreign-born respondents and a respondent born in the United States whose ethnicity is Cuban. The correlation matrix also showed a high correlation of -0.820 between *Spanish\_Proficient* and *English\_Primary\_Language*. Consequently, I omitted *Spanish\_Proficient* from the regression.

The linear regression also indicated the existence of two independent variables with a VIF greater than 5. *Catholic* had a VIF of 5.983, while *Protestant* had a VIF of 5.860. As a result, I excluded *Catholic* from the regression. After excluding all of the aforementioned variables, I re-ran the linear regression. The results showed that VIFs for

each remaining independent variable remained below the value of 5, indicating I had sufficiently corrected for the problem of multicollinearity.

The results from the logistic regression demonstrate a “good fit” referring to how well the estimated values by the regression reflect the actual values. For a logistic regression, the model is “good” if predictions are greater than 50%. The classification table found in Table B1 (see Appendix B) evinces that this model predicts a person is Democrat 75.7% of the time, and that a person is a Republican 65.2% of the time. Overall, it indicates that this model is able to predict the dependent variable correctly 70.3% of the time. Additionally, the Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients indicates a Chi-Square value of 215.130, the Cox and Snell R-Squared a value of 0.227, and the Nagelkerke R-Squared a value of 0.303, further demonstrating this model fits well (Table B1).

### Hypotheses Testing

The regression results depicted in Table B2 (see Appendix B) indicate eleven variables were significant. Of cultural inputs, four variables were significant: *Cuban\_Family\_Heritage*, *Mexican\_Family\_Heritage*, *Exposure\_Religion\_Immigration* and *Hispanic\_Latino\_First*. First, Latino conservatives identifying their family heritage as Cuban are less likely to be Democrats. This is consistent with previous literature finding that the Cuban population as a whole is more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2007; Dutwin et al., 2005; Kelly & Kelly, 2007; Nicholson et al., 2005). Interestingly, Latino conservatives identifying their family heritage as Mexican

are less likely to be Democrats, which runs counter to the larger Mexican-American population. Next, respondents with exposure to a religious institution speaking out on the issue of immigration were less likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party. Respondents answering the question, “*Do you think of yourself first as a [Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican...] first as a Hispanic/Latino, first as a [Catholic, Protestant...], or first as an American?*” as “Hispanic/Latino,” increased their probability of affiliating with the Democratic Party.

Of affluence inputs, only one variable was significant, *Income1*. Increases in income slightly decreased a conservative Latinos likelihood of affiliating with the Democratic Party. Of demographic inputs, only one variable was significant, *Age1*. Latino conservatives are more likely to increase their odds of affiliating with the Democratic Party with increases in age.

Only two of the political attitudes measuring views generally indicative of social conservatism predicted partisanship. Such attitudes include abortion, the death penalty, divorce, gay marriage, attendance to religious services, those indicating religion is very important to them and those indicating religion influences their political thinking. Respondents opposing the death penalty (*Oppose\_Death\_Penalty*) were more likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party, while respondents opposing gay marriage, as expressed in *Oppose\_Gay\_Marriage*, were less likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party. This suggests that socially conservative political attitudes mostly fail to move conservative Latinos in party affiliation.

Another variable measuring political attitudes, *Poor\_Have\_It\_Easy* also predicted partisanship. Individuals preferring the statement “*poor people have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing anything in return*” over “*poor people have hard lives because government benefits don’t go far enough to help them live decently*” decreased their probability of affiliating with the Democratic Party as did individuals higher on the scale asserting that discrimination is unproblematic among Latinos, as expressed in *Downplay\_Discrimination*. Finally, conservative Latinos asserting religion as important in influencing their political thinking, as found in *Relig\_Unimportant*, decreased their odds of affiliating with the Democratic Party.

In comparing the relevant magnitudes of each significant dummy variable (Table B2), the strongest predictive variable is *Cuban\_Family\_Heritage*. Respondents identifying their family heritage as Cuban decreased their likelihood of affiliating with the Democratic Party by 88%. The second strongest predictor of partisanship among dummy variables is *Mexican\_Family\_Heritage*. Respondents identifying their family heritage as Mexican decreased their probability of affiliating with the Democratic Party by 47%. Respondents identified under *Hispanic\_Latino\_First*, increased their probability of affiliating with the Democratic Party by 46.4%. Next, in *Poor\_Have\_It\_Easy*, respondents believing the government does too much to help the poor decrease their likelihood of affiliating with the Democratic Party by 37.10%. Finally, respondents who were exposed to a religious institution speaking out on the issue of immigration, as



expressed in *Exposure\_Relig\_Immigration*, decreased their odds of affiliating with the Democratic Party by 22.60%.

Among the four significant variables reflecting an ordinal scale, the variable with the greatest magnitude presented as *Oppose\_Death\_Penalty*. Respondents opposing the death penalty for persons convicted of murder increased their probability of affiliating with the Democratic Party by 39.7%. Subsequently, respondents opposing gay marriage (*Oppose\_Gay\_Marriage*) decreased their probability of affiliating with the Democratic Party by 24.40%. Next, respondents downplaying discrimination (*Downplay\_Discrimination*) among Latinos decreased their likelihood of affiliating with the Democratic Party by 22.5%. Finally, the variable *Relig\_Unimportant* maintained the smallest magnitude with those asserting religion is unimportant in influencing their political thinking increasing their odds of affiliating with the Democratic Party by 15.6%.

Next, for *AgeI*, an interval variable, the results show a 1.6% change in likelihood of affiliating with the Democratic Party for each one-year change in age. Since a logistic regression is non-linear, the exact change in likelihood over time varies over the range of the variable, although it remains significant. This is also the same for *IncomeI*, another interval variable, where each \$1 increase in annual income produces a -0.10% change in affiliating with the Democratic Party. As with *AgeI*, the exact change in predicted probability is not directly proportional to changes in *AgeI* due to the “S” shaped curve of the model.

### Crosstabulations

In this section, I use a crosstabulation analysis to more fully understand the relationship between party affiliation and the moral attitudes of abortion, the death penalty, divorce, gay marriage, levels of religious service attendance, the importance of religion and the impact of religion in influencing political thinking.

To determine the relationship of respondent's asserting that the Democratic Party could do a better job in improving morality, despite holding social values more in line with the Republican Party, I ran a cross-tabulation of *Dem\_Morality* with other independent variables ostensibly reflective of conservatism: *Oppose\_Abortion\_Rights*, *Oppose\_Death\_Penalty*, *Oppose\_Divorce*, *Oppose\_Gay\_Marriage*, *Relig\_Attendance*, *Relig\_Importance* and *Relig\_Unimportant*. I also included *Clergy\_Abortion* and *Clergy\_Homosexual*, although I only used these variables to create the "religious exposure variables" and did not integrate them as independent variables in the regression. Additionally, I ran a crosstabulation of each of the latter variables with the dependent variable *Democrat*. The cross tabulation below only include respondents not excluded as "missing" for any of the incorporated variables.

