

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCES  
A CALIFORNIA STATE GOVERNMENT CASE STUDY

A Thesis

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by

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Department of Public Policy and Administration

Abstract  
of  
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCES  
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Increasingly, the state of California has taken to forming task forces in order to tackle new, wide reaching problems such as climate change. These problems often cut across many different agency jurisdictions; and as no one agency is big enough to address them, calling for collaboration between relevant agencies and a redirecting of existing resources to face these new problems has become common place. The purpose of this thesis is to ascertain whether or not task forces composed of multiple public sector entities should be considered effective tools for policy enactment in the state. My exploratory study draws upon existing academic literature on what makes task forces effective to create an interview procedure that was utilized to speak with 6 public officials currently or having previously served on task forces. I then compared how the interviewees felt about what benefited and impeded their task force's ability to perform with what the literature said drove task force effectiveness and gave each task force a passing or failing grade based on whether or not a task force had more positive or negative factors respectfully. My results show that all task forces in my case selection are

considered effective by the interviewees who served on them and based on what the reviewed literature suggests would make an effective task force. I conclude that task forces as they are now are indeed effective tools for solving far reaching problems, and any inefficiencies they face are endemic in the public sector itself.

\_\_\_\_\_, Committee Chair  
Charles Gossett

\_\_\_\_\_  
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## **Introduction**

My interest in collaborative efforts was sparked from what I learned in PPA's collaborative policy class. In the introduction to Collaborative Governance Regimes, one of the primary readings assigned for the class, the rise of different forms of collaboration between organizations is attributed to two sources: the first being the rise of "wicked" problems defined as issues that are far reaching and difficult or impossible to currently solve due to a lack of complete understanding of the phenomena that would require more steps and input to address than a single entity may be capable of (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). The second has to do with the changing landscape of the public sector, with new processes such as the devolution of power to multiple levels of government and the rise of contracting government services out to private and non-profit entities requiring multi-lateral decision making and broader coordination to bring about the same level of investment to deal with problems that were previously unilaterally driven at the national level (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). A classic example of a wicked problem the modern world is now facing is climate change, which has and will continue to affect the whole world without respect for boundaries.

How can you deal with a massive cross cutting problem when no one organization is up to the task? You work together. In the public sector, collaboration between different government agencies and levels of government often come in the form of task forces, which draw upon the resources of existing agencies and directs them temporarily or long term to address a new issue. Given how large the state of California is and the active

approach it has taken in addressing wicked issues such as climate change, it comes as no surprise that the state has formed numerous inter-agency taskforces to better address potential and ongoing issues. Some of these task forces, such as the state's eight Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces, are partnered with departments at the federal level; in this case, FEMA, to coordinate the rescue of persons trapped in collapsed structures and other confined spaces across the state (CalOES, 2017). Others, such as the K-12 civic learning task force, rely on input from teachers and superintendents at school districts, one of the most local public sector entities to ensure that all Californians receive education on civic life in our state and how they can become and stay engaged in the democratic process. (Power of Democracy, 2017). Given the gravity of their assignments, understanding how task forces can be successful is paramount, and is the objective of my thesis. Beginning with the question of "What makes inter-agency task forces in the state of California effective?", I have provided an extensive literature review on the topic of task forces and synthesized their assertions into four factors. Then I will use the methodology of "Structured, Focused Comparison" to compare the experiences of members who have served on an inter-agency task force in the state of California. Through this comparison, I will examine how well academic understanding of what makes task forces effective lines up with the reality of task forces in the state of California, in order to further refine the best practices of task force formation and operation.

### **Defining a task force:**

Before I can begin to examine literature relevant to task forces and select cases, I must first establish the definition I will be using for a task force throughout this study. There is no formal legal definition of what a task force is, such as the minimal requirements a collaborative effort must have to be considered a task force. Therefore, for the purposes of my thesis, a task force shall have the following definition: Any collaborative effort composed of members from existing public sector and other partnered entities assembled to accomplish a new task that is outside of the purview of the existing entities' mandates. In short, task forces pull existing resources from established agencies and direct them at a new effort outside of the job description of said agencies. Because of this definition, several collaborative efforts, namely the Climate Action Teams managed by the EPA and the Strategic Growth Council, while not nominally referred to as task forces, meet my definition of what a task force is and they will be used as cases of study later on. As my thesis is focused on the effectiveness of task forces in the public sector, entities that are referred to as task forces but primarily represent private or non-profit efforts will not be discussed here.

### **Relevance/Importance of topic:**

The total number of public sector task forces in the state is not compiled in any easily accessible location, and after trying to quantify them myself, it's easy to see why. At the state level, the Department of Justice oversees seventeen different task forces throughout the state that are led by senior members of the department's Bureau of

Investigation (Department of Justice, 2017). The departments' forces include teams assigned to drug crackdown such as the Fresno Methamphetamine Task Force (CVMIT), anti-gang activity, namely the Tulare County Regional Gang Enforcement Team (TARGET), suspect apprehension in the form of Los Angeles Interagency Metropolitan Police Apprehension Crime Team (LA IMPACT), as well as other law enforcement duties (Department of Justice, 2017). Together, these teams enact an extensive range of law enforcement policies, but the DOJ taskforces only number half as much as those that are coordinated by the California EPA.

In total, CalEPA coordinates with 30 environmental taskforces at lower levels of government, encompassing 25 counties and 5 regional, multi-county efforts, as well as issue-specific task forces: the California Border Environmental Task Force and the San Diego Marine Environment Task Force (CalEPA, 2017). Indeed, the use of task forces has become ubiquitous as a means of pursuing policy in the state, with further examples including the California Department of Public Health's Health in All Policies task force, which works to build a healthy community environment to contribute to better health (Department of Public Health, 2017), the Department of Public Education's STEM Task Force, which evaluates the effectiveness of science and math education in California's schools, (Department of Education, 2017) and the Department of Food and Agriculture's Nitrogen Tracking and Reporting Taskforce, which measures nitrogen levels used in fertilizer and other agricultural products to determine its impact on the local environment. (Department of Food and Agriculture, 2017). Because of the growing use of task forces as a means to develop and enact policies in the state of California, an effort to

better understand how task forces can be effective at their assigned task is quite a worthy endeavor in the field of public policy and administration to undertake.

### **General interest publications:**

Along with the growing discussion of task forces in academia and their expanded use in the public sector, they have also come more into focus in the media recently. As with media in general, task force efforts tied to crime prevention receive quite a bit of focus in the news. On April 9, 2017, a local news station at Santa Clarita reported that the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department's Major Crimes Bureau Burglary-Robbery Task Force, composed of local investigators who work in tandem with the police of different cities in the Southern California Region and representatives of crime focused state agencies, was able to apprehend a team of seven men who were responsible for a string of recent business robberies (Smith, 2017.) The task force, formed in November of last year, was convened in order to investigate the recent spike in late night robberies that crossed city jurisdictions, and the apprehension was the culmination of a months long effort to connect suspect vehicles departing the sites of the crimes shortly after they occurred (Smith, 2017).

While reporting on the "interesting" aspects of law enforcement is expected, the more bureaucratic, regulatory aspect can be seen in the efforts of the Indian Child Welfare Act Compliance Task Force, which was recently covered in a news piece by *Eureka Times Standard* in Northern California (Houston, 2017). The task force was initially formed as a response of Humboldt county's failure to comply with the Indian

Child Welfare Act, a law passed at the national level in 1978 to address a nationwide epidemic of native American children being disproportionately removed from their homes in child custody cases, with Native American children facing a rate of placement in foster homes instead of returned to their parents six time higher than the national average, and eight times higher than the average in California (Houston, 2017). The task force has since expanded its focus to address the chronic source of failure of compliance: that no additional resources were passed down from the federal to state and local levels in order to combat the epidemic; and because of this failure to reduce the high rate of separation from their parents, many Native American communities in California feel that many of their children are growing up separate from their culture, threatening its survival (Houston, 2017). Its final recommendation to the attorney general of California's office was released at the end of march, encouraging the state to provide the funding necessary for local Social Services agencies to take special precaution when reviewing cases of Native American families and the establishment of a nonprofit California Tribal Families Coalition to work with Bureau of Children's Justice to develop solutions for the issue and well as help provide legal representation to Native American families in custody cases (Houston, 2017).

Outside of law enforcement and legal matters, mention of task forces have also cropped up in reporting on hot policy topics in California currently. In *The Desert Sun*, a local news source in inland southern California, writer Ian James discussed at length the efforts that state and federal government have taken to combat the desertification of the Salton Sea, a large salt water lake in the area that is an important ecological habitat

(James, 2017). Headed by the Natural Resources Agency, the Salton Sea Task Force has been established to direct a 383 million dollar effort to replace the dried areas of the lake with new artificial ponds and wetlands. Officials have stated that the current planned implementation will not be able to completely replace the lost water, but see it as the first step to reversing the desertification trend, restoring lost habitat for migrating waterfowl and reducing the amount of dust that will be kicked up by the wind; a major contributor to asthma and other breathing issues (James, 2017). The current plan aims at addressing immediate concerns and has no plans to combat the greater problem beyond the next ten years, though Bruce Wilcox, head of Salton Sea Policy, believes that the effort will evolve into a longer-term effort to restore the local ecology, and could see between 1.5-2 billion dollars in investiture as their understanding of the problem and means to combat it is refined (James, 2017). Originally, the federal government under President Obama had pledged an additional 30 million dollars to help get the artificial pond projects started, but the recent change in administration could potentially see investment into the environmental project fall off as priorities shift, so implementation could wind up being farther behind than what was original intended (James, 2017).

Moving from the topic of environmental protection to education, an article written for the *Los Angeles Daily News* discusses the events that led to the Department of Education agreeing to the demands of a federal court order to significantly improve the monitoring of educational progress made by students with disabilities. The article notes that even though 85% of disabled students in the state have no mental impairments, their levels of academic accomplishments are far lower than those with no disabilities because



they lack the resources needed to stay caught up in class. (Meredith, 2017). The steps California is now taking to improve its monitoring systems were first proposed by the Special Education Task Force in their statewide report in 2015, which noted that California has one of the lowest high school graduation rates for students with disabilities- 60% compared to the national average of 80% (Meredith, 2017). Of the task force's recommendations, the primary one is to coordinate general and special education together as one entity rather than running them separately. This would allow for students to have their needs accommodated while still matching the track that other students move on throughout all levels of pre-college education (White, 2015). Additionally, the report calls for expanding the range at which students are tracked from their progression through grade school to include preschool, kindergarten, and all the way up to age 22 to account for those students who may have been held back several years (White, 2015). As these news articles show, the impact task forces have has become more apparent to both reporters and the public.

### **Conclusion:**

As Emerson and Nabatchi noted, the world has fundamentally changed. Not only have new, widespread problems developed since the end of the twentieth century, but the traditional model of unilateral direction of public sector power has devolved to many different levels. This has necessitated the rise of collaborative efforts among different government agencies in order to direct the same level of resources once wielded in one central location to address the real and very consequential issues that have arisen in the modern era. Task forces are one facet of these collaborative efforts. As problems such as

climate change could be devastating if not properly addressed, I have decided to conduct an exploratory study to see whether or not California's task forces are effective at pursuing the goals they are given. In the next section of this study, I review a sample of the academic literature that has been written on task force effectiveness in order to compile common factors throughout. Next, I explain how I used the collected factors as the basis for designing an interview using the structured, focused comparison model, resulting in a universal set of questions that will allow me to check to see if the factors of the literature review had a positive, negative, or little impact on the task force's performance. Then, I give my analysis of the interviews, the opinion of the interviewees on whether or not they believed the task force was effective, as well as my own opinion of whether or not the task force is effective based on whether or not the factors seem to have a more positive than negative impact. Finally, I offer a brief summary of findings and possible recommendations to refine and expand on future research into this topic in the future.

## **Literature Review**

Temporary organizations, such as task forces, have increasingly become a tool of both the public and private sector to solve accomplish large, far reaching goals. Literature on the topic has gradually become more prolific. In this section, I have summarized my understanding of current works in the field and I noted indicators that may affect the success of a task force. I find that the literature suggests three factors are particularly important in determining the level of success a task force may have: participants, resources, and work environment. Each factor is an umbrella that encompasses specific elements that help define it. The specifics of each factor and condition, how they are connected, and their relevance to my thesis are discussed below. In addition, I will be discussing a fourth, catch-all factor that often results from lacking the favorable aspect of one of the previous factors known as Departmentalism. I conclude with a short summary.

### **Participants:**

For a task force to be effective at completing its objective, the “right people” need to have been selected for the task force and those chosen have to want to participate. By “right people,” I mean that the members represent the relevant agencies and that the people selected are at a sufficiently high level of authority that they can speak for the agency on matters before the task force. Also, participants should not be at such a high rank that the duties of being a task force member are ignored because of the press of more important responsibilities. From the literature, I have surmised five conditions that seem to drive both an agency’s and an individual’s willingness to become members of a

task force: The goal of the task force, the personal interest of members, the backing of the leadership of the individual parent organizations, and a feeling of trust toward the other members of the task force. In his “Seven Requirements for Successful Collaboration”, Portnoy (1987) emphasizes the importance of selling the task force to potential members by being clear about what the task force is striving to accomplish, what everyone’s role will be, and how it will benefit them by participating. By being clear from the onset about the benefits and how the task force will be run, agencies will be able to know what to expect and what they’re expected to do to be successful; as well as what they can personally gain from participating.

