BUILDING A BOX AROUND GROWTH: POLICY OPTIONS FOR MANAGING CALIFORNIA’S URBAN GROWTH

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BUILDING A BOX AROUND GROWTH: POLICY OPTIONS FOR MANAGING CALIFORNIA’S URBAN GROWTH

A Thesis

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Abstract

of

BUILDING A BOX AROUND GROWTH: POLICY OPTIONS FOR MANAGING CALIFORNIA’S URBAN GROWTH

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California’s urban landscape is undergoing fundamental change. The state population was 24 million in the beginning of the 1980s and is about 36.1 million today, an increase of 40 percent in two decades. California’s rapid growth has occurred without a systematic plan to manage its impacts. Lack of planning for the consequences of growth has led to urban sprawl, loss of farmland and open space, strained infrastructure, decreased air and water quality, a jobs-housing imbalance, social separation, concentrated poverty, and a general decline in the quality of life. The problems are not limited to individual cities and counties but spill over from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. California’s uncoordinated approach to planning and accommodating growth is not suitable to the regional nature of its problems. The problems generated by unmanaged growth are regional and California’s state and local governments, in their current form, are ill equipped to solve them.

This report analyzes California’s regional governance and growth management framework and determines how it can be improved. To prepare this thesis, I reviewed
literature on regional governance and growth management in California and other states. I reviewed the history of regional governance and growth management in California to understand the context of the current situation and the challenges, constraints, and opportunities present on the regional governance and growth management horizon. I reviewed regional governance and growth management frameworks from other states to determine the components that would best help California improve its framework given the state’s unique social, environmental, economic, and political climate. I analyzed four alternatives: keeping California’s current growth management framework, developing a “top-down” growth management framework, developing a “bottom-up” growth management framework, and developing a “fusion” growth management framework. I evaluate alternatives using four criteria – effectiveness, political acceptability, flexibility, and robustness.

The research finds that California does not have a strategic, comprehensive approach to regional governance and growth management. I recommend the California State Legislature create some sort of regional planning bodies to implement state growth planning goals and objectives. Second, the Legislature should strengthen and empower existing structures such as Councils of Governments (COGs) and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) to act as the implementation arm of California’s growth management system. Third, general plans need to reflect regional, not parochial, needs by including elements that require coordinated and cooperative approaches to land-use planning and problem solving. Lastly, the Legislature needs to take a hard look at how to
create incentives for regional cooperation, coordination, and planning. California should follow the examples set by other states and look forward when planning for future growth. The failure of California to take a forward-looking view of regional governance and growth management would be a mistake future generations will pay for.

_____________________________________, Committee Chair
Robert J. Waste
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction and Background

I. Introduction

California’s rapid, unplanned growth has created a new California. In the new California, people and jobs move farther and farther away from urban cores. The consequences of this human and economic migration are longer commutes, loss of open space, increased isolation of the poor, and a general decrease in the quality of life. Problems that were once merely local are now clearly regional. California needs a coordinated approach to planning and decision-making to solve the complex problems we have created. Regional challenges have outstripped the abilities of California’s state and local governments to deal with them. The state can no longer afford uncoordinated growth. Without more careful strategic planning, public resources and institutions could be overwhelmed by the level of growth projected in the coming decades. Legislators need to team with local governments and regional leaders to develop new and innovative governing structures to manage the challenges we face. Regions are the appropriate scale for many critical decisions related to growth and development, including those concerning affordable housing, workforce development, jobs and housing balance, and environmental and open space preservation.

What would regional governance look like in California? To answer this question, this thesis will address the following problem statement:
California's uncoordinated approach to urban growth management is not suitable to the regional nature of its problems. How can the state best manage its urban growth?

I used a criterion-alternative matrix (CAM) to analyze options and make recommendations for a growth management framework in California. The matrix’s design lists policy alternatives in the rows and evaluative criteria in the columns. The CAM analysis I used for this thesis relies on Eugene Bardach’s *A Practical Guide to Policy Analysis* (2000).

**Thesis Layout**

To prepare this thesis, I reviewed literature on regional governance and growth management planning in California and other states. I reviewed the history of regional governance and growth management in California to understand the context of the current situation and the challenges, constraints, and opportunities present on the regional governance and growth management horizon. Elisa Barbour’s 2002 study for the Public Policy Institute of California, *Metropolitan Growth Planning in California, 1900-2000*, was especially helpful to my historical research.

My final recommendations regarding the problem statement emerge through the six chapters of this report. In the remainder of this chapter, I provide general background information on regional governance and growth management in California. Chapter Two is where I define the social, environmental, economic, and political environments where
the problem lives. In Chapter Three, I lay out alternatives for regional governance in California. The criteria I used to evaluate the alternatives are found in Chapter Four. Chapter Five contains my analysis of the alternatives using the chosen criteria. Finally, Chapter Six has my conclusions and recommendations.

II. What is the Problem?

“At the dawn of the 21st Century California is once again the great experiment. California’s economic, demographic, and geographic diversity presents an opportunity to invent a new social and economic order that celebrates complexity and diversity and that builds the self-governing mechanisms appropriate to this new century.”

Robert M. Hertzberg, Speaker of the California Assembly, in a letter the members of the Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism (January 13, 2002)

California’s rapid growth has exposed weaknesses in the structure of state and local government. The burdens of growth – loss of farmland and open space, infrastructure degradation, sprawl development, jobs located farther and farther away from housing, longer commutes which contribute to air pollution and stress, social separation and concentrated poverty, and a weakened business climate caused by a general decline in the quality of life – spill over from one jurisdiction to another and require regional cooperation for solution. Representatives of civic organizations, the business community, state and local government, labor, and the wider public have begun to advocate for a coordinated, collaborative approach to regional governance and growth management.
Rapid and uncoordinated growth has many unintended consequences. Rather than list them all, I have elected to group them by category. Researchers in the regional governance field are in agreement that the problems associated with growth group themselves into the following categories:

- Fiscal constraints
- Environmental preservation
- Social and economic opportunity
- Fragmented land use planning systems
- Fractured governance

I provide an overview of these categories in the following sections.

**Fiscal Constraints**

Local governments saw a primary source of revenue over which they had discretionary authority, property taxes, greatly reduced after the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. According to Wassmer (2002) and Orfield and Luce (2002), Proposition 13 took control of locally generated property taxes out of the hands of local governments and turned it over to the state for distribution. The effect of this loss of discretionary revenue has caused local governments to find new ways to pay for service delivery. User fees, charges, franchise taxes, and utility-user taxes have all been used to supplement the loss of property tax revenue (Wassmer, 2002), but the key revenue stream used by local governments post Proposition 13 has been the sales tax.
Local officials have turned to commercial development to ensure fiscal health. Local governments choose retail development over housing because retail development generates sales tax. This process is called the “fiscalization of land use.” The need to compete for sales tax revenue creates fierce competition and discourages regional cooperation. The results have been sprawl development, lack of affordable housing, increased traffic congestion, and a jobs/housing mismatch because job centers move farther and farther away from housing. Local jurisdictions have few incentives to cooperate on land use and other issues as long as sales tax is their primary source of discretionary revenue.

Another consequence of constrained revenues is a reduction in infrastructure investment. The result has been the deterioration of roads and highways, sewer and water systems, waste disposal facilities, and other public infrastructure. California’s rapid growth has pushed its infrastructure beyond its limits. According to Porter (1992), daily life is affected by infrastructure deficiencies. Congested roads, overcrowded classrooms, water rationing, and similar problems reduce the quality of life. Local governments have shifted the costs for infrastructure development to the private sector through the imposition of fees and exactions (Porter, 1992; Barbour, 2002). Local governments have ignored financing improvements for existing infrastructure in older areas while the private sector finances infrastructure for new areas. In short, we pay for what we can and not what we should.
Environmental Preservation

The disappearance of farmland and open space is an obvious consequence of California’s rapid urbanization. According to Waste (2001), 70,000 acres of land were urbanized in California between 1996 and 1998 and there was a 141% increase in agricultural land annexed in the Central Valley region in 1996-1997 (p. 7). Environmental planning strategies to improve water quality, air quality, land cleanup, and habitat conservation sometimes occur in isolation from each other, making it difficult to reach integrated and balanced environmental outcomes. In addition, environmental planning is often separated from other planning processes, particularly land development and land use planning.

With 12 million more Californians anticipated in the next 20 years, planning for environmental protection and pollution prevention will be extremely challenged. Local land use, water, energy, transportation, and pollution prevention planning must address local needs within a larger regional framework so that neither neighboring communities and regions nor our precious natural resources are assigned to shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden (Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism, 2002, p. 83).

Social And Economic Opportunity

According to Waste (2001) and the Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism (2002), California has a regional economy with job centers increasingly located farther and farther away from where workers live. This “spatial mismatch” results in higher unemployment among workers who have been “left behind” by the flight of job centers from the central city to the suburbs. Orfield and Luce (2002) indicate that concentrated
poverty and failing schools are results of the “spatial mismatch” in California. Other results are lack of affordable housing near job centers, increased traffic congestion as commutes get longer, a decrease in the skilled labor force and increased air pollution. Degradation of these quality of life indicators is bad for business.

**Fragmented Planning Systems**

California does not have a regional planning framework. In the 1980s and 1990s, rapid population growth, the decentralization of jobs and housing, environmental and fiscal constraints, and government gridlock exposed a fragmented planning system and drew greater attention to the regional consequences of policymaking (Barbour, 2002, p. viii). California’s affordable housing crisis, fiscal gridlock, need to reconcile environmental and economic goals, and the need for more strategic infrastructure investment are all results of its fragmented planning system. A coordinated regional planning system could be one way to begin to solve these problems (Barbour, 2002, p. x). The historical section of this chapter provides a more comprehensive treatment of this problem.

**Fractured Governance**

With over 5,000 local governments, including 58 counties, and 478 cities, California has a highly decentralized governance system. Each of the local agencies tries to maximize its local self-interest, often at the expense of regional interests and regional opportunities for coordinated governmental action (Waste, 2001, p. 6). Paul Lewis, in his 1998 study, *Deep Roots: Local Government Structure in California*, concludes political fragmentation
may offer an advantage for the delivery of routine services, but may lead to “parochial, self-interested land-use decisions and a lack of policy concern for regional challenges” (pp. vi-vii). The separation of governance into so many units is inefficient for growth management planning and works against a coordinated, collaborative system of regional governance. California is made up of thousands of fiefdoms competing for the same limited resources with little or no incentive to cooperate on a regional level to develop policy solutions to larger problems like air quality, traffic congestion, land use, and environmental preservation. Unified responses from governing units are needed to solve California’s regional problems.

### III. History of Growth management Planning in California

Elisa Barbour’s 2002 study for the Public Policy Institute of California, *Metropolitan Growth Planning in California, 1900-2000*, provides a comprehensive review of the history of regional planning in California. Her work was the primary source of information for this section.

#### First Wave: The Progressive Era

Barbour (2002) divides the history of growth planning in California into three phases, or “waves.” According to Barbour, home rule and urban consolidation characterized the first wave of growth planning in California. Barbour traces modern urban planning in California back to the Progressive era at the turn of the 20th century. “Home rule,” the ability of city governments to conduct their affairs without interference from the state
government, was the focus of business leaders and other reformers of the period. The ability to raise taxes, issue bonds, and build large-scale infrastructure needed for urban expansion were all Progressive Era reforms that facilitated early metropolitan planning. Cities were relatively isolated in the young state. Because most people lived in the central cities, the city of the Progressive Era became a metropolitan region.

As cities attempted to expand their boundaries by annexation, home rule began to work against the power of central cities. Instead of consolidating the political power of the central city, urban expansion and home rule power transformed California’s metropolitan areas into clusters of independent cities often differentiated by wealth, race, and function. Each new city organized itself into a separate governmental unit and politically fragmented the state’s metropolitan areas.

**Second Wave: Post World War II**

The state and federal government attempted to mitigate the effects of the fragmentation that resulted from the first phase of growth planning in California. Barbour (2002) calls this process “vertical regionalism” – state-dominated regional planning for large-scale infrastructure and environmental planning (p. 42). According to Barbour (2002), an unintended consequence of vertical regionalism was that metropolitan government became more fragmented because of the new division between planning areas dominated the state and federal governments – regional transportation and environmental concerns – and land use, which remained a local concern. In short, control of key policy areas ended
up under different levels of government and was not organized at the scale of metropolitan regions (p. 42).

