PUTTING POLITICAL REFORM IN A PUBLIC POLICY CONTEXT:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY GOALS OF POLITICAL REFORM BALLOT
MEASURES IN CALIFORNIA

Ash Roughani
B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2005

THESIS

Submitted in partial satisfaction of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

at

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SACRAMENTO

FALL
2008
PUTTING POLITICAL REFORM IN A PUBLIC POLICY CONTEXT:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY GOALS OF POLITICAL REFORM BALLOT
MEASURES IN CALIFORNIA

A Thesis

by

Ash Roughani

Approved by:

__________________________, Committee Chair
Timothy A. Hodson, Ph.D.

__________________________, Second Reader
Nancy Shulock, Ph.D.

__________________________
Date
Student: Ash Roughani

I certify that this student has met the requirements for format contained in the University format manual, and that this thesis is suitable for shelving in the Library and credit is to be awarded for the thesis.

______________________________  ________________________________
Robert W. Wassmer, Ph.D.       Date
Chair

Department of Public Policy and Administration
Abstract

PUTTING POLITICAL REFORM IN A PUBLIC POLICY CONTEXT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY GOALS OF POLITICAL REFORM BALLOT MEASURES IN CALIFORNIA

by

Ash Roughani

Political reform is a seemingly paradoxical concept, but it also happens to be a category of public policy. Political reform is paradoxical in the sense that political systems are inherently political, so any attempt to make these systems apolitical is fraught with false assumptions. Yet, reformers have advocated for a myriad of public policies they allege would reform our system of democratic governance. While political scientists have studied these policies at the idiosyncratic level, no body of research exists that takes an aggregate view of these policies. I begin to bridge this knowledge gap by distilling the policy goals of modern political reform attempts in California. To accomplish this task, I analyze the arguments in favor of political reform ballot measures placed before voters from 1970 to 2008. I find that the concerns of highest priority to reformers are empowering citizens, reducing the influence of special interests, reducing the disproportionate power of incumbents, political parties, or party leaders, enhancing electoral representation, and promoting more effective policymaking. I then discuss the prospects for achieving these goals through public policy.

________________________, Committee Chair
Timothy A. Hodson, Ph.D.

________________________
Date
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Tim Hodson and Nancy Shulock for their helpful comments. In addition, I would like to thank the entire faculty in the Department of Public Policy and Administration at California State University, Sacramento for enlightening my curiosity with their collective wisdom.

I am also grateful to Mona for being in my life.

Of course, this thesis would not have been possible without the efforts of the numerous individuals and organizations who have strived, with the best of intentions, to improve the political process.

Lastly, I wish to thank President-elect Barack Obama. His intellect, inclusiveness, and inspirational vision for a better tomorrow will ultimately prove that rules can never be a substitute for leadership.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgments</th>
<th>vi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement of the Problem</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of the Study</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations of the Study</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the Remainder of the Study</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 The Desire for Reform</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 The Science of Political Reform</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 A Legal Framework for Political Reform</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 A Public Policy Framework for Political Reform</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Potential Reform Goals</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. METHOD</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Research Design</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Sample and Data Collection</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Data Analysis Procedures</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.31 Content Analysis</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.32 Open Coding</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.33 Quantitative Analysis</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. RESULTS</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Content Analysis of Ballot Measure Policies</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Open Coding of Ballot Pamphlet Argument Themes</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Table 1 Three Types of Policies and Conflicts</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Table 2 Policy Category Definitions</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Table 3 Ballot Measures Addressing Multiple Policy Categories</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Table 4 Theme Identification Key</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Table 5 Top Five Cross-Cutting Political Reform Argument Themes</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Figure 1 Mungerian Policy Framework</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Figure 2 Political Reform Ballot Measure Policy Distribution</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Figure 3 Political Reform Ballot Measure Policy Distribution by Breadth</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Figure 4 Prevalent Argument Themes in Favor of Campaign Finance Policies</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Figure 5 Prevalent Argument Themes in Favor of Redistricting and Reapportionment Policies</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Figure 6 Prevalent Argument Themes in Favor of Term Length Policies</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Figure 7 Prevalent Argument Themes in Favor of Open Primary Policies</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Figure 8 Prevalent Argument Themes in Favor of Ethics and Open Meeting Policies</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Figure 9 Prevalent Argument Themes in Favor of Compensation, Powers and Funding Policies</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Figure 10 Prevalence of Political Reform Argument Themes</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Politics: “1 a: the art or science of government b: the art or science concerned with guiding or influencing governmental policy c: the art or science concerned with winning and holding control over a government” (“politics,” 2008).

Reform: “1 a: to put or change into an improved form or condition b: to amend or improve by change of form or removal of faults or abuses” (“reform,” 2008).

Recent calls for a constitutional convention in California by prominent groups and individuals could be indicative that the time for a major overhaul of the way decisions are made in Sacramento might be on the horizon (Leavenworth, 2008; Weintraub, 2008; Wunderman, 2008). These calls were most immediately precipitated by a record-late state budget, the causes of which were both political and fiscal in nature (Walters, 2008). This paper’s timing with current events is purely coincidental, but its findings could prove useful in setting the context as new calls for political reform in the Golden State are made.

What does it mean to reform politics? Cain (2007) defined political reform as “attempts to improve the quality of democratic representation through changes in norms, rules, and institutions” (p. 635). He further explained this type of reform as encompassing two activities: (1) changing the way representatives are placed into public office, and (2) regulating their activities once in public office. These descriptions are helpful toward understanding political reform as a process, but insufficient toward providing guidance regarding how those who seek to “improve the quality of democratic representation” ought to proceed with their endeavors. In particular, the normative outcomes of political reform are completely absent. To be sure, some advocates may
construe the description as implying that reform for the sake of reform, rather than for the sake of results, is a worthwhile activity. This paper, at its fundamental core, will go further toward developing a greater understanding of political reform through a systematic analysis of the policy goals associated with past political reform efforts. That is, this paper will go further toward answering the question, “What are supporters of political reform attempting to achieve?”

In this paper, I analyze the common themes within and among six classes of political reform policies (PRPs) as they have been proposed at the ballot box in California to create a more robust public policy context for political reform. I provide this context in the attempt to understand the broader goals that political reformers strive for through their supported policies and, in turn, the set of desired outcomes I develop might serve as qualitative criteria for the empirical measurement of the effectiveness of individual PRPs. Such criteria are necessary to create a larger and more diverse set of PRPs that reform advocates may pursue to realize their goals and establish potential indicators of improved democratic representation. Alternatively, the criteria may prove to be too far reaching for any set of rules to facilitate their attainment.

Background

Political reform, outside of a United States context, often refers to larger institutional reforms that alter the macrostructure of political systems. In the context of this paper, however, political reform refers to those policies intended to enhance governance within existing political democracies. This is contrasted with attempts to
bring democracy to China or political reconciliation within Iraq. Instead, PRPs will refer to specific public policies such as campaign finance reform and redistricting reform. These policies are often enacted after focusing events that heighten public awareness of the more disconcerting activities that a minority of elected officials engage in, such as corruption scandals. Reform efforts are typically spearheaded by good government, or “goo-goo,” groups (Michael, Walters, & Weintraub, 2002, p. 33). These groups spend years advocating for change to the political system, but success is minor absent a focusing event or support from prominent leaders.

Political reform practitioners work within two separate domains, law and policy, and operate with separate objectives. Cain (2007) took this even further and claimed that law professors cover the normative domain of political reform, while political scientists have jurisdiction over the descriptive or analytical domain of political reform. Downstairs from this ivory tower are real world practitioners of political reform: lawyers who support the real world normative fights and policy analysts who support the real world descriptive fights. Yet this claim is not wholly accurate. One premise of this paper is that there is no objective policy community around political reform. This is unfortunate given the potential value that policy analysts might add to any discussion of political reform. By examining the underlying goals of PRPs, the policy analyst could propose radically different policies than reform advocates have proposed in the past that are more effective in achieving their desired goals.

Lawyers are not the only players in the political reform game, though. Advocacy groups are instrumental in spearheading legislation and initiatives they believe will
support the policy goals of their organizations; but their mission, too, differs from the role of policy analysts. While advocacy groups often develop their own policy proposals, such proposals become the standard doctrine for these reform groups, absent any consideration of potential alternatives. At worst, some critics might even observe that they are merely harboring solutions in search of problems. Policy analysts, on the other hand, are more interested in further refining policies and developing alternatives that can fulfill the same objectives as the original policies.

**Statement of the Problem**

There is no common collective understanding or set of criteria that encompasses individual PRP efforts. Campaign finance reforms, as a subset of PRPs, attempt to mitigate the influence of money on the policymaking process. Specific campaign finance reform policies may take the form of limits on campaign contributions, prohibitions on campaign contributions from certain sources, or even public subsidies to candidates to reduce the need for fundraising. While the specific goal of reformers is clear in terms of reducing potentially negative effects of large campaign contributions or contributions from particular sources, the broader goals are not immediately apparent. Why are campaign finance reform policies considered a subset of PRPs? That is, what do campaign finance policies have in common with term limits? What do campaign finance policies and term limits have in common with redistricting reform? If these answer are not immediately obvious, which I contend they are not, the assumed nexus between these
and other PRPs warrants further investigation. Such an investigation is the subject of this paper.

The motivation behind this study rests on the assumption that PRPs lack a solid public policy foundation. While there are a plethora of policies in this arena that have been proposed, all of them lack a context that solidifies the nexus between the policies themselves and their claimed objectives. The problem is exacerbated by the lack of academic research on the body of policies as a holistic set of mechanisms to achieve a coherent set of common outcomes. In fact, Cain (2007) pointed out that political science research on PRPs “have only recently merged into something resembling a recognizable sub-field of political reform” (p. 635). Through a review of the literature, I explore the potential goals of reformers and then assess the actual goals they have claimed to pursue through the enactment of PRPs.

The public policy literature must embrace PRPs as a distinguishable set of policy options aimed at an overriding policy objective, specifically improving representative democracy. This set of policy options should be considered descriptive rather than normative. A more precise definition that better specifies the notion of improvement in “the quality of democratic representation” would promote a more refined delineation and substantive foundation. Such a grounding is available for many other types of policies. For example, policy analysts and economists understand what a tax is and when a tax is appropriate. Generally, Pigouian taxes are necessary for reducing negative externalities (Munger, 2000, p. 122). In the case of PRPs, policymakers and advocates understand the
goals of specific policies, but a comprehensive set of goals for the body of policies is largely absent.

A further threat to the legitimacy of PRPs lurks in the background: How would we know if a PRP is effective? Policy analysts are trained to evaluate the effectiveness of policies using objective criteria that allow for the application of metrics. In the case of Pigouvian tax, success of the particular tax rate is contingent upon the degree to which the negative externality is internalized. Once metrics are applied, policymakers may adjust the tax rate higher if it is insufficiently internalizing the externality or decrease the rate if its returns are diminishing. Political reform advocates ought to prefer the implementation of effective PRPs over ineffective PRPs if they are committed to their stated goals.

Purpose of the Study

Advocates and policymakers behind PRPs, as I will demonstrate in this paper, make lofty claims regarding the governance outcomes that will purportedly result from the policies they back. But if it is, in fact, the case that minor structural adjustments to the political process can result in improved democratic governance, then the public has a substantial amount to gain from their implementation. At the end of the day, the actions of government impact the everyday lives of all people. If the quality of and speed at which policy decisions are made could increase, then there is a high probability that quality of life improvements will follow. The relevant question is whether or not PRPs can fulfill such a bold promise.
The first goal of this paper is to establish a better definition of “political reform.” Such a definition will allow for the distinction of PRPs from other types of policies. This is important because, as I will demonstrate, “political reform” is a term used loosely among political observers. Moreover, the definition may lay the groundwork for future PRPs that have yet to be developed.

The second goal of this paper is to develop qualitative criteria by which PRPs should be measured, based on documented policy goals. Reformers often claim that their supported policies will impact other policy outputs of the political process. Policy analysts need a tool to test the claims made by reformers and the ability to differentiate between successful and unsuccessful PRPs. Moreover, the definition of success must facilitate a shared understanding among policymakers, reform advocates, policy analysts, and political scientists in order for PRPs to be improved. For example, McGhee (2008) found that redistricting reform would not decrease partisanship in the California Legislature. Yet partisanship might only be one concern of redistricting reform backers. Even McGhee admitted that, in the context of his findings, he is “agnostic about whether redistricting reform should be implemented for other reasons” (p. 72). This paper will shed light on some of those other possible reasons.

Lastly, the third goal of this paper, bolstered by both the criteria for and definition of PRPs, is to establish a public policy context for new PRPs. Absent a niche in the public policy literature, political reform efforts lack a firm grounding of scholarly thought to draw upon compared to other policy fields such as fiscal planning or performance management. I believe that this field of study is only in its infancy and will
grow in depth and breadth as the number of individuals and groups involved in this policy arena increases. After all, there is a subtle but critical assumption underlying PRPs: if the processes by which public policies are made can be improved, the subsequent public policies themselves will improve. In fact, this idea is remarkable if it assumes that an inherently political process might become less political because of changes to the rules that govern it. A greater understanding of the appropriate conditions for implementation of PRPs might assist policymakers in their overall efforts to represent the public.

Limitations of the Study

The primary limitation of this study is that my dataset is restricted to the state of California. However, California has proposed a wide variety of PRPs throughout its history. Later, I justify why California is a good model to generalize my findings to other states, but the fact remains that a project larger in scope would be sufficiently exhaustive and, therefore, inappropriate for a Master’s thesis.

A second limitation of this study is that I only utilize six categories of PRPs for my analysis. As a consequence, I may overlook some important features of political reform that would otherwise be discovered if I used a larger sample of PRPs. A study that included legislation in addition to ballot measures would be more comprehensive. Further research in this field, however, could go beyond the results of this study.

Lastly, this study is largely limited to PRPs intended to reform the politics within legislative bodies. I am reluctant to assume that reforms could not cover other branches
and divisions within government given that politics is ubiquitous within all realms of the public administration sphere. If performed correctly, my analysis will show that reforms are adaptable to both the executive and judicial branches of government. For instance, many judicial seats in the U.S. are won through election rather than executive appointment or legislative confirmation. Therefore, PRPs that are targeted at electoral processes apply to the judicial branch in those cases. They, of course, also apply to the presidency, governorships, and constitutional offices; all divisions of the executive branch.

Organization of the Remainder of the Study

This thesis is organized as follows: in Chapter 2, I review the relevant literature that will help narrow the context of political reform; in Chapter 3, I describe the methods I use to analyze the narrative content of political reform proposals; in Chapter 4, I present the results of my analysis; and lastly, in Chapter 5, I discuss my findings and summarize the knowledge I have contributed to the subject of state-level political reform in the U.S.
Chapter 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The literature on political reform crosses a number of subjects ranging from political science, to law, to public policy and public administration. These disparate research silos lack a coherent framework for the holistic analysis of political reform policies. Thus, this review of the literature is intended to bridge some of these chasms. In Section 2.1, I make the case that there is a deep desire for reform of American political institutions. In Section 2.2, I discuss the state of political science research on political reform. In Section 2.3, I share a legal perspective on attempts to alter the democratic process. In Section 2.4, I position political reform within the context of public policy development and analysis. Lastly, in Section 2.5, I identify potential policy goals of PRPs.

2.1 The Desire for Reform

There is a rich history of efforts in the field of public administration to separate politics from policy analysis and administration. Perhaps the earliest and most explicit call was made by Woodrow Wilson (1887), in his seminal work *The Study of Administration*. He argued:

The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics; it at most points stands apart even from the debatable ground of constitutional study. It is a part of political life only as the methods of the counting house are a part of the life of society; only as machinery is part of the
manufactured product. But it is, at the same time, raised very far above the dull level of mere technical detail by the fact that through its greater principles it is directly connected with the lasting maxims of political wisdom, the permanent truths of political progress (p. 209).

What came to be known as the “politics-administration dichotomy” is the notion that activities such as public management, policy analysis, and policy implementation should be segregated from the dynamic world of politics. This subsequently gave rise to practices such as Frederick Taylor’s scientific management that required a “one best way” of accomplishing tasks and division of labor to promote organizational efficiency (Rainey, 2003, p. 25). But Rainey (1990) found that “[a]n emphasis on the distinction earlier in the century has given way to the overwhelming evidence that politics and administration are not separate (p. 173).” While they may not be separate, a new question involves the feasibility of their intermingling.