Once the basics have been established, one must take into account how the leadership in each agency can drive their agency’s participants to work fully to achieve the task force’s goals, emphasized by the following two cases. First, an article by Bakvis and Luc (2004) examines the effectiveness of three task forces assembled by the Canadian government: The Technological Innovation Strategy, the Climate Change Secretariat, and the Urban Native Strategy. The article notes several barriers to the effective implementation of inter-departmental efforts present in these task forces at various points in their operation, such as departments being protective of their jurisdiction and hesitation to cede some control over areas they considered themselves experts in to others, a need to prove themselves as competent in the face of their peers and those they are beholden to, as well as other acts of what the authors deem as “departmentalism” (Bakvis and Luc, 2004). Despite the difficulties these behaviors presented, the authors conclude that the initiatives were generally successful in enacting

the agendas the federal government wanted to pursue through them; a driving factor in such success was the fact that all of the heads of the agencies were willing to work together. For example, in the case of the Innovation Strategy, two of Canada's central agencies were tasked with developing a framework for promoting the development of new skill sets in Canada's workforce: Industry Canada (IC), and Human Resources Development Canada (HRDA). Both of these agencies understood what the goal of the task force was; however, the agencies developed different approaches based on their individual stakeholders and support base, with IC representing top businesses and universities and HRDA used to dealing more with smaller, more diverse groups respectfully (Bakvis and Luc, 2004). The role of the two agencies was not particularly well defined, and as a result, the two agencies wound up developing conflicting plans that emphasized a top-down approach in the former's case and a more grass-roots bottom up strategy in the latter's. This lack of a united approach between the two departments eventually led to them hosting events separately and occasionally on the same day, leading the public to wonder if a unified effort to develop a plan for innovation was actually taking place (Bakvis and Luc, 2004). Things were looking rather uncertain at this point, but thankfully the ministers of each agency were committed to the overall goal set for the task force, so to preserve their image and comply with their objective, the ministers in charge of the two agencies ended their separate efforts and held a Joint National Summit on Innovation and Learning in November of 2002. This in turn led ultimate to compilation of a plan (Bakvis and Luc, 2004). Despite an initial setback due to poor coordination over how each agency would contribute, dedicated leaders were able

to put things back on track. Had the leadership of IC and HRDA not been willing to put aside their differences for the sake of accomplishing their goal, it's possible that a unified plan would have never been developed.

While Canada's central agencies might have been able to move past issues of departmentalism in the interest of accomplishing their joint task, an article by Burton Rosenthal (1975) provides a clear example about just how doomed a collaborative effort is if one of the joint entities does not want to participate. Rosenthal's case examines an instance in 1969 New York City where Gordon Chase, newly appointed health services administrator, attempted to unite the Department of Health and the Housing and Development Administration towards the goal of updating old apartments to prevent lead poisoning from paint and pipe work (Rosenthal, 1975). Chase had succeeded in making the reduction of hazardous materials that contributed to lead poisoning a major goal with the Health Department, and had hoped that by forming a task force with the Housing and Development Administration, they would be able to make updating the older departments where lead paint and pipes were still used part of the regular maintenance schedule (Rosenthal, 1975). The HDA, however, was concerned that the cost to overhaul the older, lead tainted apartments would be pushed onto the landlords, whom they were responsible for overseeing and addressing their complaints and would surely face backlash from if that was the case. Moreover, due to their differing areas of expertise, the actual renovating was to be done almost entirely with the HDA's maintenance crews, which they resented because it meant that they would fall greatly behind on the regularly scheduled work the city already required of them (Rosenthal, 1975). In this case, not only

was the role the HDA would play unclear, but participating the task force was directly against the interests of HDA because it would have drawn too many resources away from their agency's mission; and thus the HDA director resisted cooperation. For these reasons, HDA ultimately refused to work with Chase and the Department of Health- and without them, Chase was not able to treat the source of the problem, and his efforts were thwarted.

Lastly, once goals, roles, and the interest of the agency and leaders have been established, the condition that really sustains an agency's participation in a task force is trust. Considering the first case study, a sense of trust existed between the Canadian ministers that their partner was committed to a goal they both had an interest in fulfilling, and as a result were able to overcome the initial setback their organizations had. Meanwhile, in the second case, the effort to renovate the old apartments ultimately failed because the HDA didn't trust that Gordon Chase had their interest in mind when he made his proposal. In Portnoy (1987), nearly half of his criteria for a successful collaborative effort, three of seven, are related to building trust between members. These criteria are: 1) acknowledging the differences in agenda between members if any so they understand their stake in the matter is not forgotten, 2) accommodating differences in work place norms so as to not cause alienation, and 3) ensuring that members receive recognition for what they are able to accomplish so that they don't feel unappreciated (Portnoy, 1987). In a similar guide, Smallen and Leach (1999). stress that building trust in a collaborative environment rests on establishing four traits among team members: 1) intimacy, 2) a personal friendship beyond the minimum workplace interaction, 3) clear and concise

communication, a willingness to treat all members equally, and finally 4) treating all members with respect. Moreover, trust between members is vital for a task force to adapt to sudden, unforeseen problems without retreating to their own turfs and passing blame between each other. Lighthart, Oerlemans, and Noorderhaven (2016) assert that the presence of operational flexibility, the ability of the project to change day-to-day operations to meet new problems, can be an indicator that members are acting in a positive trust environment, and making good progress toward accomplishing their objectives. Numerous additional factors are cited by the authors that drive operational flexibility, including a sense of urgency across all members to complete the project and of course enough resources to make adaptability possible. These resources are especially important, as maintaining operational flexibility comes with its own costs in time and money to adapt to new circumstances and can lower operational efficiency for the member that is required to bend the most in response (Lighthart et al., 2016). Maintaining operational efficiency in the long term may also lead to stress among participants and possibly lose sight of their actual goal if they spend too much time on contingency planning (Lighthart et al., 2016). The longer suboptimal work conditions drag on, the less flexible operations become and the greater the likelihood that an unforeseen circumstance could sink the project. When less than ideal conditions occur, maintaining strong operational flexibility rests on what they refer to as “the shadows of time” which represent the past interactions that joined agencies have had with each other (shadows of the past) and projections of other projects in the future that may require them to work together again (shadows of the future) (Lighthart et al., 2016). Simply put, organizations



that have had positive interactions in the past and expect to work together again are much more likely to be willing to take on the costs of organizational flexibility to the benefit of other members out of respect for the work they've done together in the past and in trust that they may do the same for them in the future as well as to maintain a good working relationship for the future. As being able to adapt well to changing circumstances is a clear sign of effectiveness, building a long term working relationship between multiple agencies is ideal for ensuring that task forces are able to accomplish their objectives.

**Resources:**

Adequate resources are also essential for allowing task forces to complete their objectives. Resources include not only funding and supplies, but access to the appropriate level of experienced staff to develop and manage the project and connections amongst the community and other organizations they may be able to solicit aid from (Mattessich and Barbara, 1992). The need for adequate resources to accomplish a task is an obvious requirement, yet as research shows, many public agencies are expected to continue to do more with dwindling resources (Bakker et al, 2016). In fact, the rise in the formation of task forces and other temporary organizations within or alongside more permanent organizations is itself attributed to the constraints existing agencies are facing in regards to dealing with new problems through the need to pool existing funds and personnel by forming new connections (Bakker et al, 2016).

One such task force, the Interagency Refinery Task Force, was formed in 2013 in California after a fire at a Chevron Oil refinery in Richmond occurred in August of the

previous year prompted a statewide suspicion of the safety status of other refineries in the state and emergency responders' preparedness to deal with such severe situations (CalEPA, 2016). With membership including 10 state agencies, the federal Environmental Protection Agency, and public emergency response teams in localities where oil refineries are located, the task force was better able to address safety concerns and emergency situations by diverting the collective funds of all members to sites that require attention; rather than simply sitting on individual funding in the hopes that it will be adequate to handle any situation that might occur (CalEPA, 2016). Through this collaboration, the state believes that the pooled resources of the agencies will be better able to avert and combat potential disasters more effectively while working within the same level of funding. More personal connections can also be the deciding factors in certain situations, such as Sward's (2016) example of a large, one time public works project bringing many organizations, both public and private together to accomplish its construction. In this instance, organizations had no basis to trust the others of being able to handle the job well or not lean on them to take on additional duties, nor are they particularly motivated to spend time to build bridges and connections if they are unlikely to pay off in the future. In instances such as these, he asserts that the factor most likely to enable a strong working relationship between members is similarities in culture between individual agencies (Sward, 2016). The connection created by having similar behaviors and mores allows for a sense of familiarity and easy consensus as to how collaborative efforts should be structured, and makes individual organizations more likely to trust others and to reciprocate favors done for them (Sward, 2016). This system of reciprocity

is what makes operational flexibility in a collaborative effort possible; without it, agencies are much more likely to engage in departmentalism and fight with others over what they perceive as their jurisdiction or turf, making the odds of an efficient completion of their project much less likely.

While creating task forces can be an effective means of pooling resources to accomplish a common goal, the process of sharing resources comes with its own set of problems. In “Temporary Organizations: Prevalence, Logic and Effectiveness”, Kenis, Janowicz, and Cambre (2009) discuss a theory known as Resource Dependency Theory, which states that, regardless of how many resources an individual organization might have, they never have access to all of them, and are dependent on other organizations to acquire all of the resources necessary to be productive; and must subsequently surrender part of their autonomy to acquire them. This situation creates a dilemma where organizations have to choose between maintaining their autonomy by being protective of their own interests above others and thereby engaging in departmentalism, or giving up some of their influence on a matter in order to acquire the necessary resources to remain effective (Kenis et al, 2009). As organizations become bound together in temporary or long term task forces working on a task separate from the parent organization’s usual work, an entire new layer of difficulty is added to the situation: organizations must choose between maintaining sufficient resources to fulfill their original task or commit sufficiently to what is required of them on the task force (Kenis et al, 2009). If an organization finds that it needs to contribute a significant level of resources to a collective project, it might find itself unable to perform its typical duties and may try to pull

resources back to remain self-sufficient amongst its typical neighbors; while at the same time, those that have been assigned to the task force might fight their own parent agency or others for further resources to maintain their own operational effectiveness (Kenis et al, 2009). As inter-agency organizing can create situations in which departmentalism can be encouraged from forces acting outside and within collaborating organizations and the collaborative body itself, it is entirely possible for measures meant to pool more resources communally to resort in more fighting to overcome individual shortages. To ensure further disputes do not occur and individual and collective efforts remain effective, maintaining an adequate amount of resources across as many levels as possible is a must.

### **Work Environment:**

With all other factors in place, maintaining an environment that supports productivity is the last indicator of an effective task force. While participants are the people that compose a task force, and resources are what the people on the task force have available to get a job done, environment is the interior force, the structure of the task force, and exterior force, community interaction, that shape how it operates. Starting with the interior, the big contributor to a positive work environment is the task force's structure. As with any organization, having a clearly defined mission and goals as a means to accomplish that mission will help ensure that things start off and remain productive (Portnoy, 1987). Following the mission layout is the structure the task force is operating in, which in the public sector tend towards two different models- horizontal and vertical (Uren, 2013). Vertical structures are the more classical top-down approach in management, often directed by an agency at the highest level of government while

delegating to increasingly local agencies down the metaphorical totem pole. By contrast, having a horizontal structure means that the joined agencies tend to work on a more equal level (Nelson, 2016). Knowing what structure to expect before members begin working can help sort out potential disagreements and power struggles that can occur from working in a poorly defined environment (Uren, 2013). Regardless of the structure of a public task force however, they are often convened to begin their task by a higher authority or some central organizer. The status of this organizer can impact whether or not the members view the work assigned to them as a legitimate cause. If the organizer is seen as a positive force in the community that has managed previous work effectively, then joined members are more likely to follow their instructions (Mattessich and Barbara, 1992). Conversely, if the organizer is considered a poor actor and organizer and the task binding them not worth the effort, then agencies are more likely to resist participation, or try to find means to contribute on their own terms (Mattessich and Barbara, 1992).

Beyond the structure of the task force, the other environmental force is community input and reaction. A good case of how the public can support or sink a task force can be seen in the Denver Partnership, a coalition of local governmental entities and businesses that in 1988 attempted to collaborate on expanding commercial infrastructure within the city. (Mattessich and Barbara, 1992) Its first project, the establishment of a mile-long mall, was considered a success because local stakeholders continuously aired grievances and discussed where the mall would be located, who would get to have a branch inside, how big a space each participant would have, among others topics. Eventually discussion led to a solution that was amenable to many, and at the time the

mall reported having an average of 50,000 visitors a day. Less successful was the task force assigned with developing the convention center. Planning between members was conducted in closed sessions, with little communication occurring with a public that was afraid that the citizens would carry the brunt of the cost in higher taxes (Mattessich and Barbara, 1992). Ultimately, popular support for the center swung away, and construction was canceled. As can be seen, organized communication is highly necessary for maintaining support and understanding of an issue, and without it a task force may be unable to accomplish its goals.