First, with respect to *Oppose\_Abortion\_Rights*, of the 742 respondents believing abortion should be *illegal* in all or most cases, 42% (311) of them believe the Democratic Party could do a better job in improving morality in this country (Table 4).

Table 4

Crosstabulation of *Oppose\_Abortion\_Rights* and *Dem\_Morality*

	Republicans Better at Improving Morality; “Neither,” “Don’t Know,” “Both”	Democrats Better at Improving Morality	% Believing Democrats Better at Improving Morality	Total
1: Legal in all cases	59	37	39%	96
2: Legal in most cases	151	100	40%	251
3: Don't know	11	12	52%	23
4: Illegal in most cases	208	128	38%	336
5: Illegal in all cases	223	183	42%	406
Total	652	460	-	1,112

Likewise, 47% (159) of respondents believing that abortion should be *illegal* in most cases leaned toward the Democratic Party, similar to the 56% (228) believing abortion should be *illegal* in all cases (Table A2). Together, 52% (387) of respondents believing that abortion should be *illegal* in all or most cases lean toward the Democratic Party (Table 5).

Table 5

Crosstabulation of *Oppose\_Abortion\_Rights* and *Democrat*

	Republican	Democratic	% Democrats	Total
1: Legal in all cases	52	44	46%	96
2: Legal in most cases	121	134	53%	255
3: Don't know	5	20	80%	25
4: Illegal in most cases	179	159	47%	338
5: Illegal in all cases	178	228	56%	406
Total	535	585	-	1120

Among the respondents answering survey questions pertaining to gay marriage and the party that could better handle issues of morality, 74% (813) opposed gay marriage. Of this percentage, 38% (309) believed that the Democratic Party is better in improving morality in this country (Table 6).

Table 6

Crosstabulation of *Oppose\_Gay\_Marriage* and *Dem\_Morality*

	Republicans Better at Improving Morality; “Neither,” “Don’t Know,” “Both”	Democrats Better at Improving Morality	% Believing Democrats Better at Improving Morality	Total
1: Favor	93	105	53%	198
2: Don't know	49	39	44%	88
3: Oppose	504	309	38%	813
Total	646	453	-	1,099

Among the respondents answering questions pertaining to gay marriage and their party affiliation, 83% (917) opposed gay marriage. Of this percentage, 42% (385) leaned or affiliated with the Democratic Party.

Table 7

Crosstabulation of *Oppose\_Gay\_Marriage* and *Democrat*

	Republican	Democrat	% Democrat	Total
1: Favor	69	131	66%	200
2: Don't know	34	56	62%	90
3: Oppose	432	385	42%	917
Total	535	572		1,107

Of the 499 respondents favoring the Catholic Church’s restrictions on divorce, 37% (185) maintained that the Democratic Party is better at improving morality (Table 8).

Table 8

Crosstabulation of *Oppose\_Divorce* and *Dem\_Morality*

	Republicans Better at Improving Morality; “Neither,” “Don’t Know,” “Both”	Democrats Better at Improving Morality	% Believing Democrats Better at Improving Morality	Total
1: Favor Catholic Church’s Restrictions	314	185	37%	499
2: Don't know	94	44	32%	138
3: Oppose Catholic Church’s Restrictions	241	228	49%	469
Total	649	457		1,106

Of the 45% (504) respondents favoring the Catholic Church’s restrictions on divorce, 50% of them (253) leaned toward the Democratic Party (Table 9).

Table 9

Crosstabulation of *Oppose\_Divorce* and *Democrat*

	Republican	Democrat	% Democrats	Total
1: Favor Catholic Church's Restrictions	251	253	50%	504
2: Don't Know	73	67	48%	140
3: Oppose Catholic Church's Restrictions	208	263	56%	471
Total	532	583		1,115

Of those favoring the death penalty, 36% (200) believe the Democratic Party is more adept at improving morality. Likewise, of those opposing the death penalty, 49% (235) believe that the Democratic Party is better in improving morality, while 51% (248) are in the reference group (Table 10). Those opposing the death penalty viewing it as a “moral issue” may explain the number of respondents opposing the death penalty and asserting that the Democratic Party could do a better job at improving morality. Since the Democratic Party is more likely to lean toward opposing the death penalty, it makes sense as to why more respondents opposing the death penalty would think that the Democratic Party could do a better job at improving morality than those favoring it.

Table 10

Crosstabulation of *Oppose\_Death\_Penalty* and *Dem\_Morality*

	Republicans Better at Improving Morality; “Neither,” “Don’t Know,” “Both”	Democrats Better at Improving Morality	% Believing Democrats Better at Improving Morality	Total
1: Favor	360	200	36%	560
2: Don’t Know	42	27	39%	69
3: Oppose	248	235	49%	483
Total	650	462	-	1,112

Further supporting the assumption that support or opposition to the death penalty may be viewed as a moral issue is the significantly large number of conservative Latinos opposing the death penalty also leaning toward the Democratic Party (62%) and the 42% of respondents leaning toward the Democratic Party that favor the death penalty (Table 11).



Table 11

Crosstabulation of *Oppose\_Death\_Penalty* and *Democrat*

	Republican	Democrat	% Democrat	Total
1: Favor	325	238	42%	563
2: Don't Know	24	45	65%	69
3: Oppose	184	303	62%	487
Total	533	586		1119

In looking at the cross-tabulation, of 1,120 respondents answering this question, 58% (644) respondents attend religious services either more than once a week or once a week, indicating a high level of religiosity. While only 39% (253) of the latter believe that the Democratic Party is better in improving morality, this number seems quite large considering the level of church attendance (Table 12).

Table 12

Crosstabulation of *Relig\_Attendance* and *Dem\_Morality*

	Republicans Better at Improving Morality; “Neither,” “Don’t Know,” “Both”	Democrats Better at Improving Morality	% Believing Democrats Better at Improving Morality	Total
1:More than once a week	171	100	37%	271
2: Once a week	220	153	41%	373
3:Once or twice a month	85	70	45%	155
4:Few times a year	74	55	43%	129
5:Seldom	53	49	48%	102
6:Never	55	35	39%	90
Total	658	462	-	1,120

Similarly, the number of respondents leaning toward the Democratic Party (50%) that attend religious services more than once a week, or at least once a week, seems high. Among Anglos, greater levels of church attendance positively correlate with an affiliation toward the Republican Party (Table 13).