Some observers are skeptical about a clean integration between politics and administration. As Waldo (1990) concluded:

If one searches for a term to designate a human collectivity in which politics and administration are well integrated, two of the terms considered certainly would be totalitarian and utopian. Patently, we are not currently at risk for totalitarianism or within sight of utopia. But if and as we seek to move toward the latter, we must be aware of the former (p. 82).

More recently, deLeon and Denhardt (2000) construed Waldo’s view as implying that techniques of public administration are, in fact, political philosophies themselves (p. 90).
They use the reinvention movement in government, a movement intended to improve its performance, to argue their point. This movement is based on the idea “that the accumulation of the narrowly defined self-interests of many individuals can adequately approximate the public interest” (p. 89). This market-based model, they argued, “denigrates the role of collaborative action, produces an impoverished vision of the public interest, tends to exclude some persons from the public arena, and reduces trust among citizens and between them and their government” (p. 93). So the lesson for reformers seems to be that any attempt at reform will be value-laden, as there is no such thing as a neutral reform. My analysis of reformers’ policy goals will bring light to some of these values. But we should also be interested in what the public wants from their government to make an informed judgment about the appropriateness of political reform as a means of improving their satisfaction with government.

Public opinion plays a key role in determining what PRPs are enacted and implemented. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argued that citizens are more concerned with the processes through which policies are developed and care much less about which policies decision-makers enact. In fact, many Americans believe that much of society is in agreement on broad goals of public policy and that the details of specific policy choices to achieve those goals are much less significant, if not irrelevant. As a consequence, citizens are deeply disaffected by current political processes. They believe that government is run by self-interested politicians who make decisions at the behest of special interests in order to advance their own careers. When the news media report on political disagreements, it is a sign that these special interests are in control of the policy
process. In other words, without the grip of special interests, policymakers could make decisions through a process that involved little disagreement or debate because of the broad public consensus on many policy issues (p. 105).

Contrary to what political scientists and proponents of deliberative democracy have argued in the past, Americans do not want to be more involved in political decision-making because they have little tolerance for political disagreement. Polling data can demonstrate that citizens want to be involved in the political process, but this interest is better explained by their distrust of politicians rather than a genuine interest in politics. To be sure, Americans prefer what could be thought of as “stealth democracy” in which decisions are made by “empathetic, non-self-interested decision makers” as far removed from public view as possible (p. 161). As long as policymakers are concerned with the public interest, they will enact appropriate public policies. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse do not necessarily endorse this view of government nor necessarily believe it is attainable; rather, this is their conclusion based on their own research of American public opinion.

The work of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse has implications for the kind of political reform that ought to be implemented if reformers are concerned with improving public opinion of the political process. The solution proposed by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse is two-fold. First, while they argued that a government run by empathetic, non self-interested decision makers is likely unattainable, they conceded that there are opportunities to create incentives for public officials to appear less self-serving. Second, they argued that “we must work to convince the people that political conflict often springs from them and is a good and natural part of any democratic political system” (p.
228). In other words, the public must learn to tolerate political conflict. While reformers have pursued the former goal, there is little evidence to demonstrate that reformers have given the second goal much attention. This is likely because reformers pursue the goal of improved public perception in concert with other goals related to the quality of the political process. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse endorsed polices that limit campaign financing, decrease the salaries of public officials, and limit the benefits public officials may receive, if reformers are solely focused on improving public perception (p. 221). Of course, such policies may be inappropriate if reformers are concerned with issues beyond public opinion.

So while the public seems to want to remove politics from governing, academic theorists argue that such an outcome is not possible. In fact, they have argued that any attempt to remove politics will implicitly impose an underlying political philosophy itself. However, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argued that there are ways to both decrease the ability of elected officials to be self-serving and increase public acceptance of the legitimacy of political disagreements.

2.2 The Science of Political Reform

Cain (2007) delineated two categories of political reform. The first category deals with the fundamental structure of democracy. Reforms in this category are intended to preserve the essence of democratic rule and distinguish democracies from non-democracies. First tier concerns include ensuring that all votes are counted or that voters are not intimidated when they go to the polls. The second category of political reform
deals with marginal improvements in relation to political jurisdictions that are already
democratic. Second tier concerns include the extent to which elections are competitive or
that opposing candidates face relative parity in their financial resources. First tier
concerns enjoy greater normative consensus over second tier concerns. Consequently,
Cain argued, political reform priorities ought to focus on the first category of reforms (p.
636).

Cain also stressed the point that the discourse around political reform is too often
hyperbole. In describing that the actual effects are much smaller than both proponents
and opponents claim, Cain stated, “The real effects of reform are usually smaller in every
direction for a number of reasons, but mainly because of their intermingling with other
factors that work in the opposite direction” (p. 637). But the hands of political scientists
are not clean in this fiasco. Cain warned:

The failure of political science to demonstrate definitively what is apparently
obvious to everyone else, especially those in the reform community, has been a
long-standing source of frustration and irritation with our profession. This has
encouraged some reform groups to move ahead based on their instincts and to
downplay the significance of scholarly findings for any reform debate. This is a
shame in many senses. It means that the public is being led to believe that the
problems are more simple and stark than they actually are. And it has led some
foundations to fund only research that supports conclusions that they have already
assumed are correct. The latter is particularly disturbing since it has undermined
norms of objectivity in our profession (p. 637).
While this observation is accurate, it eschews the notion that political gamesmanship is necessary for political victories. Reformers and their opponents cannot be held to the same high bar as political scientists, considering the ubiquity of politics in the policymaking process.

2.3 A Legal Framework for Political Reform

The political process is derived from a legal structure. I do not make this point merely to highlight the obvious; rather, I make the point to remind practitioners that some policy goals may not be legally attainable within the constraints offered by the U.S. Constitution. In other words, the range of possible PRPs are limited at the outset of the policy development process. Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes (1998) noted that “a paradox rests at the core of democratic politics: this politics is in part a contest over the structure of state institutions, and yet those very institutions define the terms in which the contest of democratic politics proceeds” (p. 1). Political decisions regarding the structure of the political process are made even before a polity participates in the democratic process. Indeed, there are two conflicting views about the political process: the first view assumes that the democratic process facilitates the political decisions that are made in society; the second view does not take the democratic process for granted and assumes that “pre-existing laws, rules, and institutions” constrain the degree to which political decisions are truly democratic (p. 1). The authors argued that the latter view is patently more correct than the former. Notwithstanding the existing legal structure of political institutions, policy goals are embedded within the proposed laws to “reform” these institutions.
However, not all goals may be easily attained due to preexisting legal constraints such as
the First Amendment’s granting of the right to free (political) speech, in addition to the
associational rights of political parties.

2.4 A Public Policy Framework for Political Reform

Political reforms are enacted through public policies. However, there is a tension
among policy analysts about the proper mode of study relative to PRPs. In discussing the
role of policy analysts, Munger (2000) noted:

[T]he question of the best (most just, most ethically defensible, or just
most practical and effective) system for making political choices is one of
the most important conflicts in the policy process, but it is largely the
province of political science, and it is antecedent to policy analysis.

Policy analysts generally start with a given statute or regulation and don’t
go behind it to examine the institutions themselves (p. 265).

He then argued that campaign finance policies are an important exception to this
tradition. I expect that all political reforms will be exceptions to this rule, as campaign
finance policies are only one type of PRP. Moreover, PRPs are implemented by way of
constitutional amendment, statute, or regulation; allowing sufficient opportunity for
analysis of these policies outside of political science.

Munger described three types of policies and the corresponding conflicts that lead
to their development:
Table 1: Three Types of Policies and Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Type</th>
<th>Sources of Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Efficiency Policies</td>
<td>Markets and Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Equity Policies</td>
<td>Markets and Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Institutional Reform Policies</td>
<td>Experts and Politics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This framework assumes that markets, politics, and experts are three independent sources of wisdom for policy analysts, each with its own perspective and role in policy arenas. Munger illustrated Figure 1 to depict the sources of tension that result in differing policy choices. PRPs fall under the category of institutional reform policies (p. 31).
What does it mean that institutional reform policies result from a conflict between politics and experts? The underlying assumption here is that the particular form of institutional design will influence the policy outcomes originating from a particular institutional structure. This is to say that policies resulting from a Federalist system that protects the rights of political minorities will differ from those resulting from a Parliamentary system that does not impose these same constraints. More relevant to California, policies resulting from the initiative process (a form of direct democracy) will differ from those passed by the California State Legislature (a form of representative democracy). In other words, the process by which we decide directly influences what we decide. But more importantly, there is an implicit assumption that experts believe political processes may be improved and that better processes will facilitate better policy outcomes. Of course, the meaning of the word “better” may be best defined through the political process.

Munger pointed to the potential difficulty in enacting institutional reform policies because the incumbency of all sitting lawmakers implies that each of them benefits from the structure of the current institutional form (p. 34). He went on to say that attempts to improve the institutional structure by experts face great difficulty. This may be the central issue that political reform policies, rather than institutional reform policies generally, attempt to improve: the reluctance of elected officials to take those actions which are in all of society’s interest, rather than those which only serve political expediency. In fact, if politics were completely removed from the policymaking process, Munger’s framework implies that policy debates would exist solely between markets and
experts with the singular goal of increasing efficiency. This policymaking vacuum would rationally prioritize scarce resources to maximize social utility. According to political scientist Bjørn Lomborg:

Right now, politicians know that in public they have to say they support all things, and suggest there is an infinite amount of money to give to an infinite amount of good causes. Semiprivately, they know that if they have 10 good causes, the easiest thing is to give one-tenth of the funds to each – so there are no complaints. But privately they know there isn't enough money for everything and that they probably should have given most of it to the one or two groups that would do the most good (as cited in Strassel, 2006).

Lomborg’s view is one of pure efficiency, but his view also points to a negative aspect of politics. After all, such political decisions inherently balance the competing values of equity and efficiency. Therefore, it initially appears that institutions may be “reformed” in a way that skews outcomes toward greater efficiency and less equity, or toward greater equity and less efficiency. It is an open question whether or not improved institutional design could ignore these presumed tradeoffs by increasing the consideration of both values equally.

Public policies should be aligned with desired outcomes to maximize their effectiveness. If desired outcomes are not achieved through certain policies, those policies should be jettisoned and replaced with alternative policies. In noting that the
evaluation of policy alternatives should be focused on the expected outcomes of a policy alternative rather than a policy’s qualities, Bardach (2005) claimed:

Applying criteria to the evaluation of outcomes and not of alternatives makes it possible to remember that we might like [Outcome] O_A a great deal even if, because we lack sufficient confidence that [Alternative] A would actually lead to [Outcome] O_A, we decide not to choose Alternative A after all. With that judgment on the table, it would be possible to look for other alternatives with a greater likelihood of producing [Outcome] O_A (p. 26).

The goal of this paper is to establish the predominant outcomes that reformers attempt to accomplish with PRPs. Using Bardach’s logic, these outcomes can improve the public policy framework used by reformers to develop new alternatives to the traditional PRPs that have had difficulty being implemented. The largest impediment to the passage and implementation of PRPs – or, at least effective PRPs – can reasonably be derived, generally, from their lack of political feasibility, absent a major focusing event such as a high profile act of political corruption. This is a practical criterion that analysts should consider when evaluating policy alternatives (p. 31). Bardach warned the analyst not to view political conditions as static, however, as the analyst is best positioned to know what conditions would make an optimal policy politically acceptable (p. 32). At this point, the analyst must recommend or implement a political strategy if she or he wishes to further pursue a policy considered politically unacceptable. Again, this reality is what makes PRPs distinct from other public policies: reform of the political process potentially allows previously infeasible policies to become feasible. For example, a
reform that effectively diminishes the influence of lobbyists could reasonably increase the success of health care reform efforts if said lobbyists were a significant barrier to achieving health care reform.

The preceding description of policy analysis is based on the rational-analytic model, but this model does not enjoy consensus among scholars. While the model considers political feasibility as a criterion, Stone (2002) argued that every step in the process is political. As she so bluntly stated:

*Reasoned analysis is necessarily political.* It always involves choices to include some things and exclude others and to view the world in a particular way when other visions are possible. Policy analysis is political argument, and vice versa (p. 378).

On her view, the pursuit of desired goals, the identification of problems, and the development of policy solutions all occur through a political lens. There is no neutral conception of goals, problems, or solutions. The source of this lack of objectivity is rooted in ambiguous understandings of what many assume are universal concepts, such as equity or efficiency. Stone noted that “[i]deas are at the center of all political conflict” (p. 11). Indeed, we might expect ideas about how best to reform the political process to encounter great conflict. In fact, if Stone is right, then PRPs are merely tools to advance the agendas of the constituencies they benefit. Of course, some constituencies can include people who see a genuine benefit or value in things like more experienced legislators.
2.5 Potential Reform Goals

In assessing whether the recent developments of new forms of representation and public participation have fundamentally transformed modern democratic processes, Dalton, Scarrow, & Cain (2003a) used the principles of access, transparency, and accountability as their metrics (p. 14). Access is determined by the degree to which citizens may participate in the decision-making process. Transparency ensures that full information is available to citizens so that they can make informed decisions and hold elected officials accountable. Accountability means that decisions by elected officials are made in the public interest. In addition, the researchers drew upon Ronald Dahl’s five criteria of democracy: (1) inclusion; (2) political equality; (3) enlightened understanding; (4) control of the agenda; and (5) effective participation (Dalton, Scarrow, & Cain, 2003b, p. 257).

Organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations have their own set of publications to draw upon principles for international development. The literature on good governance recognizes eight characteristics that formal governmental structures must exhibit: (1) participatory; (2) consensus oriented; (3) accountable; (4) transparent; (5) responsive; (6) effective and efficient; (7) equitable and inclusive; and (8) rule of law (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for the Asia and the Pacific, n.d.). While the intended audience of this material is for those working in the field of international development, the principles are sufficiently broad to be adapted to advanced industrial democracies.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which collects statistics on best practices in developed countries around the world, researched practices that build public trust in government. According to OECD (2000):

Public service is a public trust. Citizens expect public servants to serve the public interest with fairness and to manage public resources properly on a daily basis. Fair and reliable public services inspire public trust and create a favourable environment for businesses, thus contributing to well-functioning markets and economic growth (p.1).

OECD identified eight of the most common “core values” of public service across 29 developed countries. In order of descending frequency, these core values included: (1) impartiality; (2) legality; (3) integrity; (4) transparency; (5) efficiency; (6) equality; (7) responsibility; and (8) justice (p. 2). It should be noted that these values pertain to public servants in the executive branch. However, this may be a distinction without a difference in the context of generic normative principles of governance.

Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) outlined three tasks democratic theorists have argued should be the outcomes of successful democracies: (1) good decisions; (2) perceived legitimacy; and (3) opportunities for citizens to become better people (p. 163). That is, an improved political system would increase the occurrence of these outcomes.

In addition to general goals of democratic governance, it is helpful to explore specific goals of legislative reform. Rosenthal (2004) claimed that past efforts to identify a “good” legislature focused on product or structure (p. 6). He rejected the metric of product because it assumes that the legislature is a means to an end, rather than an end in
itself. He also rejected the metric of structure or capacity because it is not necessarily linked to performance. Instead, Rosenthal proposed that a legislature should be judged on its performance, measured by the three principal functions of legislatures: representing, lawmaking, and balancing the power of the executive. He found three things that contribute to improved legislative performance: (1) a connection by legislators to their constituencies and a responsiveness to constituency views where they exist; (2) a balance between the deliberative aspects of lawmaking on the one hand and the political aspects on the other, ensuring that the process takes into account arguments as to the merits of a measure; and (3) effective legislative leadership, which requires that leaders have substantial experience, skills, and resources (p. 243).

McGhee (2007) examined reforms that have been proposed to improve the California State Legislature. He prioritized the use of three criteria for assessment of the Legislature’s performance: (1) competence; (2) bipartisanship; and (3) efficiency. He argued that political observers perceive the Legislature to be lacking performance in these three areas and that reformers have used this to justify new reform proposals such as adjustments to term limits, the creation of independent redistricting commissions, and lowering the two-thirds vote threshold for passage of the annual budget (p. 2).