### **Departmentalism: When work doesn't get done.**

As mentioned previously, when the positive influence of one of the above factors is missing, members of a task force may begin to engage in what is known as departmentalism. Departmentalism occurs when members no longer see full participation in the work of the task force as being in their home agency's best interest and will seek instead to retain their resources for themselves (Bakker et al, 2016). This behavior also brings about numerous counter-productive ways, such as resisting other agencies attempting to work in their jurisdiction, contributing to the collective effort at a lower rate, among others (Bakker et al, 2016). When the HDA resisted taking on the workload to renovate the apartments, (Rosenthal, 1975). it was clearly acting to preserve its own agency and maintain its ability to perform its existing functions- a clear case of departmentalism. When task forces and parent organizations squabble over resources, when members don't have as strong faith in the capabilities of their partners, and when

As expected, the literature on the topic of task forces espouses many conditions that affect a task force's ability to accomplish the goal they are given, and a deficit in any of these authors' criteria can lead to a decrease in efficiency and threaten to sink the project all together. The table below summarizes the range of factors discussed by each of the works consulted:

Authors:						Discussed Factors:				
				Participants:		Resources:		Environment:		
Rosenthal (1975).				X		X				
Portnoy (1987)				X		X			X	
Mattessich and Barbara (1992).				X		X			X	
Smallen and Leach (1999)				X						
Bakvis and Luc (2004)				X						
Kenis et. all (2009).				X		X				
Uren (2013)									X	
Bakker et. all (2016).						X				
Lighthart et. all (2016)				X						
Sward (2016).				X						
Nelson (2016)				X					X	

As can be seen, the sampled research tends to put an even emphasis on each factor in determining what makes a task force effective, but especially tends to stress the importance of what brings participants to the table and their associated conditions. To put

this scholarly research to the test, the next chapter will cover how I used these three factors and the pitfall of departmentalism to construct a structured, focused comparison to grade the effectiveness of five California task forces based on feedback I received from interviewing one or more of the task forces' members.



## **Methodology**

While conducting my research into what makes task forces effective and what task forces exist in the State of California, it became apparent to me that the study of task forces has not yielded much quantitative data. Much of the research I was able to gather for this thesis took the form of a case study, comparing one task force to another, extrapolated common wisdom of public management best practices to the level of task forces, or cited direct comments from their subjects as the causes for their success. Additionally, quantifying the success of public agencies has been historically difficult, as many of them are not tied to a specific producing a specific good like many private sector entities and cannot be graded on their ease of production. Public sector task forces face the same problem as public agencies, and as my thesis is attempting to make an informed call about whether or not an inter-agency task force is effective, I have decided to follow the general trend of task force research and conduct a qualitative comparison of several task forces by interviewing a member or two of each task force selected and examining their shared experiences. Specifically, I will be using the method of structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett, 2005) to analyze the interview responses from members of seven different task forces to ascertain what qualities make a task force effective. Based on my understanding from the literature review, my theory is that interviewees who view their task force as effective at performing their assigned role will feel that there was high desire to participate amongst the participants, adequate resources to perform their task, and a positive work environment. Conversely, task forces that faced difficulty in performing their role will cite that at least one of the three factors were

absent or inadequate, in the form of low desire for the participants to work, inadequate resources, or a negative work environment. The remainder of this section will be devoted to defining the structured, focused comparison and outlining the task forces I've chosen as case studies, why, and who I will be interviewing from each for their perspective on it.

### **The structured, focused comparison:**

The structured, focus comparison is a method for comparing multiple cases in the same study by using a universal set of questions and standards by which to acquire and compare responses (George and Bennett, 2005). Structured, focused comparison builds upon the basic case study process, which typically only examines a single instance for study and uses questions and standards of comparison that vary from other case studies on the same topic (George and Bennet, 2005). As a result of these differing standards, comparing cases even from the same investigator and coming up with a collective theory based on them can be particularly difficult. The method of structured, focused comparison seeks to avoid the pitfalls of earlier case study research by building a structure to define the investigation so that the same approach and standards can be used for greater ease of comparison (George and Bennet, 2005).

There are two main features: that the study is *both* structured and focused. Regarding structure, 1) the area of study being addressed must be well defined and all cases being studied must be instances of that universe, 2) there must be a well-defined research objective and research strategy that will shape which instances will be selected for study, and 3) research variables should be of theoretical interest to academia and be

applicable for policymakers to leverage in order to influence outcomes (George and Bennet, 2005). By focused, George and Bennet mean that the investigation should only pertain to questions that cover the specific topic of interest being researched without meandering into other potentially equally as important, but unrelated, studies (George and Bennet, 2005). Once these guidelines are set, the questions used for inquiring about the different case studies and the standards used to compare them must be the same for every instance, as mentioned previously.

Now, applying the method of structured, focused comparison to my thesis yields the following research design: First, the universe of my study pertains to inter-agency task forces either currently or having previously operated in the state of California. All seven of my case studies- The Strategic Growth Council, the California High Risk Sex Offender and Sexually Violent Predator Task Force, The Climate Action Teams, the Tree Mortality Task Force, The Drought Task Force, the Sustainability Task Force, and the Developmental Centers Task Force/Developmental Services Task Force, meet that definition. The selection of cases in my universe is driven by two factors: first, my cases were chosen to try and cover as wide a variety of task forces within the state of California as possible. They cover a wide variety of topics such as the environment, the treatment of criminals, and internal innovation. By selecting a wide variety of fields, I hoped to get a grasp of how effective task forces are at implementing policies as a whole, rather than tying them to a specific area the public sector operates in. Second, the selection of my cases also came out of a need for practicality. The task forces listed here are ones with whom I was able to get an interview with one of its members.

Next, my research objective is to figure out what makes inter-agency task forces in California effective, and my research strategy to do so is to interview members of active or formerly active task forces and compare their experiences with what previous research proclaims makes for effective task forces. Third, the factors I've devised from the literature- participants, resources, and work environment, are all tangible things that can shape the decision-making process when forming and maintaining task forces. Fourth, I developed a set of interview questions that probe for positive and negative instances of my three factors that will be used in each case study and serve as the basis for my analysis of the relevance of the literature toward task forces in the state of California, the results of which will be covered in the next section (for the questions themselves, please see the attached appendix at the end of this document).

### **The Score Sheet:**

The following table is used to evaluate the effectiveness of each task force in the study. The first two columns cover the interviewed task force member in question and the task force that they served on, which have already been finalized. The following columns will cover where I saw each factor crop up during the interview process, as well as both the interviewee's and my own conclusion about whether or not the task force is effective. Beyond the introductory questions, each question in the interview is associated with one of the four factors discussed in the literature review. Responses to these questions relating to Participants, Resources, and Work Environment are grades as either positive or negative. For instance, one of my research questions asks "With respect to money, supplies, and time, did you have enough resources" a question clearly related to the factor

of resources. If an interviewee responded that there was no major resource issue, I would grade it as a positive, as having adequate resources would have a beneficial impact on how effective the task force was. Conversely, If the interviewee said that resources were inadequate, I would give it a negative grade as it is likely to have resulted in a negative impact on task force effectiveness. The score for Departmentalism was handled a little differently. During the interview with each task force member, I noted each time they indicated (unprompted by me) a situation where one or more of the task force members said or did something that negatively affected the work of the task force. For example, one respondent mentioned that some agency heads would often drag their feet on prioritizing innovation requirements required by the task force, which I noted as an example of Departmentalism. An instance of departmentalism is not merely an impeding factor to task force effectiveness, but rather represents deliberate individual actions from agencies and individuals that take away from the task force's ability to act effectively. Finally, the last two columns record the interviewees' judgement of whether or not the task force was effective and my own view of the task force based on the strength of the factors. If the literature accurately reflects the proper building blocks for a strong task force, interviewees should see the positive aspects of the three main factors within their task force and as few instances of departmentalism as possible; and subsequently claim their task force was effective because of it. Similarly, if a task force sees that members were less willing to participate, had inadequate resources, and a negative work environment, there should be more instances of departmentalism mentioned and the interviewee should believe that their task force was not effective. If the literature does not

seem to match up with reality, we should see instances where the interviewee sees high desire to perform amongst participants, adequate resources, a positive work environment, few instances of departmentalism, but believe the task force was ineffective, likely due to the influence of some other non-measured variable.

**Table 2: Model for Comparison**

Interviewee:	Task Force:	Positive/ negative Participants:(3-5)	Positive/ negative Resources: (4)	Positive/ Negative Environment: (6-7)	#Departmental Cases	Interviewee: Effective?	My Call: Effective?
Ken Alex	Strategic Growth Council						
Rudy Bermudez	The High Risk Sex Offender and Sexually Violent Predator Task Force						
Ashley Conrad- Saydah	Climate Action Teams						
Ashley Conrad- Saydah	Tree Mortality Task Force						
Matt Hennigan	Tree Mortality Task Force						
Matt Hennigan	Drought Task Force						
Matt Hennigan	Sustainability Task Force						
Catherine Blakemore	Developmental Centers/Developme ntal Services Task Force						
Amy Wall	Developmental Centers/Developme ntal Services Task Force						

**Case One: The Strategic Growth Council**

My first case is the California Strategic Growth Council, a collaborative effort bringing together many state departments and agencies, including Business, Consumer Services and Housing, Transportation, Natural Resources, Health and Human Services, Food and Agriculture, and Environmental Protection, to coordinate policies that promote economic, environmental, and communal activities (California Strategic Growth Council, 2015). As its name suggests, this task force is headed by a ten member council, drawing 7 of its members from prominent agency secretaries such as Diana Dooley, head of the California Health and Human Services Agency, as well as having three members appointed by the Governor, Senate Committee on Rules, and Speaker of the Assembly respectfully (California Strategic Growth Council, 2015). The council itself is currently chaired by Ken Alex, Senior Policy Advisor to Governor Jerry Brown and the Director of the Office of Planning and Research, and is the interviewee representing this task force. Along with holding regular public meetings, the SGC hosts two grant programs that award money for various local level projects- the California Climate Investments (CCI) and the Sustainable Communities Implementation Program. The CCI pulls funding directly from the state's Cap-and-Trade program and directs the money toward projects that contribute toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving public health and the environment (California Strategic Growth Council, 2015). Projects that can qualify for a CCI grant include affordable housing, renewable energy, public transportation, zero-emission vehicles, environmental restoration, more sustainable agriculture, recycling, and others (California Strategic Growth Council, 2015).



Meanwhile, the SCIP is the program that awards the more the \$180 million set aside by the passage of the Safe Drinking Water, Water Quality and Supply, Flood Control, River and Coastal Protection Bond Act of 2006, aimed at making communities more livable and self-sustaining (Strategic Growth Council, 2015). Further, the SGC is also responsible for running four different initiatives aimed at actualizing their goal of promoting communal, environmental, and economic policies, which are the Five Year Infrastructure Plan, Health-in-All Policies, Integrated Regional Conservation and Development, and Infill development (Strategic Growth Council, 2015). Each effort is composed of a more directed and specific collaborative effort to improve things in the state at the local level. Given the prominent roles members of this council serve both here and in their home organizations and the all-encompassing approach they've taken to improving the state, I believe this task force to be of great importance, and understanding its strengths and weaknesses to potentially refine their current collaborative approach to be of great importance; which makes it a worthy case study. Ken Alex, the current chair of the council, shall be interviewed about his time there.

### **Case Two: The High Risk Sex Offender and Sexually Violent Predator Task Force**

My second case study covers a task force that was convened back in 2006 under Arnold Schwarzenegger that served as a fact-finding body in order to develop policy reform. The task force came about as a response to a scandal revolving around then Department of Corrections secretary Rod Hickman, who was found to have circumvented legal requirements toward settling sex offenders under penal code 290 by housing them in areas without informing the local community; the most egregious, and the act that

caused Schwarzenegger to call for Hickman's resignation, was the placement of a convicted child molester within the Disney village at Disneyland (Bermudez, 2017). Co-chaired by then assembly members Rudy Bermudez and Todd Spitzer, the task force joined together prominent state agencies involved in the field of law enforcement, including the Department of Corrections under the new secretary Jim Hilton and the Department of Mental Health, public sector associations such as the sheriff and police associations, the league of California cities, and Counties Association, as well as relevant non-profits (Bermudez and Spitzer, 2006). The task force worked throughout 2006 to hear from experts from all joined entities on how to create a holistic approach to better handle the topic of sexual criminals as well as assuage the public outrage that had resulted from Hickman's actions (Bermudez and Spitzer, 2006). The end result of the task forces' meetings was a list of 26 recommendations that were sent to Schwarzenegger's office to be enacted as policy, the biggest of which was the formation of The Sex Offender Management Board (SOMB), which serves as an all-encompassing body for handling information regarding sex offender cases and keeping the public up to date about where sex offenders are and will be settled (Bermudez and Spitzer, 2006). I chose this task force as a case study because it is one with a clearly defined scope and objective that has already been accomplished. My interviewee, former assembly member and task force co-chair Bermudez, should be able to give me a full summary of the task forces' actions during its course, where it went right and wrong, and what could have been done better.

