Question 1

 Summarize the problem of skepticism from a traditional and contemporary point of view, being explicit about how they differ.  Summarize the traditional problem of induction, and the new problem (or "riddle") of induction.  Explain why the traditional problem can be dealt with by adopting the contemporary point of view on skepticism.  Explain why the new problem can not.
 

Answer to Question 1

A.  The problem of skepticism from a traditional point of view.

From a traditional point of view, the problem of skepticism raises doubts about whether any knowledge based on our beliefs about the external world is justified. Concerned with understanding how humans create knowledge, philosophers like Descartes employ skeptical arguments to demonstrate that we cannot trust the evidence of our senses. Illustrative of the skeptical argument is the brain-in-a-vat example, which asks us to consider that the world might be vastly different than we presume: we might all be brains in vats. No sensory experience could count as evidence against this possibility, for we would be unable to distinguish it from evidence supporting the opposite conclusion. The argument from skepticism proceeds as follows:

1.    It is possible that I am a brain in a vat.
2.    If (1) is possible, then it is possible that everything I now believe about the world is false.
3.    If it is possible that everything is false, then it is possible that I know nothing.
4.    Therefore, it is possible that I know nothing.

Unable to rule out the possibility that we are brains in vats, skepticism argues that we cannot trust the evidence of our senses, and that it is reasonable to doubt whether we know anything at all. Skepticism does not claim that we are brains in vats, but argues that merely raising the doubt about the trustworthiness of our senses is sufficient reason to doubt any beliefs based on sensory experience. Embracing the skeptical stance is to conclude that none of our beliefs—even those based on multitudinous and consistent sensory experiences—is justified, nor any more reasonable to hold than its denial.

Few philosophers embrace the skeptical conclusion. A traditional approach to the problem begins by considering whether it might be possible to defend the rationality of at least a limited set of beliefs by appealing to other, incontrovertible beliefs. Yet skepticism calls into question every one of our beliefs, making it impossible to gain any foothold from which to refute it. The problem of skepticism cannot be answered via the traditional approach; therefore, by definition, it is not a real problem.

B.  The contemporary approach to the problem of skepticism, and how it differs from the historical approach.

Contemporary epistemology is concerned with how it is possible to acquire knowledge from perception. It begins with the assumption that we do, in fact, know things: we have a set of beliefs which we regard as knowledge. Reflection may reveal inconsistency in our beliefs, in which case not every belief can be true. Whereas adopting the skeptical conclusion would have us abandon the entire set of our beliefs and conclude that knowledge is not possible, the contemporary approach treats the skeptical argument as a reductio ad absurdum of its premises. This approach acknowledges that the conclusion of a skeptical argument is often more confidently held than the supporting premises. In order to preserve the consistency of our beliefs, contemporary epistemology considers it reasonable to treat the conclusion of the skeptical argument as false while rejecting one of the premises, recognizing that the form of a deductively valid argument merely prevents one from accepting the premises and the negation of the conclusion.

C.  The traditional problem of induction.

David Hume, in the Treatise on Human Nature, argues that the problem with induction is, essentially, that it is not deduction. Given that the premises of an inductive argument do not logically entail the conclusion—that is, it is possible to have true premises and a false conclusion—it is always possible, despite overwhelming and consistent evidence to the contrary, to find counterevidence that will render our conclusion false. Despite the fact that every A we have ever observed is also a B, we are never justified in using this evidence to support the claim that all As are Bs, for it would take but a single instance of an A not being a B to undermine the inductive inference drawn from the entire body of evidence we have accumulated to the contrary. Skepticism posits that a person is not justified in deriving general claims from a finite number of empirical observations. Even if one attempts to strengthen the inductive argument by adding a premise such as the principle of the uniformity of nature (i.e., that the future will resemble the past), the inductive argument can never be turned into a deductive argument, for the principle itself must appeal to an inductive argument to establish the consistency of nature. Hume concludes that no form of reasoning in which the premises of an argument can be true and the conclusion false (i.e., any form other than deduction) is a reliable source of knowledge.  

D. The new problem (or “riddle”) of induction.

Nelson Goodman offers what is called the “new riddle of induction”. Goodman accepts that perfectly good conclusions can be derived from induction, and he posits that philosophers must give an account of the principles of induction so that we may distinguish good inductive arguments from bad ones.