California’s Little Hoover Commission, a state agency that holds hearings and recommends strategies toward improving the operations of state government, wrote a report that recommended an eight step process through which all reform efforts should flow. They outlined seven essential values that must guide each step in the process: (1)
leadership; (2) trust; (3) transparency; (4) public involvement; (5) inclusiveness; (6) commitment; and (7) timeliness (Little Hoover Commission, 2004, p. iii).

We can also adapt the lessons that emanate from the public administration literature on the performance of public sector organizations. Admittedly, these lessons are aimed at executive branch agencies and program delivery; however, the findings from this literature are worth exploring to see if they can be adapted to the political process. A typical starting point in this area begins with private sector principles for effective management. Peters and Waterman’s *In Search of Excellence* found that the management in successful companies exhibited: (1) a bias for action; (2) close proximity to the customer; (3) high value on autonomy and entrepreneurship; (4) enhancement of productivity through people; (5) a hands-on approach that emphasizes the organization’s values; (6) a focus on strengths rather than weaknesses; (7) a simple organizational structure and minimal staff; and (8) an even balance between tight control and loose flexibility (as cited in Rainey, 2003, p. 394).

These characteristics are not in far contrast to those which experts believe are instrumental for effective public sector organizations. For instance, Osborne and Gaebler’s *Reinventing Government* recommended that public organizations strive to be: (1) catalytic; (2) community-owned; (3) competitive; (4) mission-driven; (5) results-oriented; (6) customer-driven; (7) enterprising; (8) anticipatory; (9) decentralized; and (10) market-oriented (as cited in Rainey, 2003, p. 407). Consistent with the rejection of the political philosophy of the reinvention movement proffered by deLeon and Denhardt in Section 2.1, Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) claimed that the aim of public servants
should be “to help citizens articulate and meet their shared interests rather than to attempt
to control or steer society” (p. 549). This alternative to the market-based model of
reinvention, which they call the “New Public Service,” is based on (1) theories of
democratic citizenship; (2) models of community and civil society; and (3) organizational
humanism and discourse theory (p. 552).

As I have shown, there are numerous potential policy goals reformers might
pursue through reform policies. While many goals overlap, their complex breadth is
indicative of very different interpretations of the possible meaning of “political reform.”
I have also shown that policy goals are not neutral. Even though the public might agree
on certain abstract goals, such goals are inherently subject to ambiguous interpretation
that inevitably lead to practical disagreements about the means to achieve these goals.
Moreover, while some scholars and the general public support removing politics from
decision-making, most experts agree that this outcome is not practically feasible. Instead,
reformers might acknowledge that we make collective decisions within a political system.
This pursuit, of course, will itself encounter political resistance. But aided with the
assistance of policy analysts, better alternatives could be crafted and more avenues for
change could be paved. In Chapter 4, I highlight the policy goals reformers have actually
pursued through ballot measures in California.
Chapter 3

METHOD

This study is intended to produce a better understanding of the goals of state-level PRPs in the U.S. This chapter delineates the method I use to produce this enhanced understanding. In Section 3.1, I outline the research design I employ along with its potential challenges. In Section 3.2, I describe and justify my chosen sample of PRPs. In Section 3.3, I detail my qualitative and quantitative data analysis procedures.

3.1 Research Design

In this study, I employ a four-step analysis to capture the goals of proposed and enacted PRPs in California with the assumption that the results may be generalized to other states or nations with similar characteristics to California. While my approach is primarily qualitative in nature, I also quantify my findings to bolster their robustness.

Research approaches that use qualitative data have both advantages and disadvantages. Gray (2004) noted that qualitative data may be much more informative than quantitative data, but simultaneously more subjective or limited (p. 319). In an underdeveloped policy field, like that of political reform, however, a qualitative foundation may assist future quantitative research by providing a theoretical context.

At this point, it is crucial that the reader understand an important distinction in my methodology. Gray (2004) noted the difference between inductive and deductive research, stating that “Deduction begins with a universal view of a situation and works back to the particulars; in contrast, induction moves from fragmentary details to a
connected view of a situation” (p. 6). This study is both deductive and inductive in nature and, accordingly, proceeds in four separate steps.

In the first part of my analysis, I categorize proposed political reforms based on their policy type. This is the deductive component of my study and is a content analysis that proceeds with less rigor than the latter steps in my analysis. This process is relatively straightforward insofar as the policy categories are established at the outset and the policies are paired with their respective categories. I justify cases where the categorization is less clear and those cases in which a policy must fall under more than one category.

In the second part of my analysis, I review the arguments in favor of each policy from the dataset. I treat the arguments for each policy as part of an aggregate set of political reform arguments without respect to the policy a particular argument supports. After highlighting recurring themes, I use an open coding technique to classify each type of argument within the aggregate set. A set of political reform policy goals is the result of this process.

In the third and fourth parts of my analysis, I quantify the degree to which some policy goals are pursued more often than others. In the third part, I quantify the prevalence of each argument theme within each policy type and illustrate those which are the most dominant in each particular policy category. In the fourth and last part, I quantify the prevalence of each argument theme across all policy types. This last step allows the reader to understand the goals of political reform as a generic policy prescription. Consequently, this particular field of study will contain a more refined
context of what it means to reform politics. The degree to which such policy goals are realistic will be one subject discussed in the last chapter.

3.2 Sample and Data Collection

The key to having a good dataset is to ensure that it is representative of the population (Gray, 2004, p. 83). In this case, I must strive for a sample of PRPs that are representative of the population of PRPs from which I wish to draw conclusions. Therefore, the broad nature of my research question necessitates a sample of PRPs that is diverse, translatable, and meaningful. The sample must be diverse because PRPs do not come in a single flavor; rather, different policies are proposed with the intent of accomplishing separate, but related objectives. In addition, if the findings are to be generalized, the sample must also be translatable to other states in the U.S. Lastly, the sample must be meaningful such that the disaggregated policy themes that emerge tell a story about what it means to reform the political process in an advanced democracy. Toward these ends, I have limited my sample to ballot measures in the state of California. More specifically, I limit the scope of my analysis to the arguments in favor of PRP ballot measures that have been placed before California voters between 1970 and 2008.

California is often seen as a model for other states and countries. In addition to being the country’s most populous state, California boasted the eighth largest economy in the world in 2006 (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2006, p. 1). It is also home to much of the technological innovation that is driving productivity around the world. In addition, the state faces great challenges such as a large immigrant population, frequent natural
disasters, and a high cost-of-living. Such challenges demand responsive political institutions that foster effective governance. As Schrag (2006) concluded:

The challenges are both frightening and awe-inspiring, each carrying opportunity within it, even as the opportunities bring new challenges. In trying to forge a modern postindustrial democratic society not only from its cultural diversity but also from a population consisting in considerable part of Third World immigrants, California was undertaking something that had never been done in human history, and trying it at a time of growing overseas competition in industries and technologies that this country had once regarded its own… But there were plenty of ideas, and the state’s history and traditions of adventure and optimism were always there for those who cared to recall and honor them. The question is which way California – or the nation, for that matter – really wants to go (p. 262).

The last sentence of the preceding passage reflects a common belief across the U.S. that many ideas begin in California and spread to the rest of the country and even other nations.

The initiative and referendum process, as it is manifested in California, provides a unique opportunity to assess the recent record of state-level political reform attempts in the U.S. The process may proceed independently from the will of incumbent elected officials if citizens organize to place their own measures on the ballot that limit the opportunity for elected officials to act in self-serving ways. Therefore, this particular hurdle among political feasibility concerns, present in typical legislative processes, is absent from direct democratic processes. In other words, PRPs that are derived by
initiative may be more sweeping and well-intended than those originating from a legislative body. This should not be interpreted to mean that they would be more effective, however. In addition, legislators have the power to place constitutional amendments and referenda before voters, but this power does not limit the right of citizens to do the same. A reasonable conclusion is that, in general, the initiative process affords citizens the opportunity to craft public policy in a manner that expresses their full, uninhibited intentions. Perhaps the only limitation of using ballot measures as a source for PRPs is that those measures lacking sufficient funding or grassroots support typically do not appear on the ballot.

In order for a ballot initiative to be valid in the state, the measure must only address one subject. This constitutional requirement is known as the “single-subject rule,” and, as noted by Schrag (2006), “was designed to prevent precisely the kind of stratagem that combined a provision appealing to voters (legislative pay cuts) with the real objective (reapportionment), but one that voters didn’t understand and cared little about” (p. 293). The single-subject rule facilitates a framework of discrete categories for the analysis of PRPs.

I chose the year 1970 as a starting point for my review of ballot measures because it was the decade that California’s Political Reform Act of 1974 was placed on the ballot and passed by voters. DeBow and Syer (2003) noted that this measure was approved as a response to the Watergate scandal (p. 62). The Political Reform Act represents a significant milestone in the efforts to regulate politics in California and remains today as the existing framework from which many other reform efforts base their strategies. In
exploring the question of whether or not political reforms have fundamentally changed the democratic process, Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow (2003) commented:

By some accounts, the reforms of democratic institutions in the United States during the last three decades of the twentieth century were as extensive as the populist reforms that transformed American democracy during the first three decades of the century (p. v).

In other words, there is a recognizable distinction between the types of reform that occurred in the early 1900s and those that were proposed and enacted post-1970. To be sure, these modern reforms are the subject of my inquiry.

For each statewide election, the secretary of state issues a ballot pamphlet (known as the “California Voters Pamphlet” between 1974 and 1978, the “California Ballot Pamphlet” between 1979 and 1996, the “California Voter Information Guide Ballot Pamphlet” in 1998, and the “Official Voter Information Guide” between 2000 and 2008; each of these documents will be referred to as “ballot pamphlet” herein). While the contents of the ballot pamphlet have changed slightly over time, those that have remained constant include, for every measure: a proposition number, a title, a summary, an argument in favor, an argument against, a rebuttal to the argument in favor, a rebuttal to the argument against, and an impartial fiscal and policy analysis. The ballot pamphlet is an excellent data source because of its standard format and consistency across time.

In order to construct my sample, I review the title and summary of every ballot measure, beginning with the 1970 Primary Election and ending with the 2008 Primary Election. I then identify those measures that fall into one or more categories of six PRPs:
(1) campaign finance policies; (2) redistricting and reapportionment policies; (3) term length policies; (4) open primary policies; (5) ethics and open meeting policies; and (6) compensation, powers, and funding policies.

Table 2: Policy Category Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance</td>
<td>Policies that restrict, regulate, or subsidize the financial resources of candidates for political office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistricting / Reapportionment</td>
<td>Policies that alter the decennial process of redistricting and reapportionment for political districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Length</td>
<td>Policies that shorten or lengthen the period in which elected officials may hold a particular political office or combination of offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Primary</td>
<td>Policies that expand the opportunity for voters to participate in party primaries that would otherwise be closed to these voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics / Open Meeting</td>
<td>Policies that regulate the conduct of behavior by political candidates or officeholders, or require certain official proceedings to be held in public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation, Powers &amp; Funding</td>
<td>Policies that regulate the state compensation of elected officials, modify the fiduciary authority of official entities, or limit institutional funding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once I identify the proper classification of each ballot measure, I am able to conduct my analysis.
For each category of PRP ballot measures, I identify the themes that emerge from the policy goals stated in the argument in favor of each measure. The ballot measure arguments in favor of each proposition are my focus because the primary justification for each measure is contained in this part of the ballot pamphlet. These pro-arguments appear first in the order of all four arguments in the pamphlet and often contain the same message that is presented in other campaign material such as television, radio, or print advertisements. It is, in sum, an optimal source for determining why proponents believe that their policy should be implemented and what proponents believe their policy will do.

Of course, there are several disadvantages to this type of sample. First, and of most concern, proponents may intentionally mischaracterize the nature of their proposal to deceive voters into voting for a measure that they otherwise would not vote for. Second, proponents of a measure may exaggerate the effects of their proposition by making lofty claims. Lastly, it is difficult to predict what effect a proposal may have prior to its implementation, particularly when it involves changing the rules of politics that have the potential to create perverse incentives or other unintended consequences. Notwithstanding these concerns, I believe that my approach is valid because my goal is to capture the notion of what it means to reform politics. Given that the goal of ballot measure proponents is to pass the proposal they are backing and that the public is often eager to reform a political process they perceive to be broken, the collective published arguments in favor these measures should accurately depict the meaning of political reform in a U.S. context.
3.3 Data Analysis Procedures

There are four distinct steps in my data analysis procedures: (1) I analyze the content of each ballot measure to determine its policy type; (2) I code for argument themes and policy goals in the aggregate; (3) I quantify the prevalence of argument themes by policy; and (4) I quantify those themes which are the most prevalent across all measures.

3.3.1 Content Analysis

In the first step of my data analysis, I employ a content analysis in order to distinguish the varying policies among the ballot measures. There is a wide body of literature available on the methodology of content analysis. Krippendorff (2004) defined content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (p. 18). Weber (1985) further specified the activity:

A central idea in content analysis is that the many words of the text are classified into much fewer content categories. Each category may consist of one, several, or many words. Words, phrases, or other units of text classified in the same category are presumed to have similar meanings (p. 12).

The content analysis I perform is intended to delineate the policy areas of PRPs that I selected for my study. This component allows me to group separate policies based on the specific policy prescription. Once the PRPs are delineated, I proceed with the second component of my study.
3.32 Open Coding

In the second step of my data analysis, I code for common argument themes using a technique known as open coding that I borrow from the grounded theory methodology. Grounded theory methods allow researchers to develop a refined understanding of qualitative data in the analysis of its meaning. Strauss and Corbin defined grounded theory as a theory that is “discovered, developed and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to that phenomenon” (as cited in Gray, 2004, p. 329). While similar in nature to content analysis, grounded theory differs insofar as it does not presume any categorical specification at the outset. In other words, in contrast to the preceding deductive content analysis, grounded theory methodologies are inductive. Grounded theory methodologies involve several complex levels of analysis.

Strauss and Corbin outlined three steps for grounded theory researchers: (1) open coding; (2) axial coding; and (3) selective coding. The first step, open coding, is the only procedure used here because I have chosen to employ a quantitative analysis rather than develop a grounded theory of political reform. Gray (2004) noted that open coding involves “the process of asking questions and making comparisons” with the result of “the generation of concepts and categories” (p. 332). I use open coding to classify aggregated argument themes in favor of the ballot measures in my dataset. Once I develop a final set of argument themes through an iterative process, I use the theme set to quantify the prevalence of each theme.
3.33 Quantitative Analysis

There are two components to my quantitative analysis of argument theme prevalence. In the first component, I assess the frequency of argument themes within each of the six ballot measure policy types. This allows me to quantify the degree to which some policy objectives are more prevalent relative to the dominant objectives within other policy categories. I identify those policy goals which are prevalent in fifty percent or more of the ballot measures within each policy category.

The second component of my qualitative analysis of argument theme prevalence controls for each type of policy, regardless of the number of ballot measures proposed to enact that particular policy. This allows me to quantify those policy goals that are cross-cutting. In other words, by treating each policy type equally, I am able to identify the most frequent goals cited by advocates of political reform. While reformers pursue different policies to achieve different goals, my analysis of those cross-cutting themes will enhance our broader understanding of political reform.
Chapter 4

RESULTS

In producing a better understanding of political reform, this chapter details the results of four separate analyses of the ballot pamphlet argument themes in favor of proposed PRPs. In Section 4.1, I employ a content analysis of the ballot measures in my dataset to distribute ballot pamphlet arguments within their appropriate categories. In Section 4.2, I use an open coding technique to categorize ballot pamphlet arguments by their respective themes. In Section 4.3, I quantify the prevalence of argument themes within each policy category. Lastly, in Section 4.4, I quantify the dominance of cross-cutting political reform themes.