Table 13

Crosstabulation of *Relig\_Attendance* and Democrat

	Republican	Democrat	% Democrat	Total
1:More than once a week	132	141	52%	273
2: Once a week	191	186	49%	377
3:Once or twice a month	69	87	56%	156
4:Few times a year	60	69	54%	129
5:Seldom	46	57	55%	103
6:Never	41	50	55%	91
Total	658	462		1,120

Out of 1,120 respondents answering the question regarding the role of religion in their life, 94% (1,049) indicated that religion is either “very” important or “fairly” important in their life. Only 6% (67) respondents indicated it was “not very” important, while less than 1% (4) indicated they “didn’t know.” Of those indicating religion is “very” important, 42% (365) asserted that the Democratic Party is better at improving morality, while 58% (507) comprised the reference group. Of those asserting religion is “fairly” important, 41% (73) believed the Democratic Party is better at improving morality, while 59% (104) comprised the reference group (Table 14).

Table 14

Crosstabulation of *Relig\_Importance* and *Dem\_Morality*

	Republicans Better at Improving Morality; “Neither,” “Don’t Know,” “Both”	Democrats Better at Improving Morality	% Believing Democrats Better at Improving Morality	Total
1: Very Important	507	365	42%	872
2: Fairly Important	104	73	41%	177
3: Don’t Know	0	4	100%	4
4: Not Very Important	46	21	31%	67
Total	657	463		1,120

Again, among respondents asserting that religion is “very” or “fairly” important in their lives, the percentage leaning toward the Democratic Party seemed high. Of those indicating it was “very” important, 52% (461) leaned toward the Democratic Party, similar to the 51% (91) leaning toward the Democratic Party indicating religion is “fairly” important (Table 15).

Table 15

Crosstabulation of *Relig\_Importance* and *Democrat*

	Republicans	Democrat	% Democrats	Total
1: Very Important	418	461	52%	879
2: Fairly Important	87	91	51%	178
3: Don't Know	0	4	100%	4
4: Not Very Important	35	33	49%	68
Total	540	589		1,129

Finally, in gauging the importance of religion in influencing political attitudes in *Relig\_Unimportant*, 52% (576) of respondents answering this question indicated religion is “very” important in influencing their political thinking, while 25% (276) indicated it is “fairly” important in influencing their political thinking. Of those indicating it is “very” or “fairly” important, 40% (348) believe that the Democratic Party could do a better job at improving morality while 59% (504) constituted the reference group (Table 16).

Table 16

Crosstabulation of *Relig\_Unimportant* and *Dem\_Morality*

	Republicans Better at Improving Morality; “Neither Party Better,” “Don’t Know,” “Both”	Democrats Better at Improving Morality	% Believing Democrats Better at Improving Morality	Total
1:Very Important	359	217	38%	576
2:Somewhat Important	145	131	40%	276
3:Don’t Know	10	5	33%	15
4:Not Too Important	56	50	47%	106
5:Not at all Important	88	58	40%	146
Total	658	461	-	1,119

Of those respondents indicating that religion is “very” important in influencing their political thinking, 49% (283) leaned toward the Democratic Party. Of those indicating it was “somewhat” important, 57% (158) leaned toward the Democratic Party. Together, 51% (441) of respondents indicating religion was “very” or “somewhat” important in influencing their political thinking leaned toward the Democratic Party (Table 17).

Table 17

Crosstabulation of *Relig\_Unimportant* and *Democrat*

	Republican	Democrat	% Democrats	Total
1:Very Important	299	283	49%	582
2:Somewhat Important	120	158	57%	278
3:Don't Know	6	9	60%	15
4:Not Too Important	47	59	56%	106
5:Not at all Important	68	79	54%	147
Total	540	588	-	1,128

In sum, the crosstabulations demonstrate that a significant percentage of conservative Latinos lean toward the Democratic Party and believe that the Democratic Party is better in dealing with morality, despite holding political attitudes associated with the Republican Party. This is true of those believing abortion should be illegal in “all” or “most” cases, those opposing gay marriage, those favoring the Catholic Church’s restrictions on divorce, those attending religious services regularly, those asserting the important of religion, and those indicating the religion influences their political thinking.

#### Hypotheses

The hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 include those based on the social identity theory suggesting that conservative Latinos are Democrats because the Latino population

as a whole overwhelmingly affiliates with the Democratic Party. Under this theory, the Democratic Party serves as the “in-group” to which Latinos seek to belong. These hypotheses include:

*Hypothesis 1:* Conservative political attitudes will not serve as a predictor of partisanship even among conservative Latinos.

*Hypothesis 2:* Political attitudes that are more liberal and specific to Latino issues, such as discrimination and attitudes toward immigration, will serve as a predictor of partisanship with the Democratic Party.

*Hypothesis 3:* Conservative Latinos regarding themselves to be Latino/Hispanic first, are more likely to be Democrats.

While most political attitudes affiliated with conservatism were not predictors of partisanship (abortion, divorce, levels of religious service attendance) two variables reflective of conservatism were: *Oppose\_Gay\_Marriage* and *Oppose\_Death\_Penalty*. As a result, Hypothesis 1 is largely unsupported.

There was also one variable indicative of an issue specific to Latinos that predicted partisanship, namely *Downplay\_Discrimination*. The variables *Immigration\_Threat* and *Immigration\_Protest* did not predict partisanship. Rather, respondents higher on the scale indicating that discrimination was not an issue among Latinos were less likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party than those believing it is an issue. Consequently, this suggests that Hypothesis 2 is partially supported.



Finally in examining Hypothesis 3, the variable *Latino\_Hispanic* served as a predictor partisanship. Since this variable was significant, Hypothesis 3 can be accepted.

In determining whether conservative Latinos see themselves as part of an “in-group” different from the “in-group” affiliating with the Democratic Party, the hypotheses presented below assume that Latinos with higher levels of religiosity see their respective “religious circle” as the desirable “in-group.”

*Hypothesis 4:* Conservative Latinos with exposure to a place of worship addressing conservative issues are more likely to be Republicans.

*Hypothesis 5:* Conservative Latinos evidencing higher levels of church attendance are more likely to be Republicans.

*Hypothesis 6:* Conservative Latinos identifying themselves in terms of a religion first, are more likely to be Republicans.

Only one of the five “religious exposure” variables for Hypothesis 4 predicted partisanship, namely *Exposure\_Relig\_Immigration*. Hence, Hypothesis 4 receives weak support, at best. In retrospect, however, it is unknown whether places of worship are advocating liberal or conservative views on immigration. The test of Hypothesis 4 is therefore inconclusive.

The variable, *Relig\_Attendance*, measuring levels of religious service attendance was not significant, demonstrating that Hypothesis 5 can be rejected.

