or unjust that expresses this type of justice and injustice; for the majority of lawful actions, we might say, are the actions resulting from virtue as a whole. For the law instructs us to express each virtue, and forbids us to express each vice, in how we live. Moreover, the actions producing the whole of virtue are the lawful actions that the laws prescribe for education promoting the common good.

We must wait till later, however, to determine whether the education that makes an individual an unconditionally good man is a task for political science or for another science; for, presumably, being a good man is not the same as being every sort of good citizen.26 Special justice, however, and the corresponding way for something to be just <must be divided>.

One species is found in the distribution of honors or wealth or anything else that can be divided among members of a community who share in a political system; for here it is possible for one member to have a share equal or unequal to another's. Another species concerns rectification in transactions. This species has two parts, since one sort of transaction is voluntary, and one involuntary. Voluntary transactions include selling, buying, lending, pledging, renting, depositing, hiring out—these are called voluntary because the origin of these transactions is voluntary. Some involuntary ones are secret, e.g. theft, adultery, poisoning, pimping, slave-deception, murder by treachery, false witness; others are forcible, e.g. assault, imprisonment, murder, plunder, mutilation, slander, insult.

Book VI

1

Since we have said previously that we must choose the intermediate condition, not the excess or the deficiency, and that the intermediate condition is as correct reason says, let us now determine this, <i.e. what it says>. For in all the states of character we have mentioned, as well as in the others, there is a target which the person who has reason focuses on and so tightens or relaxes; and there is a definition of the means, which we say are between excess and deficiency because they express correct reason. To say this is admittedly true, but it is not at all clear. For in other pursuits directed by a science it is equally true that we must labour and be idle neither too much nor too little, but the intermediate amount prescribed

26. being a good man . . . : On the distinction between the virtues of a man and of a citizen see Pol. III. 4. The question about education is considered again in X. 9 and in Pol. VII.
by correct reason. But knowing only this, we would be none the wiser, e.g. about the medicines to be applied to the body, if we were told we must apply the ones that medical science prescribes and in the way that the medical scientist applies them.

Similarly, then, our account of the states of the soul must not only be true up to this point; we must also determine what correct reason is, i.e. what its definition is.

After we divided the virtues of the soul we said that some are virtues of character and some of thought. And so, having finished our discussion of the virtues of character, let us now discuss the others as follows, after speaking first about the soul.

Previously, then, we said there are two parts of the soul, one that has reason, and one nonrational. Now we should divide in the same way the part that has reason.

Let us assume there are two parts that have reason; one with which we study beings whose origins do not admit of being otherwise than they are, and one with which we study beings whose origins admit of being otherwise. For when the beings are of different kinds, the parts of the soul naturally suited to each of them are also of different kinds, since the parts possess knowledge by being somehow similar and appropriate <to their objects>.

Let us call one of these the scientific part, and the other the rationally calculating part, since deliberating is the same as rationally calculating, and no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise. Hence the rationally calculating part is one part of the part of the soul that has reason.

Hence we should find the best state of the scientific and the best state of the rationally calculating part; for this state is the virtue of each of them. And since something's virtue is relative to its own proper function <we must consider the function of each part>.

There are three <capacities> in the soul—perception, understanding, desire—that control action and truth. Of these three perception clearly originates no action, since beasts have perception, but no share in action.

As assertion and denial are to thought, so pursuit and avoidance are to desire. Now virtue of character is a state that decides; and decision is a deliberative desire. If, then, the decision is excellent, the reason must be true and the desire correct, so that what reason asserts is what desire pursues.

This, then, is thought and truth concerned with action. By contrast, when thought is concerned with study, not with action or production, its good or bad state consists <simply> in being true or false. For truth is the function
of whatever thinks; but the function of what thinks about action is truth agreeing with correct desire.

Now the origin of an action—the source of the movement, not the action's goal—is decision, and the origin of decision is desire together with reason that aims at some goal. Hence decision requires understanding and thought, and also a state of character, since doing well or badly in action requires both thought and character.

Thought by itself, however, moves nothing; what moves us is thought aiming at some goal and concerned with action. For this is the sort of thought that also originates productive thinking; for every producer in his production aims at some <further> goal, and the unconditional goal is not the product, which is only the <conditional> goal of some <production>, and aims at some <further> goal. <An unconditional goal is> what we achieve in action, since doing well in action is the goal.

Now desire is for the goal. Hence decision is either understanding combined with desire or desire combined with thought; and what originates movement in this way is a human being.