Reformers, concerned about the negative aspects of suburbanization (particularly environmental degradation and racial and social disparities), attempted to extend the state and federal vertical regionalism model to land use and environmental planning (Barbour, 2002, p. vii). The rise of environmentalism in the late 1960s and 1970s created the political environment for state and federal vertical regional planning. Federal and state legislation in the areas of water pollution (1972 Clean Water Act) and air pollution (1970 Clean Air Act) established water and air quality standards that states must follow. The California Legislature created regional boards govern the implementation of environmental standards. The regional environmental planning mandated by federal environmental legislation proved to be beyond the ability of local governments to control alone. Single-purpose, state and federal directed vertical regional planning filled this vacuum and took precedence over local regional efforts (Barbour, 2002, pp. 38-9).

Efforts to centralize land use authority and create strong multipurpose regional planning institutions were less successful than efforts to centralize environmental planning. According to Barbour (2002), in the 1960s the federal government began to require regional planning as a condition for funding highways, mass transit, airports, sewage treatment plants, housing, health facilities, and open space. The California Legislature passed the Regional Planning Act in 1963 to aid the state in its efforts to meet the new
regional planning mandates for federal funding. This legislation provided for the division of California into regional planning areas and established planning districts with limited taxing powers governed by local elected officials, if two-thirds of the cities and counties in the areas agreed upon the need for such a district. The County Supervisor’s Association obtained an amendment creating an escape clause. The “escape clause” said that if a voluntary association were already in existence, no new planning district would be activated.

Local governments took advantage of the “escape clause” in the state’s Regional Planning Act and created 26 Councils of Governments (COGs) in the 1960s and early 1970s. Local governments structured the COGs as voluntary organizations of local governments to coordinate planning across a broad range of policy areas. The federal requirement for regional planning as a condition for federal funding and the California Legislature’s passage of the Regional Planning Act in 1963 and its “escape clause” helped create the broadest systematic form of cross-jurisdictional regionalism in California that still persists today (Barbour, 2002, pp. 28-9).

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 mandated that federal highway funds would only be distributed to projects considered in a comprehensive regional planning process. The 1970, 1973, and 1978 federal Highway Acts strengthened the tie between regional planning and funding by calling for regional review by “metropolitan planning organizations” (MPOs) in urban areas with a population of 50,000 or more and
earmarking funds for planning. In California, most MPOs were designated by the state to coincide with existing COGs (Barbour, pp. 29-30).

COGS were structured by local governments as voluntary organizations of local governments instead of regional governments. The most common governing structure of COGs is apportionment on a one-government, one-vote basis regardless of the population or economic influence of the member agencies (Barbour, 2002, p. 29). Barbour (2002) refers to this regional institutional model as “voluntary, horizontal” regional planning (p. 43). According to Fulton (1999), Barbour (2002), and Waste (2001), COGS have been relatively ineffective because of their voluntary nature and governance structures. COGS have rarely been able to forge, implement, and enforce regional plans because they don’t have the necessary authority to leverage regional cooperation (Waste, p. 25), “run by a group of local officials rather than officials with a regional constituency” (Fulton, p. 96), and “serve as interface rather than decision-making bodies” (Barbour, p. 43).

Vertical regionalism ensured that the state and local agencies could apply adequate public resources and accountability to regional policy problems with inherently regional scale and that local governments were unable to solve alone. Vertical regional planning fractured the regional planning system in two ways. First, the state organized single-purpose planning agencies along narrow functional lines. Second, the home rule concept still dominated local land use policy, despite the fact that many state planning policies were often directly related to land use patterns. Barbour (2002) concludes that the
fragmentation between state and local planning systems “helped ensure local land use
decision would come to drive regional growth planning because local plans and
projections were taken as given” (p. 42).

**Third Wave: 1990-Present**

A third phase of regional planning reform was underway beginning in the 1990s. The
reformers of this period looked a lot like the Progressive Era reformers of Phase One.
While early Progressives sought to empower city governments through the use of home
rule, many Third Wave reformers advocated a kind of regional home rule which would
allow metropolitan areas to respond to changing economic conditions (Barbour, 2002).

The current reform wave emphasizes economic development, efficient and equitable
public investment in the face of fiscal constraint, and integration of environmental and
economic goals. It relies on collaborative decision-making and public-private
partnerships. The current reform wave distinguishes itself from the previous wave by its
greater emphasis on developing regional consensus on integrated planning goals and its
lesser emphasis on establishing new institutions or procedural requirements. Barbour
(2002) says that the key elements of the Third Wave are new transportation and
environmental protection programs that devolved authority to the regional or county level
and called for a greater link between these planning areas and land use policy and the rise
of broad-based regional reform coalitions with strong support from business leaders (p.
119).
New transportation (e.g., Federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Act [ISTEA]) and environmental programs (e.g., CALFED) created a new framework for regional planning. Authority in these policy areas devolved downward to regions and counties. The regional level is now where local, state, and federal agencies combine plans to achieve interrelated policy goals. The new framework encourages increased planning integration, but it is still up to local governments to push it along and expand it.

Regional activists, described as “civic entrepreneurs” by Doug Henton, John Melville, and Kim Walesh in their 1998 report prepared for the James Irvine Foundation, *California Regions Take Action: The Emergence of California Civic Entrepreneurs*, are pushing governments to fill in the new regional framework. “Collaborative Regional Initiatives,” or CRIs, are leading the push toward regional governance and planning. These initiatives, according to Barbour (2002), “unite public officials, educators, and other leaders from business, labor, environmental, social equity, and other organizations in developing regional growth-management strategies” (p. 120).

The most evolved CRIs in California are in the areas where growth pressures are greatest and business leaders are well organized. Reflecting what is called “new regionalism,” CRIs “are creating a new type of governance for the twenty-first century – regional in scope, collaborative in nature, and based on an understanding of the interdependence between the economy, the environment, and social equity” (California Center for Regional Leadership, 2001, p. 9).
Business leaders are at the forefront of the CRI movement. Leaders of industry understand that government has to change to react to an economic system that has become regional and global in nature. CRIs provide a policy focus for expanding regional planning integration. A unified focus is key to reforming regional governance. It is essential that the vision for regional governance be strong enough to allay long-held public suspicion about expanding government’s role.

**Local Governments Step Up**

Coordinated governance and planning activity among local governments has also been on the rise. For example, Riverside County is combining an update of its general plan with development of transportation and habitat preservation plans. Called the Riverside County Integrated Plan (RCIP), it is a model for planning integration using counties as the framework. The RCIP is an alliance of 10 local, state, and federal agencies and involves environmental groups, property owners, business associations, farmers, and local officials. In another example, the San Diego COG (SANDAG) is attempting to develop a comprehensive regional plan that incorporates local plans and uses infrastructure funds to promote “smart-growth” land use goals.

**IV. Conclusion - Riding the Third Wave into the Future**

Barbour (2002) concludes that the current wave places greater emphasis on developing regional consensus on integrated planning goals, places lesser emphasis on new institutions or procedural requirements, and calls for collaboration among existing
institutions. Barbour further concludes that effective regional planning will require active support from state government mostly because the state defines the regulatory environment and affects regional outcomes with its own programs and investments (p. xii). Most other researchers on this topic agree with Barbour’s conclusion that regional governance will require some sort of state support (Sanders (1991); LeGates (2001); Barbour and Teitz (2001); and Waste (2001)). What would a state supported regional governance and growth management structure look like in California? To answer this question, I researched regional governance and growth management frameworks in other states and analyzed them to determine how they might, or might not, work in California.

I found that regional governance and growth management frameworks in other states vary widely. In his 1999 book, SprawlBusting, Jerry Weitz discusses intergovernmental frameworks for regional decision-making. Weitz identified top-down frameworks in which the state plays a dominant role and bottom-up frameworks in which the state plays a much less decisive role. Weitz describes top-down frameworks as “state dominant,” “pre-emptive/regulatory,” and with a “high degree of persuasion.” Weitz describes bottom-up frameworks as “regional local/cooperative and with a “low degree of persuasion”. Theorists have also described a third type of framework between the top-down and bottom-up models – the hybrid framework. The hybrid framework has been described by Richard LeGates in his 2001 report to the Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism, The Region is the Frontier: Frameworks, Goals, and Mechanisms, for Collaborative Regional Decision-Making in Twenty-First Century California, as
“conjoint planning,” “fusion,” and “moderate degree of persuasion” (p. 2). I chose top-down, bottom-up, and fusion frameworks as the basis for my analysis of options for a regional governance framework in California because they are the three most common state-supported regional governance frameworks and offer a broad spectrum of examples. I provide an analysis of these frameworks and how they might work in California in Chapter Five of this thesis. Chapter Six outlines my conclusions and recommendations for a growth management program in California.
The policy environment surrounding the question of how, or if, California can adopt some sort of regional governance and growth planning framework is complex. Social, environmental, economic, and political issues all swirl around the regional governance question. Any examination of alternatives for regional governance in California must take into consideration the constraints and opportunities that make up the regional governance policy environment. The opportunities and constraints that shape the regional governance discussion contribute to the development of the criteria this thesis uses for evaluating the various policy alternatives.

The first two sections of this chapter examine the social and environmental aspects that shape the policy discussion around regional governance and growth management. These first two sections also discuss the “larger than local” nature of California’s social and environmental issues. The third section outlines economic challenges to the institution of regional governance. The effects of Proposition 13 and a brief discussion of the complexities of the state-local financing scheme also appear here. The final section of this chapter examines the political constraints to and opportunities for regional governance.
I. Social Issues

California’s rapid, uncontrolled growth patterns (sprawl) has exacerbated the separation between wealth and poverty in the state. California’s development pattern of choice, sprawl (or, rapid suburbanization), has created what Orfield (2002) calls “social separation.” Wassmer (2002) explains that sprawl development “scatters and disperses development in inefficient ways, distancing people’s homes from their workplaces while frequently failing to optimally use the open spaces in between” (p. 5). This “spatial mismatch” results in higher unemployment among workers who have been “left behind” by the flight of job centers from the central city to the suburbs.

The jobs-housing mismatch tends to create an affordable housing problem because housing built near new suburban job centers is much more expensive than older, existing housing stock in central cities. The flight of job centers to the suburbs also speeds up neighborhood decline and concentrated poverty. Middle-class homeowners follow the migration of businesses and jobs to the suburbs. Poorer residents, not able to make the suburban move to follow jobs, stay in the central cities. Housing values in the older central city decline due to a lack of demand, poorer individuals of all races move in, and central cities start to spiral downward. Orfield (2002) indicates that concentrated poverty, racial and ethnic segregation, and failing schools in central cities are the results of the “spatial mismatch” in California. These social problems multiply the severity of problems faced by poor individuals. The probability of teen pregnancy, high school dropouts, and joblessness increase in this environment. These outcomes adversely affect the quality of
life in the region, reduce the pool of skilled workers, and eventually negatively affect opportunities for economic growth and development.

Central cities are not alone in feeling the effects of sprawl development – suburbs are also affected. Orfield (2002) points out that cities and suburbs are interdependent – central cities’ social problems affect the suburbs. He points to research that shows “median household incomes of central cities and their suburbs move up and down together in most regions and that the strength of this relationship appears to be increasing” (p. 7). He cites research that indicates that the smaller the gap between city and suburban incomes, the greater the regional job growth and income growth in central cities results in income growth and home value appreciation in the suburbs. These findings have stimulated the discussion about whether or not some sort of regional governance and growth management program are desirable in California.

II. Environmental Issues

Modern regionalism in California began to take hold as a response to the rise of environmentalism in the late 1960s and 1970s. California’s rapid expansion and suburbanization in the post-World War II era threatened the state’s natural environments and rural landscapes. The urban quality of life deteriorated as environmental problems crossed urban boundaries and became regional issues. Concerns about the preservation of California’s natural resources and its deteriorating air and water quality gave birth to a
broad environmental movement in the state. Environmentalists called for regulation to control pollution and preserve natural resources.