4.1 Content Analysis of Ballot Measure Policies

At the outset of this study, I outlined six policy areas that I would use to categorize PRP ballot measures: (1) campaign finance policies; (2) redistricting and reapportionment policies; (3) term length policies; (4) open primary policies; (5) ethics and open meeting policies; and (6) compensation, powers, and funding policies. In my initial review of forty-six California ballot pamphlets beginning with the 1970 Primary Election and ending with the 2008 Primary Election, I identified thirty-three ballot measures that fit within one or more of these policy areas on the basis of their titles. Upon a detailed review of each measure’s summary and analysis, three were completely removed from the dataset, four were placed into two categories and one was placed into three categories.
Proposition 225 (Limiting Congressional Terms. Proposed U.S. Constitutional Amendment. [1998 Primary Election]), Proposition 3 (Partisan Presidential Primary Elections. Legislative Initiative Amendment. [1998 General Election]), and Proposition 60 (Election Rights of Political Parties. Legislative Constitutional Amendment. [2004 General Election]) were completely removed from the dataset. Proposition 225, which would have limited the terms of members of Congress in California, was removed from the dataset because its proponents did not submit an argument in favor of the measure after similar attempts at limiting Congressional terms in other states had been thrown out by several courts after enactment. Proposition 3 addressed California’s open primary law and initially appeared to fit under the open primary policy category. However, the measure was removed from the dataset because it would have required a closed primary for presidential contests. Proposition 60, as passed by the voters, requires that the general election ballot contain the winner of each political party’s primary election. Proposition 60 was removed from the dataset because it effectively ensures that a version of the open primary – known as a “top two” primary – is constitutionally prohibited in all state elections. Therefore, the final dataset, located in Appendix B, contains thirty ballot measures.

Five measures in the final dataset fall under multiple policy categories. Proposition 9 (Financial Disclosures and Limitations Affecting Political Campaigns, Public Officials and Lobbyists - Other Matters. Initiative. [1974 Primary Election]), Proposition 112 (State Officials, Ethics, Salaries. Open Meetings. Legislative Constitutional Amendment. [1990 Primary Election]), Proposition 118 (Legislature,
Table 3: Ballot Measures Addressing Multiple Policy Categories*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Campaign Finance</th>
<th>Redistricting / Reapportionment</th>
<th>Term Length</th>
<th>Ethics / Open Meetings</th>
<th>Compensation / Powers / Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 9</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 118</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 140</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 131</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*None of the above propositions contain open primary policies.

The remaining twenty-five ballot measures fall exclusively under one of the six discrete policy categories. Combined with the five propositions that fall under multiple policy categories, the final dataset contains thirty-six “policy occurrences.” Figure 2 shows the distribution of these policy occurrences.
Campaign finance ballot measures are the most prevalent PRP in the dataset at twelve occurrences. There are three categories of PRPs that each occur six times: term length policies; redistricting and reapportionment policies; and ethics and open meeting polices. Lastly, compensation, powers, and funding policies and open primary policies have four and two occurrences, respectively. Figure 3 illustrates the breakdown by single versus multiple policy measures.
All policy categories contain a greater number of single policy measures than multiple policy measures with the exception of ethics and open meeting policies. This is likely because it is easier to incorporate ethics and open meeting requirements into other policies while passing constitutional muster under the single subject rule. The same may be said to a lesser degree of compensation, powers, and funding policies. It is necessary that these policy categories stand alone, however, because the dataset contains propositions that solely address these policies. Appendix A contains the complete set of ballot measures and their policy category assignments. At this point, I am able to proceed with the core analysis.

4.2 Open Coding of Ballot Pamphlet Argument Themes

In order to develop a theory of political reform, I proceed with an open coding process derived from the grounded theory methodology to distill the recurrent themes
present within an aggregate set of ballot pamphlet arguments. These arguments are restricted to the thirty ballot measures and their respective pro arguments in my dataset. After four complete iterations of policy category development, I settle upon fourteen basic argument themes that emanate from the dataset. These argument themes specify the goals of political reformers on the basis of what proponents have stated would be the outcome of an enacted political reform ballot measure. The argument themes are as follows:

1. Reduce the Influence of Special Interests
2. Reduce the Role of Money in Politics
3. Reduce Conflicts of Interest
4. Save Taxpayer Money
5. Empower Citizens
6. Increase Transparency
7. Promote Political Equality or Fairness
8. Increase Enforcement of the Law
9. Reduce Real or Perceived Corruption
10. Increase Electoral Competition
11. Enhance Representation
12. Reduce the Power of Incumbents, Parties or Leadership
13. Promote Honesty or Integrity
14. Promote More Effective Policymaking
Appendix C contains a detailed sample of argument phrases extracted from the ballot pamphlets for each theme. The characteristics of each argument resemble the descriptions below.

Reduce the Influence of Special Interests

Political reform proponents claim that elected officials are controlled by special interests and, thus, unaccountable to the public. These proponents typically offer their ballot measure as a solution to this problem. This theme is related to reducing the role of money in politics; however, I code for this theme when an argument explicitly refers to the influence of campaign contributors, the influence of lobbyists, or the acceptance of gifts. I do not code for this theme if an argument generically refers to money in politics. Most often, this argument theme uses the term special interests and is easy to recognize.

Reduce the Role of Money in Politics

Money may be the mother’s milk of politics, but many reformers argue that campaign contributions pervert the democratic process. I code for the theme of reducing the role of money in politics when an argument refers to the cost of campaigns, the influence of money, campaign contributions, or the restriction of certain sources of money. I draw a distinction between the influence of money and the influence of special interests, as described in the preceding theme.
Reduce Conflicts of Interest

A conflict of interest occurs when an elected official is in the position to make a decision that may provide him or her personal gain. Arguments that indicate a motive to reduce such conflicts include preventing fundraising during certain periods, placing various responsibilities with an independent commission, or restricting certain sources of income. In most instances, proponents claim that their proposal will reduce conflicts of interest.

Save Taxpayer Money

Saving taxpayer money is a prevalent theme and one in which it is not clear if the objective is truly to save money or if the theme is introduced to enhance appeal of the measure. Because many citizens believe that government is rife with waste, fraud, and abuse, introducing this theme could increase the chances of a particular measure’s passage. If the claim is genuine, then the assumption among reformers is that the costs of government are higher than they would be under a system that is less political. In any case, these arguments refer to wasteful spending, loophole ridden legislation, or prohibitions on taxpayer funded campaigns. Any attempt to assess the truth value of this claim goes beyond the scope of this study.

Empower Citizens

Citizen empowerment may be the broadest theme. This theme is derived from the idea that systems of governance are not responsive to the needs of the public. While this
notion may appear vague, it is easily recognized in ballot pamphlet arguments. Political reformers utilize this theme when they argue that a measure will protect the rights of individuals, restore government to the people, expand voter participation, or hold elected officials accountable.

Increase Transparency

As Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis once said, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants” (as cited in Graham, 2002). The transparency theme is one that follows this mantra. Reform proponents argue that greater transparency will create an incentive for elected officials to behave in more public regarding ways. These arguments refer to greater disclosure, required public notices, or prohibition of certain closed meetings.

Promote Political Equality or Fairness

Equality and fairness are ideals upon which the American system of government was founded. The extent to which these ideals are not obtained in our current system of governance may guide reformers to restore such values. The political equality or fairness theme claims that the measure will level the playing field, ensure free and fair elections, or stop political sneak attacks.
Increase Enforcement of the Law

Enforcement of the rule of law is integral to the effectiveness of intended policies. Without enforcement of the law, there is little incentive for officials to follow the law. In many cases, political reform proponents argue that enforcement of political regulation is lax. Consequently, there are many ballot pamphlet arguments containing language about closing loopholes, increasing fines, and establishing new penalties.

Reduce Real or Perceived Corruption

Political corruption is a long-held justification for political reform. In particular, corruption is rampant in many developing countries where the concept of political reform refers to more fundamental democratic reform such as greater adherence to the rule of law. Corruption also occurs in advanced democracies, however. Reducing the prevalence of corruption or its appearance is a theme present in ballot pamphlet arguments that refer to cleaning up politics or explicitly state that a particular proposal will end corruption.

Increase Electoral Competition

Competition may be desirable in political markets, just as it is in economic markets. To be sure, there is little utility in voting for an incumbent who is running unopposed. Many proponents of political reform argue that their proposals will increase electoral competition and that such competition will allow the best candidates with the best ideas to win elections.
Enhance Representation

At the heart of the representative democracy is the notion of representation; the greater degree to which an elected body is representative of the people, the greater the likelihood that their concerns will be addressed. Political reformers have claimed that certain reforms will preserve communities of interest, aid the election of citizen legislators, and ensure that elected officials represent the public rather than just their political base or special interests.

Reduce the Power of Incumbents, Parties or Leadership

Excess power on the part of incumbents, political parties, or legislative leaders has the potential to create an environment of unresponsive policymaking. Reformers believe that these entities do not have the public interest in mind when they exert disproportionate power. As such, proponents of political reform have argued that their policies will reduce the presence of selfish party politics, take power away from party bosses and political insiders, and put an end to lifetime legislators.

Promote Honesty or Integrity

Politicians are sometimes seen as dishonest or lacking integrity in order to advance their own careers. This behavior might occur during campaigns or while governing. Proponents argue certain political reforms will reduce dishonest campaigns and make government more honest.
Promote More Effective Policymaking

Many members of the public have expressed their desire for government to work better. Ineffective governance can reduce quality of life if certain issues such as education, health care, or infrastructure are left unaddressed. The effectiveness theme is expressed in many ballot pamphlet arguments claiming that political reform will reward merit, allow representatives to solve problems, and fix the political process.

These fourteen themes provide sufficient detail to begin the process of capturing the goals of political reformers. Moreover, the themes do not presume a specific policy types for their obtainment. Again, the goal of this endeavor is to see how discrete policy proposals under the guise of political reform share a commonality.

4.3 Argument Theme Prevalence by Policy Type

In this section, I quantify the prevalence of these themes within each policy category. In order to quantify the themes, I tabulate a dummy variable for each theme’s occurrence per ballot measure. Within each policy category, I identify those themes that are present within fifty percent or more of the ballot measures for that particular policy. These themes are considered dominant within the policy category. Table 4 identifies the names used for each theme in the figures contained in this section.
Table 4: Theme Identification Key

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Interests</td>
<td>Reduce the Influence of Special Interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money in Politics</td>
<td>Reduce the Role of Money in Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts of Interest</td>
<td>Reduce Conflicts of Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save Money</td>
<td>Save Taxpayer Money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>Empower Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Increase Transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality / Fairness</td>
<td>Promote Political Equality or Fairness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>Increase Enforcement of the Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Reduce Real or Perceived Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Increase Electoral Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Enhance Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents / Parties / Leadership</td>
<td>Reduce the Power of Incumbents, Parties or Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty / Integrity</td>
<td>Promote Honesty or Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Promote More Effective Policymaking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.31 Campaign Finance Policies

Of the twelve ballot measures proposing campaign finance policies, citizen empowerment is a dominant theme in each argument. Reducing the influence of special interests ranks second and is present in all but one of the campaign finance policy arguments. Reducing the role of money in politics and saving taxpayer money are in three-quarters of the arguments. Reducing the appearance or reality of corruption,
promoting political equality or fairness, and increasing enforcement of the law are all prevalent themes in about half of the arguments in favor of campaign finance policies.

![Figure 4: Prevalent Argument Themes in Favor of Campaign Finance Policies](image)

4.32 Redistricting and Reapportionment Policies

Of the six arguments in favor of redistricting and reapportionment policies, each one claims the policy will reduce the power of incumbents, political parties, or legislative leaders. This makes sense given that most of the policies are intended to take the redistricting process out of the direct control of the legislature. The second most prevalent themes in favor of this policy are citizen empowerment, political equality and fairness, and enhanced representation. Two-thirds of the policies argue that conflicts of interest will be reduced and taxpayer money will be saved. Lastly, half of the measures argue that increased competition will result upon enactment of the policies.
4.33 Term Length Policies

Proponents of policies that modify term lengths equally argue that their proposals will reduce the influence of special interests, enhance representation, reduce the power of incumbents, parties or leadership, and increase the effectiveness of policymaking. Four of the six arguments state that the policy will empower citizens. Half of the proponents argued that corruption would be reduced as a result.
4.34 Open Primary Policies

Of the two open primary proposals, proponents argued that both measures would reduce the influence of special interests, empower citizens, increase electoral competition, enhance representation, and reduce the power of incumbents, parties or leaders. One of the arguments says that the open primary will promote more effective policymaking.

Figure 7: Prevalent Argument Themes in Favor of Open Primary Policies

4.35 Ethics and Open Meeting Policies

Ethics and open meeting policy advocates argue that their proposals will primarily empower citizens. Two-thirds of these arguments revolve around increased enforcement and greater honesty and integrity on the part of government officials. Three of the six arguments in favor of ethics and open meetings claim that the policy will reduce the influence of special interests, reduce conflicts of interest, and reduce corruption.
Figure 8: Prevalent Argument Themes in Favor of Ethics and Open Meeting Policies

- Citizens: 83%
- Enforcement: 67%
- Honesty / Integrity: 67%
- Special Interests: 50%
- Conflicts of Interest: 50%
- Corruption: 50%

n = 6

4.36 Compensation, Powers and Funding Policies

Citizen empowerment is the most prevalent theme in favor of compensation, powers and funding policies. There are eight themes that occur in half of the proposals: reduce the influence of special interests; reduce the role of money in politics; reduce conflicts of interest; save taxpayer money; promote political equality or fairness; reduce the power of incumbents, parties or leadership; promote honesty or integrity; and promote more effective policymaking.

Figure 9: Prevalent Argument Themes in Favor of Compensation, Powers and Funding Policies

- Citizens: 75%
- Special Interests: 50%
- Money in Politics: 50%
- Conflicts of Interest: 50%
- Save Money: 50%
- Equality / Fairness: 50%
- Incumbents / Parties / Leadership: 50%
- Honesty / Integrity: 50%
- Effectiveness: 50%

n = 4
4.4 Cross-Cutting Political Reform Themes

While the dominant argument themes in favor of each type of policy are informative, my intent is to delineate those dominant argument themes that are cross-cutting, controlling for policy type. I perform this task by averaging the theme prevalence across all six policy areas, as calculated in the previous section. This method allows me to give equal weight to all policy types, regardless of the number of times any specific policy type has been proposed. For example, the theme distribution in favor of campaign finance policies and the theme distribution in favor of open primary policies are on equal footing despite of the fact that the dataset includes policy occurrences of twelve and two, respectively. I discussed the justification for this strategy in the previous chapter.

The top five cross-cutting PRP themes are: (1) empower citizens; (2) reduce the influence of special interests; (3) reduce the disproportionate power of incumbents, political parties, or party leaders; (4) enhance electoral representation; and (5) promote more effective policymaking. The prevalence of these five dominant themes is depicted in Table 5.

Table 5: Top Five Cross-Cutting Political Reform Argument Themes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Prevalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Empower Citizens</td>
<td>84.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Reduce the Influence of Special Interests</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Reduce the Power of Incumbents, Parties or Leadership</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Enhance Representation</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Promote More Effective Policymaking</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I depict the prevalence of all fourteen themes in Figure 10. I used the normalized prevalence series controls for policy type to complete Table 5. The aggregate series does not control for policy type. Had I not controlled for policy type, the themes related to saving taxpayer money, reducing corruption, and reducing the role of money in politics would have replaced the representation and effectiveness themes in Table 5. This would have been a direct result of campaign finance policies comprising a third of the total policy occurrences. In Chapter 5, I discuss these findings.

Figure 10: Prevalence of Political Reform Argument Themes

\[ n = 36 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents / Parties / Leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save Money</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality / Fairness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts of Interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money in Politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty / Integrity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Normalized vs. Aggregated
Chapter 5
DISCUSSION

With the policy goals of PRPs established, I now discuss the implications of my findings. In particular, I argue for a more narrow definition of “political reform” and explicate the inescapable political reality of reforming politics. Lastly, I reflect on the role of leadership as it relates to the potential reform of political institutions.

The Meaning of Political Reform

Cain’s definition of political reform from Chapter 1 was “attempts to improve the quality of democratic representation through changes in norms, rules, and institutions.” The question I raised revolved around the meaning of “improve the quality of democratic representation.” Combining Cain’s definition with my results, I establish the following definition:

Political Reform = \( f[\text{quality of democratic representation}(+)] \)

Where:

Quality of Democratic Representation = \( f[\text{citizen empowerment}(+), \text{special interest influence}(-), \text{power of incumbents, parties, or party leaders}(-), \text{elected officials representative of electorate}(+), \text{effective policymaking}(+)\]

In plain English:

(D1) Political reform is a function of change in the quality of democratic representation, which is determined by the degree to which citizen empowerment is increased, the influence of special interests is reduced, the power of
incumbents, parties, or party leaders is reduced, elected officials become more representative of the electorate, and policymaking becomes more effective.