Finally, *Religion\_First* was not significant, meaning that conservative Latinos identifying themselves in terms of a religion, first, did not predict partisanship. Based on the latter findings, Hypothesis 6 can be rejected.

In conclusion, the findings suggest that Latino conservatives do not see themselves as part of an “in-group” based upon their religious affiliation, but many do see themselves as affiliating with the “in-group” of the Democratic Party. This evidence is consistent with the social identity theory. Under this theory, conservative Latinos seek to affiliate with the Democratic Party because it is the “in-group” of the Latino population at large. So, while conservative political attitudes largely fail to predict partisanship among conservative Latinos, a more liberal issue specific to Latinos such as discrimination and a strong identity as being Hispanic/Latino first, do predict partisanship with the Democratic Party, as shown in Hypothesis 2. Additionally, the crosstabulations provided in this chapter further support this interpretation, as a significant number of conservative Latinos with commensurate conservative political attitudes affiliate or lean toward the Democratic Party, or believe the Democratic Party is better at improving morality in this country despite holding views that seem to indicate they would be more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party.

## Chapter 5

### CONCLUSION

A significant number of Latinos affiliate with the Democratic Party despite many Latinos holding conservative political attitudes. In response to my research question, “what makes conservative Latinos affiliate with the Democratic Party,” the logistic regression offers some clues. Conservative Latinos are less likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party if they are of Cuban and Mexican family heritage, have higher incomes, downplay discrimination among Latinos, oppose gay marriage, have exposure to religious institutions speaking out on the issue of immigration, and believe that the poor have it easy because of their access to public assistance. Further, conservative Latinos are more likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party if they are older, oppose the death penalty, assert religion is unimportant in influencing their political thinking, and believe they are “Hispanic/Latino” first.

I was able to accept two hypotheses in testing the social identity theory, recapitulated as: *Political attitudes that are more liberal and specific to Latino issues, such as discrimination, will serve as a predictor of partisanship with the Democratic Party and Conservative Latinos regarding themselves to be Latino/Hispanic first, are more likely to be Democrats.* In addition to the latter hypothesis, two other factors lend support to the social identity theory advanced in Chapter 3. Aside from the political attitudes including the death penalty and gay marriage, none of the other factors often indicative of conservatism predicted partisanship. Specifically, Protestantism, attitudes

toward abortion, levels of religious attendance, attitudes toward divorce, and the importance of religion failed to predict partisanship even among a sample of Latinos self-identifying as conservatives. This is telling as the majority of respondents in this sample oppose gay marriage and abortion, favor the Catholic Church's restrictions on divorce, attend religious services regularly, assert the importance of religion in influencing their political thinking, and favor the death penalty. Yet, many still assert that the Democratic Party is better at improving morality in this country. This remains ironic as the Republican Party paints itself as showing more concern with the specific moral issues espoused by conservative Latinos. It also suggests that Republican attempts to woo conservative Latinos will remain ineffective if courtship is based on the belief that the Republican Party can capture Latinos by simply educating them about the Party's platform, as Republican strategists have asserted in the past.

#### Political Implications

These findings suggest that the conservatism espoused by Latino conservatives will have little bearing in determining party affiliation, which in turn translates into little bearing on the policies implemented by elected officials voted-in by Latino voters. This of course assumes that a large portion of conservative Latino voters fail to engage in "swing voting." Hence, as previous studies have shown, attempts by the Republican Party to court *conservative* Latinos based on *conservative* values remain generally fruitless, as well as secondary factors including increases in socioeconomic status actuated through education and income.

With recent population projections evidencing that the Latino population will continue to grow significantly in coming years, their influence on American political institutions will grow commensurately. If Latinos vote according to party lines, and if demographic and political characteristics of this population remain unchanged, one would expect the division of partisanship among conservative Latinos to remain. Consequently, the impact of conservative Latinos on public policies is not likely to render shifts toward one party over another; however, population growth with respect to non-conservative Latinos will likely engender increasing support toward the Democratic Party and the paradox of conservative Latino voters will remain.

One potential shift that could, however, induce more conservative Latinos to affiliate with the Democratic Party remains discrimination. The recent passage of legislation in Arizona referred to as “the nation’s toughest law” on immigration (Archibold, 2010) could potentially cause a shift in the number of Latinos believing discrimination among Latinos is a current problem. Arizona has both a large Latino and an estimated 460,000 illegal immigrants (Cooper, 2010).

Under this law, immigrants are required to carry immigration papers with them at all times. Failure to do so is a criminal offense (Archibold, 2010). Other components of the law include fining businesses hiring illegal employees and allowing citizens within Arizona to sue government agencies if it is believe that federal or state immigration laws are not being enforced (Archibold, 2010). The law also creates tougher restrictions for hiring day laborers and knowing transporting illegal immigrants (Cooper, 2010).

Not only has this law engendered controversy in Arizona, it has also caused a national and international uproar with President Obama calling it “misguided” (Cooper, 2010) and Mexican President Felipe Calderon condemning its passage (Cooper, 2010). Most of the concerns expressed toward the law encompass fears of racial profiling directed toward the Latino population and many believe that all Latinos, even those here legally, will become unjust targets of the police. While many Latinos have already voiced opposition to this law, only time will tell its magnitude and if conservative Latinos are to weaken their existing ties with the Republican Party as a result.

#### Further Research

While this thesis incorporates the Democratic Party as the dependent variable, additional research should determine the extent to which conservative Latinos actually align their vote with their partisanship leaning or affiliation due to the “swing voter” label. Further examination should determine whether conservative Latinos translate their affiliation with the Democratic Party into a vote for a Democratic candidate at the ballot box. This is an important distinction, as it remains unknown as to the percentage of conservative Latinos who actually cross party lines when voting.

Likewise, further analysis should incorporate and develop a more comprehensive survey comprising only conservative Latinos with a large enough sample size to make such a study nationally representative. Included questions should measure the multi-dimensional concept of conservatism including questions regarding fiscal conservatism.

Additional studies should also differentiate among conservative Latinos registered to vote and non-registered conservative Latinos.