**Case Three: The Climate Action Teams.**

The Climate Action Teams, or CATs, have been active since 2006 after the passage of the California Global Warming Solutions Act, otherwise known as AB32, and have been tasked with two main goals; the first of which is to reduce carbon emissions in order to help meet the state's objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and eventually getting it to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 (California Climate Change, 2017). The second goal is to provide information for the California Climate Adaption Strategy, which assesses the impact climate change has had on the state's environment and resources, speculate on what further changes are likely to occur, and how the state can mitigate them (California Climate Change, 2017). Given the many contributors to carbon emission and the wide effects climate change can have, the Climate Action Teams are composed of numerous work groups, themselves task forces, based on their area of expertise. Topics these groups cover include Agriculture, Biodiversity, Coastal protection, Forest Protection, Land Use, Public Health, Public Sector Coordination, and Water Energy (Climate Action Team, 2017). The work of the CATs thus far is repeatedly published in reports, which include their Near-Term Implementation Plans to work towards their two objectives, grading various state agencies on their effectiveness to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and annual reports mandated by executive order S-3-05 (Climate Action Team, 2017). Given that climate change is the quintessential wicked problem, I felt it was necessary to include task force efforts to address it in my study. Given the scope and long term approach the state has taken to deal with climate change, I believe that of all the task forces I am examining, the

CATs will have had to deal with the most problems and have had the hardest time remaining effective at accomplishing their goals. Ashley Conrad-Saydah, the Deputy Secretary for Climate Policy at the California EPA, shall be the interviewee for this task force.

#### **Case Four: Tree Mortality Task Force**

The fourth case of my study examines the Tree Mortality Task Force, put into place by an emergency order by governor Jerry Brown in October of 2015 in order to combat the recent epidemic of tree deaths in the Sierra Nevada region due to the ongoing drought and the subsequent rise in wood beetle infestations because of it (Office of the Governor, 2015). The Task Force is jointly led by the Governor's Office, the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, and the Office of Emergency Services. In addressing the emergency, the objectives of the task force have been set as follows: provide for public health and safety of persons and property in identified high hazard zones, ensure efforts associated with implementation of the directives contained in the Governor's State of Emergency Proclamation remain coordinated, ensure continuous communication among state, federal, and local governments, as well as with other non-governmental organizations assigned to the task force, provide consistent and coordinated messaging between task force member agencies and the public and manage projects and programs in a financially responsible and efficient manner (Tree Mortality Task Force, 2015.) As can be seen in their objectives, the task force mainly serves as a coordinating body for the individual directives that have been placed onto departments such the aforementioned lead agencies as well as CalTrans, the Department of General Services, and various

counties and local governments in the affected area (Office of the Governor, 2015). This task force was chosen for two reasons: first, it is a good example of a task force serving as a coordinated body for individual agency efforts, second it is one of the two task forces studied that I was able to interview two members of. It will be interesting to see if its perceived effectiveness changes depending on the member in question. Mrs. Conrad-Saydah of the EPA and Matt Hennigan of the Governmental Operations Agency shall be speaking on this task force.

#### **Case Five: Drought Task Force**

Similar to the Tree Mortality Task Force, the Drought Task Force was convened as a result of a declaration of a state of emergency by governor Brown, this time emphasizing protecting and conserving the state's remaining water resources (California Drought, 2017). As part of the emergency declaration, all agencies with assignments related to water, such as the Department of Water Resources, the various Regional Water Boards, and the California department of Food and Agriculture, have been organized under a new Incident Command System to continually provide policy recommendations, aid in emergency responses, and water conservation efforts for as long as the emergency is in place (California Drought, 2017). Among the task force's current works, its official website also constantly produces updates on the status of drought alleviation programs, statistics on water conservation in the state, and offers information on how citizens can take advantage of programs to contribute to mitigating the effects of the drought (California Drought, 2017). These programs include the household water tank program, the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program, Drought Housing Rental

Subsidies (DHRS), and several others (California Drought, 2014). This task force is another one focused on addressing the wide-reaching problem of climate change, focusing on the specific problem of the recent drought in the state. Given the variety of ways climate change impacts the state, I believed having multiple cases of California's mission to mitigate its effects would help measure how effective the state has been at addressing all the problems caused by the quintessential wicked problem. To find out, task force member Matt Hennigan of the Government Operations Agency will be interviewed for his experience on the task force.

### **Case Six: Sustainability Task Force**

The Sustainability Task Force is run by the government operations agency in conjunction with the governor's office in order to reduce the environmental impact state entities have as part of the state's wider effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Hennigan, April 2017). Unlike other task forces that oversee work groups tackle different projects as in the Climate Action Teams, all state agencies are tasked with the same thing, reducing their environmental impact, and have the same options for doing so, such as purchasing newer electric vehicles to phase out older parts of their fleet and cutting energy usage in their buildings (Hennigan, April 2017). Agencies report to the task force every 6 months about their progress towards the task force's goal, and if they are found to have made insufficient progress, then the department head is required to meet with the governor in to discuss how they can get back on track and to be impressed upon that this objective is of the highest priority for the state (Hennigan, April 2017). I had not originally planned to use this case in my study, in his interview Mr. Hennigan

included it with his discussion of the Tree Mortality and Drought Task Forces, and I believe it was worth including as it widens the universe to include an instance of the state using a task force for self-innovation as part of addressing the issue of climate change.

**Case seven: Developmental Centers Task Force/Developmental Services Task Force.**

My final case to be studied is a task force headed by the California Health and Human Services Agency, the Developmental Services Task Force, which grew out of the Developmental Services Task Force. While what their objective is isn't clearly stated on their official website, the Developmental Services Task Force works with local level governments and non-profits to aid those with various mental and physical disabilities, reforming formerly incarcerated persons, and citizens in overwhelming debt, to become rehabilitated into members able to function freely in society (Dooley, 2014). As the Developmental Center Task Force, they were convened in order to discuss the future of the state's four developmental centers, which had become increasingly underfunded and underutilized as the state's culture moved towards preferring (Dooley, 2014). Ultimately, the task force recommended the state begin closing the centers and transitioned into the broader Developmental Services Task Force in order to continually coordinate and promote community based services (Developmental Services Task Force, 2017). The task force now routinely holds meetings and workshops meant to inform the general population about the safety net measures in place to protect people with disabilities, programs aimed toward helping disabled people find meaningful employment and overcome obstacles to becoming employed, as well as make policy recommendations to the state legislature about how to refine disability programs (Developmental Services

Task Force, 2017). Given that the task force serves as both an information gathering function and an administrative one, it will be interesting to see if it is more effective at performing one of its functions over the other, and why. Two task force members, Catharine Blakemore, the executive director of Disability Rights California and Amy Wall, the assistant director of Developmental Center Closure for the Task Force, shall be giving their expertise on the task force.

**Conclusion:**

Now that my method for conducting my research has been set, analyzing responses from task force members using a universal set of questions that check the presence of the four factors discussed in the literature review, as well as the five task forces I will be examining, we will now move on to the results of my research. The following section will summarize my meetings with the task force members, whether their responses were primarily positive or negative, the relevance of the factors from the literature review on their experience, and my assessment about whether or not the task force is effective based on their responses.



## Results

This chapter summarizes my findings based on interviews with people associated with task forces in California. The interview process took from March 23<sup>rd</sup> to April 10<sup>th</sup>, 2017, during which time I spoke with six individuals about their experience on different task forces. Each interviewee served on at least one task force selected in my study, with two of them, Matt Hennigan and Ashley Conrad-Saydah, serving on a total of three and two of the task forces respectfully. Additionally, two of my cases, the Tree Mortality Task Force and the Developmental Centers Task Force/Developmental Services Task Force had two interviewees serving on it concurrently. Because I was able to get more than one perspective on these task forces, both of their experiences on it are compared to try and get a bigger picture of how effective the task force seems to its members. Of my interview questions, 3 pertain to questions of the task forces' participants, 3 cover the topic of resources, and 6 were about internal and external factors that contribute to the work environment. As mentioned previously, instances of departmentalism were tallied throughout my discussions with each member. While these questions wound up being somewhat unbalanced, several of them have more factor indicators than others due to the interviewees telling stories about the task force and generally providing more information than was required of them. For the purposes of this exploratory study, I believe they are sufficient while noting that a future study may benefit from a more balanced and careful question selection.

Before explaining my results, I would like to explain the process by which I went through to get approval to conduct a formal survey for my thesis. CSU Sacramento has a former

review board to ensure that the wellbeing of human research subjects is protected and that research is conducted in a humane and non-manipulative way. As my study strictly interviewed public officials, it was given a rating of exempt and each individual interview did not need to be reviewed by the board itself. Next, I'd like to point out that the names of my interviewees were gathered and recorded to lend weight to the credibility of their experiences on the task forces they served on. To protect their identity and statements, this study will not be published further than necessary for my thesis, as per their pre-interview agreements. The results of my compilation efforts are as follows:

**Table 3: Final Results**

<b>Interviewee:</b>	<b>Task Force:</b>	<b>Positive/negative Participants (3-5):</b>	<b>Positive/negative Resources (4):</b>	<b>Positive/Negative Environment (7):</b>	<b>#Departmental Cases</b>	<b>Interviewee: Effective?</b>	<b>My Call: Effective?</b>
Ken Alex	Strategic Growth Council	3(0)*	2(1)	3(3)	0	Yes	Yes
Rudy Bermudez	The High Risk Sex Offender and Sexually Violent Predator Task Force	3(0)	3(1)	6(0)	0	Yes	Yes
Ashley Conrad-Saydah	Climate Action Teams	3(0)	1(2)	4(2)	0	Yes	Yes
Ashley Conrad-Saydah	Tree Mortality Task Force	3(0)	3(0)	6(0)	0	Yes	Yes
Matt Hennigan	Tree Mortality Task Force	3(0)	3(0)	5(2)	0	Yes	Yes
Matt Hennigan	Drought Task Force	3(0)	3(0)	5(2)	0	Yes	Yes
Matt Hennigan	Sustainability Task Force	3(2)	3(0)	5(2)	2	Yes	Yes
Catherine Blakemore	Developmental Centers/Developmental Services Task Force	5(0)	3(0)	6(0)	0	Yes	Yes
Amy Wall	Developmental Centers/Developmental Services Task Force	3(0)	2(1)	6(0)	0	Yes	Yes

\*Numbers represent the number of positive or negative responses to interview questions related to each factor. Number outside of the parenthesis represents the number of mentioned positive responses, while the number inside represents the number of negative responses.

There are several similar trends that can be noted from the data. Beginning with general observations, all of my interviewees viewed the factors pulled from the literature as tending to have a more positive than negative impact on their task force. Additionally, all individuals interviewed believed that their task force was effective at performing the tasks assigned to them. Breaking down the trends by factor, I have noted the following:

Participants:

- All interviewees believed that members of their task forces trusted each other to act appropriately and in good faith.
- All interviewees believed that task force members generally had a good opinion of the work the task force was doing.
- All interviewees believed that any controversy that may have arisen over their assigned task did not cause enough friction to hurt the group's willingness to work toward their objectives.

Resources:

- Four interviewees mentioned that their task forces suffered from inadequate resources at some point in their operation that impeded their ability to pursue their goals by some amount.
- All interviewees believed that the individual members serving on their task forces were rightly chosen to have a part to play in accomplishing its goals.
- All interviewees believed that all serving members had good connections with their home agency and were able to pull additional resources from them and delegate work related to the task forces as needed.

Environment:

- Two interviewees mentioned that their task force suffered from some internal problem that effected their work environment. Notably, Mr. Hennigan saw the

same detrimental environments in every task force he served on; namely a time-consuming meeting process in which individual task force members contributed little.

- Two interviewees mentioned that their task force suffered from some external problem that effected their work environment. Notably, the Strategic Growth Council had to deal with both internal, limitations on their ability to communicate, and external impeding factors.

#### Departmentalism:

- Only a single interviewee mentioned any cases of departmentalism impeding the task force's work. In both instances, they arose out of an unwillingness to fully participate from either heads of agencies on the task force itself or from lower management in the overseen agencies.

Overall, despite any difficulty they may have mentioned, all interviewees believed their task forces were effective, as mentioned above. As none of my cases exhibit more negative impacts of my factors than positive, I too concluded that these task forces should be considered effective based on what the literature says makes an effective task force. For more specific analyses of the interview responses, please see the following paragraphs, which cover the interviews on a case by case basis.