We do not decide to do what is already past; no one decides, e.g. to have sacked Troy. For neither do we deliberate about what is past, but only about what will be and admits <of being or not being>; and what is past does not admit of not having happened. Hence Agathon is correct to say 'Of this alone even a god is deprived—to make what is all done to have never happened.'

Hence the function of each of the understanding parts is truth; and so the virtue of each part will be the state that makes that part grasp the truth most of all.

5

To grasp what intelligence is we should first study the sort of people we call intelligent.

It seems proper, then, to an intelligent person to be able to deliberate finely about what is good and beneficial for himself, not about some restricted area—e.g. about what promotes health or strength—but about what promotes living well in general.

A sign of this is the fact that we call people intelligent about some <restricted area> whenever they calculate well to promote some excellent

27. the source: Lit. 'that from which the movement <is> but not that for the sake of which (hou heneka) <the movement is>'. Aristotle refers to the efficient and final causes. 'Goal' translates both telos and hou heneka.

28. the goal. Now desire . . . : A different punctuation would yield 'the goal, and desire is for the goal. Hence . . . '.


end, in an area where there is no craft. Hence where <living well> as a whole is concerned, the deliberative person will also be intelligent.

Now no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise or about what cannot be achieved by his action. Hence, if science involves demonstration, but there is no demonstration of anything whose origins admit of being otherwise, since every such thing itself admits of being otherwise; and if we cannot deliberate about what is by necessity; it follows that intelligence is not science nor yet craft-knowledge. It is not science, because what is done in action admits of being otherwise; and it is not craft-knowledge, because action and production belong to different kinds.

The remaining possibility, then, is that intelligence is a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about what is good or bad for a human being.

For production has its end beyond it; but action does not, since its end is doing well itself, <and doing well is the concern of intelligence>.

Hence Pericles and such people are the ones whom we regard as intelligent, because they are able to study what is good for themselves and for human beings; and we think that household managers and politicians are such people.

This is also how we come to give temperance (sôphrosunê) its name, because we think that it preserves intelligence, (sôzousan tên phronêsin). This is the sort of supposition that it preserves. For the sort of supposition that is corrupted and perverted by what is pleasant or painful is not every sort—not, e.g., the supposition that the triangle does or does not have two right angles—but suppositions about what is done in action.

For the origin of what is done in action is the goal it aims at; and if pleasure or pain has corrupted someone, it follows that the origin will not appear to him. Hence it will not be apparent that this must be the goal and cause of all his choice and action; for vice corrupts the origin.

Hence <since intelligence is what temperance preserves, and what temperance preserves is a true supposition about action>, intelligence must be a state grasping the truth, involving reason, and concerned with action about human goods.

Moreover, there is virtue <or vice in the use> of craft, but not <in the use> of intelligence. Further, in a craft, someone who makes errors voluntarily is more choiceworthy; but with intelligence, as with the virtues, the reverse is true. Clearly, then, intelligence is a virtue, not craft-knowledge.

There are two parts of the soul that have reason. Intelligence is a virtue of one of them, of the part that has belief; for belief is concerned, as intelligence is, with what admits of being otherwise.

Moreover, it is not only a state involving reason. A sign of this is the fact that such a state can be forgotten, but intelligence cannot.
We ascribe wisdom in crafts to the people who have the most exact expertise in the crafts, e.g. we call Pheidias a wise stone-worker and Polycleitus a wise bronze-worker, signifying nothing else by wisdom than excellence in a craft. But we also think some people are wise in general, not wise in some restricted area, or in some other specific way, as Homer says in the Margites: 'The gods did not make him a digger or a plowman or wise in anything else.' Clearly, then, wisdom is the most exact form of scientific knowledge.

Hence the wise person must not only know what is derived from the origins of a science, but also grasp the truth about the origins. Therefore wisdom is understanding plus scientific knowledge; it is scientific knowledge of the most honorable things that has received understanding as its coping-stone.

For it would be absurd for someone to think that political science or intelligence is the most excellent science, when the best thing in the universe is not a human being and the most excellent science must be of the best things.

Moreover, what is good and healthy for human beings and for fish is not the same, but what is white or straight is always the same. Hence everyone would also say that the content of wisdom is always the same, but the content of intelligence is not. For the agent they would call intelligent is the one who studies well each question about his own good, and he is the one to whom they would entrust such questions. Hence intelligence is also ascribed to some of the beasts, the ones that are evidently capable of forethought about their own life.