(D2) Political reform policies are those policies that empower citizens, reduce the influence of special interests, reduce the power of incumbents, parties, or party leaders, make elected officials more representative of the electorate, or increase the effectiveness of policymaking.

D1 is a more narrow definition of political reform that establishes the degree to which a particular policy might be considered political reform. For example, a policy that merely empowers citizens is a lower degree of reform relative a policy that empowers citizens and reduces the influences of special interests. From D1, I derive D2 which defines PRPs as policies that lead to specific outcomes.

These outcomes ought to serve as the criteria for prioritizing PRPs based on the efficacy of each policy. That is, if those objectives that are seemingly unattainable should be modified or jettisoned. Of course, this is where policy analysts must engage in further empirical study. Reformers and policymakers ought to be equipped with the tools to know which PRP is most appropriate to address a particular problem. Additionally, Cain specified that political reform need only be an “attempt,” rather than the realization of democratic improvements. The best determination of the efficacy of a PRP that has not been implemented is through sound conceptual analysis. Again, policy analysts must engage in further study in this area. There are a number of other policy goals from my analysis that would qualify as improvement in the quality of democratic representation. To list them all, however, would not establish a sense of which policy goals are most
important. Moreover, it would be foolish to presume that such an abstract notion could
be limited and not change over time.

My results are based on political reform attempts in the state of California and to
only those policies that went before voters in the last four decades. While I do not
believe that the preceding definition of political reform is universal, I also do not believe
that is merely restricted to California. California is at a similar point in the evolution of
representative democracy as other states in the nation. Consider the perception that
special interests have too much influence over the political process. A free and open
democracy allows for the development of interest group advocacy. To be sure,
stakeholders would be unwise not to voice their views on policy matters that have a
material effect on their activities. The perception of undue influence from these groups is
inevitable because not everyone wins in the political process and those who are at the
table are more likely to have their views addressed than those who are not.

Reform brings change to something that already exists, which is different than
how we would want something to be if we started from scratch. Because democracy is a
working experiment, we actually do not know what the best form would look like. While
some international development organizations have developed governance indicators to
measure depth of democracy in developing nations, it seems that the differences among
advanced industrial democracies are too subtle to gauge. That is, we are currently limited
in our ability to assess the importance of subtle structural distinctions as they relate to the
functioning of democratic governance. Indeed, the preceding definition of political
reform is based purely upon the preferences of reformers. At the same time, however,
these preferences are aligned with what the public wants from their government. Although, this hints at a weakness in my study pertaining to whether the stated goals of reformers are genuine or if they are merely the tools of communications spin artists. And while Cain (2007) argued that “[t]here may be no universal best form of democracy,” a citizenry certainly has the power to advocate for procedural change within the democratic process. We can look at where we are at, decide that we can do better, and develop policies that would conceivably get us to where we want to be. If the policies we adopted did not work, then we can go back to the drawing board. This is a key assumption underlying political reform.

We Cannot Take the Politics Out of Politics

Upon embarking on this study with some skepticism about the reform of the political process, the policy goals of PRPs that I discovered appear to be much more realistically attainable. But it is not realistic to think that these goals take the politics out of politics. At the heart of democratic governance is the idea that reasonable people will disagree. It is utopian to think that this disagreement will vanish with the implementation of political reform. As the definition suggests, however, there are concrete features of democracy that the public finds untenable. Moreover, these features arguably inhibit the ability of elected officials to reach consensus in the face of reasonable disagreements.

Interestingly, none of the reforms I analyzed claimed to help educate citizens about the legitimate role of politics. Political processes, at least in a democracy, exist primarily for the purposes of facilitating collective decision-making. Indeed, the
findings of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse regarding public disgust over political
disagreement is disturbing to those who take legitimate discourse seriously. This is not to
say that political actors do not sometimes cross the line in their methods of disagreement
or that legislative bodies could not be more deliberative, but that those who care deep
enough to answer the call of public service believe in their convictions and assume an
adversarial role to fight for these convictions. As Rosenthal (2004) claimed:

[L]egislatures do not look good because of the very nature of the functions they
perform. They channel, express, and try to settle differences and conflicts, and
they do so in a complicated, unprogrammed, and human fashion. A most
unattractive business to the average eye, legislatures and the process come off as
even less attractive as a result of their treatment in the press, in political
campaigns, by advocates for one side or another, and because of the misbehavior
of some of their own members (p. 245).

It is not clear that the opinions and rhetoric of reformers helps much either. A quick
glance at Appendix B, the Ballot Measure Argument Dataset, and the ignorant reader
might assume that politicians were children of Satan. In sum, the idea that changing the
rules of an institution will somehow induce politicians to come together and sing “Kum
Ba Yah” is absurd.

The most significant tradeoff in the regulation of politics is that forces against
such efforts to change the status quo will inevitably seek alternative paths. Such is the
political nature of politics. As Cain (2007) found, “Even as reforms are being hatched,
someone in the political system is thinking about how to get around them” (p. 637).
Ultimately, this can create more complex forms of activity that seek to undo the objectives of particular PRPs, thus creating a need to impose further regulation. This balancing act calls into question the practicality of reform. That is, if the status quo will continuously revert to itself, why induce further complexity into an already tumultuous system? While this question is somewhat philosophical, I take it that the answer from reformers is that they understand their activities as encompassing a process of continuous improvement and that the forces against reform lag the implementation of reform. This logic entails a cyclical nature of reform that assumes problems grow with time and that reform can quell some problems for at least a minimally significant duration. To be sure, as political reform finds its natural home in the public policy literature, researchers will test such theories.

Conclusion

Reformers attempt to achieve their goals through public policies. By changing the rules of the game, they argue, we are improving the quality of democratic representation; determined by the degree to which citizen empowerment is increased, the influence of special interests is reduced, the power of incumbents, parties, or party leaders is reduced, elected officials become more representative of the electorate, and policymaking becomes more effective. But where does leadership fit into this framework (coincidentally, one of the goals of reformers is to reduce the power of some leaders)? The issue I am raising is the feasibility of supplanting leadership with public policy. This notion just seems odd. Certainly, a good leader could empower citizens and ignore
special interests or be more representative and enact policies that are more effective. So the question then becomes to what degree is political leadership dampened by institutional arrangements. Cain (1997) considered this same question in the following manner:

[T]here are real pitfalls to inferring institutional flaws from the perceived failure of policies. Sometimes, good institutions produce bad policies; sometimes, badly flawed institutions, just by random luck or the extraordinary efforts of key political figures, produce good policies; and sometimes the system falters because people of good will simply cannot agree. Knowing when an institution is broken and whether it can be fixed are difficult questions that can easily lead to mistakes (p. 332).

Reforming the political process should not be a substitute for leadership. In fact, an effective leader would be sufficiently keen to know what reforms are necessary, if any. The implication of this conclusion is that political reformers might bear greater fruits from their labor if they focused their efforts on ensuring that those candidates with the greatest potential to lead are elected to office and enabling the leadership of those officials once they are in office.

Could elected officials serve the public better? Reformers argue that they could through structural reforms to the political process; on the other hand, I at least want to present the possibility that leadership matters more than institutional rules or arrangements. More importantly, the quality of leadership seems to be more cognitively accessible to the public’s mind compared to process concerns. How do we know if a
leader is good? If some of the preceding research is indicative of what should be changed in our system today, then a good leader will be one who educates the public about the valid role of political disagreement. A good leader will be one who listens to all sides, but also makes clear the inevitable tradeoffs of policy choices. In essence, a good leader will be one who understands their role in politics as, according to the philosophy of Leon Panetta, putting governing above winning (as cited in Goldmacher, 2008, p. 3A).
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. Ballot Measure Policy Categorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Ballot Measure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pass / Fail</th>
<th>Policy Category(ies)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>June 4, 1974</td>
<td>Proposition 6</td>
<td>Public Legislative Proceedings. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Ethics / Open Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>June 6, 1978</td>
<td>Proposition 12</td>
<td>Constitutional Officers, Legislators and Judges Compensation. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.</td>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>Compensation, Powers &amp; Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>June 3, 1980</td>
<td>Proposition 6</td>
<td>Reapportionment. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Redistricting / Reapportionment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>November 2, 1982</td>
<td>Proposition 14</td>
<td>Reapportionment by Districting Commission or Supreme Court. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.</td>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>Redistricting / Reapportionment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Ballot Measure</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Pass / Fail</td>
<td>Policy Category(ies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>June 5, 1984</td>
<td>Proposition 20</td>
<td>Elected Officials. Disqualification for Libelous or Slanderous Campaign Statements. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Ethics / Open Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>November 6, 1984</td>
<td>Proposition 39</td>
<td>Reapportionment. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute.</td>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>Redistricting / Reapportionment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>November 6, 1984</td>
<td>Proposition 40</td>
<td>Campaign Contribution Limitations. Elective State Offices. Initiative Statute.</td>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>Campaign Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Ballot Measure</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Pass / Fail</td>
<td>Policy Category(ies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>June 5, 1990</td>
<td>Proposition 112</td>
<td>State Officials, Ethics, Salaries. Open Meetings. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Ethics / Open Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Compensation, Powers &amp; Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethics / Open Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Term Length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethics / Open Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>November 6, 1990</td>
<td>Proposition 140</td>
<td>Limits on Terms of Office. Legislators’ Retirement, Legislative Operating Costs. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Term Length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Compensation, Powers &amp; Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Ballot Measure</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Pass / Fail</td>
<td>Policy Category(ies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>November 3, 1992</td>
<td>Proposition 164</td>
<td>Congressional Term Limits. Initiative Statute.</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Term Length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>June 2, 1998</td>
<td>Proposition 226</td>
<td>Political Contributions by Employees, Union Members, Foreign Entities. Initiative Statute.</td>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>Campaign Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Ballot Measure</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Pass / Fail</td>
<td>Policy Category(ies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>March 5, 2002</td>
<td>Proposition 45</td>
<td>Legislative Term Limits. Local Voter Petitions. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.</td>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>Term Length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>November 2, 2004</td>
<td>Proposition 62</td>
<td>Elections. Primaries. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute.</td>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>Open Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>November 8, 2005</td>
<td>Proposition 77</td>
<td>Redistricting. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.</td>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>Redistricting / Reapportionment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Ballot Measure</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Pass / Fail</td>
<td>Policy Category(ies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>February 5, 2008</td>
<td>Proposition 93</td>
<td>Limits on Legislators’ Terms in Office. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.</td>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>Term Length</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. PROPOSITION 6 (1974 Primary Election)

Title

Public Legislative Proceedings. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.

Popular Vote

Yes: 3,318,433 (79.0%); No: 883,600 (21.0%)

Argument in Favor

A "YES" VOTE ON PROPOSITION 6 FAVORS PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF LEGISLATION.

The Constitution now provides that the Legislature meet in public, but a huge loophole exists. The loophole is that either house may hold non-public meetings whenever, in the legislators' opinion, closed meetings are desirable.

BY VOTING "YES" YOU WILL SUBSTITUTE EXPLICIT LEGAL PROCEDURES FOR MERE "OPINION." YOUR "YES" VOTE WILL ENSURE THAT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES MEET IN PUBLIC.

With approval of Proposition 6, non-public meetings may no longer be held based on the "opinion" of either house, but only on those occasions when specifically authorized by statute or concurrent resolution.

This safeguard means that in the case of a statute authorizing a reason for a non-public meeting, not only must both the Senate and Assembly approve such a bill, but the Governor must sign it. For a non-public meeting to be authorized by concurrent resolution both houses must approve it, and the approval must be by a 2/3 vote of each house.

These safeguards will not totally prevent non-public meetings when privacy is truly essential. In fact a new law has been enacted which details certain subjects which may still be discussed in non-public meetings should this amendment be approved. YOUR "YES" VOTE WILL ENSURE, HOWEVER, THAT NO REASONS FOR CLOSED MEETINGS WILL BE PERMITTED EXCEPT THOSE WHICH PASS A VERY THOROUGH AND EXACTING PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING MERIT.

The need for an informed citizenry is obvious, and it should be equally apparent that in order to be truly informed, the public must be aware of the deliberations involved in the decision-making process as well as the actual decisions. Such awareness is best achieved by observing how the public business is conducted and not by relying on government spokesmen for an explanation of what occurred behind closed doors.

Proposition 6 is another step toward improving the public's ability to be informed of the actions of public servants. In 1953 Assemblyman Ralph M. Brown successfully
fought for a law which greatly improved the public's right to know how the business of local government is conducted.

In 1968 Assemblyman William T. Bagley secured passage of a similar law affecting boards and commissions of state government.

NOW BY YOUR "YES" VOTE YOU CAN MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE WILL ALSO MEET IN PUBLIC, NOT BY WHIM, BUT ACCORDING TO THE RULE OF LAW.

A "Yes" vote is supported by the California Newspaper Publishers Association, Common Cause, the California Broadcasters Association, and the California Freedom of Information Committee.

WE URGE YOU TO VOTE "YES" ON PROPOSITION 6.

DONALD L. GRUNSKY  
Senator, 17th District  
GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN  
Senator, 37th District

2. PROPOSITION 9 (1974 Primary Election)

Title


Popular Vote

Yes: 3,224,765 (69.8%); No: 1,392,783 (30.2%)

Argument in Favor

VOTE FOR HONESTY AND INTEGRITY IN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT!

VOTE “YES” ON PROPOSITION 9, THE POLITICAL REFORM ACT OF 1974

It is time the people of California put an end to corruption in politics. It is time politicians are made directly responsible to the people – not to purchased demands of special interests. It is time to open wide the doors of the state capitol, of county boards, and of city halls so that we may all look inside. It is time for political reforms which can only be accomplished by Proposition 9.

THE PROBLEM:

Big money unduly influences politics: big money from wealthy individuals and wealthy organizations. In politics, these powerful interests – whatever their party –
usually have one goal: special favors from government. In California, corporations receive large tax breaks from the state. Companies contracting with local government often contribute to the campaigns of local officials. From city councils to the state legislature, oil companies, land developers, and other powerful interests sit down with our elected officials to write new laws. And the cost of state and local government continues to climb.

Who pays for this? You, the taxpayer, of course. On energy issues, tax policy, transportation programs, and every major issue, the voice of the citizen/taxpayer is seldom heard above the demands of the big moneyed interests.

THE REASON FOR THE PROBLEM:
Why do powerful interests continue to dominate?
Because the business of politics is usually conducted in secret. Because in Sacramento lobbyists can provide secret favors to help pass new laws. Because candidates for office must seek increasing amounts of special interest money to meet skyrocketing campaign costs. Because public officials can increase their personal incomes by making government decisions which affect their own financial holdings. In California politics, money speaks.

THE SOLUTION:
Your “YES” vote on Proposition 9!

YOUR “YES” VOTE WILL:
1. Limit spending for statewide campaigns.
2. Require full disclosure of anyone contributing $50 or more to a campaign.
3. Stop sizable anonymous cash contributions to campaigns.
4. Prohibit lobbyists from giving campaign contributions and expensive gifts to politicians.
5. End conflicts of interest by stopping all state and local officials from voting on matters in which they have a personal financial stake.
6. Enforce the law by establishing a tough, nonpolitical commission to investigate, subpoena, levy fines, and seek criminal penalties for violators.

YOUR “YES” VOTE WILL ENACT A LAW:
1. Written by constitutional and political experts.
2. Circulated in 53 counties by nearly 10,000 voters who collected over 500,000 signatures of California residents to place this on the ballot.
3. Which can only be amended by two-thirds vote of the Legislature.

We three signers urge you to speak out for good government. Vote “YES” on Proposition 9.
3. PROPOSITION 12 (1978 Primary Election)

Popular Vote

Yes: 2,009,835 (38.1%); No: 3,270,577 (61.9%)

Title

Constitutional Officers, Legislators and Judges Compensation. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.