A process called vertical regionalism – described by Elisa Barbour in her 2002 study for the Public Policy Institute of California, *Metropolitan Growth Planning in California, 1900-2000*, as “centralized, state-dominated regional planning for large-scale infrastructure and environmental planning” (p. 42) – evolved as a response to new, large scale environmental problems. Vertical regionalism created single-purpose, functional agencies that focused on one topic such as air or water quality. Vertical regionalism ensured that public officials could apply adequate public resources and accountability to regional policy problems with inherently regional scale, and that local governments were unable to solve alone. Vertical regional planning also fractured the regional planning system because single-purpose planning agencies followed narrow functional lines and the doctrine of home rule still dominated local land use policy despite the fact that many state planning policies often directly influenced land use patterns.

This section takes a look at how state officials organized vertical regionalism to monitor air and water quality in California, and the challenges inherent in regional local land use planning.
Air and Water

State boards manage air and water quality and regulation in California regionally. The state of California directs water management in California and has organized the process on a bioregional basis. The legislature created the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) in 1967. The SWRCB uses nine regional water control boards to oversee water rights and quality. The governor appoints Board members and the State Senate confirms them. The 1972 the state designated the SWRCB as the authority responsible for granting, reviewing, and enforcing permits to appropriate water in California, and governing quality standards under the federal Clean Water Act.

The state Legislature created the state Air Resources Board (ARB) was created in 1967 to define emission and quality standards, air basins, and regional pollution control districts that regulate stationary sources such as industrial and commercial establishments. The ARB is the authorizing agency for implementation and enforcement of the 1970 Federal Clean Air Act emissions standards. Air quality management has retained its tradition of county control. There are 35 air pollution control districts in California. Twenty-five of those districts exist at the county level. The remainder of the districts are multi-county agencies. Governing boards are generally composed of county supervisors.

These agencies focus more on procedural matters than actual integration of planning, policy, or governance. Agency representatives do not have regional constituencies nor do they have incentives to cooperate beyond their legislative mandates.
**Land Use**

Regional solutions to land use questions have proved elusive. Home rule provisions allow local governments to dictate land use decisions without direct state policy control from the state government. Under the home rule provisions, local governments can plan their land uses in isolation without concern for how their decisions affect the larger region. In a few unique cases, state government has been able to create regional governance structures with significant land use authority. The cases called for protection of valued and endangered natural resources with significant effects on local land use policy. In these instances, public concern was sufficient to overcome the objections of local governments to the establishment of strong regional authorities (Barbour, 2002, p. 40).

There are four state agencies responsible for land use in specific geographical areas: the Bay Conservation and Development Commission (San Francisco Bay), the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (Lake Tahoe area), the California Coastal Commission (the Coast), and the Delta Protection Commission (Sacramento Delta). All but the Delta Protection Commission have land use regulatory authority that supercedes that of local governments (Fulton, 1999, p. 91). I summarize the story of the Bay Conservation and Development Commission below to illustrate the complexities of developing regional land use planning and governance in the face of home rule and local control.

**Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC)**

The state Legislature created the BCDC in response to the increasing decline of the San Francisco Bay in the 1960s. Local leaders formed a group called Save San Francisco Bay
to advocate for regional planning to control shoreline development around the Bay. The organization appealed to the only regional government organization established to address regional planning issues: the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG). ABAG was formed by Bay Area local jurisdictions and counties to address the planning coordination problems the multitude of Bay Area local jurisdictions and counties could not resolve on their own, such as transportation and housing, and to meet the growing public concern about the rapid degradation of the San Francisco Bay. ABAG was also a conduit of state and federal planning money. ABAG was a logical forum to address the coordination of planning issues around the Bay. Unfortunately, the combination of real regulatory power and the strongly held belief in local control over land use meant that ABAG was politically unable to address the issues of land use planning controls around the Bay.

Unsatisfied with ABAG’s progress achieving solutions to protect the Bay, the organization turned to the California Legislature for help creating an independent commission with land use regulatory powers. In 1965, the state legislature passed revolutionary legislation establishing the Bay Area Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) as a state regional planning agency to supervise development around the Bay. The state Legislature established the BCDC with overriding authority over land uses that affect the Bay. The BCDC became a prototype for other such agencies in California and elsewhere (Pincetl, 1999; Barbour, 2002).
Summary

California’s response to the environmental issues caused by its rapid postwar growth has been the creation of a collection of single purpose and functional agencies, as opposed to a system that is integrated and policy driven. While state and federal mandates and funding requirements created single purpose regional planning agencies, the home rule concept still dominates local land use policy despite the fact that many state planning policies are often directly connected to land use patterns. Home rule provisions have thwarted land use regional planning except in the rare cases when a precious natural resource was in imminent danger, as the story of the Bay Conservation and Development Commission illustrates.

III. Economic Issues

Proposition 13 and Disappearing Revenue

Economic issues play a central role in the development of regional governance strategies. The primary economic barrier to regional governance is the revenue-limiting constraints imposed by Proposition 13 in 1978 and subsequent similar initiatives. Proposition 13 was a major local property tax cut and fundamentally altered the way California local governments raise revenue. According to Wassmer (2002) and Orfield and Luce (2002), Proposition 13 took control of locally generated property taxes out of the hands of local governments and turned it over to the state Legislature for distribution. The impact of Proposition 13 is illustrated by the difference in the percentage of property tax revenue raised by California cities. Local property taxes, on average, constituted 16 percent of
municipal revenue in the fiscal year prior to passage of Proposition 13 (1977-78). By 1997-98, this percentage had fallen to 6.8 percent – less than half the amount raised prior to Proposition 13 (Wassmer, 2002).

Assembly Bill (AB) 8 provided the mechanism for distribution of countywide property taxes back to local governments. AB 8 requires that the property tax revenue received by a local government be a continuing function of the property taxes levied prior to Proposition 13, plus a portion of the additional property tax revenue generated through any year-to-year growth in the locality’s property tax base. The creation by the state legislature of the Educational Revenue Augmentation Funds (ERAF) in each county further altered the property tax redistribution scheme. ERAF mandated that various amounts of countywide property tax revenue be redirected from non-school local governments and deposited into a fund that went only to schools (Wassmer, 2002).

**Summary**

By weakening local governments’ general tax base, Proposition 13, and ERAF ushered in an era of intense competition among cities and counties for tax-producing development. A fiscal environment that forces local jurisdictions to compete with each other for limited tax and fee revenue, and a policy environment that favors home rule for local land use decisions, is not an environment conducive to coordinated, regional planning and governance efforts. Strategies for regional governance cannot ignore revenue constraints placed on local governments by the state.
IV. **Political Issues**

Politics play a key role in the development of options for regional governance and planning. Any substantive reform focused on creation of regional governance and growth management planning will require action by the California Legislature and Governor. Successful reforms are supported by key interest groups, enacted by the state legislature, and enacted by the Governor. Given this environment, reformers should have an understanding of the political environment surrounding regional governance and growth management planning if they are to be successful in their efforts developing strategies for regional governance and planning.

**Inter-Jurisdictional Competition**

Although growth management planning problems increasingly require more collaborative governance arrangements, trends in state and local relations encourage the opposite. Proposition 13 undermined local governments’ control over tax rates and revenue allocations, the essential resources for managing growth and providing services. It has become harder for local governments to maintain fiscal solvency in the wake of the revenue reducing initiatives passed in the last 20 years. Local governments have turned to their primary source of authority – control over land use – as the main method to ensure fiscal solvency. “Fiscalized” land use decisions increase inter-jurisdictional competition and discourage regionally beneficial outcomes. The impasse between the state and local governments on fiscal reform obstructs regional governance solutions. Given this environment, there are no incentives for local governments to agree to any type of state-
mandated governance and growth management planning initiatives (Barbour and Teitz, 2001).

**Weak COGs**

California’s Regional Councils of Governments (COGs) can be important settings for regional deliberation. But because they are voluntary associations, and there are too few financial or other incentives to produce substantive regional outcomes, it is difficult for them to reach solutions that are more than a collection of local interests and don’t have a regional constituency. The weakness of the COGs, the state’s primary regional governance and planning body, is indicative of the disconnect between the state and local governments on regional issues.

**Too Many Cooks – 5,000 Local Agencies**

California’s amalgam of governmental agencies, by last count there were over 5,000, is another political challenge to regional governance and growth management planning reform. Lewis (1998) concludes political fragmentation but may lead to “parochial, self-interested land-use decisions and a lack of policy concern for regional challenges” (pp. vi-vii). He further concludes that “local fragmentation continues to separate fiscal resources from social needs and to impede coordination on issues such as land use” and recommends “enhanced mechanisms for regional growth and infrastructure issues may be necessary” (p. xiv). Without state mandates for regional governance and growth planning reforms, the myriad of agencies have little incentive to collaborate on regional issues.
The time alone that would be involved in negotiating regional governance and planning implementation strategies through the complex web of agencies is enough of a deterrent from even attempting such reform.

Suburbs vs. Central Cities

The politics of regional governance are split with central cities and older suburbs on one side and newer, fringe suburbs on another. Central cities and older suburbs are more likely to support regional governance initiatives and suburban communities are more likely to oppose regional governance. According to Barbour (2002), suburban voters tend to oppose regional governance for two reasons: lifestyle differences and loss of control. Suburban voters want to maintain the physical and social character of communities and oppose integration of “lifestyle” services such as land use, schools, police protection, and health and welfare. Suburban voters are, on the other hand, more likely to accept integration of “systems-maintenance” functions, such as transportation and utilities because there are potential cost savings involved in the integration of these services. Suburban voters also distrust regional governance initiatives because they fear losing access to government decision making. They fear a regional government would take away too much local power (Barbour, 2002, p. 26).

Darryl Steinberg of Sacramento played out the separation of central cities and suburban communities on the regional governance issue in 2002 over the battle for Assembly Bill (AB) 680 introduced. AB 680 called for the division of future sales tax growth in the six-
county Sacramento region. The City of Sacramento, the region’s largest and oldest city, supported the bill and most suburban cities in the region bitterly opposed it. Assemblymember Dave Cox (Fair Oaks) crystallized the suburban argument when he told the Sacramento Bee, “This is a bill that literally wipes out local control. What it tells city councils and boards of supervisors is that [the Legislature] can do it better than you can, and, therefore, we (the Legislature) ought to impose our will” (California Planning & Development Report, January 2002 [emphasis mine]). The Legislature eventually defeated the bill.

Opportunities for Regional Governance and Planning

Despite the political challenges of implementing regional governance, there are also opportunities. Opinion polls show the public is increasingly frustrated about growth issues. Polls reveal that the public may be ready for growth management reform, including a stronger role for regional planning agencies. A 2001 Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) statewide poll revealed that 89% of the public agreed that local governments should work together on local growth issues rather than make growth decisions on their own (Baldassare, 2001).

According to Barbour and Teitz (2001), regional leadership is emerging in California. Collaboration is increasing among local governments and civic leaders to solve problems that cut across jurisdictional borders. Local governments have found that they must cooperate to maintain control over the consequences of growth. Examples of cooperation
and coordination between local governments are: coordinated plans for urban growth boundaries, open space protection, economic development, jobs-housing balance, and other objectives.

The increased involvement of civic leaders in pushing for reform has also become a reason for increased collaboration. Leaders from business, the environmental community, and transportation activists are the most vocal in calling for regional governance and planning. The emergence of leaders from these sectors is a politically logical evolution of the regional governance and planning issue. The issues that affect their sectors are regional in scope. Examples of efforts led by “civic entrepreneurs” include campaigns by Joint Venture Silicon Valley and the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group to encourage Santa Clara County and its cities to adopt a uniform building code, to increase taxes for highway and light-rail construction, and to promote affordable housing and infill development (Barbour and Teitz, 2001). Another example is the Sierra Business Council’s work with Placer County to develop an ongoing, countywide open space and habitat protection program called Placer Legacy.