## APPENDICES



## APPENDIX A

## Background Data and Descriptive Statistics

Table A1

*List of Survey Questions and Recoded Variables*

ORIGINAL VARIABLE:	NEW VARIABLE:	ORIGINAL QUESTION:
Dependent Variable:		
• <i>lean</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	“Regardless of whether you can vote in U.S. elections, please tell me, in politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?”
Affluence Inputs:		
• <i>qn81</i>	<i>Homeowner</i>	“Do you own the place where you live or do you pay rent?”
• <i>qn82</i>	<i>Bank_Account</i>	“Do you have an account with a bank or not?”
• <i>qn65</i>	<i>Employed</i>	What is your employment status? Are you...Employed full time; Employed part time; A homemaker or stay at home parent; Retired; A student; Unemployed; Laid off; Disabled
• <i>income</i>	<i>Income</i>	“Is your total annual household income from all sources, and before taxes...?”
Familial Status Inputs:		
• <i>qn56</i>	<i>Married</i>	“Are you married, divorced, separated, widowed, or never been married?”
• <i>qn67</i>	<i>Parent</i>	“Are you the parent or guardian of any children under 18 now living in your household?”
Attachment to the United States Inputs:		
• <i>Combo 67</i>	<i>Citizen</i>	“Are you currently a citizen of the United States, or not?”
• <i>qn6</i>	<i>Foreign_Born</i>	“Were you born in the United States, the island of Puerto Rico or in another country?”
• <i>qn6b</i> • <i>q55</i>	<i>Yrs_Living_US</i>	“In what country were you born?” (only asked of those not born in U.S. or Puerto Rico); “What is your age?”
• <i>English (engspk) + (engrd)</i>	<i>English_Proficient</i>	“Would you say you can carry on a conversation in English, understanding and speaking, --very well, pretty well, just a little, or not at all?” AND “Would you say you can read a newspaper or book in English—very well, pretty well, just a little, or not at all?”

Table A1 continued

ORIGINAL VARIABLE:	NEW VARIABLE:	ORIGINAL QUESTION:
<b>Attachment to the United States Inputs:</b>		
• <i>Primary Language</i>	<i>English_Primary_Language</i>	Spnspk + Spnrd Engspk + Engrd
• <i>qn75</i> • <i>qn76</i>	<i>Parents_Foreign_Born</i>	“Were either of your parents born in Puerto Rico?” “Were either of your parents born outside the US?”
<b>Demographic Inputs:</b>		
• <i>qn55</i>	<i>Age</i>	“What is your age?”
• <i>qn74</i>	<i>Educational_Attainment</i>	“What is the lat grade or class that you completed in school - Post-graduate training or professional schooling after college; College graduate; Some college, no 4-year degree; Business, technical, or vocational school after high school; GED; High school grad; High school incomplete (grades 9-11); None, or grade 1-8.
• <i>qns5</i>	<i>Female</i>	Gender recorded from survey taker
• <i>qn5</i>	<i>White</i>	“What race do you consider yourself to be? White, black or African-American, Asian, or some other race?”
• <i>MSC: Metro Status</i>	<i>Rural Suburban</i>	MSC: Metro Status (determined by survey not respondent)
<b>Cultural Inputs:</b>		
• <i>relig</i>	• <i>Secular</i> • <i>Protestant</i> • <i>Catholic</i>	“What is your religion – Catholic, Evangelical or Protestant Christian, Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, or an orthodox church such as the Greek or Russian Orthodox Church?”
• <i>qn22</i>	<i>Relig_Importance</i>	“How important would you say religion is in your own life – very important, fairly important, or not very important?”
• <i>Reli_Attendance</i>	<i>Relig_Attendance</i>	“Aside from wedding and funerals how often do you attend religious services...more than once a week, once a week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, seldom, or never?”
• <i>qn49_a</i>	<i>Clergy_Abortion</i>	“On another subject, does the clergy at your place of worship ever speak out...on the issue of abortion?”
• <i>qn49_b</i>	<i>Clergy_Homosexual</i>	“On another subject, does the clergy at your place of worship ever speak out...about laws regarding homosexuality?”
• <i>qn49_c</i>	<i>Clergy_Elections</i>	“On another subject, does the clergy at your place of worship ever speak out...about candidates and elections?”
• <i>qn49_d</i>	<i>Clergy_Voting</i>	“On another subject, does the clergy at your place of worship ever speak out...on the importance of voting?”

Table A1 continued

ORIGINAL VARIABLE:	NEW VARIABLE:	ORIGINAL QUESTION:
<b>Cultural Inputs:</b>		
•qn49_e	<i>Clergy_Immigration</i>	“On another subject, does the clergy at your place of worship ever speak out...about laws regarding immigration?”
•qn4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<i>Mexican_Family_Heritage</i></li> <li>•<i>PuertoRican_Family_Heritage</i></li> <li>•<i>Cuban_Family_Heritage</i></li> </ul>	“Now I want to ask you about you and your family’s heritage. Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran or are you and your ancestors from another country? Which do you identify more with?”
•qn6a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<i>Mexico_Foreign_Born</i></li> <li>•<i>PuertoRico_Foreign_Born</i></li> <li>•<i>Cuba_Foreign_Born</i></li> </ul>	In what country were you born?
•qn58	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<i>Hispanic_Latino_First</i></li> <li>•<i>Religion_First</i></li> </ul>	“Do you think of yourself first as a COUNTRY first as a HISPANIC/LATINO, first as a RELIGION or first as an American?”
• <i>Spanish</i> (spnspk) + (spnrd)	<i>Spanish_Proficient</i>	“Would you say you can carry on a conversation in Spanish, both understanding and speaking, --very well, pretty well, just a little, or not at all?” AND “Would you say you can read a newspaper or book in Spanish – very well, pretty well, just a little, or not at all?”
<b>Political Attitudes Inputs:</b>		
•qn11_a	<i>Oppose_Death_Penalty</i>	“All in all, do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?”
•qn11_b	<i>Gov_Health_Insur</i>	All in all, do you favor or oppose the U.S. government guaranteeing health insurance for all citizens, even if it means raising taxes?
•qn18_a	<i>Large_Government</i>	“Now I’m going to read you some pairs of statements that will help us understand how you feel about a number of things. As I read each pair, tell me whether the first statement or the second statement comes closer to your own views – even if neither is exactly right. The first pair is...1) I’d rather pay higher taxes to support a large government that provides more services, or 2) I’d rather pay lower taxes and have a smaller government that provides fewer services.”
•qn34b	<i>Oppose_Abortion_Rights</i>	On another subject, do you think abortion should be legal in all cases, legal in most cases, illegal in most cases, or illegal in all cases?”
•qn34b	<i>Oppose_Divorce</i>	“Do you approve or disapprove of the Catholic Church’s restrictions on divorce?”
•qn11_c	<i>Oppose_Gay_Marriage</i>	All in all, do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?