Argument in Favor

Your YES vote on Proposition 12 means:

- **YOU FAVOR TAKING AWAY THE LEGISLATURE'S POWER TO SET ITS OWN SALARIES, AND THOSE OF ALL OTHER STATE ELECTED OFFICIALS.**
- **YOU SUPPORT CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION TO DETERMINE SALARIES AND BENEFITS FOR STATE LEGISLATORS, OTHER STATE ELECTED OFFICIALS AND JUDGES.**
- **YOU WANT TO SEE SUCH PAY AND BENEFIT DECISIONS MADE UNDER PUBLIC SCRUTINY WITH CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AT OPEN HEARINGS.**
- **YOU INSIST THAT THE PROCESS BE FREE OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE.**

These changes in the way California sets salaries and benefits for its elected officials and judges will become part of the California Constitution by your YES vote on Proposition 12.

The outcry that goes up each time legislators vote themselves a pay increase clearly demonstrates the public's strong dislike for the current system. Proposition 12 will, by your YES vote, create a California Elected Officials Compensation Commission.
It will be an independent, seven-member body whose sole duty during its existence will be to determine salaries and benefits for state elected officials and judges.

The commission will be disbanded automatically every two years and a new one chosen. Dissolving the commission biennially will guarantee its impartiality.

The commission will have seven members. The governor will appoint four, three of whom must be:

- The current or former chairman of the Fair Political Practices Commission.
- The current or former chairman of the Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy (The Little Hoover Commission).
- The current or former chairman of the State Personnel Board.

Two members selected by those three commissioners will be:

- One from a statewide nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to the education of the voters or government improvement.
- One from a statewide, nonprofit organization of California taxpayers concerned with efficiency in the collection and expenditure of public funds.

Two public members, not from any of the previous categories; chosen as follows:

- One appointed by the governor.
- One appointed by the Judicial Council of California. Such an appointee may not be a present or former judge.

The legislature will not be represented on the commission. Its only involvement in the compensation process will be a requirement that it ratify the commission's recommendations. Failure by the legislature to approve these recommendations means that they will not go into effect. The legislature will not be able to change the commission's figures.

Your YES vote will take the determination of state elected officials' salaries and fringe benefits out of the political arena and place it in the hands of an independent public commission where it belongs.

A YES VOTE FOR PROPOSITION 12 IS A VOTE FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT.

OLIVER A. THOMAS  
President, California Taxpayers' Association

GARY SIRBU  
State Chairman, California Common Cause

4. PROPOSITION 6 (1980 Primary Election)

Popular Vote

Yes: 2,989,761 (54.7%); No: 2,475,818 (45.3%)
Title
Reapportionment. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.

Argument in Favor

The reapportionment language in California’s Constitution has never been changed to conform to the 1965 ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court ordering equal representation for equal numbers of people. The California Supreme Court has also declared many of our Constitution’s provisions on reapportionment invalid. When California went through reapportionment following the 1970 census the process was clouded by these outdated provisions.

Now, to prepare for an orderly redistricting after the 1980 census, it is essential to update our Constitution.

Proposition 6 is a fair, carefully considered proposal.

- It removes all invalidated reapportionment provisions from the Constitution.
- It inserts simple, clear instruction to the Legislature on how to redraw Assembly, Senate, congressional, and Board of Equalization districts.
- It requires all districts to be reasonably equal in population.
- It requires preservation of the integrity of cities, counties, and geographic regions.
- It removes the reference to “persons who are not eligible for citizenship” – a reference which is an unfortunate holdover from a time in history when California blatantly discriminated against the Chinese in this state.

This measure passed both houses of the Legislature in 1978 with strong support from both parties.

Vote YES to give California a Constitution with a workable reapportionment article.

SUSAN F. RICE
President, League of Women Voters of California

THOMAS B. HOFELLER
Associate Director
Rose Institute of State and Local Government
Claremont Men’s College

ROBERT W. NAYLOR
Member of the Assembly, 20th District

Proposition 6 would establish reasonable rules for redrawing boundaries for legislative and congressional districts after each census.

From past experience, we know what could happen with next year’s reapportionment. Without the restrictions in Proposition 6, California could end up with districts that are confusing, unfair and unrepresentative. Proposition 6 will block forces in the Legislature...
from gaining unfair dominance by one political party or insuring reelection for particular incumbents.

Proposition 6 would reduce abuses by requiring the Legislature to follow these rules:

- **Respect city and county boundaries.** This rule would prevent the irrational division of cities for purely partisan purposes. It would help protect minority communities from being carved up just to dilute their votes. And it would help maintain local control by giving cities and counties effective representation in the Legislature.

- **Single-member districts.** Many states elect several legislators at once from large consolidated districts. Because multimember districts are so large, they reduce the influence of individual voters and increase the costs of elections. Proposition 6 would prohibit multimember districts in California.

- **Equal population.** California’s Constitution should clearly state that wide variations in population can never again distort our representative process.

- **Contiguous districts.** Proposition 6 would require that districts be composed of adjacent territory and not widely separated areas. It would also help deter odd-shaped districts which join distant communities only by corridors along beaches, highways and waterways.

Do not be misled by smokescreen arguments on the issue of counting aliens for reapportionment. Proposition 6 will have absolutely no effect on whether aliens, illegal or otherwise, are counted for this purpose.

Proposition 6 offers Californians an unprecedented opportunity to eradicate the kinds of political reapportionment “deals” that divide communities and discourage healthy competition in our elections.

Please vote YES on Proposition 6.

**ROBERT W. NAYLOR**  
*Member of the Assembly, 20th District*

**THOMAS B. HOFELLER**  
*Associate Director*

**Rose Institute of State and Local Government**  
**Claremont Men’s College***

---

5. **PROPOSITION 14 (1982 General Election)**

**Title**

Reapportionment by Districting Commission or Supreme Court. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.
**Popular Vote**

Yes: 3,065,072 (45.5%); No: 3,672,301 (54.5%)

**Argument in Favor**

IT'S TIME FOR A CHANGE; LET'S REFORM REAPPORTIONMENT

Democracy has no firmer foundation than free and fair elections. Actions that compromise the fairness of elections threaten the very heart of democracy. Nothing does more damage to fair elections than allowing legislators to draw their own district lines.

Reapportionment occurs every ten years when the Legislature establishes new legislative and congressional districts for California. How lines are drawn influences the outcome of elections in this state for the next ten years. In recent decades Californians were treated to the spectacle of incumbents striving to increase their own political power by drawing new district lines that would serve only their own narrow personal or partisan interests.

THE PEOPLE WANT REFORM

This year the people of California were so disturbed by the incumbents' abuse of the reapportionment power that three million of them voted to reject the Legislature's handiwork -- a vote of two to one against the Legislature's reapportionment plans.

This proposition is your chance to take reapportionment permanently out of the hands of the Legislature and to stop the incumbents from tampering with fair elections.

Proposition 14 offers permanent reapportionment reform for the people of California. It takes the power to redraw the district lines away from the Legislature and gives it to an independent districting commission which is directed to "provide fair and effective representation for all citizens of the state, including racial, ethnic and language minorities, and for political parties."

THIS COMMISSION ASSURES FAIR REPRESENTATION

- The commission consists of ten members, three selected by the Democrats, three by the Republicans, and four by the senior presiding justices of the California Court of Appeals.
- It must draw new districts based only on population -- not political -- considerations. No more bizarre, gerrymandered districts.
- Representatives of both parties and a majority of the nonpartisan commissioners must agree on the final district lines. No more secret deals favoring one party or another.
- The commission must hold public hearings on reapportionment plans, produce maps of the new districts, and allow the people to participate in the approval of district lines. This is a real improvement over the way the Legislature has reapportioned the state.
- Finally, the commission will reduce the cost of drawing the new district lines. The Legislature spends millions of our dollars pursuing its personal and partisan
needs. The commission will do its work and then go out of business until the next reapportionment.

A FAIR REAPPORTIONMENT SYSTEM WILL SERVE YOU BEST
The only fair way to redraw voting districts is to take the job away from those who stand to benefit. There is no worse conflict of interest than the incumbents drawing their own election districts.

VOTE YES ON REAPPORTIONMENT REFORM VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 14

GERALD FORD
Former President of the United States

DONALD WRIGHT
Former Chief Justice, California Supreme Court

SUSAN ROUDER
Chair, California Common Cause

6. PROPOSITION 20 (1984 Primary Election)

Title

Elected Officials. Disqualification for Libelous or Slanderous Campaign Statements. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.

Popular Vote

Yes: 2,472,075 (51.9%); No: 2,290,901 (48.1%)

Argument in Favor

In recent years political smearing and outright lying have come to dominate campaigns in California. Candidates are spending less and less time discussing important issues and their own qualifications and more and more time telling falsehoods about their opponents:

The reason is obvious. In this era of million-dollar campaigns the stakes are high and treachery is often effective.

As a result, voters have become turned off by the negative and sometimes deceitful tactics that political candidates use to get elected.

Proposition 20 is the only major political reform on the ballot since Proposition 9, the Political Reform Initiative, in 1974.

Proposition 20 will make candidates for political office think twice before telling a lie.
Proposition 20 is a simple and strong solution to this unacceptable campaign tactic: If you lie or slander your opponent and he or she can prove you lied in court, then you will be thrown out of office.

Under current law that can't happen. Current law only allows a defeated candidate to sue the victor for libel to recover monetary damages, even if the courts decide that the winner lied to defeat his opponent. But the voters are still left with a politician who lied to get elected. That's not right.

There is no other profession where persons can lie about themselves or their competitors and keep their jobs or continue to do business.

Proposition 20 in no way inhibits an individual's right to free speech. You can say what you want, when you want, and however you want.

But, if a political candidate knowingly tells a lie, with reckless disregard for the truth, and it is a major contributing cause to the defeat of the opponent as determined by a jury, the candidate forfeits his or her office.

Dishonest campaigns cheat the voting public just as surely as a dishonest business practice, dishonest medical practice, or any other dishonest professional practice.

Even more though, dishonest campaigns threaten the very heart of our democratic system. They rob the people of their right to make an informed, intelligent decision. They twist and render meaningless our precious American act of voting.

Proposition 20 will be a deterrent not only to candidates, but to campaign managers as well. Many campaign managers will use any tactic available to get their client elected to office, including lying, because their reputations are enhanced, and therefore their fees increase and eventually their income goes up.

Californians demand honesty and integrity in the doctors, lawyers, architects and businessmen they call upon for service. They also demand it of their elected officials, but sometimes those officials are more concerned about winning than honesty and integrity.

Proposition 20 will impose the ultimate political penalty on candidates who lie to get elected: loss of that office they so desperately desire.

Proposition 20 will force candidates to be accountable for their printed and published statements.

I urge you to vote yes on Proposition 20 and help stop the unethical practice of lying about a political opponent.

ART AGNOS
Member of the Assembly, 16th District

7. PROPOSITION 24 (1984 Primary Election)

Title

Legislature: Rules, Procedures, Powers, Funding. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.
Popular Vote

Yes: 2,444,751 (53.1%); No: 2,162,024 (46.9%)

Argument in Favor

Politicians who control your California Legislature think they're above the law and accountable to no one, spending money on themselves "like drunken sailors." Special interest bills are rushed through without a hearing. A handful of powerful bosses completely control the process.

In just six years, legislators' spending on themselves has gone up by more than 100 percent, while support for schools, transportation, and basic needs has been neglected. These politicians spend your tax money on themselves as if it grows on trees.

Today your Legislature is controlled by a few powerful bosses. They pick the members of committees, send bills where they choose, and regularly kill needed legislation at the bidding of special interests who shower them with campaign dollars. They use so-called "conference committees" to rewrite bills and ram them through at the last moment with no public input or knowledge.

Concentration of power in the hands of a few political bosses has made California's Legislature arrogant and unresponsive. Needed legislation is regularly killed, despite overwhelming public support. Citizens must resort to the initiative to get action, because the Legislature won't listen to them.

That's why more than a half million California citizens signed the Legislative Reform Act, Proposition 24, and why we urge you to vote YES on Proposition 24. Proposition 24 will cut the Legislature's spending on itself by 30 percent (saving you $37 million) and impose reasonable limits on future increases.

It requires all decision on legislative spending be made in open, public meetings, rather than the current system which allows a single member to spend literally hundreds of thousands of your tax dollars any way he chooses, without any public knowledge or scrutiny.

It requires an annual audit of all legislative funds by an independent auditor approved by the Fair Political Practices Commission.

It also prohibits "ghost voting" (where votes are cast for members who don't bother to show up) and "vote switching," which have allowed members of the Legislature to mask their true actions from the people they claim to represent.

It requires two-day public notice for conference committee bills before a vote is taken on the floor.

And it limits the extraordinary power of a few members to influence the course of legislation and punish other members for the good faith exercise of their free will and judgment on behalf of the people.

Restore simple fairness and a genuine respect for your State Legislature. Give your voice and your opinion importance in California's legislative process. Save yourself $37 million in the first year alone!
REGAIN CONTROL OF YOUR LEGISLATURE! CUT THE POLITICAL BOSSES DOWN TO SIZE.
Proposition 24 doesn't write legislative rules; it merely establishes guidelines for the Legislature's conduct. It guarantees true majority rule while maintaining procedural safeguards.
IT STOPS WASTE, SAVES YOU MONEY, AND GIVES YOU MORE SAY IN HOW LAWS ARE MADE.
IT'S TIME TO END THE POLITICAL GAMES! LET'S GIVE CALIFORNIA'S LEGISLATURE BACK TO THE PEOPLE!
VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 24.

PAUL GANN

8. PROPOSITION 39 (1984 General Election)

Title
Reapportionment. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute.

Popular Vote
Yes: 3,995,762 (44.8%); No: 4,919,860 (55.2%)

Argument in Favor

Your YES vote on Proposition 39 simply will take reapportionment away from the politicians in the Legislature, permanently ending this serious conflict of interest.
This is a VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM. That's why over one million Californians signed petitions to give reapportionment to a fair and nonpartisan commission.
You see, the Legislature is supposed to draw district lines -- the process known as reapportionment -- so that citizens are fairly and equally represented in the State Legislature and Congress. Instead, THE POLITICIANS have willfully corrupted the process to advance THEIR OWN PERSONAL AMBITIONS to remain in office or seek higher office.
If we could only illustrate for you in this voters' pamphlet the shape of some districts, you'd be appalled at the disfigured, bizarre shapes these POLITICIANS design trying to make it as easy as possible for them to gain reelection.
SIMPLY STATED, the politicians are placing their own interests -- their own job security -- far above their duty to the Constitution and, most importantly, their duty to us.
Thousands of volunteers and concerned organizations worked tirelessly statewide to get this initiative on the ballot to CORRECT THIS TREMENDOUS PROBLEM, once and for all.
Your YES vote **WILL ENSURE ABSOLUTE FAIRNESS** in the reapportionment process because this initiative *will establish an independent, nonpartisan commission*. And it puts that process in the Constitution, where IT WONT BE TAMPERED WITH BY THE POLITICIANS OR THE SUPREME COURT.

Please consider these **FACTS** before you vote. **VERY SIMPLY**, the independent, nonpartisan commission:

- **WILL SAVE TAXPAYERS MONEY.**
- **WILL BE CHOSEN BY A DRAWING** conducted by the President of the University of California.
- **WILL CONSIST OF EIGHT FORMER APPEALS COURT JUDGES.**

**TO ENSURE FAIRNESS,** commission members:

- **WILL NOT** be paid lobbyists.
- **WILL NOT** be political party officeholders.
- **WILL NOT** be public officeholders.
- **WILL NOT** ever have been in the State Legislature or Congress.

Further, newly developed computer technology will allow nonpartisan personnel to design fair and equal legislative districts.

Your YES on PROPOSITION 39 will substitute fair and responsible rules in place of the whims and secret negotiations of politicians.

These rules **WILL CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEE:**

- **RESPECT FOR YOUR CITY AND COUNTY BOUNDARIES.**
- **NO POLITICAL FAVORITISM** for incumbents or political parties.
- **EQUAL population in DISTRICTS.**
- **PRESERVATION OF COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST.**
- **REAL COMPETITION** among candidates.
- **FAIR REPRESENTATION** for **ALL** ethnic and racial groups.
- **COMMONSENSE DISTRICT LINES** that respect California's diverse geography.

This entire plan has been carefully designed to **guarantee your right to vote.** Any commission plan would be subject to a referendum and a VOTE BY THE PEOPLE, NOT THE POLITICIANS or SUPREME COURT who can, *and have*, cut off the people's right to vote before.