The state Legislature has also begun to recognize the need for a coordinated, regional approach to governance and planning. The Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism issued its final report, *The New California Dream: Regional Solutions for 21st Century Challenges* in 2002. The report outlined new state policies that support effective solutions to some of California’s immediate and long-term issues: economic competitiveness;
persistent poverty and underemployment; traffic congestion and long commutes; unaffordable housing; and loss of open space and habitat, among many others. The Commission promoted a range of policy measures and flexible support for collaborative regional compacts. The creation of the Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism and the issuance of the final report are a good start to formulating strategies for regional governance and planning in California. Unfortunately, as Speaker’s Commission released the report, the state’s electricity crisis, security concerns, and an economic downturn had diverted attention from its recommendations. The political environment for regional reform, however, has remained strong. According to Barbour (2002), during the early 2000s there has been a “convergence of state and local concerns regarding infrastructure, housing, and fiscal reform that has served to justify stronger regional coordination” (p. 140).

Summary

The political environment around regional governance and planning is complex and challenging. Structural, procedural, geographic, and control issues constrain regional governance efforts. Opportunities also exist for regional solutions. The public seems ready to again embrace regional solutions to problems; “civic entrepreneurs” have organized themselves to create systems and dynamics to solve regional problems; and the legislature has begun to take another look at how regional solutions to California’s problems can be developed. Regional reform initiatives must consider both sides of the
political environment before the Legislature and stakeholders develop implementation strategies.
CHAPTER THREE

Alternatives for a Growth Management Framework in California

I. Causes of California’s Regional Problems

“California does not have a plan for growth.”


Chapters One and Two of this thesis provided an overview of the regional problems caused by unmanaged growth in California, the sources of the problems, a historical review of regional governance and growth management planning efforts, California’s current responses to regional problem-solving, and the social, environmental, economic, and political opportunities and constraints that shape the issue and its proposed policy options. This chapter presents policy options that I later consider as alternatives for a regional governance and growth management framework for California. I outline the criteria used to evaluate each policy alternative in next chapter of this thesis.

This section contains three parts. Part one takes another look at the causes of California’s regional problems. The section focuses on how California’s rapid rate of growth and why an uncoordinated approach to growth management has exacerbated the state’s regional problems. Part two discusses the variables inherent in the alternatives offered for the development of an intergovernmental framework for growth management in California. Part three summarizes the alternatives considered for analysis.
California’s urban landscape is undergoing fundamental change. The state population was 24 million in the beginning of the 1980s and is about 36.1 million today, an increase of 40 percent in two decades. California’s rapid growth has occurred without a systematic plan to manage its impacts. Lack of planning for the consequences of growth has led to urban sprawl, loss of farmland and open space, strained infrastructure, decreased air and water quality, a jobs-housing imbalance, social separation, concentrated poverty, and a general decline in the quality of life. The problems are not limited to individual cities and counties but spill over from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. California’s uncoordinated approach to planning and accommodating growth is not suitable to the regional nature of its problems. The problems generated by unmanaged growth are regional and California’s state and local governments, in their current form, are ill equipped to solve them.

**Structural Deficiencies**

California’s rapid growth has exposed weaknesses in the structure of state and local government. According to John Kirlin’s 1989 analysis regional governance, *Improving Regional Governance*, the basic structure of governance in California’s regions has changed little since the 1960s. Cities and counties operate as general-purpose local governments, overlaid with a council of governments, and several function-specific, single-purpose regional authorities. Kirlin identifies three structural deficiencies affecting regional agencies in California:

1. *Regional agencies tend to deal with single functions.* Lack of coordination among agencies often results in competing objectives. Lack of unity in purpose and
objectives results in difficulties integrating policies of interdependent systems. A consequence of this fragmentation is delayed regional plan approval and implementation and, most importantly, a delay in arriving at a solution to problems by state, regional, and local agencies.

2. **Regional agencies lack direct political accountability.** State or local bodies select or appoint officials from a body of elected officials, but are not accountable to, or empowered by citizens of the region. Agency officials’ responsibility to local constituencies takes precedence over responsibilities to the regional issue. These dynamics make it less likely that the decisions made by regional officials are made in the interest of the general citizenry. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the California regional planning institutions and their appointing authorities. The number of each type of institution operating is shown in parentheses following the name of the institution.

3. **The structure for creating, integrating, and eliminating local and regional institutions lacks flexibility.** Rules for local government formation are uniform across the state and leave little accommodation for the diverse geographic and demographic conditions that exist.
Table 3.1: Appointments to Boards of Regional Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Institution</th>
<th>Appointing Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Pollution Control Districts (39)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airport Land Use Commissions (37)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay Area Air Quality Management District (1)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Coastal Commission (1)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councils Of Government (28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Solid Waste Management Plans (58)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous Waste Management Plans (advisory committee) (58)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Agency Formation Commission (57)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Transportation Commission (1)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Transportation Planning Agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Transportation Commissions (23)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Transportation Commissions (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Water Quality Control Boards (9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco Bay Conservation And Development Commission (1)</td>
<td>x  x  x  x  x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Coast Air Quality Management District (1)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahoe Regional Planning Commission (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals:</strong></td>
<td>7  5  11  12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: John Kirlin, *Improving Regional Governance*, Table 9-1, p. 195

**Home Rule**

The home rule concept in California also contributes to the state’s inability to manage its growth. Home rule allows local governments to conduct their affairs without interference from state government. Home rule is especially strong where local land use decisions are concerned. Local governments fiercely protect their ability to control their land uses without interference from the state. Local governments are concerned that an empowered regional entity, comprised of directly elected leadership would create a new tier of government and redefine intergovernmental relations at the local and state levels. The loss of local control over land use and other issues to a new, regional governing body is a primary concern that local governments have about the establishment of regional
governing bodies. Coordination derived from voluntary compromise, however reluctantly achieved, is preferable to local officials than the subordination of their authority to another level of government. Home rule and the disconnect between state and local authority on land use planning issues constrain state government’s ability to establish and enforce statewide growth management planning goals and objectives that are be part of a comprehensive growth planning system.

Proposition 13 and Competition for Revenue

Other major causes of California’s failure to manage its growth are the fiscal constraints imposed on local communities by Proposition 13. Local governments saw a primary source of revenue over which they had discretionary authority, property taxes, greatly reduced after the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. The effect of this loss of discretionary revenue has caused local governments to find new ways to pay for service delivery. The key revenue stream used by local governments after Proposition 13 has been the sales tax. Local governments have turned to land use (development) to improve their fiscal health. Local governments choose retail development over housing because retail development generates sales tax. This process is called the “fiscalization of land use.” The need to compete for sales tax revenue creates fierce competition between local jurisdictions and discourages regional cooperation. The consequences of fiscalized land use have been sprawl development, lack of affordable housing, increased traffic congestion, housing shortages, and a jobs/housing mismatch that occurs when job centers move farther and farther away from housing. Local jurisdictions have few incentives to
cooperate on land use and other issues as long as sales tax is their primary source of discretionary revenue.

The causes of California’s uncoordinated approach to growth management are both structural and fiscal. The policy alternatives for an intergovernmental framework for growth management I suggest in this thesis call for political and structural reform of the current system. The next section describes key variables that need to be considered before suggesting which policy alternative is best to pursue.

II. Variables Inherent in Alternatives

The policy options I outline in this thesis present structural reforms that change the relationship between state and local governments in California. The alternatives call for varying degrees of state-centered control of the growth management planning process. The degree of centralization and the level at which it occurs determine the policy impact. This section presents major variables that impact the policy alternatives for the establishment of a regional governance framework in California. The primary product of a regional governance and growth management framework is a growth management plan. State, regional, or local levels of government develop plans. The variables discussed below focus on the plan and planning requirements. The variables include whether plan submittal is mandatory or optional, the level of plan review and approval authority (approve, disapprove, or merely comment), the level of planning consistency required, and how collaborative regional decision-making occurs.
Growth Management Plan Submittal – Mandatory or Optional?

A fundamental issue in the design of a state-sponsored growth management program is whether growth management plan submittal is mandatory or optional for state, regional, local governments. A mandatory framework is primarily state-directed with the adoption of state standards, statutes, rules, goals, guidelines, decisions, and interpretations through administrative rules to guide the development of comprehensive plans and development regulations. A mandatory framework is often described as “top-down” – the state plays a dominant role in the growth management planning process.

A voluntary framework carries no state planning mandates but might be loaded with incentives for planning that may or may not have to be met for funding allocations, infrastructure investment, or state certification. A voluntary framework is often described as “bottom-up” – the state plays a much less decisive role in the growth management planning process.

Level of Growth Management Plan Review and Approval Authority – Absolute or Advisory?

A key variable of growth management planning process is at what governmental level plan review occurs and with what degree of authority. Gale (1992) identifies three distinct types of plan review and approval.

- The first type is a centralized review process with state approval/denial authority to ensure greater uniformity among state, local, and regional planning units. This type of
review/approval process is most consistent with top-down growth management frameworks.

- The second type is approval by a regional agency with a review/comment procedure. This process increases the risk of variable quality of plans. This type of review/approval process is most consistent with bottom-up growth management frameworks.

- The last type is a combined system with a state department holding final approval authority and regional and/or local agencies left to devise the specific content of their comprehensive plans and the implementing development regulations (Gale, 1992, p. 427). This type of review/approval process is most consistent with growth management frameworks that combine elements of top-down and bottom-up frameworks – a fusion framework.

**Level of Growth Planning Consistency Required**

Planning consistency refers to the degree that state, regional, and local plans match common goals and objectives. Planning consistency is an important variable because regional growth management planning cannot be successful with local governments working in isolation. Requirements for consistency in land use policies among state, regional, and local levels of government, compatibility between plans of proximate jurisdictions and consistency in plan elements within communities vary from framework to framework.
Vertical consistency requires state, regional, and local policies and plans be coordinated with each other – from the top to the bottom. Horizontal consistency requires plans be in agreement across governmental units – from side to side, or between like governmental units (i.e., plan agreement between city and city, regions and region, county and county). A framework that mandates vertical and horizontal consistency requires that plans agree from the top down and from side to side. Achieving consistency requires jurisdictions to coordinate their efforts between and among each other, encourages collaboration and sets a clear policy direction for growth management planning. Figure 3.1 from Jerry Weitz’s 1999 book *SprawlBusting* illustrates different kinds of (planning consistency) consistency among plans.

**Collaborative Regional Decision-Making**

The process of collaborative regional decision-making varies from system to system. Inter-agency issues are more prevalent in a regional governance context than a hierarchical governance context. Coordination between jurisdictions is critical for regional governance systems to be successful, so there is a heightened possibility of conflict between agencies. Creating a collaborative decision-making environment among jurisdictions in a growth management system is key to its success. It is important that jurisdictions coordinate inter-agency issues related to regional governance. Some systems use growth management hearing boards to resolve disputes. Some hearing boards function in a quasi-judicial capacity – essentially land use courts. Some boards can reverse local government decisions, and recommend sanctions. Some systems use a state
commission to develop and implement state planning goals and administrative regulations as well as oversee a state department that reviews all city and county plans. Some systems use community solutions teams to solve regional issues. Other systems use a cabinet-level office to foster inter-agency coordination. Consensus processes are used in other systems. Vertical and horizontal consistency requirements also foster collaborative regional decision-making.

III. Introduction of Policy Alternatives

Table 3.2 is a summary of policy alternatives for the institution of a growth management framework for California. The alternatives call for varying degrees of state-centered control of the growth management planning process. The degree of centralization and the level at which it occurs determine the policy impact. This section is a further description of the alternatives suggested.
Figure 3.1: Weitz’s Diagram of Types of Plan Consistency

State Comprehensive Plan

Regional Plan A

Regional Plan B

Local Plan A

Local Plan B

Local Plan Element A

Local Plan Element B

Local Development Regs. A

Local Development Regs. B

Vertical Consistency

Horizontal Coordination

Implementation Consistency

Internal Consistency

Source: Jerry Weitz, Sprawl busting, figure 8-3, p. 199
Alternative 1: Allow Present Trends to Continue – Allow the Current System to Manage Growth

Bardach (2000) said an alternative that allows current trends to continue should always be included in an analysis of alternatives because naturally occurring change can sometimes solve the problem (p. 13). This alternative also provides the analyst a baseline with which to compare the alternatives that represent a change from the status quo. This option would continue to rely on California’s system of local general plans, special districts, joint powers agreements, Local Agency Formation Commissions, and Regional Councils of Governments to continue to manage California’s growth and regional issues. Kirlin (1989) described the basic structure of governance in California’s regions as: “Cities and counties operate as general purpose local governments, overlaid with a council of governments, and several function-specific, single-purpose regional authorities” (p. 187).