An example will illuminate the problem that concerns Goodman. Suppose after having observed some ravens that we hypothesize, using induction, that all ravens we have observed have been observed. Using inductive inference, it seems that we are justified to conclude that all ravens have been observed. That this conclusion is false is not the issue, for we know that induction from true premises can lead to false conclusions; rather, it is that we are utterly unjustified in basing our conclusion on the stated premises. That the form of our argument is identical to (and indistinguishable from) the form used in perfectly good inductive arguments is Goodman’s new problem of induction. Goodman’s work in this area is with the problem of projectibility, which refers to the distinction between a property being either projectible or unprojectible. In our example, “having been observed” is the type of unprojectible property that Goodman argues cannot be legitimately used in induction.

E.  Why the traditional problem of induction can be dealt with by adopting the contemporary point of view on skepticism.

As with the problem of skepticism, the contemporary point of view regarding induction contends that answering the skeptic is, by definition, impossible. Nor is there even a need to prove the skeptic wrong. We know induction to be a reliable method for drawing general conclusions about the world. Contemporary epistemology justifies inductive reasoning by leaving open the possibility that counterevidence may subsequently invalidate the inductive argument.

F. Why adopting the contemporary point of view on skepticism does not deal with the new problem of induction.

While a contemporary treatment of the skeptical argument as a reductio ad absurdum serves to shift the problem of skepticism away from whether knowledge is possible, the same treatment applied to the new problem of induction will not suffice. Goodman’s new riddle of induction shows that a conclusion drawn from inductive inference may be not only false but also unjustified; hence, a reductio ad absurdum rejection of a premise in favor of a (seemingly) more certain conclusion is patently unjustified. No matter how strongly we hold the conclusion to be true, it may be wholly unsubstantiated by our premises.

Goodman argues that philosophers must formulate rules for inductive reasoning to address such things as the problem of projectibility, only one of a host of difficulties raised by the new problem of induction. This task has thus far proven to be exceedingly difficult.

 

Question 2

2.  Explain why the concept of a defeasible reason  is an important alternative to (a) incorrigible reasons and (b) inductive reasons for the foundationalist theory of epistemic ascent. Explain why the foundationalist must allow memory as a source of epistemologically basic beliefs.   Be sure your answer demonstrates a clear grasp of all the relevant terms.  

Answer to Question 2

A. The role of epistemic ascent within the foundationalist theory.

A foundationalist theory must provide an account of epistemic ascent, the process by which non-basic beliefs are justified by reasoning from basic beliefs. Foundationalist theories (and epistemology in general) rely upon the basing relation to explain how one can come to hold one belief on the basis of another. Pollock’s definition of the reasoning process relies upon this basing relation:

A belief P is a reason for a person S to believe Q if and only if it is logically possible for S to become justified in believing Q by believing it on the basis of P.

B. Why the concept of a defeasible reason is an important alternative to incorrigible reasons for the foundationalist theory of epistemic ascent.

Historically, epistemology treated only conclusive reasons as good reasons. Conclusive reasons are incorrigible reasons, according to the foundationalist theory of epistemic ascent, because they are reached by employing logically valid reasoning processes and the basing relation in conjunction with incorrigible beliefs.

Foundations theories have traditionally held that appearance beliefs are incorrigibly justified; that is, they are self-justifying, in that they need not appeal to reason or to further justified beliefs. For appearance beliefs to serve as conclusive reasons, foundationalism must show how (putatively incorrigible) perceptual beliefs logically entail facts about the external world. Philosophers posit that the requisite entailment must be a function of an analysis of concepts with regard to appearances, where a concept is characterized by its definition and logical properties. Entailment is found in the following form, suggests Pollock:

x’s looking red to S under circumstances of type C entails that x is red.

Accordingly, the concept of something looking red under some circumstances logically entails its being red. By attempting to make statements about our perceptions logically equivalent to statements about the world, phenomenalism attempts (unsuccessfully) to demonstrate how perceptual beliefs treated as incorrigible reasons lead to conclusive statements about the world. Any attempt to derive entailment from the statement “under circumstances of type C” is unsuccessful because it presumes either (a) C is known by means which do not rely on how a thing appears to us, in which case our statement begs the question; or (b) knowledge of C is derived from internal methods, which are clearly fallible. Consequently, the project of phenomenalism fails to establish the method by which an object can be constructed from our experiences of the object. The failure to demonstrate the incorrigible relation between appearance beliefs and conclusive reasons makes the concept of defeasible reasons an important alternative for foundationalist theories, for it makes knowledge about the world possible.

Defeasible reasons are non-conclusive; that is, such a reason is one for which there can be defeaters. Says Pollock:
 
If P is a reason for S to believe Q, R is a defeater for this reason if and only if (P&R) is not a reason for S to believe Q.

