Phil 21 – Spring 08       Questions on Descartes’ Meditations (Part II)

Anderson

 

1. The demon argument raises the possibility that our belief in a physical world external to the mind might actually be mistaken.  What do we ordinarily mean by the physical world?  List four central characteristics of the physical world that are not also characteristics of the mind, given Descartes’ understanding of the mind.

 

2. If the demon argument succeeds, then we could all be under the truly gigantic illusion that there may not be a physical world.  But by the terms of the argument, our experiences may not be any different from the experiences we would have if there really were a physical world.  So why should we care whether the argument succeeds or not?  Would it really matter?

 

3. By the end of the first meditation, Descartes holds that all of his beliefs are in doubt.  T or F

 

4. The cogito argument goes: I think, therefore I am.  But since it is equally true that if I eat I must exist or if I walk I must exist, why couldn’t Descartes have argued just as effectively: I eat, therefore I am or I walk, therefore I am?

 

5. Granted that the cogito argument establishes your existence as long as you are thinking, (a) Does it logically follow from that argument that when you aren’t thinking you don’t exist?  (b) Does it at least logically follow that you might not exist when you aren’t thinking?  Explain your answers.

 

6. A fundamental distinction is drawn in philosophy between beliefs that are confirmed or disconfirmed by the senses (empirical knowledge) and beliefs that are confirmed or disconfirmed by reason alone (a priori knowledge or knowledge of necessary truths – what Descartes seems to mean by having “clear and distinct ideas”).  Which of the following statements should be classified as empirically knowable and which as knowable a priori:

(a) All squares have four sides.

(b) No given object can be in two different places at the same time.                                         

(c) If A is older than B and B is older than C, then A is older than C.

(d) Every effect has a cause.

(e) Every event has a cause.

(f) Man has evolved over several million years from some ape-like ancestors.

(g) Every suspected criminal is a criminal.

(h) Every suspected criminal is suspected.

(i) I am five years younger than I was five years ago.

 

7. An essential property of a thing is a property it could not exist without.  From a common sense perspective, which of the following would be true:

(a) It is essential to our concept of an automobile that it is made in a factory.

(b) It is essential to our concept of a house that it have windows.

(c) It is essential to our concept of a circle that its area is pi times the radius squared.

(d) It is essential to our concept of a mammal that it have a heart and lungs.

(e) It is essential to our concept of a human that he or she have a physical body.

 

8. In the second meditation Descartes draws the surprising conclusion that he is essentially a mind; his body is not essential to his existence.  The argument appears to be this:

    1. I must have some essential property.

    2. Any property I might lack is not among my essential properties.

    3. I might lack every essential property except thinking.

    4. So, thought is among my essential properties.

    5. Thought is not an essential property of bodies.

    6. Hence, necessarily, my body doesn’t think.

    7. So, necessarily, having a body is not essential to me.

    8. So I am only a mind.

(a) What is Descartes’ justification for line 3?

(b) Where does his argument go wrong, or does it?

 

9. In the wax argument Descartes appears to be trying, among other things, to show that the essential properties or identity of a piece of wax cannot consist in its sensible qualities (qualities obtained via the senses).  His reason is that the sensible qualities may all change while the wax remains.  This is not a very convincing argument.  How might it be faulted?

 

10. Descartes’ proof of God in Meditation III relies on the notion that he could not have manufactured the idea of God out of other ideas he already had; the only possible cause of his idea of God must therefore be God himself.  Central to his proof is the idea that God is an infinite being and he (Descartes), being finite in his powers and abilities, could never produce an idea of an infinite being on his own.  Nothing less than an infinite being could cause his idea of an infinite being.  Is this really true?  Suggest a way we finite humans could produce a coherent idea of infinity.                                              

 

11. We all hold a good many false beliefs, but why?  Descartes’ explanation is that we misuse our free will when we assent to a proposition that we don’t clearly and distinctly understand.  This implies that we must freely choose which beliefs to hold and which not. (a) It seems extremely implausible that we freely choose all of our justified beliefs without exception.  Give an example of a type of belief that you firmly believe to be true and are justified in believing, but which it is extremely unlikely that you chose to believe.  (b) Also, give an example of a belief that you probably did choose to believe.  What is it about that belief that makes you think it was chosen?

                                                   

12. Understanding what a thing is requires grasping the essential characteristics of the thing, those properties without which it wouldn’t be the kind of thing it is.  Further, in the normal case, to know the essential characteristics of a given type of thing (that is, to “have the concept of it”) is one thing, but whether anything exists in reality that qualifies as an instance of that concept is another.  The ontological argument however, claims there is one important exception to this: our concept of God as a supremely perfect being includes, among his essential properties, the property of necessary existence. A being having all perfections would necessarily have to exist.                                                                     (a) It follows from this that a person who sincerely thinks he has a concept of God and yet still wonders whether God exists doesn’t really have a true concept of God. T or F 

(b) What can an atheist or religious skeptic say in objection to this argument?