Alternative 2: Develop a “Top-Down” Growth Management Framework

Top-down, state-dominated frameworks call for mandatory growth plan preparation by state, regional and/or local jurisdictions. The intergovernmental framework for growth management used in Florida and Oregon are good examples of top-down models. In these models, the state imposes relatively strong sanctions on regional and local planning bodies that fail to submit plans, that submit plans that fail to meet established state standards, or otherwise choose not to comply with program requirements. The state mandates interjurisdictional consistency in these models. There is formal state approval
of local plans (Gale, 1992; Weitz, 1999). The state requires significant plan preparation at the local, regional, and state levels. The intent of this policy alternative to increase the probability of consistency among local, regional, and state plans as they relate to state growth planning goals, mandates, and regulations. This alternative requires the state to conduct a major overhaul of the current state and local planning processes and to create regional planning bodies. This alternative forces the state to adopt state growth and development standards, statutes, rules, goals, guidelines, decisions, and interpretations through administrative rules to guide the development of local comprehensive plans and development regulations. The state would have to develop set of standards that outline its expectations for the content and substance of local comprehensive plans. The state would also have to develop an extensive plan monitoring compliance system to prevent compliance delays and consistency problems. This model depends on a high degree of centralization at the state level.

**Alternative 3: Develop a “Bottom-Up” Growth Management Framework**

Bottom-up frameworks rely less on state-driven mandates for growth management. The intergovernmental framework for growth management used in Georgia is a good example of a bottom-up model. In this model, planning comes from lower levels of government with considerable discretion left to negotiation between local and regional bodies. Plan preparation by local and regional jurisdictions is voluntary and the reviewing body is limited to a review and comment function. Consistency standards are moderate and focus more on horizontal than vertical consistency. The intent of this policy option is to offer a
more decentralized alternative to the top-down model. This option keeps most of the power for growth management at the local level. The option also calls for the development of regional planning and governing bodies, but its structure suggests that plans developed in this model may be merely collections of local policies and plans as opposed to true regional plans (Gale, 1992; Weitz, 1999). Bottom-up models create space for discretionary judgment by local and regional planning bodies. This flexibility will be attractive to local agencies. For the model to work the state needs to develop growth management goals and objectives; but local and regional jurisdictions would have the flexibility to negotiate the particulars of how they meet state goals and standards.

**Alternative 4: Develop a “Fusion” Growth Management Framework**

Fusion frameworks combine top-down and bottom-up characteristics. The growth management framework used in Washington state is a good example of a fusion model. Like top-down models, fusion models mandate local and county plan preparation. A unique characteristic of the fusion model is that it limits the mandate to rapidly growing jurisdictions and permits voluntary planning from slower growing communities, similar to bottom-up models. Plan consistency is horizontal. Plans developed by counties and cities must be coordinated with, and consistent with, comprehensive plans of other counties or cities with which the county or city has, in part, common borders or related regional issues. The state government does not have primary responsibility for plan review in the fusion model, that responsibility is decentralized to local jurisdictions as in the bottom-up frameworks. Whether and to what extent plan review should occur is left
to counties to negotiate with their constituent communities. There is no requirement for a state or regional plan in the fusion model. The state may review and comment on, but doesn’t approve, county and local plans (Gale, 1992). The state still develops growth management goals for planning, but local governments are allowed the flexibility to devise the specific content of their comprehensive plans and the implementing development regulations (LeGates, 2001). The state reserves the power to impose sanctions on nonparticipating jurisdictions. The intent of this policy option is to offer a framework that develops state standards and guidance for growth management planning, but provides local governments the flexibility to develop the content and implementation strategies.

Table 3.2: Policy Alternatives for Development of a Growth Management Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Allow Present Trends to Continue Unchanged</td>
<td>Continue California’s current system of local general plans, special districts, joint powers agreements, Local Agency Formation Commissions, and Regional Councils of Governments to continue to manage California’s growth and regional issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Develop a “Top-Down” Framework</td>
<td>Mandatory growth planning. A state-mandated and directed local, regional, and state growth management planning system to direct where, how, and when growth will occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Develop a “Bottom-Up” Framework</td>
<td>Voluntary growth planning. State provides a context, vision, and process within which more specific local and regional plans can be voluntarily developed and implemented by local and/or regional bodies to achieve commonly derived goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Develop a “Fusion” Framework</td>
<td>A hybrid of mandatory and voluntary growth planning. State provides policy guidance and incentives to guide local and regional cooperation and planning. Existing governments – especially counties – coordinate development and implementation of the new planning requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

This section included a discussion of the key variables that influence California’s ability to develop a growth management framework. All of the variables are procedural and administrative. Given the focus of these variables have to do with procedural and administrative changes at all levels of government, it is not surprising that the policy alternatives suggested are designed to make changes in the current structure of regional governance and growth management in California. I have concluded California’s current system is a failed system in need of overhaul and repair. The current regional governance and growth management framework can be repaired and rebuilt with state government intervention and the three new policy alternatives listed above are suggested as reforms to help California build a new regional governance and growth management framework that will help it manage and plan its growth effectively. In the next chapter, Chapter Four, I describe the criteria I use to evaluate the alternatives presented in Chapter Three.
CHAPTER FOUR

Criteria for Evaluating Alternatives

In Chapter Three I introduced four alternatives for the development of a growth management framework in California. The alternatives I presented included continuing to allow California’s current system of local general plans, special districts, joint powers agreements, Local Agency Formation Commissions, and Regional Councils of Governments to manage California’s growth and regional issues; creating a “top-down” growth management system in which the state directs where, how, and when growth will occur; creating a “bottom-up” system in which the state provides a context, vision, and process for growth management with local and regional agencies primarily responsible for developing comprehensive growth plans; and a “fusion” system in which the state provides policy guidance and incentives to guide local and regional cooperation and planning and existing governments – especially counties – coordinate development and implementation of the new planning requirements.

I used four criteria to evaluate the alternatives. I was careful to choose criteria that did not point to obvious solutions. The criteria are effectiveness, political acceptability, flexibility, and robustness. According to Bardach (2000), choosing criteria to evaluate policy alternatives is a structured process to determine the preferred alternative(s). Criteria help a policy analyst weigh the benefits and drawbacks of each alternative. The criteria serve as measurements that account for issues and considerations that affect the policy’s implementation and the likelihood of its intended outcomes. This chapter
discusses each criterion and the rationale behind its selection. The final section of this chapter provides an overview of the methodology used in Chapter Five that applies my criteria to the policy alternatives I have suggested and the determination of my preferred alternative(s). I use the outline of the alternatives, criteria, and methodology of my analysis to make it clear to the reader how I determined the final policy recommendations in Chapter Six.

**Criteria Selection and Justification**

I used the selection of criteria as the systematic process to evaluate each policy alternative and determine which alternative(s) provides the best opportunity for achieving the desired outcome. The desired outcome of choosing a growth management framework in California is the establishment of a systematic, coordinated, and collaborative governance process that will help California manage its growth to minimize the economic and environmental costs and maximize the social benefits (California Senate Office of Research, 1991). Ideally, implementation by the state of a new growth management system in California will be achieved through policies that are easy for state and local agencies to develop and implement, do not radically upset current growth management systems, streamlines current systems through administrative efficiencies, flexible enough to allow local agencies a wide range of opportunities to develop and implement responses to broad state growth management goals, and enjoys broad political support from policymakers, stakeholders, and the public at large.
I. Criteria

Effectiveness

Effectiveness focuses on the alternative’s likelihood of success in solving the problem being studied. The problem is that California’s uncoordinated approach to growth management fails to address the regional nature of its growth-related problems. I determined effectiveness in a few ways: by looking at other states and determining whether the alternative worked there; by looking at California’s historical experience with growth management and analyzing what has and has not been successful at helping the state manage its growth; and analyzing the state’s current system of local general plans, special districts, joint powers agreements, Local Agency Formation Commissions, and Regional Councils of Governments used to manage growth and plan regionally. I determined the degree of effectiveness of an alternative by the degree in which it would be successful in minimizing the economic and environmental costs and maximizing the social benefits of growth.

Analyzing effectiveness is difficult because it is hard to determine if what has worked in one state will work in another. I attempt to resolve this difficulty by overlaying what works in other states with the political, social, economic, and environmental environment of California. While whole systems cannot be transferred onto the California landscape, parts of systems from other states coupled with new legislation increase effectiveness as it relates to the problem statement.
Political Acceptability
Political approval from state and local policymakers is required to implement any of the alternatives I have proposed for the implementation of growth management frameworks for California. I outlined the complex and politicized policy environment surrounding regional governance issues in Chapter Two. Without acceptance from constituents, policymakers will not enact even the most coordinated, effective, efficient, flexible, and easy to administer regional governance policies. Political acceptability of the outcomes of the alternatives by constituents and lawmakers is, therefore, a major criterion for evaluation. I based the level of political acceptability of alternatives on the estimated chance it would be supported by constituents and stakeholders and enacted by the California legislature.

I determined whether an alternative was politically acceptable by looking at opinion polls, past legislation, and recent actions by governing as well as non-governing bodies.

Flexibility
Flexibility focuses on whether alternative allows affected agencies to devise specific content of comprehensive growth management plans and implementation strategies. All of the alternatives I propose require state-adopted goals and objectives for growth management. The alternatives differ in the amount of freedom they allow local and regional agencies to choose ways to achieve state growth management goals. Each alternative offers a different degree of flexibility for agencies to determine the content
and implementation strategies of their growth plans. The degree of flexibility is important because each local area and region has its own culture and unique growth planning needs. Flexibility is also important in California because of the state’s long-held home rule doctrine. I gave positive scores to alternatives that prescribed high levels of flexibility to devise the specific content of comprehensive growth management plans and implementation strategies.

I performed structural analyses of each alternative to determine the level of flexibility it offered.

**Robustness**

The robustness criterion focuses on the relative ease or difficulty with which an alternative can be implemented and changed by governments or stakeholders. Bardach (2000) points out that policies that emerge in practice can diverge from policies as designed and adopted. He further states “A policy alternative, therefore, should be robust enough so that even if the implementation process does not go smoothly, the policy outcomes will still prove to be satisfactory” (p. 25). Policies may be impractical because of political, cost, or time constraints. Alternatives that score high on the other criteria may be too expensive, time consuming, or too administratively difficult to implement.
I measured the robustness of the alternatives by considering financial costs associated with its implementation, the time and money spent to implement it, and the political costs of implementing the alternative.

II. Methodology

I used a criterion-alternative matrix (CAM) to analyze options and make recommendations for the implementation of a coordinated growth management framework in California. The matrix’s design lists policy alternatives in the rows and the criteria to evaluate them in the columns. I provide a short description of the projected outcome related to the respective criterion and policy alternative in the appropriate cell. The CAM analysis allows me to make comparisons among the various alternatives. A full description of the CAM method appears in Eugene Bardach’s *A Practical Guide to Policy Analysis* (2000).

The criterion-alternative matrix helps a policy analyst choose among alternatives because it outlines and compares the analyst’s evaluation of the likely consequences associated with each alternative. The matrix exposes extremes and allows the analyst to identify the full range of options – both favorable and unfavorable.