Non-conclusive reasoning is important to the way we do in fact reason, for it provides the method by which we can retract a justified belief. Consider the belief Q for which P provides conclusive reason. We come to believe Q on the basis of P. If all reasoning were conclusive (i.e., without benefit of defeasible reasons) we would be left with no way to refute Q except by refuting P, which seems unlikely given that P is also held on conclusive grounds. Thus, rejection of justified belief Q is rational when we recognize a defeater for our belief. It is important to note that the now-defeated belief Q can be reinstated if its defeater is similarly defeated.
 

C. Why the concept of a defeasible reason is an important alternative to inductive reasons for the foundationalist theory of epistemic ascent.

Historical epistemology has long assumed that a reason is a good reason for believing its conclusion only when the conclusion is either (a) a logical entailment, or (b) the result of induction. Now that we have shown that reasoning cannot proceed from entailment, let us consider induction and two forms of inductive reasoning, inference to the best explanation and scientific realism.

Induction fails as a framework for explaining perceptual knowledge for precisely the reason phenomenalism fails, namely, that it presupposes direct access to the world of objects by means that do not rely upon sensory perception. Induction of this type fails because of the fallibility of perception.

As a type of inductive reasoning, inference to the best explanation posits that there is a causal relationship between, say, something being red and it appearing to us as being red. The confirmation of hypotheses often proceeds this way. The best explanation for something appearing red to me is that it is, in fact, red. Pollock argues that inference to the best explanation fails to establish the requisite causal relation for reasons similar to those that ultimately undermine induction (and, for that matter, conclusive reasoning). When one thinks “That looks red to me”, it seems that one must somehow be thinking about the way the thing actually looks (i.e., objectively), and then comparing that to the way the thing appears to look (i.e., through perception), and then concluding “This does, in fact, look that way to me”, where “that way” is used in the objective sense. The problem, argues Pollock, is that “the thing looks red to me” can only ever count as an explanation when one has non-inductive, non-perceptual grounds for belief, and yet this is only possible with prior perceptual knowledge. Inference to the best explanation ultimately either begs the question or must rely on induction, and is not an adequate method for creating perceptual knowledge.

Scientific realism approaches perceptual knowledge by using inference to the best explanation, and posits that the best explanation for the way things appear to us is the existence of the physical world. This method treats our inferences as evaluations of global theories rather than confirmation of particular instances, and assumes such inferences are formulated only after (and in relation to) numerous observations about how things generally appear have been recorded. Scientific realism relies on the perceiver being aware of the process of perception and forming thoughts about such perceptions. Pollock argues that perception is generally an automatic process—a far cry from the sort of deliberative stance required to make scientific realism work—and therefore scientific realism also fails to create perceptual knowledge.

That conclusive reasons are an unworkable framework for perceptual knowledge leads some philosophers to assume that non-conclusive reasoning will suffice. Yet problems with induction, including inference to the best explanation and scientific realism, render non-conclusive reasoning inadequate. Tackling the problem of perception must therefore proceed along the lines of non-conclusive, non-inductive reasoning. Such reasons are defeasible; that is, person S is justified in holding belief P so long as she does not instantiate any arguments which would constitute a defeater for P.  

D.  Why the foundationalist must allow memory as a source of epistemologically basic beliefs.

Foundationalist theories posit that reasoning proceeds from a privileged class of basic beliefs to other non-basic beliefs. Beliefs that one currently entertains are thoughts, though other mental states (e.g., fear, hypotheses) can enter into our thoughts. Thoughts, then, comprise the mental states that we occurrently entertain. The process of reasoning is itself occurrent, for it requires that we have in mind the pertinent thoughts to construct an argument. Yet the process of constructing a complex argument need not (and often cannot) be done entirely occurrently; that is, we are incapable of occurrently holding all pertinent thoughts that would be required to construct a multi-step argument. Rather, we occurrently hold enough thoughts to create a sub-argument, then treat the conclusion of the sub-argument as a premise for a subsequent argument, meanwhile dispatching with (forgetting) the reasons we originally used in creating the sub-argument. Memory thus serves two important functions in reasoning: (a) it provides us with premises for our arguments; and (b) it reminds us that the parts of our arguments for which we no longer remember reasons are indeed accurate, and it warns us when we have acquired a defeater for a previously justified sub-argument.

Only occurrent memory can provide the premises for arguments, yet it is wrong to assume that the justificatory status of a conclusion is therefore the result of successfully recalling the premises employed when we originally formed the conclusion. Not only is memory fallible, but it is limited in scope—we simply do not have the ability to remember every premise of every argument we have constructed. The justificatory status of a conclusion is instead a function of the process of remembering; that is, so long as no defeater is recalled, the memory is considered justified.