Table A1 continued

ORIGINAL VARIABLE:	NEW VARIABLE:	ORIGINAL QUESTION:
Political Attitudes Inputs:		
• <i>qn18_c</i>	<i>Poor_Have_It_Easy</i>	“Now I’m going to read you some pairs of statements that will help us understand how you feel about a number of things. As I read each pair, tell me whether the first statement or the second statement comes closer to your own views – even if neither is exactly right. The first pair is... 1) Poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing anything in return, or 2) Poor people have hard lives because government benefits don’t go far enough to help them live decently.”
• <i>qn22</i>	<i>Relig_Unimportant</i>	“Generally speaking, how important are your religious beliefs in influencing your political thinking? Would you say our religious beliefs are a very important influence on your political thinking, somewhat important, not too important or not at all important?”
• <i>qn16</i>	<i>Worship</i>	“In your opinion should churches and other houses of worship keep out of political matters – or should they express their views on day-to-day social and political questions?”
• <i>qn19_e</i>	<i>Immigration_Threat</i>	“Now I’m going to read you some pairs of statements that will help us understand how you feel about a number of things. As I read each pair, tell me whether the first statement or the second statement comes closer to your own views – even if neither is exactly right. The first pair is... 1) The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values, or 2) The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society.”
• <i>qn18_f</i>	<i>Immigration_Protest</i>	“And in the United States in the past year have you participated in any protests or demonstrations to support immigration rights, or not?”
• <i>qn21</i>	<i>Downplay_Discrimination</i>	“In general, do you think discrimination against (Hispanics/Latinos) is a major problem, minor problem, or not a problem in preventing (Hispanics/Latinos) in general from succeeding in America?”

Table A2

*List of Recoded Variables*

VARIABLE LABEL:	DESCRIPTION:
<b>Dependent Variable:</b>	
<i>Democrat</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is a Democrat; 0=if person is a Republican.
<b>Affluence Inputs:</b>	
<i>Homeowner</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is a homeowner; 0=if person is not a homeowner
<i>Bank_Account</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person has a bank account; 0=if person does not have a bank account
<i>Employed</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is employed full-time or part-time job; 0=if person is a homemakers/stay at home parent, retiree, student, unemployed, disabled
<i>Income</i>	Ordinal Scale - \$2,500; \$7,500; \$12,500; \$15,000; \$17,500; \$22,500; \$27,500; \$32,500; \$37,500; \$40,000; \$42,500; \$47,500; \$55,000; \$67,500; \$87,500; \$125,000; \$175,000; \$220,000
<b>Familial Status Inputs:</b>	
<i>Married</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is married; 0=if person is separate, widowed, divorced, never been married
<i>Parent</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is parent of a minor living at home; 0=if person is not parent of minor living at home
<b>Attachment to the United States Inputs:</b>	
<i>Citizen</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is a citizen; 0=if person is not a citizen
<i>Foreign_Born</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is foreign born or born in Puerto Rico; 0=if person is born in continental United States.
<i>Yrs_Living_US</i>	Interval Scale
<i>English_Proficient</i>	Ordinal Scale – those speaking/reading English very well (1), pretty well (2), just a little (3), not at all (4)
<i>English_Primary_Language</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if English is the person's primary language; 0=if person is bilingual or uses Spanish as their primary language
<b>Demographic Inputs:</b>	
<i>Age1</i>	Interval Age Scale
<i>Educational_Attainment</i>	Ordinal Scale – Highest level of educational attainment: None, or grade 1-8 (1), High School incomplete (grades 9-11) (2); High School Graduate (3); GED (4); Business, technical, or vocational school after high school (5); Some college, no 4-year degree (6); College graduate (7); Post-graduate training or professional schooling after college (8)
<i>Female</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is a female, 0=if person is not.
<i>White</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is white; 0=if person is Black/African American, Asian, "some other race," or "don't know"
<i>Rural</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is from a Rural-Non Metro area; 0=if person is from Urban Center City-Metro; Center City County-Metro; Suburban Metro; Suburban Non-Center City-Metro

Table A2 continued

VARIABLE LABEL:	DESCRIPTION:
<i>Suburban</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is from a Suburban-Metro area or Suburban-Non-Center City-Metro, 0=if person is from a Rural-Non Metro, Urban-Center City-Metro or Urban-Center City County-Metro area
<b>Cultural Inputs:</b>	
<i>Secular</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is Catholic; 0=if person is Secular, Protestant, Jehovah's Witness, Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Other-Non-Christian or Christian
<i>Protestant</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is Protestant; 0=if person is Secular, Catholic, Jehovah's Witness, Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Other-Non-Christian or Christian
<i>Catholic</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person is Catholic, 0=if person is Secular, Protestant, Jehovah's Witness, Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Other-Non-Christian, or Christian
<i>Relig_Importance</i>	Ordinal Scale – very important (1), fairly important (2), don't know (3); not very important (4)
<i>Relig_Attendance</i>	Ordinal Scale – those attending religious services more than once a week (1), once a week (2), once or twice a month (3), a few times a year (4), seldom (5), and never (6)
<i>Relig_Exposure</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person attends religious services more than once a week, once a week, once or twice a week, or a few times a year; 0=if person seldom or never attends
<i>Clergy_Abortion</i>	Ordinal Scale - place of worship speaks out about abortion, yes (1), don't know (2), no (3)
<i>Clergy_Homosexual</i>	Ordinal scale – place of worship speaks out about homosexuality, yes (1), don't know (2), no (3)
<i>Clergy_Elections</i>	Ordinal scale – place of worship speaks out about elections, yes (1), don't know (2), no (3)
<i>Clergy_Voting</i>	Ordinal scale – place of worship speaks out about importance of voting, yes (1), don't know (2), no (3)
<i>Clergy_Immigration</i>	Ordinal scale – place of worship speaks out about immigration laws, yes (1), don't know (2), no (3)
<i>Exposure_Relig_Abortion</i>	Ordinal Scale – exposure to a place of worship speaking out about abortion (1), don't know (2), no exposure (3)
<i>Exposure_Relig_Homosexual</i>	Ordinal Scale – exposure to a place of worship speaking out about homosexuality (1), don't know (2), no (3)
<i>Exposure_Relig_Elections</i>	Ordinal Scale – exposure to a place of worship speaking out about elections (1), don't know (2), no exposure (3)
<i>Exposure_Relig_Vote</i>	Ordinal Scale – exposure to a place of worship speaking out about the importance of voting (1), don't know (2), no exposure (3)
<i>Exposure_Relig_Immigration</i>	Ordinal Scale – exposure to a place of worship speaking out about immigration (1), don't know (2), no exposure (3)