To “score” each alternative, I chose to use a cardinal scale to rate the performance of each alternative for each criterion. I chose a scale of pass/fail. My analysis focused on the following steps. I gave each cell a score. The criterion-alternative matrix is complete
when a score is issued for each cell. Next, I totaled the cells for each of the five criterions on each policy option. I then tallied the number of passes and fails. Finally, I compared the total passes and fails of each alternative to determine the best policy alternative. Table 4.1 provides information on what is required for policy alternatives to rate either a pass or fail for each of the criterion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Interpretation of Ratings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Pass</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Fail</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Projected to achieve complete policy objective – institution of a coordinated state growth management system minimizing the economic and environmental costs and maximizing the social benefits of growth – within a short-term time frame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Acceptability</td>
<td>Legislation restructuring California’s growth management system is likely to be passed and implemented; endorsed by the majority of stakeholders (community, business, local, regional, and state agencies).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>High degree of freedom for local agencies to interpret, design and implement growth management plans; flexibility in negotiating plan disputes and differences between agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robustness</td>
<td>Implementation possible within existing administrative structure and short-term time frame; costs to implement, and political constraints minimal; components of policy alternative flexible and able to be periodically modified and improved.</td>
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Table 4.1: Key For Interpreting Criteria Rating Scale

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CHAPTER 5

Analysis of Policy Alternatives

Many residents and policymakers are unsatisfied with the economic, social, and environmental consequences of California’s rapid growth. According to the Senate Office of Research’s (SOR) 1991 publication, *Prosperity, Equity, and Environmental Quality: Meeting the Challenge of California’s Growth*, the state government has failed to anticipate problems, plan ahead, and provide the fiscal resources to effectively address the challenges brought by rapid population growth, increasing social diversity, and physical development. An increased imbalance between jobs and housing in metropolitan areas, longer commutes, higher housing costs, more air pollution, and other social, environmental, and economic costs are the consequences of California’s lack of effective local, regional, or state programs to manage growth (p. 1).

California can take a variety of approaches to the development of a state growth management framework. I considered the following four alternatives:

1. Present Trends. This alternative allows present trends to continue unchanged, or retains the current “system” in its present state;

2. Top-Down. This alternative is a mandatory growth management planning program. The program’s focus is a state-mandated and directed local, regional, and state growth management planning system to direct where, how, and when growth occurs.
3. Bottom-Up. This alternative is a voluntary growth management planning program. The program’s focus is a state provided a context, vision, and process within which more specific local and regional plans can be voluntarily developed and implemented by local and/or regional bodies to achieve commonly derived goals.

4. Fusion. This alternative is a hybrid of the mandatory and voluntary growth management planning programs. The program’s focus is state policy guidance and incentives that guide local and regional cooperation and planning. Existing governments – especially counties – coordinate development and implementation of the new planning requirements.

To determine which alternative the Legislature should pursue, I analyzed each alternative using four criteria:

1. Effectiveness, or the alternative’s likelihood of success in solving the problem.

2. Political acceptability, or the likelihood the public will accept it.

3. Flexibility, or whether alternative allows affected agencies to devise specific content of comprehensive growth management plans and implementation strategies.

4. Robustness, or the relative ease or difficulty with which an alternative can be implemented and changed.

Table 5.1 provides an overview of the analysis I performed on the four alternatives presented.
Alternatives

I. Alternative 1: Allow Present Trends to Continue – Allow the Current System to Manage Growth

Introduction

California lacks a coordinated strategy for making decisions about growth. The state government’s current planning and development system relies on five elements – state conservation and development policies, state and regional growth and infrastructure plans, environmental disclosure laws, single purpose regional agencies, and local general plans. Planning in California is fragmented. State government does not use public investments to achieve broad strategic state objectives. Local plans are not integrated with regional strategies and statewide policies for conservation and development. As a result, it is difficult for local communities and public agencies to achieve legislative goals for conserving natural resources, promoting economic development and prosperity, and providing basic human needs (Senate Office of Research, 1991, pp. 2-3).

Effectiveness

Allowing present trends to continue is inefficient at solving the problem of managing California’s growth. Sprawl development, social separation, infrastructure degradation, environmental pollution, and an increased imbalance between jobs and housing are the prominent consequences of the current system. I provide a full evaluation of the effectiveness of this alternative Chapter One.
Political Acceptability

California residents have voiced their opinion on the current system’s ability to manage growth. Fed up with California’s current system of growth management, city and county boards and residents themselves, through the initiative process, have initiated growth control measures. More than three hundred of California’s five hundred cities and counties have adopted some sort of growth management program (Landis, 1992). Between 1971 and 1989, 357 land-use planning measures were placed on local ballots and there were more than 850 growth-control or growth-management measures in place. That elected officials have adopted more local growth-management measures than the public has, is evidence of the widespread concern about growth issues at the local level (Barbour, 2002; Senate Office of Research, 1991).

The state Legislature has also expressed its concern that the present growth management system in inadequate to managing California’s growth. Throughout history, the Legislature has created commissions to study the effects of California’s growth and the need for policies, programs, and processes to control it to protect the state’s quality of life and economic stability. Some of the commissions and programs in the past and present include:

- The Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems (1960) called for a more centralized approach to governmental formation and planning (Barbour, 2002);
The Urban Strategy for California (1978) called for an intergovernmental planning process and set three priorities for development: to renew and maintain existing urban and suburban areas, to promote infill development those areas, and when urban development was necessary outside them, use land immediately adjacent to the developed land first (Princetl, 1999; Barbour, 2002);

The Senate Urban Growth Policy Project (1988) proposed fifteen recommendations to propose a comprehensive framework of consistent policies and planning procedures to coordinate state, regional, and local approaches to managing growth and development; and

The Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism (2002) recommended new state policies to support effective regional solutions to California’s most serious and long-term growth-related issues.

The Legislature has also expressed its dissatisfaction with California’s current growth management system by proposing legislation. The Legislature introduced nearly seventy bills related to growth management planning in the late 1980s alone. Most of the bills included an enhanced regional governance component and many called for more comprehensive state growth policies, development of comprehensive regional plans, and methods to encourage or mandate local consistency (Barbour, 2002).

“Civic entrepreneurs,” representatives of civic organizations, the business community, state and local government, labor, and the public at large, have begun to take action and
advocate for a coordinated, collaborative approach to growth management.

“Collaborative Regional Initiatives (CRIs)” unite members from these groups in developing regional growth-management strategies. I provide a more complete treatment of the “civic entrepreneur” movement and CRIs in Chapter Two.

The general consensus of California residents, policymakers, and civic groups and organizations is that the way California manages its growth is broken and needs to be changed. There may not be consensus as to how it needs to be changed, but there is agreement that something needs to be done (Baldassare, 2001, in Babour and Teitz 2001, p. 9).

**Flexibility**

California’s growth management system components have mixed flexibility. Local planning is very flexible in that local general plans are easily changed and local bodies can pass growth management initiatives with or without voter approval. Single purpose regional agencies are inflexible because they can’t solve complex growth associated problems because of their focus on a limited set of narrow concerns (i.e., air quality, housing, transportation, water quality, open space protection). Councils of Governments (COGs) and other non-governmental bodies (Community Regional Initiatives) are somewhat more flexible in their regional planning processes. I provide a full overview of the California growth management system in Chapter One.
Robustness

The robustness criterion measures the relative ease or difficulty that an alternative can be implemented and changed. My analysis in Chapters One and Two concludes that the current system is inefficient, intertwined, not easily changed, and complicated to understand and interface with. Fiscal constraints, fragmented planning systems, fractured governance, and inter-jurisdictional competition all impediments to changing the current system.

II. Alternative 2: Develop a “Top-Down” Growth Management Program

Introduction

Florida and Oregon both use top-down growth management programs to manage their growth and development. Top-down, state-dominated growth management programs that call for mandatory growth plan preparation by state, regional, and/or local jurisdictions would be unpopular in California. Local governments have enjoyed a long history of local control over land use decisions and would be resistant to ceding much, if any, of that control to the state. Developers and the building industry would also resist any additional controls on development.

This alternative requires the state government to conduct a major overhaul of the current state and local planning processes and the creation of regional planning bodies. If the Legislature adopts this option, the state government would have to adopt state growth and development standards, statutes, rules, goals, guidelines, decisions, and interpretations by
adopting administrative regulations to guide the development of local comprehensive plans and development regulations. The state Legislature would also have to develop a set of standards that outline its expectations for the content and substance of local comprehensive plans. In addition, the state Legislature and the Administration would have to develop an extensive plan monitoring compliance system to prevent compliance delays and consistency problems. This model depends on a high degree of centralization at the state level.

Effectiveness

How effective are top-down growth management programs? I reviewed top-down programs in Florida and Oregon and analyzed them to see how such a program would fit in California. I considered California’s political, social, environmental, and economic environment to evaluate the effectiveness of this option.

Growth management programs in Florida and Oregon have some fundamental commonalties:

- Strict vertical and horizontal consistency mandates for planning.
- Adoption of “one-size-fits-all” approach where the smallest city and largest county are subject to the same goals and rules.
- Short and practically unattainable local plan compliance deadlines.
- Development of growth management goals and policies are centralized at the state level and require legislative approval.
• Local growth management plans are approved by state governmental agencies.

Top-down models that rely on coercion encourage local governments to prepare growth management plans. Florida and Oregon’s experience with the strict top-down model has been mixed. Local government resistance to tight state control of planning processes has led to low compliance with state planning mandates. Tight plan compliance deadlines have led to local governments’ inability to meet deadlines, their postponement of large policy decisions due to lack of time to analyze complex policy issues effectively, and use of short cut and “cookbook” approaches to planning as opposed to a thoughtful approach. The one-size-fits-all approach fails to recognize the vast differences in planning needs of local governments and causes confusion among local entities when they have to address planning requirements that do not apply to them or don’t meet their needs (Weitz, 1999). Top-down programs appear to be more focused on process and regulation and underestimate the importance of building local capacity and commitment to growth management planning.

On the other hand, both programs set clear policies and goals for statewide growth management planning. Florida’s program mandates regional planning. In fact, Florida requires all cities and counties to have an Intergovernmental Coordination Element (ICE) as a required element in their general plans. The ICE requires horizontal coordination of plans among adjacent local governments, school boards, and other units of local government as well as vertical coordination among local government plans, regional
plans, and the state plan. Both states require vertical and horizontal consistency to insure consistency of plans up and down and across local jurisdictions (Weitz, 1999).

States are moving away from the top-down, state-centered and controlled growth management programs and toward more collaborative approaches that share responsibility for development and implementation of growth management goals and policies. Florida and Oregon have moved to less restrictive programs recently. Oregon has modified its regulation-heavy program with incentives, grants, education, and technical assistance. Florida has moved to a more collaborative, less coercive approach to growth management planning and including local governments more in the process (Weitz, 1999; LeGates, 2001). In 2001, Florida governor Jeb Bush’s Growth Management Study Commission recommended replacing Florida’s Growth Management Act (the enabling legislation for its growth management program) with a general vision statement, simplifying local planning, shifting authority to local government, focusing state planning on matters of compelling statewide interest, and relying more heavily on incentives (LeGates, 2001). Florida and Oregon’s movement away from the tightly controlled, coercive style of top-down growth management planning toward less coercive programs indicates a shift away from the rigid, state-centered planning strategy and a shift toward a more collaborative approach.

The top-down growth management program option is effective because it is a complete program that truly attempts to manage growth and development. A top-down, state-
centered program would be only moderately effective in California because of the state’s long history of local control and the power of developers and the building industry. All three entities the strict regulations and high level of oversight. On the other hand, the state adoption of growth management goals and policies, vertical and horizontal consistency requirements, and regional planning components would be effective components of a California growth management program because they would provide a road map and goals for systematically managing California’s growth at the state, regional, and local levels.

**Political Acceptability**

The public has expressed its desire for growth to be managed. A 2001 Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) statewide poll revealed that 89% of the public agreed that local governments should work together on local growth issues rather than make growth decisions on their own (Baldassare, 2001, in Babour and Teitz 2001, p. 9). I discussed the popularity of local growth management initiatives and the Legislature’s efforts to design and sell an effective state-sponsored growth management program above.

Although growth management programs are popular with the public, local governments, and the Legislature, most of the support is focused on locally controlled or state guided, not state directed, growth management programs. A top-down program would not be accepted, and would be actively resisted, by Californians. Californians enjoy and treasure
their ability to make decisions about local land uses at the local level and have fought against past attempts by the state to erode home rule.

State implementation of a top-down program, as well as all of the alternatives presented in this thesis, requires new legislation to create the rules, processes, and mechanisms to create a new growth management program. The restrictive and centralized nature of a top-down system doesn’t fit the political climate of California and would not be acceptable to key stakeholders in the growth management debate.

**Flexibility**

Top-down programs rely heavily on tight rules and regulations for local growth management plan development. The state government mandates all facets of local growth management plans. Local governments have little or no freedom to interpret policy and design unique implementation strategies for their plans. Tight control by the state government of all phases of growth management planning makes top-down programs rigid and inflexible.