The foundationalist must allow memory as a source of epistemologically basic beliefs. Yet not all memories can be epistemologically basic, for foundationalism allows only a subset of our beliefs to be basic. Foundationalism must treat the results of remembering like that of perception. Whereas perception yields “being appeared to”, remembering yields “seeming to remember” as a result of reflection upon our memories. If we seem to remember P, and remember having good reason for believing so, we are justified in believing P so long as we do not, in the process of remembering, also recall a defeater for P.

 

Question 3

2.  Explain how, traditionally,  incorrigibility has functioned both as a description and as an explanation of epistemologically basic beliefs.  Explain why contemporary foundationalism must reject the incorrigibility of basic beliefs, and show how this ultimately undermines the foundationalist framework.  Your answer should include a clear discussion of the concept of prima facie justified beliefs.

Answer to Question 3

 

A. How incorrigibility has traditionally functioned as a description of epistemologically basic beliefs.

Incorrigibility is attributed to a belief just in case holding the belief logically entails that the belief is true; that is, some beliefs cannot be mistaken, and merely holding the belief guarantees that the belief is true. Pollock offers the following definition of incorrigibility thus described:

A belief is incorrigible for a person S if and only if it is impossible for S to hold the belief and be wrong.

Pollock rejects this definition for being too permissive, for it allows beliefs that we would not wish to regard as self-justifying. He argues that when we have no reason for belief in proposition P, even when P happens to be a necessary truth (e.g., a mathematical theorem), we have no justification for belief in P. That we cannot believe a necessary truth (even without reason) and be wrong should not automatically render the belief incorrigible. The provisional definition fails to capture the impossibility of us being mistaken about P; that is, whether P is true should be a function of our belief in P. Pollock thus offers a revised definition for the incorrigibility of propositions:

A proposition P is incorrigible for a person S if and only if (1) it is necessarily true that if S believes P then P is true, and (2) it is necessarily true that if S believes ~P then P is false.

Therefore, belief in an incorrigible proposition is an incorrigible belief.

 

B. How incorrigibility has traditionally functioned as an explanation of epistemologically basic beliefs.

The concept of incorrigibility has traditionally functioned as an explanation of why epistemologically basic beliefs are self-justifying; that is, why they are justified without appeal to reason or to further justified beliefs. As a working definition of incorrigibility, let us say that a belief is incorrigibly justified for a person S if and only if it is impossible for S to hold the belief and be unjustified in doing so. The foundationalist grants that perceptual beliefs about physical objects can be mistaken, and so concludes that only appearance beliefs (e.g., I am being appeared to redly) are candidates for incorrigibility.  

If a basic belief is, in fact, incorrigibly justified, then it seems that this belief is an ideal foundation for other beliefs. Yet basic beliefs need not be incorrigibly justified. Because justification starts with basic beliefs, it must be possible to be justified in holding a basic belief without a reason, though it is not the case that we are always justified in doing so. Rather, reasons serve a negative function by making us unjustified in holding a belief when there is a reason for thinking the belief false. This weaker form of incorrigibility is captured in Pollock’s definition of prima facie justification:

A belief is prima facie justified for a person S if and only if it is only possible for S to hold the belief unjustifiedly if she has reason for thinking she should not hold the belief.

 

C. Why contemporary foundationalism must reject the incorrigibility of basic beliefs, and how this ultimately undermines the foundationalist framework.

Pollock suggests that appearance beliefs are neither incorrigibly justified nor prima facie justified, and hence contemporary foundationalism must reject the incorrigibility of basic beliefs. Pollock uses the example of shadows on snow to demonstrate that appearance beliefs are not incorrigibly justified. Because shadows on white surfaces are normally grey, a person S will likely assume that shadows on snow are also grey. While in the presence of shadows on snow, if S is asked to describe the shadows’ color, it is likely S will reply that the shadows are grey. Yet snow shadows are actually blue. What is going on, argues Pollock, is that S has relied on a general belief in forming her conclusion instead of reflecting on her actual perception. Pollock argues that this example proves that appearance beliefs are not incorrigible.

One approach for the foundationalist is to consider that whenever we are unjustified in believing P, we automatically have a good reason for thinking we should not hold the belief. If this is true, then any time we are unjustified in believing a proposition, we likewise have a reason for thinking we should not hold the belief. This reasoning process seems to offer at least prima facie justification for belief in P and all other similarly constructed arguments.

With this example, Pollock shows that the foundationalist is in the position of having to trade incorrigible justification for prima facie justification. Yet treating S’s belief that snow shadows are grey as being prima facie justified leads to an untenable position for foundationalism, namely, that all beliefs can be similarly justified by appeal to prima facie justification. If all beliefs are prima facie justified, then no belief is epistemologically basic, and hence the foundationalist framework is deprived of its requisite set of epistemologically basic beliefs.