Table A2 continued

VARIABLE LABEL:	DESCRIPTION:
<b>Cultural Inputs:</b>	
<i>Mexican_Family_Heritage</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person has Mexican family heritage; 0=if person has Dominican; Puerto Rican; Cuban; Salvadoran; "Other Central American," "Other-South American," "Europe-various countries," or "other" family heritage.
<i>PuertoRican_Family_Heritage</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person has Puerto Rican family heritage; 0=if person has Mexican; Dominican; Salvadoran; "Other Central American," "Other-South American," "Europe-various countries," or "other" family heritage.
<i>Cuban_Family_Heritage</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person has Cuban family heritage; 0=if person has Puerto Rican; Mexican; Dominican; Salvadoran; "Other Central American," "Other-South American," "Europe-various countries," or "other" family heritage.
<i>Mexico_Foreign_Born</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person was born in Mexico; 0=if person was born in Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Spain, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela, French Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad/Caribbean Islands, Italy, Africa, "Other" or the United States
<i>PuertoRico_Foreign_Born</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person was born in Puerto Rico; 0=if person was born in Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela, French Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad/Caribbean Islands, Italy, Africa, "Other" or the United States
<i>Cuba_Foreign_Born</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person was born in Cuba; 0=if person was born in Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Spain, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela, French Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad/Caribbean Islands, Italy, Africa, "Other" or the United States
<i>Hispanic_Latino_First</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person considers themselves first as a Hispanic/Latino, 0=if person considers themselves first as a country, religion, an American, don't know, or "all four"
<i>Religion_First</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person considers themselves first as a religion, 0=if person considers themselves first as a Hispanic/Latino, a country, an American, "all four," "don't know"
<i>Spanish_Proficient</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person speaks/reads Spanish very well, 0=if person does not speak/read Spanish very well

Table A2 continued

VARIABLE LABEL:	DESCRIPTION:
Political Attitudes Inputs:	
<i>Gov_Health_Insur</i>	Ordinal Scale – those favoring governmental health insurance (1), don't know (2), oppose (3)
<i>Oppose_Gay_Marriage</i>	Ordinal Scale – those favoring gay marriage (1), don't know (2), oppose (3)
<i>Oppose_Death_Penalty</i>	Ordinal Scale – those favoring the death penalty for person's convicted of murder (1), don't know (2), oppose (3)
<i>Oppose_Divorce</i>	Ordinal Scale – those favoring the Catholic Church's restrictions in divorce (1), don't know (2), oppose (3)
<i>Oppose_Abortion</i>	Ordinal Scale – legal in all cases (1), legal in most cases (2), don't know (3), illegal in most cases (4), illegal in all cases (5)
<i>Worship</i>	Ordinal Scale – houses of worship should keep out of politics (1), don't know (2), be able to express their views (3)
<i>Political_Leader_Faith</i>	Ordinal Scale – political leaders express too much faith (1), right amount (2), too little (3)
<i>Relig_Unimportant</i>	Ordinal Scale – importance of religion in influencing political thinking where, very important (1); somewhat important (2), don't know (3), not too important (4), and not at all important (5)
<i>Large_Government</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person prefers to pay higher taxes to support a large government with more services; 0=if person prefers to pay lower taxes and have a smaller government with smaller services, “both statements equally,” “don't know”
<i>Poor_Have_It_Easy</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person believes that poor people have it easy, 0=if person believes the poor have hard lives because government benefits do not go far enough, “neither,” “both equally,” “don't know”
<i>Immigration_Threat</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person believes the growing numbers of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values; 0=if person believes the growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthen American society, “neither,” “both equally,” “don't know”
<i>Immigration_Protest</i>	Dummy variable, 1=if person has participated in protests or demonstrations in the past year, 0=if the person has not participated in protests or demonstrations in the past year
<i>Downplay_Discrimination</i>	Ordinal scale – discrimination is a major problem (1), minor problem (2), don't know (3), not a problem (4)



Table A3

*Descriptive Statistics of all Independent Variables*

Variable Label	N	Range	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.
<b>Dependent Variable:</b>						
<i>Democrat</i>	1132	1	0	1	0.52	0.5
<b>Affluence Inputs:</b>						
<i>Homeowner</i>	1107	1	0	1	0.4255	0.49
<i>Bank_Account</i>	1100	1	0	1	0.6736	0.46
<i>Employed</i>	1125	1	0	1	0.6453	0.47
<i>Income1</i>	960	217,500	2,500	220,000	39,330	33,633
<b>Familial Status Inputs:</b>						
<i>Married</i>	1127	1	0	1	0.5759	0.49
<i>Parent</i>	1131	1	0	1	0.4739	0.49
<b>Attachment to the United States Inputs:</b>						
<i>Citizen</i>	1129	1	0	1	0.636	0.48
<i>Foreign_Born</i>	1131	1	0	1	0.2431	0.42
<i>Yrs_Living_US</i>	1132	99	0	99	26.98	19.71
<i>English_Proficient</i>	1132	4	0	4	1.8905	1.79
<i>English_Primary_Language</i>	1132	1	0	1	0.1484	0.35
<b>Demographic Inputs:</b>						
<i>Age1</i>	1121	79	18	97	44.87	16.36
<i>Educational_Attainment</i>	1124	7	1	8	3.8176	2.22
<i>Female</i>	1132	1	0	1	0.5468	0.49
<i>White</i>	1118	1	0	1	0.52	0.5
<i>Rural</i>	1132	1	0	1	0.06	0.23
<i>Suburban</i>	1132	1	0	1	0.15	0.35
<b>Cultural Inputs:</b>						
<i>Secular</i>	1124	1	0	1	0.08	0.27
<i>Protestant</i>	1124	1	0	1	0.3612	0.48
<i>Catholic</i>	1124	1	0	1	0.4938	0.5
<i>Exposure_Relig_Abortion</i>	1128	3	0	3	1.1622	1.07
<i>Exposure_Relig_Elections</i>	1128	3	0	3	1.67	1.31

Table A3 continued

Variable Label	N	Range	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.
<b>Cultural Inputs:</b>						
<i>Exposure_Relig_Homosexual</i>	1126	3	0	3	1.38	1.2
<i>Exposure_Relig_Vote</i>	1129	3	0	3	1.2	1.09
<i>Exposure_Relig_Immigration</i>	1129	3	0	3	1.4402	1.23
<i>Relig_Importance</i>	1129	3	1	4	1.35	0.77
<i>Relig_Attendance</i>	1129	5	1	6	2.72	1.55
<i>Mexican_Family_Heritage</i>	1124	1	0	1	0.3568	0.47
<i>Cuban_Family_Heritage</i>	1124	1	0	1	0.1504	0.35
<i>Puerto_Rican_Family_Heritage</i>	1124	1	0	1	0.1237	0.32
<i>Mexico_Foreign_Born</i>	1128	1	0	1	0.22	0.41
<i>Cuba_Foreign_Born</i>	1128	1	0	1	0.14	0.34
<i>PuertoRico_Foreign_Born</i>	1128	1	0	1	0	0.05
<i>Hispanic_Latino_First</i>	1127	1	0	1	0.35	0.47
<i>Religion_First</i>	1127	1	0	1	0.19	0.39
<i>Spanish_Proficient</i>	1132	4	0	4	3.19	1.18
<b>Political Attitudes Inputs:</b>						
<i>Oppose_Death_Penalty</i>	1119	2	1	3	1.9321	0.96
<i>Gov_Health_Insurance</i>	1126	2	1	3	1.5018	0.83
<i>Large_Government</i>	1124	1	0	1	0.65	0.47
<i>Oppose_Abortion_Rights</i>	1120	4	1	5	3.63	1.38
<i>Oppose_Divorce</i>	1115	2	1	3	1.9704	0.93
<i>Oppose_Gay_Marriage</i>	1107	2	1	3	2.5574	0.78
<i>Poor_Have_It_Easy</i>	1129	1	0	1	0.28	0.45
<i>Relig_Unimportant</i>	1128	4	1	5	2.08	1.44
<i>Worship</i>	1129	2	1	3	2.21	0.95
<i>Immigration_Threat</i>	1128	1	0	1	0.27	0.44
<i>Immigration_Protest</i>	1130	1	1	2	1.78	0.41
<i>Downplay_Discrimination</i>	1131	3	1	4	1.771	1.11
<i>Political_Leader_Faith</i>	1122	2	1	3	2.5045	0.74
Valid N (listwise)	827					