**Robustness**

The robustness of an option involves constraints such as policymaker acceptance, time, and money. As I discussed in the political feasibility section above, a top-down model will not have a high degree of acceptance from policymakers at the state or local level. State creation of an entirely new, highly centralized, expanded growth management
system and all of its components, as well as maintaining the system on an ongoing basis, is complex and will take a great deal of time and money to achieve. These roadblocks make this alternative unrealistic in California.

III. Alternative 3: Develop A “Bottom-Up” Growth Management Program

Introduction

Growth management planning ascends from lower levels to higher levels of government with considerable discretion left to negotiation between local and regional bodies, in bottom-up programs. Georgia’s growth management program is a good example of a bottom-up program. The State Department of Community Affairs sets state growth management planning standards and guidelines and administers the state’s program. Local plans are optional, but regional bodies must prepare regional plans. Georgia does not require a comprehensive state growth management plan (Gale, 1992; Weitz, 1999). This process is an inversion of California’s process of that requires cities and counties to prepare local general plans but does not require regional bodies such as COGs and MPOs to develop regional general plans.

Bottom-up programs are similar to California’s current system, the main difference being that states enact the program by statute. A bottom-up program would be easier to implement in California than a top-down program. The state would not have to develop many new systems to implement a bottom-up program. Existing Councils of Governments could serve as the regional planning bodies, primarily responsible for
growth management planning activities. California state government already requires local governments to develop general plans according to limited number of state guidelines. Bottom-up programs support home rule and local control because growth management planning is focused at the local and regional level. A bottom-up program would be more popular than a top-down program in California because of its similarity with the current system, decentralized approach, and the considerable discretion given to local and regional bodies to negotiate growth management plan development and implementation.

**Effectiveness**

How effective are bottom-up growth management programs? I reviewed Georgia and Vermont’s bottom-up programs and analyzed them to see how such a program would fit in California. I considered California’s political, social, environmental, and economic environment to evaluate the effectiveness of this option.

Bottom-up growth management programs in Georgia and Vermont have some fundamental commonalities (Gale, 1992; Weitz, 1999):

- The state reserves authority to approve local and regional growth management plans, but relies heavily on regional bodies to do the bulk of the plan review, comment, and monitoring.

- Horizontal consistency between local and regional plans predominates.
Incentives, such as technical and financial assistance (grants) are emphasized over sanctions to encourage growth management planning.

The state plays a less-decisive role than local and regional bodies in growth management planning.

Regional and local comprehensive growth management plans are emphasized over a state plan.

Bottom-up models employ a collaborative, as opposed to a coercive model, weighted toward incentives for local bodies to plan instead of sanctions for not planning. The result has been a better record of compliance with local comprehensive planning mandates despite no absolute mandate to plan. The primary incentives are technical assistance and financial grants from the state for with plan preparation and implementation. In Georgia, failure to adopt a state-approved plan results in loss of qualified local government status which makes the local body ineligible to receive certain state grants and prevents it from participating in federally funded state community development programs (Gale, 1992; Weitz, 1999). This sanction is so motivational that in only seven years’ time, almost every local government in Georgia has prepared a comprehensive local growth management plan without an absolute mandate to do so (Weitz, 1999, p. 302).

Both bottom-up programs studied mandate regional planning and seek, but do not require, consideration of local plans in the development of regional plans and compatibility between plans of adjacent regional bodies (horizontal consistency). While
regional planning is important to the efficacy of a growth management program, merely seeking horizontal consistency is ineffective. By merely instructing, not requiring, regional bodies to take local plans into consideration when preparing regional plans, the state risks the possibility that some regional plans may become little more than the sum of local plans and not a truly comprehensive regional growth management plan. Other threats to the horizontal consistency standard are the twin duties of plan development assistance and review that regional bodies provide local bodies. The objectivity of regional bodies in their review role may be compromised because they assisted in the preparation of the locale plans they assisted in developing. This conflict of interest compromises the integrity of the horizontal consistency standard. (Gale, 1992)

Neither of the bottom-up programs studied require state comprehensive growth plans, so no statewide consistency standards have been developed. Lack of an overall state growth management plan leaves regional and local bodies to fend for themselves and without accountability to a vertical consistency standard. The absence of a state plan suggests a leadership vacuum in comprehensive growth planning. Local bodies, not required to plan, may question the importance of the process if the state government fails to set an example. Without the threat of the loss of qualified status (Georgia), very few local bodies would develop plans. In addition, the growth management planning goals in both cases studied are weak and are treated by states with bottom-up systems as guidelines only. Weitz (1999) says that “Georgia’s (growth management) goals, specified in administrative rules, are too few and too generalized to be of much value. Planning goals
should be strengthened either through a state comprehensive plan or via amendment to the minimum planning standards for local comprehensive plans” (p. 300).

The bottom-up model is more accommodating to the status quo of state-local relations than the top-down model. The collaborative approach to growth management planning is effective in generating compliance with planning mandates. In addition, the regional planning component is an effective feature, even if it could be designed differently to avoid possible conflicts of interest. Bottom-up programs are effective from the standpoint that very few new mechanisms would have to be created for California to adopt such a program. Also effective is the emphasis on “carrots” (incentives) not “sticks” (sanctions) as motivators for growth management planning. All would be effective components of a California growth management program.

Bottom-up programs are ineffective because they require few horizontal and vertical consistency mandates, have weak and merely advisory growth management goals, and have a lack of a state comprehensive growth management plan to “guide the way” for sub-state bodies.

**Political Acceptability**

As I discussed above, the public and Legislature have expressed their desire for growth to be managed. A bottom-up program, given its similarity to the present system and its decentralized organization, would find general acceptance among the public, private
industry, local bodies, and the Legislature. Nearly all stakeholders want to see some sort of growth management system instituted in California and a bottom-up system offers the path of least resistance as far as such a system is concerned. The state government merely guides and doesn’t direct growth management planning. Local bodies will resist the creation of regional bodies empowered by the state to oversee local planning. Locals may see regional bodies as another layer of government that will erode local autonomy and power. Councils of Governments (COGs) are already in place that could perform regional responsibilities in a bottom-up program. Locals already interact with their own COGs, so there is somewhat of a culture already created for local and regional interaction.

State implementation of a bottom-up program, as well as all of the alternatives presented in this thesis, requires new legislation to create the rules, processes, and mechanisms to create a new growth management system. Many of the processes necessary to the implementation of a bottom-up program are already in place in California, so adopting this alternative is partly a matter of moving some pieces around and strengthening some others. The collaborative and decentralized nature of a bottom-up program is a solid fit with the political climate of California and would be acceptable to key stakeholders in the growth management debate.

**Flexibility**

Bottom-up programs are mostly self-developing and self-implementing. The state Legislature provides general guidelines while regional and local bodies negotiate how to
best interpret those guidelines and develop implementation plans. The state government cedes the vast majority of the comprehensive growth management planning responsibility and accountability to regional and local bodies. In fact, Georgia once included a provision where local planning standards would vary depending on the unique needs and characteristics of the local governments – an individualized planning process. Devolution of the majority of responsibility for growth management planning to the regional and local levels makes bottom-up programs very flexible.

**Robustness**

The robustness of an option involves constraints such as policymaker acceptance, time, and money. As I discussed in the political feasibility section above, a bottom-up program, due to its similarity to the current system of state growth management planning, will have a high degree of acceptance from stakeholders and policymakers at the state and local levels. A bottom-up program would not be too complex or expensive for the state government to set up and implement, given California’s current growth management tools. The administrative and operational infrastructure of a bottom-up program is minimal, would take little time, and would use components of the current state program. The lack of roadblocks makes this alternative a realistic alternative in California.
IV. Alternative 4: Develop A “Fusion” Growth Management Program

Introduction

Fusion models use elements of the top-down and bottom-up models as the foundation for their growth management program. Similar to the top-down model, the state Legislature sets growth management goals and objectives, mandates local growth management plan preparation, and specifies the mandatory elements of local plans. Bottom-up components utilized by fusion models: the state reviews and comments, but does not approve, local growth management plans; incentives are the primary “carrot” to encourage growth management planning; horizontal consistency for growth planning is favored over vertical consistency; and enforcement of plan compliance with state goals and objectives implemented at the sub state level.

Effectiveness

How effective are fusion growth management programs? My research yielded one state using a fusion model – Washington. I reviewed and analyzed Washington’s fusion program to see how such a program would fit in California. I considered California’s political, social, environmental, and economic environment to evaluate the effectiveness of this option.

Washington’s fusion growth management program is characterized by the following components (Gale, 1992; Weitz, 1999; LeGates, 2001; Teitz, 2001):
• Horizontal consistency between county, county and city, and cities and counties sharing borders is required.

• Enforcement of plan compliance with state goals and objectives is implemented at a multi-county level, not at the state level.

• State establishes growth management goals, specifies mandatory elements that local governments are required to include in their comprehensive land use plans (but also permits locals to adopt optional plan elements), and mandates local and county plan preparation.

• Not all jurisdictions have to prepare comprehensive growth management plans.

• State reviews and comments on local growth management plans, but does not approve them - whether and to what extent plan review should occur is left counties to negotiate with their constituent communities.

• Incentives are emphasized over sanctions to encourage growth management planning.

• Local comprehensive growth management plans are emphasized over a state plan.

The fusion model studied did not mandate regional planning directly, but the state requirement to achieve horizontal consistency between county, county and city, and cities and counties sharing borders enhances regional planning. This requirement is an effective way for the state government to indirectly regionally plan. The horizontal consistency requirement allows the state government to promote/encourage/achieve regional planning without creating a new regional agency to do so. The indirect approach relieves the
tension created between state, regional, and local levels when state government creates a new governmental unit.

The fusion model relies on existing governments, primarily counties, to coordinate implementation of new growth management planning requirements. The effectiveness of this feature can have mixed results under the effectiveness criteria. It is effective in cases where counties are large and local planning capacity is already well developed, but can be ineffective in small counties with little or no local planning capacity. Washington provides technical, financial, and advisory incentives to all counties to build their capacity encourage them to develop growth management plans.

Like the bottom-up programs I discussed above, Washington’s program does not require state comprehensive growth plans, so the state has not developed statewide consistency standards. A weakness in Washington’s program is that it does not provide strong administrative review of local comprehensive plans (vertical consistency) for compliance with state standards. The lack of a vertical consistency requirement, while removing the enforcement mechanism from sight of local governments may have political benefits, it does little to ensure that all local governments plan consistently with state goals and objectives (Weitz, 1999).

The fusion model, like the bottom-up model, is more accommodating to the status quo of state-local relations than the top-down model. In addition, its approach to regional
planning and the use of existing governments to coordinate growth planning is an effective management tool. The fusion model is also effective from a state leadership standpoint in that the state develops substantive growth management goals and objectives, mandates comprehensive growth management planning, and specifies elements of those plans. Additionally, the fusion model is effective from the standpoint that very few new mechanisms would have to be created for California to adopt such a program and it relies more on “carrots” (incentives) not “sticks” (sanctions) as motivators for growth management planning. All would be effective components of a California growth management program.

The primary weakness of the fusion model is its lack of a state comprehensive growth plan and subsequent vertical consistency requirements.

**Political Acceptability**

The public, private industry, local bodies, and Legislature have expressed their desire for growth to be managed. Fusion programs are decentralized and focused on local control of the growth management planning process – both characteristics of California’s current system. Fusion program components borrowed from the top-down model – clear state goals and objectives that guide growth management planning and mandates for local bodies to develop growth management plans – are familiar to California. The state statutes already require local general plans to include certain elements (housing elements, land uses near airports, and siting of hazardous waste facilities, among other issues). The
state government also has growth management policies that allude to growth
management goals, particularly the California Environmental Quality Act, the Planning
and Zoning Law, the Williamson Act, clean air and clean water statutes, and waste
management laws (Senate Office of Research, 1989). The similarity of the fusion model
to California’s current system would be politically saleable to the public and other
stakeholders. The formalization of state growth management goals and mandates for local
bodies to develop growth management plans would be a harder sell and would encounter
resistance from local governments and the building and development communities. I
don’t see this opposition as a deal breaker because the provisions in question are not
severe and the state government already exercises them in some form or another.