#### **The Strategic Growth Council:**

The Strategic Growth Council (SGC) is a task force manned primarily by members of Governor Brown's office and tasked primarily with rewarding grants for a number of projects, including clean energy promotion and the development of new affordable housing. This task force is unique in that one of its negative environmental factors comes from an internal source rather than an outside influence. My interviewee, Ken Alex told me that when the SGC was originally enacted through statute, it had

virtually no budget yet several mandates to fulfill, which made it unclear what the SGC's goal was and how the SGC was going to accomplish it. Through later legislative action, the task force eventually gained enough resources to hire staff and manage the grant programs it was meant to oversee. Additionally, the task force has to contend with the fact that given how much money the Council has the authority to grant, legal technicalities over what projects get how much and who gets accepted for grant application can cause quite a bit of contention amongst the community it is meant to serve. Communication between task force members is also hampered to some degree due to the Bagley-Keene act, limiting the task force's ability to discuss business before decisions are made; though this is somewhat alleviated due to many of the members coming from the governor's cabinet and already having a good working relationship and a willingness to work toward the task force's goal. On a more positive note, Mr. Alex was quick to extol the effort that both staff and leadership have made in keeping the task force able to fulfill its core missions, which include doing its part in the Greenhouse Gas Reduction plan and Affordable Housing Sustainable Communities grant project. However, due to funding limitations, the SGC has not been able to enact all programs that it currently plans to. Because of this dedication among leadership and staff and its continued fulfillment of its main goals, Mr. Alex views the Strategic Growth Council as an effective task force. While this task force faces considerable challenges from several influencers that have hurt its work environment and face budgetary issues, its ability to perform its primary assignment and the fact that it has more positive indicators than negative leads me to believe it is in fact a successful task force.

**The High Risk Sex Offender and Sexually Violent Predator Task Force:**

Of all of the task forces in my study, The High Risk Sex offender and Sexually Violent Predator Task Force is one that had nearly everything in its favor. It was an information-focused task force that was tasked with creating a new policy recommendation around the housing of sex offenders and sexually violent predators that was highly demanded by the public due to the outcry caused by the former Department of Corrections Head Rod Hickman, who had been circumventing existing regulations to house sexual criminals in areas without notifying the communities where they were settled. Because of this, all joined members of the task force held the task force as a top priority, the governor allocated any resources that were needed to fulfill their goal within the one year timeframe he set, and both internal and external environmental factors were supportive. As Rudy Bermudez, the interviewee from the task force notes, each of the selected state agencies were eager to participate as it was a chance for them to prove that they were competent in the public eye in the aftermath of a major administrative oversight. Additionally, being a member of a major task force covering a hot topic issue can lend a lot of legitimacy to a non-profit, so there was no shortage of experts willing to be signed onto the task force in 2006. In fact, there were far more complaints from organizations that were turned down on the chance to serve on it than from those whose membership was required by the governor.

Once work began, the high priority of the issue helped ensure that all members trusted each other to properly contribute and no notable rifts over how to proceed formed between task force members. In terms of resources, Mr. Bermudez explained that since

all of the task force members on the state side were heads of their respective departments, they were easily able to pull any experts from their home departments to present as needed. The only slowdown that occurred in the task force's lifetime occurred when they had to call a meeting early due to lacking the right expertise to inform them on an issue initially, which was rectified the next day by pulling an additional speaker from the Department of Mental Health. Additionally, given the simplicity of the mission, it was clearly structured from the beginning in terms of what they had been convened for and the steps they would take to complete their objective. The high desire to participate of the department heads to participate helped ensure that discussions were conducted in a timely and efficient manner, communication between members was quite strong, with no mentioned squabbling over who would handle what. As expected from such a highly-motivated task force working on such a salient issue, there were no instances of departmentalism mentioned by Mr. Bermudez, and he was quite satisfied with the task force's conduct. Given everything the task force had going for it and its success in submitting its final recommendations at the end of the year, both Mr. Bermudez and I consider this to be a very successful task force.

**Climate Action Teams:**

In contrast to the narrow scope and effort of the Sex Offender Task Force, the Climate Action Teams represent a longer term, all-encompassing effort to tackle the messy issue of climate change. As might be expected, it has faced considerably more hurdles in its run than the previous case. In terms of participants, while the long-term nature of the Climate Action Teams has helped to build trust between the lead members



and a commitment to fulfilling the Teams' many objectives, interviewee Ashley Conrad-Saydah explained that differing views on climate change can mean that partners in local areas can have a more mixed outlook on what the effects of climate change are and what if anything should be done. This differed from the more united understanding of the problem enjoyed by the members of High Risk Sex Offender task force. While not critically underfunded, Ms. Conrad-Saydah believes that the task force never has enough funding to implement every project they wanted to do, and sometimes funding can prevent the task force from acquiring what she dubs a "full tour" of all relevant experts and stakeholders on everything that they do. Amongst their existing agency resources however, Ms. Conrad-Saydah felt that the membership had the connections needed to pull anything they might need for their various projects. Internally, she believes that the task force is well managed, having been established with clear goals in mind that have allowed them to always act meaningfully towards achieving them. The task force's efforts however have faced some challenge from outside forces, namely public support that can vary widely depending on local views of climate change and what they are trying to accomplish as well as several solutions they wished to deploy being delayed by sudden onset of storms. Despite these difficulties, Ms. Conrad-Saydah did not feel that there were any instances of internal squabbling that would result in departmentalism, and that the task force was still effective at doing its job. Given its strong internal core of members at the state level and that some level of difficulty has to be expected giving the difficulty climate change presents, I am inclined to agree that the Climate Action Teams do make progress in alleviating the wicked issue.

**Tree Mortality Task Force:**

The Tree Mortality Task Force was called together as a result of an emergency proclamation by governor brown regarding the sudden increase in tree deaths in the Sierras. As mentioned in the previous section, the Tree Mortality Task Force is the first of two task forces that I was able to get two different members to respond to my questions. The first, Mrs. Conrad-Saydah, had a more positive view of Tree Mortality than the Climate Action Teams, owing to three factors: The team itself is smaller, it has a more precise scope of activity, and the impact of tree mortality was more obvious to the affected areas, so local communities were more engaged in resolving the issue and have offered broader support to the task force than on general climate change problems. Because of this, the Tree Mortality Task Force is able to avoid the detrimental factors affecting the Climate Action Teams, being able to better implement their plans to address the issue at hand with a smaller budget due to not needing to direct resources at multiple problems. At the same time, she believes that the Tree Mortality task force enjoyed similar advantages to the Climate Change Task Force, being well managed, having a clear goal, having good communication between members, and able to pull needed resources from other parts of their home agencies. Matt Hennigan has a similar view that the Tree Morality Task Force has in general gone fairly well, in particular praising how having members from local governments from the affected area really helped make it clear to the state leadership in the unaffected Sacramento how bad the three death epidemic had become, as well as how effectively state agencies were able to delegate tasks to members of their home department that were experts in the field and best able to

act on the problem. However, Mr. Hennigan also notes difficulties in getting things done that were not mentioned by Ms. Conrad-Saydah. First, Mr. Hennigan believes that communication between different members of task forces in particular tends to be rather weak, as agencies tended to receive their task, delegate work to lower levels, and merely contact the rest of the task force to report, with little going back and forth between the silos. Second, he believes that the task force structured meetings in a way that was very frustrating. A typical task force meeting would take up a 1-1 ½ hour bloc of time from all members, during which they might expect to only meaningfully contribute in a two minute report. Given that participation in these task forces takes their attention from their usual assignments, he feels as though this meeting structure can dampen members' desire to participate. as their time could be more efficiently spent elsewhere. In neither interview was a clear case of departmentalism discussed. Overall, both interviewees viewed this task force as effective in its role, and given that Mrs. Conrad-Saydah views this one as having fewer issues than the Climate Action Teams while Mr. Hennigan doesn't believe his concerns have significantly hurt the cohesion of the joined task force members, I have given this case my vote of confidence as well.

### **Drought Task Force:**

The second task force in my case study that Mr. Hennigan served on, The Drought Task Force like the Climate Action Teams featured a wider assignment of tasks compared to the Tree Mortality and Sexual Predator Task Force. However, Mr. Hennigan did not seem to believe that the Drought Task Force was plagued with the same hindrances as the Climate action teams: a lack of resources and a lack of strong support in

the local communities the task force served. He explained that resources, such as funding, tend to come from existing budgets that are redirected to new priorities. This does receive pushback from existing programs, who often try to write off the redirected funding as a loss that needs to be compensated with additional revenue from the state. Mr. Hennigan doesn't seem to believe that this represents a serious issue however, as all public sector entities push back when money is spent elsewhere. Additionally, there is far less dispute about the impact of a decreased access to water than there is about climate change, and locals in drought affected regions are generally quite willing to cooperate in order to see the issue abated. Mr. Hennigan identified a problem similar to one present in the Tree Mortality Task Force Structure : generally slow and frustrating meetings and little group communication beyond what was strictly necessary. However, these problems never brought the entire task force to a stop, but merely created slowdowns on a particular front. In one instance, one of the duties of the task force was to oversee the effort of the unincorporated area of East Porterville to connect to the wells of the City of Porterville after their own wells went dry. The effort wound up stalled for a number of reasons, including a lack of local funding for the project and a bureaucratic question of whether or not connecting to the city's well would mean that the unincorporated area would need to become an official part of the city. However, the problem was able to be smoothed out with the task force's help without seriously diverting attention from their other tasks, and as with the previous case, Mr. Hennigan and I believe that this task force has thus far remained effective at fulfilling its objectives.

#### **Sustainability Task Force:**

The Sustainability Task Force acts strictly as a means for implementing public innovation, requiring state agencies to work cutting carbon emissions and developing clean energy into their objectives and budget. While Mr. Hennigan has mentioned task force members having griped over wasting their times in meetings where they have little impact and quibbled over redirected money before, the Sustainability Task Force faces unique pushback against its mandates on two fronts. First, the leadership of these departments will often deliberately drag their feet on implementing these policies, excusing their lack of progress as due to a lack of funding, manpower, or other resource claim. These instances of departmentalism are generally noticed by the governor's office relatively quickly, as part of the task force's duty is to review the progress on implementation of its members every six months. Any member found lagging behind the expected level of progress is required to meet with the Government Operations Agency in the governor's office so that the importance of the governor's innovation plan can be impressed upon them. This typically gets the point across to appointed agency heads that these regulations are a top priority for the governor and they need to make a more concerted effort to comply with them. The second form of departmentalism occurs below the leadership level, among the middle managers of the overseen agencies. For various reasons, including resentment for having to redirect funding to simply not believing that global warming is a real issue, agency members who directly oversee the work of the rank and file can simply have them not prioritize the task force's mandates. This form of departmentalism can actually be more damaging than departmentalism at the leadership level, as it isn't immediately clear where failure to act is coming from, and the task

force's main method of enforcement, the weight of the governor's office, is less effective when one person can't be singled out as needing a reminder of why they need to be compliant with the mandate. Despite these efforts to resist reform by some of its members, like all of the task forces he's served on, Mr. Hennigan believes this one is effective, as despite some setbacks the innovation mandates have largely gone forward. As with previous cases, I accept Mr. Hennigan's argument as to why the task force is effective.

#### **Developmental Centers Task Force/Developmental Services Task Force:**

My last case is also the second task force for which I was able to interview two serving members, Catherine Blakemore and Amy Wall. The Developmental Centers Task Force, which later transitioned to the more general Developmental Centers Task Force received glowing reviews during my interview with Ms. Blakemore. In particular, Ms. Blakemore praised how the task force was run, largely crediting the commitment of senior officials on the task force for ensuring it received high priority from its joined members and the state's willingness to give it a particularly long timetable and the discretion given to the task force to self-manage, which allowed them to gather information and hold the meetings necessary to produce a truly informed policy recommendations regarding closing the developmental centers. Additionally, the task force encountered a stroke of luck when the regional center of Napa lost its federal funding, which helped spin the discussion in favor of closing the centers and redirecting benefits towards helping recipients live in the community. These fortuitous factors helped ensure that, while their topic was a contentious one, discussion continued to run smoothly

and the task force was able to complete its initial assignment and transition to its current broader function of assisting with the implementation of services in the new community based environment without hitting any snags. My second interviewee, Ms. Wall, had a similarly positive view of the task force, though her praise was more reserved. While she was appreciative of the priority given to the task force from the state and the real results the task force produced, she emphasized more of the negatives the task force faced, namely the fact that the subject was controversial and that its final recommendation, closing the developmental centers, was for a while seriously contested by both center employees and the families of institutionalized patients, who argued that their relatives weren't capable of living on their own in the broader community. Ms. Wall also stated that support for the final recommendation wasn't as all-encompassing as Ms. Blakemore made it out to be. While all task force members eventually agreed, the final recommendation was also accompanied by several letters from member organizations that said they did not agree with all of its stipulations. When the task force transitioned to its more general role of community service provision, she also added that service rates, the out of pocket costs that recipients must pay when acquiring the new services became a contentious issue, particularly since different services had different rates, some of which were frozen and others more negotiable. Despite these problems, Ms. Wall joined Ms. Blakemore in viewing this task force as an effective one.