Your YES on PROPOSITION 39 will permanently end California's frustration with a reapportionment process that is scarred with political self-interest.

**YES on PROPOSITION 39** will guarantee that we will finally get what is **fair**.

If you want to:

- **SAVE TAXPAYERS MONEY**
- **PRESERVE THE POWER OF YOUR VOTE**
- **DEMAND FAIRNESS, NOT POLITICS**

vote YES on PROPOSITION 39.
9. PROPOSITION 40 (1984 General Election)

Title


Popular Vote

Yes: 3,109,746 (35.5%); No: 5,640,473 (64.5%)

Argument in Favor

We must reform the way political campaigns are financed in California.
You have a right to demand that your elected representatives serve you -- not powerful special interest groups who supply huge amounts of campaign cash.
Yet, according to the California Fair Political Practices Commission, campaign spending for legislative races reached $43.1 million in 1982 -- an average of $431,000 to win an office that pays $28,000 a year. This election that average will exceed $500,000!
California legislative candidates spent more than twice as much as the COMBINED totals spent by candidates in four other large states: New Jersey, Florida, Ohio, and Michigan.
Where does all this money come from? Over 90% of funds legislative candidates raise come from outside the districts they seek to represent. In fact, virtually all political contributions come in large amounts from various special interest groups seeking favors from the Legislature. Contributions of $5,000, $10,000 or $20,000 are routine. Contributions in excess of $100,000 are not unknown.
The present system is an incumbent protection plan. It guarantees that officeholders raise EIGHT times as much money as challengers.
Incumbent legislators raised $14.3 million in 1983, a nonelection year.
Only you can decide where your elected officials' allegiance will lie -- with you or with powerful special interest groups who supply massive amounts of campaign money.
Reform is essential. What is at stake is the preservation of representative democracy. This initiative will reduce the costs of campaigns and minimize potential conflicts of interest by placing reasonable limits on contributions.
Proposition 40 limits individuals, political parties, and political action committees to maximum contributions of $1,000 per year to any candidate. No individual could contribute more than $10,000 annually to all candidates and committees combined.

Proposition 40 would end all contributions by corporations, businesses, banks, unions and other special interests. Elected officials will go back to representing people like you -- not whatever special interest can stuff the most money into the kitty.

Courts allow limitations on contributions but not on candidates' use of personal wealth. It would be ludicrous to eliminate special interest money from campaigns only to turn the Legislature into a club for millionaires. This initiative prevents that possibility. ONLY if a candidate chooses to use personal wealth, opponents would be eligible for matching public funds.

The initiative bans "transfers" between candidates. Donations funneled from other candidates threaten to create a complex "laundry" disguising the true source of funds. Candidates who make transfers may gain political control over others who accept them.

The initiative also prohibits candidates from transferring funds among different accounts. Now officeholders can use their positions to raise funds to run for another office. We need truth in campaign fundraising. Money should be used only for the purpose for which it was raised.

You know the politicians won't change a system which is run for their benefit by enacting these vitally needed reforms. You must do the job, or it won't get done at all!

VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 40.

ROSS JOHNSON
California State Legislator
Chairman, Committee for Fair Campaign Finance

10. PROPOSITION 68 (1988 Primary Election)

Title


Popular Vote

Yes: 2,802,614 (52.84%); No: 2,501,263 (47.16%)

Argument in Favor

VOTE FOR HONESTY AND INTEGRITY IN GOVERNMENT!
VOTE TO LIMIT CAMPAIGN SPENDING!
VOTE "YES" ON PROPOSITION 68, THE REAL CAMPAIGN REFORM INITIATIVE!
It's time to stop the corrupting influence of money in Sacramento. Campaign spending has skyrocketed out of control. Some politicians now spend over a million dollars for an office paying $37,105.

Where do the politicians get that kind of money? From a handful of wealthy special interest lobbyists with a financial stake in legislative decisions! These groups contribute over 80% of all campaign money. Less than 10% of candidates' money comes from residents of their district.

CALIFORNIA'S TAXPAYERS CAN NO LONGER AFFORD A GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED BY SPECIAL INTERESTS. When the lobbyists pay the campaign bills, we pay the price:
• The state loses billions of dollars a year in tax loopholes for special interests.
• Consumers pay hundreds of millions more each year under laws that favor major contributors.
• The environment and the public's health and safety are repeatedly sacrificed to the special interests.

MONEY IS CORRUPTING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS! Citizens feel powerless and alienated. The million-dollar campaigns, mudslinging ads, laws based on money, not merit -- IT'S GOT TO STOP NOW!

THE SOLUTION: PROPOSITION 68 WILL:
• Limit campaign spending in legislative races. California currently has no laws to stop wasteful spending and end elected officials' dependence on special interest money.
• Limit the size of campaign contributions. Money talks. Current law puts no limit on how much big contributors can give.
• Prohibit non-election-year fundraising. Legislators should spend their time making laws, not money. Almost all off-year money is given to incumbents by lobbying groups interested in pending legislation. Officeholders outspent their challengers by almost 50:1 in the last election, and NOT A SINGLE INCUMBENT LEGISLATOR WAS DEFEATED!
• Allow taxpayers, without increasing their taxes, to voluntarily earmark $3 to fund campaign reform. For once, you get to tell the politicians how to spend your money, and you can have it replace special interest contributions.

SEND A MESSAGE TO SACRAMENTO: IT'S TIME TO SERVE THE PUBLIC NOT THE SPECIAL INTERESTS.
Proposition 68 is sponsored by a broad coalition of civic and citizens' groups -- business, labor, law enforcement, consumers, environmentalists. Proposition 68's proposal for reform has been endorsed by virtually every leading newspaper in California. A partial list of supporters includes:
Walter Gerken, Pacific Mutual
Sierra Club
California Council of Churches
Laborers' International Union, AFL-CIO
William Honig, Superintendent of Public Instruction
Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund
Reverend H. H. Brookins
Neil Harlan, Chairman, McKesson Corporation
Planning & Conservation League
Joseph D. McNamara, San Jose Chief of Police
American Association of University Women
Urban League, Sacramento
Common Cause
Congress of California Seniors
Consumers Union
Donald Kennedy, President, Stanford University
California Newspaper Publishers
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, L.A.
Peter Scott, CEO, DiGiorgio Corporation
California Conference of Machinists
Hollywood Women's Political Committee
Edmund "Pat" Brown, Former Governor and Attorney General
National Council of Jewish Women

VOTE "YES" ON PROPOSITION 68, THE CAMPAIGN REFORM INITIATIVE
SPONSORED BY THE CITIZENS OF CALIFORNIA.

CAROL FEDERIGHI
President, League of Women Voters of California

RAOUL TEILHET
Administrative Director, California Federation of Teachers

DANIEL LOWENSTEIN
Professor, UCLA School of Law
Former Chairman, California Fair Political Practices Commission

11. PROPOSITION 73 (1988 Primary Election)

Title

Popular Vote
Yes: 3,144,944 (58.06%); No: 2,271,941 (41.94%)
Argument in Favor

Proposition 73 will reform the way political campaigns are financed in California WITHOUT GIVING YOUR TAX MONEY TO POLITICIANS!

Proposition 73 is the ONLY CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROPOSAL THAT APPLIES TO ALL CALIFORNIA ELECTED OFFICES including State Senate, State Assembly, statewide constitutional offices and local offices.

Clearly, too much money is being spent on political campaigns today. Candidates and officeholders can be unduly influenced by special interest groups that donate large amounts of money.

Currently in California there is NO LIMIT on the amount that any one DONOR can CONTRIBUTE to a CANDIDATE for office. Contributions of $10,000, $20,000 or $30,000 are routine. $100,000 contributions are becoming commonplace. Proposition 73 will place a reasonable contribution limit on how much any one donor can give to a candidate.

If Proposition 73 is enacted:

* Individual contributions to a campaign would be limited to $1,000 per year.
* Contributions from businesses and labor unions would be limited to $2,500 per year.
* Contributions from political action committees would be limited to $5,000 per year.

Proposition 73 would also:

* Place a limit on the amount of money a candidate could take as an honorarium for such things as giving a speech.
* Prohibit "transfers" -- the practice of political power brokers collecting and transferring huge amounts of money to their anointed candidates.

MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, PROPOSITION 73 ACCOMPLISHES THIS NEEDED REFORM OF CAMPAIGN FINANCING WITHOUT GIVING YOUR HARD-EARNED TAX MONEY TO POLITICIANS.

In fact, it flatly PROHIBITS candidates' use of any tax money in order to campaign for office.

Too much money is spent on political campaigns today! IT CERTAINLY MAKES NO SENSE TO OPEN THE BIGGEST MONEY SOURCE OF ALL, THE TAXPAYERS' PURSES AND WALLETS.

Keeping government spending under control is hard enough. Imagine how much harder it will be to keep politicians from spending more tax money on the most important thing in their lives -- getting elected and reelected.

TAXPAYER FINANCING OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS MAKES NO SENSE!

* STATE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY RACES ALONE COULD COST TAXPAYERS $70 MILLION EVERY TWO YEARS. THIS IS MONEY THAT COULD OTHERWISE PAY FOR POLICE PROTECTION, FIRE PROTECTION OR SCHOOLS.
* Your tax money would be given to candidates you disagree with. In fact, it would allow EXTREMIST CANDIDATES SUCH AS COMMUNISTS OR
MEMBERS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN TO HAVE THEIR CAMPAIGNS PAID FOR WITH YOUR TAX DOLLARS.
Fortunately, you have an alternative to taxpayer financing of political campaigns.
PROPOSITION 73 IS THAT ALTERNATIVE.
Every effort to reform the way political campaigns are financed without taxpayer money has been defeated in the State Legislature. In fact, a bill identical to Proposition 73 was defeated by the Legislature at its first committee hearing!
YOU KNOW, THE POLITICIANS WON'T CHANGE A SYSTEM WHICH IS RUN FOR THEIR BENEFIT BY ENACTING THESE VITALLY NEEDED REFORMS. YOU MUST DO THE JOB OR IT WON'T GET DONE AT ALL!!
We must control the overwhelming power that special interests have over our legislative process. It's time for campaign contribution reform.
VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 73!

JOEL FOX
President, California Tax Reduction Movement
DAN STANFORD
Former Chairman, Fair Political Practices Commission, 1983-85

12. PROPOSITION 112 (1990 Primary Election)

Title
State Officials, Ethics, Salaries. Open Meetings. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.

Popular Vote
Yes: 2,994,561 (62.46%); No: 1,799,517 (37.54%)

Argument in Favor

PROPOSITION 112 IS YOUR CHANCE TO FREE STATE GOVERNMENT FROM THE INFLUENCE OF SPECIAL INTEREST DOLLARS.
PROPOSITION 112 IS YOUR CHANCE TO GUARANTEE THAT OUR STATE ELECTED OFFICIALS REPRESENT YOU AND NOT THE SPECIAL INTERESTS. VOTE FOR HONEST AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT.
Proposition 112 is a well-thought-out reform package that creates a constitutionally required set of laws that will hold government officials in both the legislative and executive branches to tough new ethical standards.
Proposition 112 is important because it will help return government to the people. VOTE YES AND VOTE TO...
Prohibit legislators, the Governor and other elected officials from accepting honoraria and speaking fees.
Restrict legislators, the Governor and other elected officials from accepting gifts of unlimited value from special interest.
Prohibit legislators, the Governor and other officials from lobbying their former colleagues for twelve months after leaving office.
Prohibit legislators from taking actions when they have financial interests which conflict with their duties and responsibilities as public officials.
Restrict the types and sources of outside income earned by legislators, the Governor and other elected officials.
Hold the Legislature accountable by requiring that legislative leaders announce goals and objectives at the beginning of each session and issue a "report card" at the end of each session.
Proposition 112 will place ethics safeguards in our state Constitution. *Politicians will not be able to change one word of these provisions ... ONLY THE PEOPLE CAN.*
A YES vote is a vote FOR good government.
Do you believe that legislators ought to be able to set their own salaries and benefits? Proposition 112 says no.
It is a fundamental conflict of interest for elected officials like legislators to set their own salaries. *The people should decide what elected officials should earn, not the officials themselves.*
VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 112 and give the people the power to set the salaries of our elected officials.
VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 112 and create a truly independent citizens commission which will have complete authority to set salaries and benefits for all state elected officials.
This commission is constitutionally guaranteed to be made up of ordinary Californians like average wage earners, business people, and public interest representatives.
Absolutely no current or former elected official, employee of the state or lobbyist can be appointed to the commission.
The commission will have PUBLIC MEMBERS, PUBLIC MEETINGS and only the PUBLIC INTEREST in mind. Its decision is final.
Proposition 112 offers the best hope for all Californians to make their state government accountable to the people and free from the influence of unethical special interests.
VOTE FOR HONEST GOVERNMENT. VOTE FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT.
VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 112.

**JOHN PHILLIPS**  
*State Chair, California Common Cause*  

**KIRK WEST**  
*President, California Chamber of Commerce*
13. PROPOSITION 118 (1990 Primary Election)

Title

Legislature, Reapportionment. Ethics. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute.

Popular Vote

Yes: 1,615,163 (32.99%); No: 3,281,177 (67.01%)

Argument in Favor

Once a model for the nation, the California Legislature is now viewed as a corrupt institution.

California schoolchildren used to go to Sacramento to see their lawmakers at work. Now they watch videos of a legislator getting paid thousands of dollars to have breakfast with lobbyists. Lawmakers who once served as role models for young people are now turning those young people against our political process.

California voters used to take pride in having the cleanest legislature in the nation. Now, according to a Los Angeles Times poll, most of them think their legislature is for sale and their lawmakers routinely take bribes.

"If Californians thought their public officials were somehow purer than most," said the New York Times, "they have had a large dose of disillusionment."

How did it happen? How did our Legislature fall into what one political scientist calls "a pattern of unethical behavior and corruption"?

It happened because too many legislators looked the other way while some of their colleagues took advantage of loopholes in the law and misused public office to serve their own personal self-interest rather than the public interest.

Voters seeking reform find they can't even throw unethical legislators out because these same politicians have manipulated the redistricting process to create self-serving, voterproof districts that virtually guarantee that they and their political allies get elected year after year.

IT'S TIME TO ENSURE THAT THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE WILL NOT BE FOR SALE.

Vote YES on PROPOSITION 118 to CLEAN UP THE LEGISLATURE and KEEP IT CLEAN. PROPOSITION 118 contains five provisions that will put an end to five kinds of legislative self-interest.

PROPOSITION 118 will:

• BAN GIFTS AND SPEAKING FEES FROM THOSE ADVOCATING LEGISLATION.
CLOSE CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST LOOPHOLES.

NOT ALLOW LEGISLATORS TO WORK AS LOBBYISTS FOR A YEAR AFTER THEY LEAVE OFFICE.

ESTABLISH STRICT GUIDELINES TO END SELF-DEALING IN STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING.

INSTITUTE A BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO ENFORCE THESE ETHICAL REFORMS.

Each one of these five provisions offers an effective remedy for a serious problem of legislative self-dealing. We believe each deserves your support all by itself.

PROPOSITION 118 will end a corrupt system where lobbyists use legal payoffs such as speaking fees, gifts, and lavish expense payments to purchase loopholes in the laws meant to safeguard the average citizen, to procure exemptions from the regulations that protect the environment, and to buy tax loopholes that shift the tax burden to working people.

PROPOSITION 118 will help ensure that spending by the Legislature for health care, education, highways and other vital services benefits all the people of California.

PROPOSITION 118 will cut the cost of redistricting and keep politicians from manipulating your vote to ensure their reelection.

PROPOSITION 118 is a grassroots movement to RESTORE HONESTY AND INTEGRITY TO CALIFORNIA POLITICS. Nearly a million Californians already support this effort to REBUILD THE STATE’S DEVASTATED POLITICAL SYSTEM and put an END TO CORRUPTION. You can bring it about by voting YES on PROPOSITION 118.

BRUCE HERSCHENSOHN
T.V./Radio Commentator
GERALD C. LUBENOW
Director of Publications
Institute of Governmental Studies
University of California – Berkeley
GARY J. FLYNN
Independent Businessman

14. PROPOSITION 119 (1990 Primary Election)

Title

Reapportionment by Commission. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute.