## APPENDIX B

## Results Tables

Table B1

*Model Goodness of Fit*

Classification Table			
	Predicted		
Observed			Percentage Correct
	0: Republican	1: Democrat	
0: Republican	277	148	65.2
1: Democrat	100	311	75.7
Overall Percentage			70.3
<i>The cut value is .500</i>			
Model Summary		Sig.	
Chi-Square	215.130	0.000	
Cox & Snell R-Squared	0.227		
Nagelkerke R-Squared	0.303		

Table B2

*Logistic Regression Model of Affiliation with the Democratic Party*

Variable Label	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	Predicted Probabilities
<b>Affluence Inputs:</b>						
<i>Homeowner</i>	-0.315	0.203	2.395	0.122	0.73	-
<i>Bank_Account</i>	0.204	0.209	0.959	0.327	1.227	-
<i>Employed</i>	-0.21	0.196	1.146	0.284	0.81	-
<i>Income1</i>	0	0	6.451	0.011	0.999	-0.10%
<b>Familial Status Inputs:</b>						
<i>Married</i>	0.138	0.183	0.571	0.45	1.148	-
<i>Parent</i>	0.045	0.184	0.06	0.806	1.046	-
<b>Attachment to the United States Inputs:</b>						
<i>Citizen</i>	-0.295	0.235	1.584	0.208	0.744	-
<i>Foreign_Born</i>	0.268	0.331	0.656	0.418	1.308	-
<i>Yrs_Living_US</i>	-0.001	0.007	0.013	0.911	0.999	-
<i>English_Proficient</i>	0.055	0.136	0.162	0.687	1.056	-
<i>English_Primary_Language</i>	-0.255	0.544	0.219	0.64	0.775	-
<b>Demographic Inputs:</b>						
<i>Age1</i>	0.016	0.008	4.211	0.04	1.016	1.60%
<i>Educational_Attainment</i>	-0.011	0.046	0.055	0.815	0.989	-
<i>Female</i>	-0.032	0.176	0.033	0.857	0.969	-
<i>White</i>	-0.059	0.173	0.116	0.734	0.943	-
<i>Rural</i>	-0.262	0.335	0.609	0.435	0.77	-
<i>Suburban</i>	-0.031	0.228	0.018	0.892	0.97	-
<b>Cultural Inputs:</b>						
<i>Secular</i>	0.193	0.338	0.327	0.567	1.213	-
<i>Protestant</i>	-0.154	0.195	0.629	0.428	0.857	-
<i>Exposure_Relig_Abortion</i>	0.054	0.125	0.184	0.668	1.055	-
<i>Exposure_Relig_Elections</i>	0.064	0.125	0.262	0.609	1.066	-
<i>Exposure_Relig_Homosexual</i>	0.003	0.122	0.001	0.977	1.003	-
<i>Exposure_Relig_Vote</i>	0.057	0.118	0.236	0.627	1.059	-
<i>Exposure_Relig_Immigration</i>	-0.256	0.115	4.976	0.026	0.774	-22.60%
<i>Relig_Importance</i>	-0.182	0.128	2.046	0.153	0.833	-
<i>Relig_Attendance</i>	0.008	0.12	0.004	0.948	1.008	-

Table B2 continued

Variable Label	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	Predicted Probabilities
<b>Cultural Inputs:</b>						
<i>Mexican_Family_Heritage</i>	-0.636	0.338	3.532	0.06	0.53	-47%
<i>Cuban_Family_Heritage</i>	-2.118	0.332	40.816	0	0.12	-88%
<i>Puerto_Rican_Family_Heritage</i>	-0.242	0.295	0.672	0.412	0.785	-
<i>Mexico_Foreign_Born</i>	0.219	0.389	0.317	0.573	1.245	-
<i>PuertoRico_Foreign_Born</i>	20.512	27,569	0	0.999	8.09 x10 <sup>6</sup>	-
<i>Hispanic_Latino_First</i>	0.381	0.193	3.886	0.049	1.464	46.40%
<i>Religion_First</i>	0.122	0.227	0.291	0.589	1.13	-
<b>Political Attitudes Inputs:</b>						
<i>Oppose_Death_Penalty</i>	0.334	0.088	14.408	0	1.397	39.70%
<i>Gov_Health_Insurance</i>	-0.156	0.101	2.377	0.123	0.855	-
<i>Large_Government</i>	0.124	0.182	0.464	0.496	1.132	-
<i>Oppose_Abortion_Rights</i>	-0.064	0.065	0.969	0.325	0.938	-
<i>Oppose_Divorce</i>	-0.003	0.089	0.001	0.976	0.997	-
<i>Oppose_Gay_Marriage</i>	-0.28	0.109	6.555	0.01	0.756	-24.40%
<i>Poor_Have_It_Easy</i>	-0.463	0.188	6.077	0.014	0.629	-37.10%
<i>Relig_Unimportant</i>	0.145	0.066	4.904	0.027	1.156	15.60%
<i>Worship</i>	0.09	0.09	0.984	0.321	1.094	-
<i>Immigration_Threat</i>	0.225	0.194	1.338	0.247	1.252	-
<i>Immigration_Protest</i>	-0.166	0.213	0.606	0.436	0.847	-
<i>Downplay_Discrimination</i>	-0.255	0.085	8.935	0.003	0.775	-22.50%
<i>Political_Leader_Faith</i>	-0.13	0.111	1.388	0.239	0.878	-
Constant	1.813	1.806	1.008	0.315	6.128	-

\*Odds ratio calculated from [Exp(B) -1] \* 100

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