**Conclusion:**

Despite most task forces encountering some level of difficulty in their operation, all interviewees viewed their task force as effective in pursuing goals. Since no task

force has more negative aspects of the literature factors than positive ones, I conclude that they are all effective as well. Given how readily my interviewees responded to my factor-related questions and related them to their work, it seems that the academic view of what makes task forces effective lines up quite well with reality. My concluding chapter will unpack all that has been discussed so far and make recommendations for how a similar study as this one could be improved in the future.



## **Conclusion**

The arrival of the 21st century heralded a new understanding of the problems our society faces. The state of California now endeavors to tackle a wide variety of far reaching problems such as climate change and healthcare. The traditional centralized approach to problem solving common in for most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century does not work well for addressing some of these problems. As such, collaborative efforts such as task forces have become a new way for the state to tackle these wicked problems. Given the potential negative implications if challenges to the task force approach were not properly addressed, I designed an exploratory study to see if the state's task forces seemed up to the monumental tasks assigned to them. I began this study with a single question: "What makes an inter-agency task force in the state of California effective?" From there, I reviewed a sample of scholarly articles on the topic of task force effectiveness, eventually compiling them into four common factors. Using these factors, I built a set of interview questions using the model of a Structured, Focused Comparison (George and Bennet, 2005.) to compare the experiences task force members had on 7 different task forces that now or at one time operated within the state. Lastly, I compiled and analyzed the responses given to the interview questions.

I found that not only did all task force members view the task forces they served on as effective, but in every case the factors appeared to have a more positive impact than a negative one and there was only one case where departmentalism clearly appeared. As such, I came to the conclusion that California's inter-agency task forces are as effective at their assignments as can be reasonably expected of a public sector entity. Additionally,

given how quickly interviewees were able to relate the factor related questions to their own work, the factors I pulled from the literature review seem to be very relevant to task forces as a whole, meaning that academia seems to have a clear grasp on what a task force needs to operate effectively. However, task forces are not perfect, and as shown in my findings section, many of them suffer from more than one factor that is impeding their ability to perform at a higher level. Many of these problems however are likely endemic to the public sector as a whole, and given the limits of funding, time, and public support, likely cannot be solved easily. As such, it seems no serious changes need to be made to refine our current understanding of task forces or our approach to running them; the system is not broken, at least no more than usual, and thus does not need to be fixed. Before my thesis comes to its end, I shall make some recommendations about how future research on the effectiveness of inter-agency task forces could be conducted, as well as voice what I believe are some implications my research has for how task forces should be approached in the future.

### **Recommendations for Future Research:**

Before fully concluding my thesis, I will offer my thoughts on my findings and give some recommendations about how future studies on the topic of task forces could be refined. What surprised me more than anything is that every interviewee who was able and willing to speak to me believed their task force to be effective, when I had originally thought I would find at least one member who for one reason or another believed their effort to have been wasted. After reflecting on it, there could have been a number of reasons as to why all of my cases turned out positive. First and foremost, it could be that

task forces that were formed to combat the wicked problems described in Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) are given higher priority exactly because policymakers understand the implications of not properly mitigating them. This priority might ensure that they have enough resources, able participants, and a well structured environment to make steps toward dealing with them meaningful. A lower priority task force might not be so well equipped, and may face greater struggles to have an impact. Additionally, potential interviewees might naturally have been more willing to talk about task forces that they did think were effective, or feel compelled to say it was effective despite hindrances to reflect better on themselves. In order to properly capture cases of failure to compare them against cases of success, failed task forces might have to be deliberately searched for and their former members sought after, which will likely take longer than taking the first respondents available. In the cases where state agencies are joined by non-profit or local partners, it could be beneficial to seek these partners out in order to contrast their view of a task force against the state's, as it might provide supplementary insight into how said task force is perceived and its actual effectiveness. If a similar study were to be undertaken after this, I would have to recommend taking the additional time needed to broaden the scope of the study to include task forces specifically considered failures and widening the pool of interviewees to include non-public officials to paint a more complete picture of how effective task forces have been in solving the problems assigned to them.

For those that favor more quantitative methods of research, a future study could examine the effectiveness of task forces by focusing specifically on those that produce or

are expected to produce a measurable result, and compare how close they came to the goal assigned to them as a percentage. One task force from my cases in particular, the Tree Mortality Task Force, had as its goal to significantly reduce the amount of tree deaths in the Sierras. Thus a future study might examine whether it resulted in measurable decline in the number of tree mortalities in the area to determine in part if the task force is effective. Researchers might examine similar data in evaluating the effectiveness of other task forces pursuing a measurable goal.

**Implications for practice:**

While my aim was not to draw lessons for practice, I would stress the following lessons based on my interviews:

- As can be seen from my case selections, task forces can be assembled to tackle important and challenging issues, including climate change, bringing innovation to the public sector, and legal matters. For those with an interest in these fields and hoping to make a difference in them, working on or with a public sector task force seems to be an excellent opportunity to be a part of a major effort to accomplish something.
- As mentioned previously, public sector task forces can suffer the same problems that traditional public sector entities face. One of the most common impediments to a task force's effectiveness was a lack of resources such as funding. When being assigned to or applying to join a task force, it is important to understand the limits of what can actually be done and be willing to accept that not all ideas and solutions can be implemented.

For those who are considering the possibility of working with a public sector task forces, I wish to emphasize that the experience could largely be a positive one for those that wish to work toward alleviating society's issues. At the same time, any enthusiasm must be tempered with the reality that even when pooling resources, there is a limit about what can be accomplished at any one time.

**Final Thoughts:**

The development and spread of the task force as a means to solve problems is simply one of many tools California has to address the issues of the new millennia. As I studied throughout the courses of Public Policy and Administration at CSU Sacramento, I became interested in the application of collaborative efforts as a problem-solving tool, and sought to study how effective were task forces, a form of collaboration, at serving the needs of the public sector. I learned quite a bit about what scholars view as the factors that drive task force effectiveness and how real task force members relate them to their daily experiences. While as I noted previously there were several steps that could have been taken to conduct a more in-depth study, if my findings are valid the future of task forces in the public sector looks to be fairly bright. With all of my interviewees reporting a positive view on their task force's effectiveness and a general enjoyment in serving on them, I believe that inter-agency task forces are likely to continue to serve the State of California well in the foreseeable future.

## Appendix: Interviews

### Ken Alex:

Would you give me your name and occupation?

Ken Alex, senior policy advisor to gov. brown.

How long have you been with this organization?

6.25 years.

Can you identify some task forces that you have worked on in your current position/with your current organization?

Strategic growth council.

Why were/was these/these task force(s) convened? Who convened the task force? What was their mission?

Created by statute, legislatively created 10 years ago, with the idea to have a multi-agency representation around issues of sustainability and growth in California.

Was this an intra or inter-agency task force?

Did you feel that the task force had a clear mission?

Yes and no. Yes in the sense that it was statutorily created and some direction given, no that it had almost no budget, which helps defined what the mission is, statutory mission was pretty broad.

What specific objectives did you pursue to accomplish that mission?

In no small part, ultimately was a budget based on some money provided through proposition and additional legislation, which have helped create more focus, allowed some hiring of staff, and given the council the chance to work on some broader issues.

Can you recall who some of the other task force members were? Who they represented?

Ten members of the council, he's director of the office of planning and research. 6 members of the governor cabinet, three public appointees.

Do you think those were the right people to be in the task force? Was there someone who should have been there that wasn't? were there people who shouldn't have been there?

Yes/

Do you think that members trusted the others to do their part?

Yes, one aspect of this council is that it's the governor's council, so they have to get along.

Do you believe that members of the taskforce had good connections with other parts of their home organization that you might need to work with?

Yes.

Did the members have a generally positive view of the work you were doing? Was anything controversial?

Give out a lot of money, a half a billion dollars, that creates conflict/controversy, always some fight around money. Guidelines are set up to guide how the money is allocated, within those guidelines, there are many disputes. How a particular building type is designated impacts the score the development receives, designating a senior facility as a retirement facility has an impact on how that facility scores.

How was the task force structured? Did it have a clear hierarchy or were members generally on more equal footing? Broadly on equal footing, majority is governor's cabinet, have control of decisions.

- Do you think that team members were managed well? If so, why?
- Do you think that communication between members was strong? If so, how?
  - Yes, people know each other and articulate, bagely-keene act limits the amount of interaction they can have, even as a member of the cabinet, significant issue.

With respect to money and supplies, and time, did you have enough resources? Inevitably a problem in government, money to give away, more and more demands on the staff.

- If not, how did having insufficient resources impact things?

Were there external factors that were beneficial? Did the task force have broad support from the constituents it served?

Bagley-Keene, has created hurdles, the fact that it is a multi-agency task force but each agency member does not have a separate or general budget, it's an add-on for them. That's a problem. Always problems with all of these things. There are unfunded mandates in the statute.

While working, did your task force ever hit a bump in the road so to speak?

One right now currently being worked on. Guidelines for giving away funds for a program called transformative climate communities are quite complicated, unlike most programs, not exempted by the administrative procedure act, APA takes quite a long time, a year or more to do any guidelines. Unless get an exception, guidelines will take a long time.

- If so, can you describe it generally? If not, what do you think kept things running smoothly.
- If you hit a bump, do you think it hurt your internal dynamic? If so, how?

Is it effective?

Yes and no, think it's been very effective in making grants consistent with the statutory direction and GHG reduction fund. Main program is affordable housing sustainable communities, highly effective, staff gets a lot of credit for what they've done. Looking at all things for the council to do, it would be hard to do everything, focus always goes to where

Not just more money, the money we do have is extremely directed and focused on an outcome or program.

**Rudy Bermudez:**

Would you give me your name and position title?

Assembly member for the 56<sup>th</sup> district, Rudy Bermudez

How long have you been with \_\_\_\_ agency name \_\_\_\_?

4 years in the Assembly

Can you identify some task forces that you have worked on in your current position/with your current organization?

California High Risk sex offender Task Force, concluded in August, decided to expand it to second task force to include Sexually violent predator task force. Incorporated all previous people, concluded in 2006.

Thinking of the most recent task force you have worked on, why were/was these/these task force(s) convened? Who convened the task force? What was the task force's mission?

Task force was convened due to public policy problems occurring under Rod Hickman, agency secretary for department of corrections. Under Hickman, she had given orders to circumvent current penal code 290 registration requirements and tried to house sex offenders in inappropriate places without knowledge of public or law enforcement. Task force mission was to come up with recommendations to address state wide problems of placing and monitoring sexual criminals.

Was this an intra or inter-agency task force?

Multi-agency taskforce, included legislature, Todd Spencer and Bermudez. Members included California state sheriff's association, police chief's association, California probation officers, some non-profits, California coalition league of California cities, California association of counties.

Did you feel that the task force had a clear mission?

Yes.

What specific objectives did you pursue to accomplish that mission?

Met periodically throughout year, brought in experts in the field, speakers from public policy groups that would come in and talk about sex offenders. Each department aired their expertise and knowledge. Provided their experts to participate and give testimony to the panel. Each agency would explain their procedures. Spend a whole day going through department of corrections or department of mental health

Can you recall who some of the other task force members represented?

Do you think those were the right people to be in the task force? Was there someone who should have been there that wasn't? Were there people who shouldn't have been there?

What were the consequences of not having the right people on this taskforce?

These people were the figureheads of their organizations, in many cases they weren't the expert in the field. Jim Hilton would have an expert come in and testify on the issues. Don't look at the individuals, but the agencies. Agencies were all the right agencies, needed a holistic approach and the totality of the issue to find a solution.

When the task force was convened, did most of the members already know each other?

Were there any special efforts or activities to build trust among the members? Do you think that members trusted that the others were committed to the success of the task force?

Some question as to why certain groups were there, pressure from some groups as to why they weren't included. Some victim groups complained they weren't selected, as we proceeded to achieve the mission, it was evident that the people selected were the right ones. Was kind of an issue of bias on their own part as to who should be there. Group that was selected was very knowledgeable and good. For some organizations, being



selected for a task force adds credibility; however this was a working taskforce, so you either knew your information or did not. Governor's team did a very good job selecting the right groups.

Do you believe that members of the taskforce had good connections with other parts of their home organization that you might need to work with?

Members were heads of their organization, Mr. Tilton could get anything he wanted out of corrections. Each group were the right figureheads that could demand access to resources as well as information that would make the task force successful.

Did the task force members have a generally positive view of the work you were doing? Was anything controversial?

Controversy was the problem that Mr. Hickman and Woodford created under their leadership, however, the task force was about solutions, not pointing fingers. Knew what the problem was, was about finding solutions and improving safety and quality of life of all Californians. Everybody was in support of all the recommendations that were developed. Many times, there was a lot of discussion. Not every comment made was in agreement, certain things were argued out. Could wind up making a decision that could negatively impact organizations, could make decision that was unlawful.

How was the task force structured? Did it have a clear hierarchy or were members generally on more equal footing?