It is also evident that wisdom is not the same as political science. For if people are to say that science about what is beneficial to themselves counts as wisdom, there will be many types of wisdom corresponding to the different species of animals. For if there is no one medical science about all beings, there is no one science about the good of all animals, but a different science about each specific good. Hence there will be many types of wisdom, contrary to our assumption that it has always the same content.

And it does not matter if human beings are the best among the animals. For there are other beings of a far more divine nature than human beings; e.g., most evidently, the beings composing the universe.

What we have said makes it clear that wisdom is both scientific knowledge and understanding about what is by nature most honorable. That is why people say that Anaxagoras or Thales or that sort of person is wise, but not intelligent, when they see that he is ignorant of what benefits himself. And so they say that what he knows is extraordinary, amazing,
difficult and divine, but useless, because it is not human goods that he
looks for.

Intelligence, by contrast, is about human concerns, about what is open to
deliberation. For we say that deliberating well is the function of the intel­
ligent person more than anyone else; but no one deliberates about what
cannot be otherwise, or about what lacks a goal that is a good achievable in
action. The unconditionally good deliberator is the one whose aim ex­
presses rational calculation in pursuit of the best good for a human being
that is achievable in action.

Nor is intelligence about universals only. It must also come to know
particulars, since it is concerned with action and action is about particulars.
Hence in other areas also some people who lack knowledge but have expe­
rience are better in action than others who have knowledge. For someone
who knows that light meats are digestible and healthy, but not which sorts
of meats are light, will not produce health; the one who knows that bird
meats are healthy will be better at producing health. And since intelligence
is concerned with action, it must possess both <the universal and the
particular knowledge> or the <particular> more <than the universal>. Here
too, however, <as in medicine> there is a ruling <science>.

Someone might, however, be puzzled about what use they are.

For wisdom is not concerned with any sort of coming into being, and
hence will not study any source of human happiness.

Admittedly intelligence will study this; but what do we need it for?

For knowledge of what is healthy or fit—i.e. of what results from the
state of health, not of what produces it—makes us no readier to act appro­
priately if we are already healthy; for having the science of medicine or
gymnastic makes us no readier to act appropriately. Similarly, intelligence
is the science of what is just and what is fine, and what is good for a human
being; but this is how the good man acts; and if we are already good,
knowledge of them makes us no readier to act appropriately, since virtues
are states <activated in actions>.

If we concede that intelligence is not useful for this, should we say it is
useful for becoming good? In that case it will be no use to those who are
already excellent. Nor, however, will it be any use to those who are not. For
it will not matter to them whether they have it themselves or take the
advice of others who have it. The advice of others will be quite adequate
for us, just as it is with health: we wish to be healthy, but still do not learn
medical science.

Besides, it would seem absurd for intelligence, inferior as it is to wisdom,
to control it <as a superior. But this will be the result>, since the science
that produces also rules and prescribes about its product.
We must discuss these questions; for so far we have only gone through the puzzles about them.

First of all, let us state that both intelligence and wisdom must be choiceworthy in themselves, even if neither produces anything at all; for each is the virtue of one of the two (rational) parts of the soul.

Second, they do produce something. Wisdom produces happiness, not in the way that medical science produces health, but in the way that health produces health. For since wisdom is a part of virtue as a whole, it makes us happy because it is a state that we possess and activate.

Further, we fulfil our function in so far as we have intelligence and virtue of character; for virtue makes the goal correct, and intelligence makes what promotes the goal correct. The fourth part of the soul, the nutritive part, has no such virtue related to our function, since no action is up to it to do or not to do.

To answer the claim that intelligence will make us no readier to do fine and just actions, we must begin from a little further back in our discussion.

Here is where we begin. We say that some people who do just actions are not yet thereby just, if, e.g., they do the actions prescribed by the laws, either unwillingly or because of ignorance or because of some other end, not because of the actions themselves, even though they do the right actions, those that the excellent person ought to do. Equally, however, it would seem to be possible for someone to do each type of action in the state that makes him a good person, i.e. because of decision and for the sake of the actions themselves.

Now virtue makes the decision correct; but the actions that are naturally to be done to fulfil the decision are the concern not of virtue, but of another capacity. We must get to know them more clearly before continuing our discussion.

There is a capacity, called cleverness, which is such as to be able to do the actions that tend to promote whatever goal is assumed and to achieve it. If, then, the goal is fine, cleverness is praiseworthy, and if the goal is base, cleverness is unscrupulousness; hence both intelligent and unscrupulous people are called clever.