The fusion model does not create an additional layer of government and therefore avoids
tension between governmental bodies. In fact, the fusion model I studied relies heavily on
existing governments to coordinate implementation of growth management planning
requirements. In this respect, the fusion model strengthens local governments. On the
other hand, the fusion model’s horizontal consistency requirements could cause
resistance from local bodies unaccustomed to having to cooperate with other
jurisdictions. In my opinion, local government resistance to the horizontal consistency
requirement is not politically negative enough to outweigh the positive aspects of
strengthening local governments.
State implementation of a fusion program requires new legislation to create the rules, processes, and mechanisms to create a new growth management system. California already has the rough framework to adopt a fusion model without many changes in its current structure, so the political costs are less than the other alternatives I have outlined. The collaborative and decentralized nature of a fusion program, coupled with its built-in program structure provided by real growth management goals, the local government accountability mandated local government growth planning provides, and the indirect regional planning the program requires local governments to perform as part of the horizontal consistency requirement makes the fusion model a strong fit with the political climate of California.

**Flexibility**

Like bottom-up programs, fusion programs allow local governments flexibility to devise specific content and implementation of comprehensive growth management plans. The fusion model provides for innovative techniques without any general limitations on procedure or substance. Cities and counties are free to experiment as they implement the state growth management goals and objectives. There are different standards for different types of governments – in Washington, state government does not require local governments with less than 50,000 population to develop comprehensive growth management plans (Weitz, 1999; Legates, 2001). Like the bottom-up model, the fusion model’s devolution of the majority of responsibility for growth management planning to the local level makes it very flexible.
Robustness

The robustness of an option has to do with constraints like policymaker acceptance, time, and money. As I discussed in the political feasibility section above, a fusion program, due to its similarity to the current system of state growth management planning and the limited changes the current system it prescribes, will have a high-moderate degree of acceptance from stakeholders and policymakers at the state and local levels. Similar to the bottom-up model, the program is not too complex nor would it be that expensive for the state to implement. State implementation of a fusion growth management model would require minimal additional administrative and organizational layers because the model mostly relies on using existing tools and infrastructure to achieve its goals. The few roadblocks make this alternative a realistic alternative for California.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALTERNATIVES</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political Acceptability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative 1:</strong> Allow Present Trends to Continue Unchanged</td>
<td>Fail. Current system has led to sprawl, social separation, pollution, and a housing/jobs imbalance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative 2:</strong> Develop a “Top-Down” Model</td>
<td>Mixed. Model sets clear growth goals and policies, but doesn’t recognize unique local planning needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative 3:</strong> Develop a “Bottom-Up” Model</td>
<td>Mixed. Model would be effective because it relies on state-local collaboration familiar to state; ineffective because growth management goals are weak usually lack a comprehensive growth management plan.</td>
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<td>ALTERNATIVES</td>
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<td>Alternative 4:</td>
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CHAPTER SIX

Conclusions and Recommendations

**Conclusion 1:** California should adopt a comprehensive growth-management system. Lack of planning for the consequences of growth has led to urban sprawl, loss of farmland and open space, strained infrastructure, decreased air and water quality, a jobs-housing imbalance, social separation, concentrated poverty, and a general decline in the quality of life. The problems are not limited to individual cities and counties but spill over from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. California’s uncoordinated approach to planning and accommodating growth is not suitable to the regional nature of its problems. The problems generated by unmanaged growth are regional and California’s state and local governments, in their current form, are ill equipped to solve them.

California’s system should be a collaborative, flexible, state-guided, regionally directed system with components similar to those of the bottom-up and fusion models I outlined in this thesis. The state Legislature’s role should be to provide policy guidance and incentives to guide local and regional cooperation and planning. The development and implementation of the new planning requirements should be left to existing governments – especially counties – to coordinate.

**Recommendation:** *The Legislature should establish broad state urban growth goals and incentives for regional and local governments to follow and delegate regional decision-making to them.*
**Conclusion 2:** California’s rapid growth has exposed weaknesses in the structure of state and local government. The burdens of growth – loss of farmland and open space, infrastructure degradation, sprawl development, jobs located farther and farther away from housing, longer commutes which contribute to air pollution and stress, social separation and concentrated poverty, and a weakened business climate caused by a general decline in the quality of life – spill over from one jurisdiction to another and require regional cooperation for solution. A coordinated, collaborative approach to regional governance needs to be developed.

Florida has established regional planning councils (RPCs) that develop strategic regional policy plans that emphasize strategic planning to solve regional problems. Florida requires strategic regional policy plans to be consistent with the Florida state plan. This consistency requirement makes the RPCs important tools for implementing state growth goals.

Washington mandates collaborative planning between counties and cities. Counties work with cities within them to develop planning policies before actual planning by either counties or cities occur.

California should create regional planning councils (RPCs) that develop regional policy plans and policies and are modeled Florida’s RPCs. Californians have proven to be
averse to the creation of additional governmental layers, so the new bodies should be created using existing Councils of Governments (COGs) and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs). COGs/MPOs are good choices to serve as the foundation for these new regional planning bodies because they have the infrastructure, personnel, and well-developed regional political cultures (LeGates, 2001, p. 51).

**Recommendation:** The Legislature should create, and fund, regional planning councils (RPCs), define their attributes, and create incentives for Councils of Governments (COGs) and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) to form RPCs. The state incentives should be strong enough to encourage formation of RPCs. The Legislature should also develop real authority for the regional planning councils to carry out their duties.

**Conclusion 3:** California’s general plan law allows local governments to make land-use decisions in isolation with little or no concern for regional issues. The law in its current form does not encourage local governments to address the regional challenges California faces today. California should reform its general plan law to incorporate new urban planning concepts such as promoting sustainable development, encouraging transit-oriented development, fostering livability, and smart growth strategies. California should also require COGs to develop general plans for their regions.
LeGates (2001) does a nice job summarizing some of the general plan best practices from other states. He recommends that California follow the lead of states such as Florida, Washington, Oregon, and Maryland and require the following elements in city and county general plans (pp. 58-60):

- **Intergovernmental Coordinated Elements (ICE).** Legates (2001) says that an ICE “requires each local jurisdiction to specify areas of regional concern and prepare an intergovernmental coordination analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of existing mechanisms and define goals, objectives, programs, activities, and procedures to improve intergovernmental coordination” (p. 59). Requiring an ICE element in local general plans would increase horizontal consistency among the general plans within a region.

- **Areas of Critical State Concern (ACSC)/Developments of Regional Impacts (DRI).** LeGates (2001) describes ACSCs as “areas of (regional) threatened natural resources” and recommends that ACSCs “should contain explicit goals, objectives, and implementation strategies to address state concerns” and that the element could “mandate coordination between local governments and state agencies around ACSCs” (p. 60). According to LeGates (2001), local governments should “identify DRIs, such as military base closures, college and university campuses, and airports, within their borders, specify the impacts they will have beyond the borders, and describe how local agency proposes to mitigate the impacts and handle spillovers” (p. 60).
Legislative reform of the state’s general plan law would go long way toward bringing local planning requirements into balance with the regional challenges of today’s California.

**Recommendation:** *The Legislature should reform the state general plan law and require cities, and counties to incorporate new urban planning concepts such as sustainable development, transit-oriented development, and smart growth strategies. The Legislature should require cities and counties to include ICE and ACSC/DRI elements in their general plans. The Legislature should require COGs to develop regional general plans. The state should require general plans to be updated every five years to keep pace with new issues created by increased development.*

**Conclusion 4:** Competition between local governments for resources creates obstacles to the cooperation needed for regional planning. California needs to eliminate barriers to cooperation by enacting fiscal reforms to ensure local revenue stability and minimize damaging competition among local governments. Legates (2001) recommends “California should encourage innovative collaborative arrangements to solve regional problems. Collaborations should be vertical collaborations between state agencies and local regional and local governments, horizontal collaborations across jurisdictions and collaboratives that are both vertical and horizontal. California should strengthen promising new institutions that are already improving interregional collaboration. The emphasis should be on incentives – carrots, rather than sticks” (p. 60).
The Legislature needs to ensure fiscal and other incentives faced by local governments do not provoke damaging competition. Proposals such as a return of property tax revenue to local governments in exchange for a shift back to the state government of sales tax revenue offer a way to reorient incentives without major spending increases. For example, fiscal reforms might condition return of property tax revenue to local governments on enactment of policies to promote transit-oriented infill development. Transportation funding could be leveraged in a similar fashion. Other incentives the state could offer include: a state housing/jobs balance incentive, an infrastructure development incentive, incentives to foster collaborative regional decision-making, and incentives for the preservation of farmland and open space.

**Recommendation:** The Legislature should reform the property and sales tax redistribution systems so as to provide incentives for regional cooperation. The Legislature should also commission a study to develop an incentive-based program to encourage regional planning.

**Concluding Thoughts**

California’s rapid and uncoordinated growth has had many unintended consequences. Some of these consequences are longer commutes, loss of open space, increased isolation of the poor, and a general decrease in the quality of life. Problems that were once merely local are now clearly regional. Regional challenges have outstripped the abilities of
California’s state and local governments to deal with them. The state can no longer afford uncoordinated growth. Without more careful strategic planning, public resources and institutions could be overwhelmed by the level of growth projected in the coming decades.

It is clear California needs a new governing strategy to meet its new regional challenges. California can benefit from the lessons and experiments of other states in the regional governance and planning arenas. To meet California’s unique political, social, environmental, and economic needs, California’s framework should be collaborative, flexible, state-guided, and regionally directed with components similar to those of the bottom-up and fusion models I outlined in this thesis. The state Legislature’s role should be to provide policy guidance and incentives to guide local and regional cooperation and planning. The development and implementation of the new planning requirements should be left to existing governments – especially counties – to coordinate.

The Legislature needs to create some sort of regional planning bodies to implement state growth planning goals and objectives. The Legislature should strengthen and empower existing structures such as COGs and MPOs to act as the implementation arm of California’s growth management system. General plans need to reflect regional, not parochial, needs by including elements that require coordinated and cooperative approaches to land-use planning and problem solving. Lastly, the Legislature needs to
take a hard look at how to create incentives for regional cooperation, coordination, and planning.

Opponents will say that the creation of a “system” or “program” to manage growth in a state as large and diverse as California is an exercise in futility. Local governments won’t cede land-use planning authority, the Legislature won’t take the risks necessary to enact the recommendations described, and the people won’t give up control of their tax revenue. These arguments have and will be made by their respective constituencies. Despite these arguments, public officials, educators, and other leaders from business, labor, environmental, social equity, and other organizations are developing regional growth-management strategies. The state Legislature has also begun to recognize the need for a coordinated, regional approach to governance and planning. The Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism issued its 2002 final report, *The New California Dream: Regional Solutions for 21st Century Challenges*. The report outlined new state policies that support effective solutions to some of California’s immediate and long-term issues: economic competitiveness; persistent poverty and underemployment; traffic congestion and long commutes; unaffordable housing; and loss of open space and habitat among many others. The Commission promoted a range of policy measures and flexible support for collaborative regional compacts. California’s history of growth planning indicates that the public and legislature respond to the challenges of growth with creativity and innovation.
What type and combination, if any, of growth management programs will be the best fit for California? Nobody really knows. I suggest one type of framework in this thesis. There are still many unanswered questions: Does California have the political will to effectively undertake a statewide growth management program? What are the best practices from growth management programs in other states? Which best practices will be the best fit for California? Which best practices should the state pilot for evaluation?

In the words of Rodney King, and in reference to all of the local agencies, “Can’t we all get along?”

The current growth management discussion is in its infancy and will take many paths before substantive actions are taken and programs implemented. Progress will be slow, but hopefully be made either by local movements like Collaborative Regional Initiatives or by the state Legislature; hopefully by both. It is my conclusion that both will have to work together to make substantive progress toward managing growth in California to avoid further despoiling the quality of life in the Golden State. California should follow the examples set by other states and look forward when planning for future growth. The failure of California to take a forward-looking view of regional governance and growth management would be a mistake future generations will pay for.

“The winners in the new economy will be the regions that learn to work together to relieve traffic congestion, build affordable housing, preserve open space, and promote economic development. If government is going to be effective in this new age, it is going to have to start thinking regionally. Government must be a partner in these regional efforts.”

Robert Hertzberg,
References