Bermudez ran the meetings, Co was Todd Spencer, when not available, Todd would run meetings.

- Do you think that team members were managed well? If so, why?
  - Stayed on task every meeting, set up outline every meeting of what they wanted to do, was Bermudez and spencer's job to hold the task force together. Prevent going on a tangent. Sometimes you had to give a little leeway to people discussing an area outside the scope only because they would bring background to the issue at hand. Wanted to make sure that we weren't solving one problem and creating two more. Wanted to give them enough rope to provide testimony and bring them in to what was relevant. Because everyone was treated equally and given respect, not one individual whose testimony wasn't valued. People felt more comfortable in having an open and frank discussion on the issues, and their concerns.
- Do you think that communication between members was strong? If so, how?
  - Very strong, lots of open discussion. Was their job as chairman to support our task force members. In many cases, Mr. Spencer or Bermudez would repeat what was said to give it the emphasis that it needed.

With respect to money and supplies, and time, did you have enough resources?

- Had adequate resources.
- If not, how did having insufficient resources impact things?

Were there external factors that were beneficial to the accomplishment of the mission?

Were there external factors that impeded the work of the task force?

External factors were: The community at large in California was at the time very upset at the placement of sex offenders in the community and how they were being reintegrated. 2 was the business segment- industries very important to California like tourism were impacted by department of corrections for failing to properly reintegrate sex offenders into the community. Disney was very upset with sex offenders being placed in Disney village. Was actually final blow that had Schwarzenegger demands the resignation of Hickman and Woodford. Titman became administrator after them.

Did the task force have broad support from the constituents it served?

It did. If you talk to a community throughout the state, people would say it is still a concern. Recently read about a violent sex offender being placed in a rural area, felt it was still too close to residential areas.

While working, did your task force ever hit a bump in the road so to speak?

Had a meeting that needed to call early, didn't know it at the time, as we discussed the issue, became very vivid that they needed an expert in the field, pulled from mental health. Meeting could not go forward until then. Didn't deter it, only slowed for a full hours, very well organized and schedules would be taken to figure out who needed to testify.

- If so, can you describe it generally? If not, what do you think kept things running smoothly.  
If you hit a bump, do you think it hurt your internal dynamic? If so, how?
- Is there anything that you believe is important about your task force experience that I haven't asked about and, if so, what is it you would like me to know?

Made a number of recommendations, handed the governor one of the most comprehensive study on recommendation on how to manage and provide treatment to high risk sex offenders, was down to whether Schwartz had will to implement them.

Was happy with process, process was fine, very smooth, had working lunches, everything went very smooth.

Very successful providing recommendations, was an inclusive, and holistic view of how to integrate sex offenders.

Thank you for your time.

**Ashley Conrad-Saydah:**

Would you give me your name and position title?

Ashley CS Deputy Secretary for Climate Policy

How long have you been with \_\_\_\_ agency name \_\_\_\_?

5 years in a month.

Can you identify some task forces that you have worked on in your current position/with your current organization?

Boss is the lead for the climate action team, aggregate of secretaries that are somewhat related to climate. Work a lot on climate action teams. Sub tasks forces, force climate action, water energy climate team, comm, research, any number of topic. Co-chaired water/energy and forest

Member of integration team for ICARP. Technical advisory to provide oversight in order to imbed adaption. Representative on tree mortality task force. Task force on forest and climate change. Chief of staff on SGC and on infrastructure working group. Greenhouse gas reduction proceeds.

Thinking of the most recent task force you have worked on, why were/was these/these task force(s) convened? Who convened the task force? What was the task force's mission?

Some conveyed for specific purposes, tree mortality convened to address drought, pathogen that has killed one hundred million trees in California. CAT established in statute about a decade ago, ongoing process to deal with climate change. More of an informational sharing group. Infrastructure working group, submit infrastructure plan annually to legislature, forest action team for carbon, water energy team more about informational sharing. Some for task/purpose with a specific timeframe, some out of statute for information which are ongoing.

Was this an intra or inter-agency task force?

All are inter-agency task forces.

**(environment)** Did you feel that the task force had a clear mission?

The ones that are convened more for informational purposes are less mission driven, water-energy team talked about water energy, though not outcome driven. Mission ones more specific within a period of time.

**(Environment)** What specific objectives did you pursue to accomplish that mission?

For the Tree mortality task force, have a charter with the 19 tasks that must be undertaken, separated tasks into sub teams to do 1-3 with them. Unravel the issues dealing with them.

Water team needs to expend 70 million in the next year.

Set timelines and hold selves accountable for non-mission teams.

Can you recall who some of the other task force members represented?

Represent other state agencies, if external, can represent counties, academics, or non-profits. Multiple groups that represent environmental justice. Can range from local to regional to state.

**(resources)** Do you think those were the right people to be in the task force? Was there someone who should have been there that wasn't? Were there people who shouldn't have been there? What were the consequences of not having the right people on this taskforce?

Biggest challenge is that you get full tour of people, sometimes need staff with full knowledge, setting agenda early. Hampered sometimes by who is or is not there. Biggest issue is that can't have funding to implement some of their ideas.

**(willingness)** Do you think that members trusted that the others were committed to the success of the task force?

About 50/50 if people knew each other. Within the same agency/topic tended to know each other, but not within larger bureaucracies. No real time built due to responding to the crisis.

Everyone knows everyone in the CAT teams, regularly meet to work together. Hardest with people outside of agencies.

Especially where there's funding on the line, members come to the table for funding and to have a say. External members feel very committed to outcomes.

**(resources)** Do you believe that members of the taskforce had good connections with other parts of their home organization that you might need to work with?

Yeah.

**(willingnessx2)** Did the task force members have a generally positive view of the work you were doing? Was anything controversial?

Not in all groups have a shared positive viewpoint. Trying to find a balance people can agree with. Have a realistic view that there will be costs to get what you need.

How was the task force structured? Did it have a clear hierarchy or were members generally on more equal footing?

Clear hierarchy in most of them. Know who the chair and leads are. Important to have leadership to know who people are accountable to.

- **(Environment)** Do you think that team members were managed well? If so, why?
  - Varies. Sometimes no need for management, don't manage the members. In very few of them do you need active management, just setting agenda and committed team members.
- **(Environment)** Do you think that communication between members was strong? If so, how?
  - Communication is usually pretty well for most members of groups.

**(resources)** With respect to money and supplies, and time, did you have enough resources?

Never enough resources. Simply too much to do in climate space. Too much to do, can't reach low hanging fruit. Not enough time to get to everything.

- If not, how did having insufficient resources impact things?

**(environment)** Were there external factors that were beneficial to the accomplishment of the mission? Were there external factors that impeded the work of the task force?

Certain things you can't control: climate changes rapidly. Storms and extreme events that thwart ability to deploy solutions.

**(environment)** Did the task force have broad support from the constituents it served?

On tree mortality, yes. One that all counties wanted to exist. Water energy work group, don't feel any strong desire to change their agencies after discussions. If resources are online, constituents are appreciative, when not, people feel unsatisfied, can feel things move slowly.

**(departmentalism)** While working, did your task force ever hit a bump in the road so to speak?

Biggest roadblocks having enough time. Same people on these groups. Can you get all work done and still go to all meetings.

- If so, can you describe it generally? If not, what do you think kept things running smoothly.
- If you hit a bump, do you think it hurt your internal dynamic? If so, how?

Is there anything that you believe is important about your task force experience that I haven't asked about and, if so, what is it you would like me to know?

Look carefully at the timing of climate outcomes, some things need to be done in the short term, some need to be done now. Some things can wait to be embraced. Look at where these things are implemented, can see if it will be successful or not.

Some of them can move pretty quickly, some not. When steering a ship that people don't want the same destination, can be very difficult. For smaller groups committed to the task, much easier. Bigger the group, the more cumbersome to make d

Tree mortality task force, made some progress in smaller groups, in larger groups just really update each other without making much progress.

Climate actions teams have been effective because they have been largely about informational sharing and putting out policy recommendations.

### **Matt Hennigan:**

Would you give me your name and occupation?

Matt Hennigan, Deputy Secretary.

How long have you been with this organization? Can you identify some task forces that you have worked on in your current position/with your current organization?

Started November 2014, 2.5 years, as long as he's been in the state. Drought Task Force, Sustainability Taskforce, Tree mortality Task force.

Why were/was these/these task force(s) convened? Who convened the task force? What was their mission?

All convened by governor's office. Drought Task Force was to address the drought, how the state would whether the drought, what specifically state agencies can do to alleviate the drought.

Tree mortality same thing, coordinating to stop the tree die off in the sierra and mitigate the impact on people.

Both associated with executive orders or emergency proclamations. Drought was, tree might have been.

Sustainability task force was called out in an executive order, one worked with most.

Purpose to achieve sustainability with energy and water use in state operations.

Was this an intra or inter-agency task force?

Inter-agency.

**(environment)** Did you feel that the task force had a clear mission?

Yeah, think so.

**(environment)** What specific objectives did you pursue to accomplish that mission?

Each department ends up with a to do list of programs to run and goals to achieve, task force meetings serve as a check in to coordinate. Department will get funding to distribute or task to monitor, task force serves as a way to check in and share news and information. How drought and tree mortality have been set up. If you look up the emergency proclamation, it will say specifically what each will do.

Sustainability charges all departments to do the same thing: save energy throughout the portfolio. Less report out, more instructions to. Meeting serves as a reminder to executive leadership to fulfill these goals. Deadlines to meet, programs to take advantage of. Not asking for a department by department report.

Can you recall who some of the other task force members were? Who they represented? Drought; Rob Ogible, executive director of the energy commission, Bill Croyle, director of water resources. Ken Star from public health on the drought task force. Tree mortality task force is divided into working groups, not just interagency, its local government, utilities, trade groups, all on the task force together. Each county reports out. Evan Johnson on tree utility Ange Lotts worked for watershed center, runs the biomass utilization agency subcommittee, CalFire runs a mapping and budgeting/operations group. Department/deputy directors who go to the sustainability taskforce. Dan Kim from energy. Mangat from parks and recreation. Cliff Reichstoffer, governor's office sponsor/convenor. Just got appointed to CPUC, getting a new GO. Wade Crowfoot. Executive person for drought and tree mortality, Kim Craig took over for drought. Saul Gomez took over tree mortality and might lead sustainability.

**(Resources)** Do you think those were the right people to be in the task force? Was there someone who should have been there that wasn't? Were there people who shouldn't have been there?

For the most part with the right people in the room. The task forces are high level enough that they're working their way they are a subject matter expert. Can devote their staff hours to get the job.

Tough to know all the people who are qualified on the matter, just expect departments to send the right person. Sometimes middle management can get left out, but for these high level task forces some people will be left out. Someone might have more expertise and better detail control, but the director might be a better choice for sway in the organization. CalTrans sends their deputy for land maintenance for tree mortality. Could send their director, who would just tell the deputy what to do.

**(Willingness)** Do you think that members trusted the others to do their part?

Everybody has good will and good intent. Trust each other to do the right thing.

**(Resources)** Do you believe that members of the taskforce had good connections with other parts of their home organization that you might need to work with?

Yeah.

**(Willingnessx2)** Did the members have a generally positive view of the work you were doing? Was anything controversial?

If there's anything worth complaining, it's that things aren't happening fast enough.

People in state service usually know that things won't go as fast. Impatience biggest factor, little bit arguing over decision making.

With decision making, its not necessarily in their mission, reminding organizations that this is also a priority.

How was the task force structured? Did it have a clear hierarchy or were members generally on more equal footing?

People are generally on equal footing, brining together people of similar rank all representing their own organization. People from the governor's office can tell people what to do.

- **(Environment)** Do you think that team members were managed well? If so, why?
  - All seasoned managers, fully capable of going back and executing. With StF need to give them a push sometimes.
- **(Environment)** Do you think that communication between members was strong? If so, how?
  - Not necessarily. Often sturcutred where everyone has individual tasks. Not a lot of instances of when cross department communication is needed or prioritized. For sustainability, all doing the same stuff, but little exchanging of best practices to get things done.

**(Resources)** With respect to money and supplies, and time, did you have enough resources?

- Tend to exist on existing budget, direction from GO is to redirect their efforts to this new priority. Little pots of money show up occasionally, often theres an existing grant or funding mechanism that has its priority shifted. Sometimes they'll come out and say they're spending too much money, but that budget was already set aside for different stuff that they're just counting differently. Funding is often not the problem, when it is it usually comes through. Organization immersion and things like that.
- If not, how did having insufficient resources impact things?
  - Most of the time, resources are not the issue, takes 6 months to sign a contract, comes down to traditional management problems. Getting department managers and staff aligned and motivated to change direction. When resources are really needed, they find the resources.

**(Environmentx2)** Were there external factors that were beneficial? Did the task force have broad support from the constituents it served?

- Having local governments at the table provide a sense of urgency, in Sacramento tree mortality isn't obvious. Having elected officials from the area helped spur things on to get solutions to take back to their constituencies. Reporters call, spurs a flurry of activity. Legislators for that matter, phone call helps spur action.