Intelligence is not the same as this capacity (of cleverness), though it requires it. Intelligence, this eye of the soul, cannot reach its fully developed state without virtue, as we have said and as is clear. For inferences about actions have an origin: 'Since the end and the best good is this sort of thing', whatever it actually is—let it be any old thing for the sake of argument. And this <best good> is apparent only to the good person; for vice perverts us and produces false views about the origins of actions.

Evidently, then, we cannot be intelligent without being good.

29. health produces health: Less probably: 'health produces happiness'.
We must, then, also examine virtue over again. For virtue is similar <in this way> to intelligence; as intelligence is related to cleverness, not the same but similar, so natural virtue is related to full virtue.

For each of us seems to possess his type of character to some extent by nature, since we are just, brave, prone to temperance, or have another feature, immediately from birth. However, we still search for some other condition as full goodness, and expect to possess these features in another way.

For these natural states belong to children and to beasts as well <as to adults>, but without understanding they are evidently harmful. At any rate, this much would seem to be clear: just as a heavy body moving around unable to see suffers a heavy fall because it has no sight, so it is with virtue. <A naturally well-endowed person without understanding will harm himself.> But if someone acquires understanding, he improves in his actions; and the state he now has, though still similar <to the natural one>, will be virtue to the full extent.

And so, just as there are two sorts of conditions, cleverness and intelligence, in the part of the soul that has belief, so also there are two in the part that has character, natural virtue and full virtue. And of these full virtue cannot be acquired without intelligence.

This is why some say that all the virtues are <instances of> intelligence, and why Socrates' inquiries were in one way correct, and in another way in error. For in that he thought all the virtues are <instances of> intelligence, he was in error; but in that he thought they all require intelligence, he was right.

Here is a sign of this: Whenever people now define virtue, they all say what state it is and what it is related to, and then add that it is the state that expresses correct reason. Now correct reason is reason that expresses intelligence; it would seem, then, that they all in a way intuitively believe that the state expressing intelligence is virtue.

But we must make a slight change. For it is not merely the state expressing correct reason, but the state involving correct reason, that is virtue. And it is intelligence that is correct reason in this area. Socrates, then, thought, that the virtues are <instances of> reason because he thought they are all <instances of> knowledge, whereas we think they involve reason.

What we have said, then, makes it clear that we cannot be fully good without intelligence, or intelligent without virtue of character.

In this way we can also solve the dialectical argument that someone might use to show that the virtues are separated from each other. For, <it is argued>, since the same person is not naturally best suited for all the virtues, someone will already have one virtue before he has got another.

30. <instances of> intelligence: Lit. 'intelligences'; perhaps '<forms of> intelligence'.
This is indeed possible with the natural virtues. It is not possible, however, with the full virtues that someone must have to be called unconditionally good; for as soon as he has intelligence, which is a single state, he has all the virtues as well.

And clearly, even if intelligence were useless in action, we would need it because it is the virtue of this part of the soul, and because the decision will not be correct without intelligence or without virtue. For virtue makes us reach the end in our action, while intelligence makes us reach what promotes the end.

Moreover, intelligence does not control wisdom or the better part of the soul, just as medical science does not control health. For it does not use health, but only aims to bring health into being; hence it prescribes for the sake of health, but does not prescribe to health. Besides, saying that intelligence controls wisdom would be like saying that political science rules the gods because it prescribes about everything in the city.

Book VII

1

Next we should make a new beginning, and say that there are three conditions of character to be avoided—vice, incontinence and bestiality. The contraries of two of these are clear; we call one virtue and the other continence.

The contrary to bestiality is most suitably called virtue superior to us, a heroic, indeed divine, sort of virtue. Thus Homer made Priam say that Hector was remarkably good; 'nor did he look as though he were the child of a mortal man, but of a god.' Moreover, so they say, human beings become gods because of exceedingly great virtue.

Clearly, then, this is the sort of state that would be opposite to the bestial state. For indeed, just as a beast has neither virtue nor vice, so neither does a god, but the god's state is more honorable than virtue, and the beast's belongs to some kind different from vice.

Now it is rare that a divine man exists. (This is what the Spartans habitually call him; whenever they very much admire someone, they say he is a divine man.) Similarly, the bestial person is also rare among human beings. He is most often found in foreigners; but some bestial features also result from diseases and deformities. We also use 'bestial' as a term of reproach for people whose vice exceeds the human level.

We must make some remarks about this condition later. We have discussed vice earlier. We must now discuss incontinence, softness and self-indulgence, and also continence and resistance; for we must not suppose

31. and because . . . : Or 'and also, clearly, the decision . . .'