**(departmentalism)** While working, did your task force ever hit a bump in the road so to speak?

Whole task force never slows down, but some initiatives can do. East Porterville wells went dry, wanted to connect to Porterville city wells. Had difficulty getting money

for the wells, had to incorporate areas into the city. Food distribution and low flow toilet rebates didn't slow down.

- If so, can you describe it generally? If not, what do you think kept things running smoothly.
- If you hit a bump, do you think it hurt your internal dynamic? If so, how?
  - People understand the barriers. When you're that high level, there's a presumption that you're doing everything you can. Not a lot of blame going around, a lot of problem solving. Do we need to go to Porterville and watch them sign the papers. A lot of it is how we use the power of the governor's office to do the things we want. If not moving forward about electric vehicles, invite them to governor's office about it so its clear where its coming from to solve the problem.

Anything else?

**(Environment)** The way the meetings are usually run. Agenda and everyone gets two minutes to talk while everyone speaks. 58 minutes of quiet, 2 minutes of actually contributing. Can see how it could be seen as a waste of time. Hour and a half meeting weekly to give a two-minute update. Doesn't really seem like a really effective use of people's time. Difference between a task force and a work group. Would like to see more work. Holding it at the governor's office freaks people out, compels people to report and leave it at that. People are reluctant to ask for help in such a formal setting. Report that things are under control, but then go back and complain that they don't have enough resources. Don't know how you can elicit a more general response or make it more of a safe place when it's so formal

Keeps it top of mind that it's a governor's office priority, keeps it above all other issues which gets things done at the end of the day. Everyone has 100 priorities but this is at the top because this is a task force they have to report to. Good at keep things on task. Work groups is where things get done in tree death, things get written, policy recommendations. Working groups report at the task force meetings about their progress.

**(Willingness)** If midlevel folks don't want it to happen, they can slow things down and leadership might not know why. You can have the leadership really bought in, but if rank and file isn't excited about it, the leadership may be reporting that it will take forever and not know why because its being slowed down by the rank and file. If the staff doesn't all believe in global warming, they won't be willing to drop their assignments to work on sustainability.

**Catherine Moore:**

Would you give me your name and position title?

Catharine, Executive director of Disability rights California.

How long have you been with \_\_\_\_ agency name \_\_\_\_?

Since 1980.



Can you identify some task forces that you have worked on in your current position/with your current organization?

California HHSA Agency Developmental Centers Task Force which then evolved into Developmental Services Task force.

Two current task forces: The developmental Center Task force, health and human services agency. How do we most successfully transition people from state developmental centers

Developmental services taskforce, look at other issues to strengthen the community services for people with intellectual and physical disabilities.

Thinking of the most recent task force you have worked on, why were/was these/these task force(s) convened? Who convened the task force? What was the task force's mission?

Taskforces convened by secretary Diana Dooley, secretary of health and welfare agency of California. First one convened to insure that individuals currently living in developmental centers could safely transition to community services.

Was this an intra or inter-agency task force?

Both internal state people and a number of external partners.

**(environment)** Did you feel that the task force had a clear mission?

Yes.

**(environment)** What specific objectives did you pursue to accomplish that mission?

Task force came together to focus on the future of the centers of California, decided to bring together stakeholders to see what you could be doing instead, came up with a final plan, have a task force that focuses on the whole system, evolved into DS task force, also had clear mission. Overarching mission has been given limited resources, how do we make the best of it. DDS responsible for delivering disability services to people diagnosed before 18. Sometimes from traumatic injury, a lot of ways to get into the system, lanterman act created an entitlement to services for people they serve. Finding HHSA funding has always been difficult. Look at the future of developmental centers, no longer believe institutions are the way to go. Her task force was to remove these old institutions, where do we go from there? Later task force looked at the system, subject to pretty traumatic budget cut, billion dollars through the system. HHSA first on the chopping block.

The purpose of the task force was to identify additional services to be put in the community and recommend what those services should look like. Resulted in report from the agency secretary, a number of pieces of legislation have passed to implement the recommendations.

Can you recall who some of the other task force members represented?

Included staff from department from developmental services, HHSA, primary internal agency representatives. External partners include families of those with developmental disabilities, consumers with disabilities themselves, regional centers, staff from the developmental centers, legislative representative, chair of the human services committee on senate. Included service providers for those who provide services in the community.

**(resources)** Do you think those were the right people to be in the task force? Was there someone who should have been there that wasn't? were there people who shouldn't have

been there? What were the consequences of not having the right people on this taskforce?

Were the right people, no group that should have been was excluded. Task force of approximately 25 people. Meetings were open to the public and their input.

**(willingness to participate)** Do you think that members trusted the others to do their part?

A lot of them knew each other already, initially there was a lot of background covering and what their interests were. Had some disparate points of view, especially since some family members had people within the centers. Always going to be very different body, one of the success of the DS task force was that there were able to bring people together, some letters from orgs that didn't entirely agree.

Mixed as to who knew whom, knew most people on the task force. Started from a place to identify and build trust by having people talk about their experience, networked task force over 12-18 months, large task force meetings quarterly, with sub work groups that met in between. Quarterly meetings were done in person and lasted 4-6 hours. Really helped people get to know each other and listened to perspectives.

**(resources)** Do you believe that members of the taskforce had good connections with other parts of their home organization that you might need to work with?

Yes, definitely. Secretary was very careful. Looked for people who tended to collaborate in meetings and had represented their faction well. Some people had done well to do budget testimony.

In some ways, mix of who connected. Represented organization and stayed in contact with other members of organization. For family members, little input from other organizations.

**(willingnessx2)** Did the task force members have a generally positive view of the work you were doing? Was anything controversial?

Subject area was controversial, somewhat the brilliance of bringing together different groups for task forces. Historically operated large state forces. Shift in where people should live, considering closing these institutions and having them live in the task forces. Had a pretty strong belief among community to have it open, others closed. Outcome developed over time.

Task force charged with make a series of recommendations that if task forces were chosen, what policies would be implemented to remain provided.

How was the task force structured? Did it have a clear hierarchy or were members generally on more equal footing?

Equal footing. Focused on different subject areas and were allowed to self-select for work groups to hone in on their area of expertise.

Convened by health and welfare agency, either Diana or one of the other secretaries who managed the task force. Equal opportunity, everyone participated.

- **(Environment)** Do you think that team members were managed well? If so, why?
  - Managed in a very respectful manner, thought that was respectful.
- **(Environment)** Do you think that communication between members was strong? If so, how?

- Yes, because we met with a fair amount of frequency and lasted awhile, people had opportunity for formal and informal members.

**(resources)** With respect to money and supplies, and time, did you have enough resources?

Was enough time, supplies the state could provide were fine, people had to bring their own lunch. Family member and consumer representatives were provided with a travel stipend. Every meeting was in Sacramento. Could not have traveled otherwise. One of the consumers that participated lived in the developmental center had a staff member to accompany them to each of the meetings, provided by state.

- If not, how did having insufficient resources impact things?

**(environment)** Were there external factors that were beneficial to the accomplishment of the mission? Were there external factors that impeded the work of the task force?

One of the things that helped was that the state developmental centers lost their Medicaid certification, which made it easier to say the center had to close, some of the disagreement of the centers closing was solved by this loss of revenue.

**(environment)** Did the task force have broad support from the constituents it served?

Yes. The report when it was written was really well received by community and legislature and provided a roadmap for closures of state institutions.

**(departmentalism)** While working, did your task force ever hit a bump in the road so to speak?

Some disagreements over ways to proceed, the state was pretty conscious for the need of a sub-workgroup process to work through that disagreement and present a unified agreement. State was very transparent by providing whatever data it had to see what was going on from the state's perspective. People who already left centers had benefits visible. All of that helped resolve the capacity for the state to successfully move people.

- If so, can you describe it generally? If not, what do you think kept things running smoothly.
- If you hit a bump, do you think it hurt your internal dynamic? If so, how?
  - Don't think there were hurt feelings, people before they came had strong feelings about what should happen/how quickly things should happen. Some people thought that closing the center should happen quickly to save money, others thought that people at centers couldn't be supported in the community. Philosophical disagreement that needed to be work through by team of dedicated people.

Is there anything that you believe is important about your task force experience that I haven't asked about and, if so, what is it you would like me to know?

Effective taskforce at getting its job done. Elements that made the task force effective was a strong commitment from **(Willingness)** senior officials, a willingness to be transparent and provide data **(Willingness)**, willingness to let them meet for a long time to develop a sense of trust to develop the issue and lots of reporting back and capacity of the task force to look at the final draft report. Admin deserves a lot of credit for letting

the task force operate, had more discretion and leniency in developing their task force **(Environment)**.

Thank you for your time.

**Amy Wall:**

Would you give me your name and occupation?

Amy Wall, assistant director of Developmental Center Closure at Developmental Services.

How long have you been with this organization?

Can you identify some task forces that you have worked on in your current position/with your current organization?

California HHSA Agency Developmental Centers Task Force which then evolved into Developmental Services Task force.

Why were/was these/these task force(s) convened? Who convened the task force? What was their mission?

Taskforces convened by secretary diana dooley, secretary of health and welfare agency of California. First one convened to insure that individuals currently living in developmental centers could safely transition to community services.

Was this an intra or inter-agency task force?

More Stakeholders, little interaction with other state agencies beyond gathering their expertise.

**(Environment)** Did you feel that the task force had a clear mission?

Yes

**(Environment)** What specific objectives did you pursue to accomplish that mission?

Task force came together to focus on the future of the centers of California, decided to bring together stakeholders to see what you could be doing instead, came up with a final plan, have a task force that focuses on the whole system, evolved into DS task force, also had clear mission. Overarching mission has been given limited resources, how do we make the best of it. DDS responsible for delivering disability services to people diagnosed before 18. Sometimes from traumatic injury, a lot of ways to get into the system, Lanterman act created an entitlement to services for people they serve. Finding HHSA funding has always been difficult. Look at the future of developmental centers, no longer believe institutions are the way to go. Her task force was to remove these old institutions, where do we go from there? Later task force looked at the system, subject to pretty traumatic budget cut, billion dollars through the system. HHSA first on the chopping block.

Can you recall who some of the other task force members were? Who they represented?

Disability rights California, protection advocacy rights, business owners that contract with regional centers, regional center representatives. Wide variety of providers for all services, tried to represent all aspects of what they do in the community, union representation.

**(Resources)** Do you think those were the right people to be in the task force? Was there someone who should have been there that wasn't? were there people who shouldn't have been there?

A lot of them knew each other already, initially there was a lot of background covering and what their interests were. Had some disparate points of view, especially since some family members had people within the centers. Always going to be very different body, one of the success of the DS task force was that there were able to bring people together, some letters from orgs that didn't entirely agree.

**(Willingness)** Do you think that members trusted the others to do their part?

Yes.

**(Resources)** Do you believe that members of the taskforce had good connections with other parts of their home organization that you might need to work with?

Yes, definitely. Secretary was very careful. Looked for people who tended to collaborate in meetings and had represented their faction well. Some people had done well to do budget testimony.

**(Willingnessx2)** Did the members have a generally positive view of the work you were doing? Was anything controversial?

A lot of what you're looking at was controversial. The mere fact that the DCS couldn't continue was controversial, what could be done with moving them. Several centers had closed in the past, a lot of things people didn't like about it. Once evolved, starting talking about rates and caseload ratio that was controversial. Rates governed by a lot of different things. Some rates are frozen, and some are negotiable. Money part was def controversial.

How was the task force structured? Did it have a clear hierarchy or were members generally on more equal footing?

More equal footing.

- **(Environment)** Do you think that team members were managed well? If so, why?
  - Yes. Admins kept meeting on task.
- **(Environment)** Do you think that communication between members was strong? If so, how?
  - Communication was good between members, most of what saw there was a lot of good faith communication and dialogue. A lot really got hashed out/discussed. Strongly advocated for their positions.

**(Resources)** With respect to money and supplies, and time, did you have enough resources?

Time is always an issue, so scheduling meetings was always a challenge. Given resources because it was an HHSA priority.

- If not, how did having insufficient resources impact things?

**(Environment)** Were there external factors that were beneficial?

Legislation/budget decisions would be made and were expected to address it for stakeholders as they were invested in it. Always aware of what was going on.

**(Environment)** Did the task force have broad support from the constituents it served?

People are pretty supportive of its work, only negative that not enough people were represented. Expertise was expanded when scope of the task force was expanded.

**(Departmentalism)** While working, did your task force ever hit a bump in the road so to speak?

No major roadblocks. Philosophical differences would cause more intense discussion, but was never a barrier.

- If so, can you describe it generally? If not, what do you think kept things running smoothly.
- If you hit a bump, do you think it hurt your internal dynamic? If so, how?

Anything else?

Definitely an effective task force. One of the few that I have worked with that has demonstrated success. Good wrapup document that shows how the state has acted on the recommendations of the task force. Group wanted to see the results, not enough to just plan. Wanted to see results, reported to stakeholders whenever policy advanced.

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