Popular Vote

Yes: 1,761,510 (36.19%); No: 3,105,501 (63.81%)
**Argument in Favor**

**LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS SUPPORTS INDEPENDENT BIPARTISAN COMMISSION**

The Public Interest is not served when legislators design their own election districts. It is an obvious conflict of interest. Prop. 119 corrects this. It establishes a temporary Independent Bipartisan Commission to do the redistricting. All meetings and negotiations of the Commission must be in public.

The current redistricting system assures safe seats for incumbents. Elections then offer voters little choice, resulting in voter apathy.

Prop. 119 requires that the Commission select a plan that honors city and county boundaries and minority populations. It benefits all voters and traditional democratic values.

Join us as Advocates for the Voter.

**SAVE TAXPAYER DOLLARS**

Prop. 119 will restore fair elections and save taxpayers money. Legislators spent $7 million redistricting in 1981 and plan spending $12 million next year. Prop. 119 limits expenditures to $3.5 million.

Paul and Howard devoted their lives to returning government to the people. Please support Prop. 119. SUPPORTED BY MRS. PAUL GANN AND MRS. HOWARD JARVIS.

**STOP GERRYMANDERING**

Using current redistricting methods, legislators unnecessarily divide cities and counties.

For instance, half of Fresno was put in a district with Carmel. Pasadena's minority citizens were lumped with Bakersfield. Newport Beach and a piece of Irvine were combined with Calexico at the Mexican border. Cities and counties across California were divided for the political advantage of legislators.

Prop. 119 requires that cities and counties be united and forbids this "gerrymandering."

SUPPORTED BY SANDY SMOLEY, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SUPERVISOR, PAST PRESIDENT, COUNTY SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA; ERNANI BERNARDI, LOS ANGELES CITY COUNCILMAN; AND CAROL WHITESIDE, MAYOR OF MODESTO.

**FAIR REPRESENTATION FOR WOMEN AND MINORITIES**

Legislators historically gerrymander districts in the name of better representation but primarily for their political parties and own benefit.

Despite proclaimed benevolence, minorities and women continue to be underrepresented in elected office and our needs continue to be neglected. California is 52% women, 38% minorities. Yet only 12% and 13% respectively occupy state and federal office. Prop. 119 intends to correct gerrymandering by removing selfish party politics.

Prop. 119 bases redistricting on fairness and representational need.
SUPPORTED BY CELES KING, STATE CHAIR, CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY (CORE); ARNOLDO TORRES, FORMER NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC); AND GLORIA HOM, TRUSTEE, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY.

**FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY**

Los Angeles Taxpayers Association supports Prop. 119. It saves taxpayers millions, gives taxpayers more competitive districts, and more opportunities for effective representation. SUPPORTED BY JAY CURTIS, PRESIDENT OF LOS ANGELES TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION.

**STOP CONFLICT OF INTEREST**

Since California reapportionment a decade ago, of 580 legislative races, only 9 have seen incumbents defeated. The Legislature has become a self-protection club for both Republicans and Democrats.

Indictments and convictions of legislators are, in part, a result of the arrogance of legislators who design their own districts so they cannot be defeated. Only Prop 119 takes redistricting away from legislators.

Stop this blatant conflict of interest! SUPPORTED BY ROBERT FINCH, FORMER U.S. SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE.

**CAROLE WAGNER VALLIANOS**

*President, League of Women Voters of California*

**STEPHEN HORN**

*Former Vice Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights*

**TOM HUENING**

*President, San Mateo County Board of Supervisors*

---

**15. PROPOSITION 131 (1990 General Election)**

**Title**


**Popular Vote**

Yes: 2,723,763 (37.75%); No: 4,490,973 (62.25%)

**Argument in Favor**

It's time for some big changes in Sacramento. Time to limit how long politicians can stay in office. Time to reform a political process that's out of control.
Prop. 131 will send a message from California voters: We're fed up with self-dealing, corruption and pandering to special interests by politicians. The people must be back in control. Since 1983 a State Senator is as likely to be convicted as lose an election. Votes in the Legislature are traded for a $3,000 payment over breakfast. The S&L scandal -- a bonanza of fat campaign contributions for politicians -- will cost every taxpayer $2,500. These are symptoms of a political system in which, all too often, politicians do not serve you. Rather, once in office too many serve themselves and the wealthy special interests who pay for their campaigns.

It's time to say "Enough."

PROPOSITION 131 MAKES FAIR, COMMON SENSE REFORMS THAT ARE ALREADY PROVEN WINNERS. IT WILL CLEAN UP CORRUPTION. AND IT WON'T RAISE YOUR TAXES ONE PENNY.

Proposition 131 will:

LIMIT HOW LONG POLITICIANS CAN STAY IN OFFICE.

If the President can only serve two terms, why should state lawmakers be able to hang on forever?

Proposition 131 will give people with different viewpoints, including women and minorities, a real chance.

LIMIT HOW MUCH POLITICIANS CAN SPEND ON THEIR CAMPAIGNS.

Where does a politician find $2,000,000 to run for a job that pays $44,000 a year? From special interests, that's where. An open invitation to corruption -- and to expensive, dirty campaigns.

Proposition 131 will make state politicians adhere to strict spending limits.

PUT AN END TO HUGE SPECIAL INTEREST CONTRIBUTIONS.

Insurance companies, oil and chemical companies, developers and other special interests routinely pour millions into California legislative campaigns.

Proposition 131 will crack down on this outrageous influence buying with strict limits on total contributions.

PUT TEETH IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION LAWS.

Political crimes can do just as much damage as street crimes. Accusations of corruption need swift investigation. But the Legislature refuses to fund real enforcement of the ethics laws.

Proposition 131 will establish a political corruption unit in the Attorney General's office and authorize independent special prosecutors.

ESTABLISH VOLUNTARY PUBLIC FINANCING AT NO COST TO TAXPAYERS.

Proposition 131 will stop Sacramento lobbyists and wealthy special interest contributors from controlling candidates. Instead, candidates who get small donations from people who actually live and work in their districts will receive matching funds from a special clean government fund.

Only those who want to contribute to the fund will do so. It won't cost one penny in additional taxes. But it will pry state government out of the clutches of special interests.
Politicians and lobbyists hate Proposition 131 because it will end their cozy backroom deals forever. But that's exactly why one million Californians signed petitions to put it on the ballot. And that's exactly why you should vote for it.

PUT THE PEOPLE BACK IN CONTROL. LIMIT POLITICIANS' TERMS. CLEAN UP STATE GOVERNMENT. VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 131!

RALPH NADER
JOHN PHILLIPS
Chair, California Common Cause
JOHN VAN DE KAMP
Attorney General of California

16. PROPOSITION 140 (1990 General Election)

Title
Limits on Terms of Office. Legislators’ Retirement, Legislative Operating Costs. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.

Popular Vote
Yes: 3,744,447 (52.17%); No: 3,432,666 (47.83%)

Argument in Favor

Proposition 140 will for the first time ever place a limit on the number of terms a State official may serve in office.

A Yes Vote on Proposition 140 will reform a political system that has created a legislature of career politicians in California. It is a system that has given a tiny elite (only 120 people out of 30 million) almost limitless power over the lives of California's taxpayers and consumers.

Proposition 140, will limit State Senators to two terms (8 years); will limit Assembly members to three terms (6 years); and limit the Governor and other elected constitutional officers to two terms (8 years).

By reducing the amount they can spend on their personal office expenses. Proposition 140, will cut back on the 3,000 political staffers who serve the legislature in Sacramento. In the first year alone, according to the legislative analyst, it will save taxpayers $60 million.

Proposition 140, will end extravagant pensions for legislators. While most Californians have to depend on Social Security and their own savings, the legislative pension system often pays more than the legislator received while in office. In fact 50 former officials receive $2,000.00 per month or more from the Legislative retirement fund.
Limiting Terms, will create more competitive elections, so good legislators will always have the opportunity to move up the ladder. Term limitation will end the ingrown, political nature of both houses -- to the benefit of every man, woman and child in California.

Proposition 140, will remove the grip that vested interests have over the legislature and remove the huge political slush funds at the disposal of Senate and Assembly leaders. Proposition 140 will put an end to the life-time legislators, who have developed cozy relationships with special interests. We all remember the saying, "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." But limit the terms of Legislative members, remove the Speaker's cronies, and we will also put an end to the Sacramento web of special favors and patronage.

Proposition 140 will end the reign of the Legislature's powerful officers -- the Assembly Speaker (first elected a quarter of a century ago) and the Senate Leader (now into his third decade in the Legislature). Lobbyists and power brokers pay homage to these legislative dictators, for they control the fate of bills, parcel out money to the camp followers and hangers-on, and pull strings behind the scenes to decide election outcomes.

Incumbent legislators seldom lose. In the 1988 election, 100% of incumbent state senators and 96% of incumbent members of the assembly were re-elected. The British House of Lords -- even the Soviet Legislature -- has a higher turnover rate. Enough is Enough! It's time to put an end to a system that makes incumbents a special class of citizen and pays them a guaranteed annual wage from first election to the grave. Let's restore that form of government envisioned by our Founding Fathers -- a government of citizens representing their fellow citizens.

VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 140 TO LIMIT STATE OFFICIALS TERM OF OFFICE!

PETER F. SCHABARUM
Chairman, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
LEWIS K. UHLER
President, National Tax-Limitation Committee
J. G. FORD, JR.
President, Marin United Taxpayers Association

17. PROPOSITION 164 (1992 General Election)

Title

Congressional Term Limits. Initiative Statute.

Popular Vote

Yes: 6,578,637 (63.57%); No: 3,769,511 (36.43%)
"Everybody is running for their own survival. The first priority of a member is to stay in office." -- 16 year California Congressman Leon Panetta, USA Today 4/28/92

Our founding fathers would be shocked at the abuses and attitudes of Congress today. While their policies were sending a record number of Californians to the unemployment line, members of the House voted themselves $40,000 in pay raises and Senate members $27,600. Each one of them now earns more than $129,000 a year. And most of them will be eligible for million dollar tax-subsidized pensions.

Our professional politicians in California's delegation have already given us a $4 trillion dollar national debt, a 9.5% California unemployment rate, 500,000 lost California jobs, banking and postal scandals, and the largest tax increase in U.S. history. Incumbent politicians have rigged the system to assure their re-election. The longer they are in Washington, the less our career representatives care about us. And the record shows that it's the long-term incumbents who are most likely to be caught in scandals.

California voters launched a national drive for term limits when we passed Prop. 140 in 1990. Term limits are an even better idea for Congress in 1992.

Prop. 164 will put term limits on California's Congressmembers. The terms of the President, the Governor and the California legislature are already limited; it's time to limit Congressional terms, too.

Prop. 164 will:

INCREASE CALIFORNIA'S CLOUT IN CONGRESS. Prop. 164 begins to break up the "good ol' boy" seniority system in Congress which rewards tenure not accomplishment and allows small states enormous power in Congress. With the largest delegation in the country, California's 54 representatives can work hard for California, instead of taking a back seat to politicians from Mississippi and West Virginia.

GIVE POWER BACK TO THE PEOPLE OF CALIFORNIA. Our representatives will be reminded they are public servants -- not masters -- who can serve for a definite time and then return home to live under the laws they made.

REINVIGORATE CONGRESS WITH NEW BLOOD AND NEW IDEAS to tackle the tough problems facing our nation today.

REINTRODUCE COURAGE AND HONESTY among our representatives by WEAKENING THE HOLD OF SPECIAL INTERESTS, LOBBYISTS AND BUREAUCRACY on Congress. Prop. 164 will force our representatives to face facts, come clean on problems and propose bold new solutions.

PROTECT YOUR RIGHT TO VOTE AND GIVE YOU A REAL CHOICE OF CANDIDATES. Incumbents dominate elections with free mail, huge staffs, free travel and PAC funding. Term limits will open up elections to competition and Prop. 164's special write-in provision will allow voters to re-elect exceptional representatives even if their terms have expired.

The dream of our founding fathers has not failed; the careerist politicians we've elected have failed. They put their own careers and multi-million dollar retirements ahead of the needs of California and the nation.
Prop. 164 will end political cronyism and reward merit, giving us a Congressional delegation that will solve problems, not add to them.

**PETER F. SCHABARUM**  
*Chairman, Citizens for Term Limits*  
**MARTYN B. HOPPER**  
*State Director, National Federation of Independent Business*  
**ALAN HESLOP, Ph.D.**  
*Professor of Government*

18. **PROPOSITION 198 (1996 Primary Election)**

**Title**


**Popular Vote**

Yes: 3,340,642 (59.51%); No: 2,273,064 (40.49%)

**Argument in Favor**

How many times have you heard someone say, "I vote for the person, not the party?" Yet, California's existing closed primary election system denies voters that choice. California faces serious challenges: Our education system, economy, criminal justice system, tax policies, and natural resources are all in trouble.

Instead of facing up to these challenges, politicians from both major parties spend more time fighting with each other and promoting narrow political agendas than they spend doing their jobs.

**GIVE VOTERS A CHOICE.**

California's closed primary election system limits voters' choices to candidates within their own party, and excludes 1.5 million independent voters from voting in primary elections at all. It favors the election of party hard-liners, contributes to legislative gridlock, and stacks the deck against more moderate problem-solvers.

The Open Primary will permit every voter to select the best candidate for each office, regardless of party affiliation.

**INCREASE VOTER PARTICIPATION.**

Voters are increasingly dissatisfied with the choices they face on election day -- and participation is declining as a result.

The Open Primary will increase participation by giving voters a real choice and by forcing candidates to focus on issues, not just partisanship. It will also give independent voters -- currently excluded in primaries -- a chance to participate.

**RESTORE HEALTHY COMPETITION.**
Party registration in most California legislative districts heavily favors one party or the other. In these so-called "safe" districts, the winner of the majority party's primary election is virtually guaranteed victory in the general election, regardless of how extreme the candidate's views.

In these districts, voters in the minority party have no real voice in the selection of their representative.

The Open Primary will encourage healthy competition in every district and force politicians to listen to all voters in their districts, not just those registered in their own party.

OTHER STATES GIVE VOTERS A CHOICE.

California has one of the most "closed" primary systems in the nation. Most other states recognize the increasing independence of voters by giving them a choice on election day.

Washington State and Alaska have open primaries very similar to the one proposed in California by this initiative. Special legislative elections in California are already conducted using a modified version of the Open Primary. The Open Primary system is proven, and it works.

WHO OPPOSES THE OPEN PRIMARY?

Hard-liners in both major political parties oppose the Open Primary because it will weaken their power and the power of special interest groups which support them.

HOW WOULD IT WORK?

Every primary election voter would receive a ballot containing the names of all candidates and their party affiliations. Voters would choose the candidate of their choice for each office, regardless of the candidate's party affiliation. The top vote-getters from each political party would then face each other in the November general election, as they do under the current system.

Non-partisan local offices and party committee offices would be unaffected by the Open Primary.

CALIFORNIA VOTERS DESERVE A CHOICE!
VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 198.

BECKY MORGAN
Former State Senator
EUGENE C. LEE
Director, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1967-1988
DAN STANFORD
Chairman, California Fair Political Practices Commission, 1983-1986
19. PROPOSITION 208 (1996 General Election)

Title

Campaign Contributions and Spending Limits. Restricts Lobbyists. Initiative Statute.

Popular Vote

Yes: 5,716,349 (61.3%); No: 3,612,813 (38.7%)

Argument in Favor

Had enough of SPECIAL INTERESTS and their high-priced LOBBYISTS BUYING POLITICAL INFLUENCE with CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS?

California is one of the few states in the country with ABSOLUTELY NO LIMITS on what special interests can contribute to political candidates in regular state elections!

During the last election season, candidates for state office received a staggering $196 million in campaign contributions! The top ten special interest contributors alone gave $9 million.

One candidate for the Legislature received $125,000 from a tobacco company one week before the election. He won by a mere 597 votes. Big money made the difference.

WHEN BIG-MONEYED SPECIAL INTERESTS WIN, THE PEOPLE LOSE:

• as consumers, we pay more for goods and services;
• our public health and safety are sacrificed;
• we end up paying for the special interest tax loopholes campaign contributions buy.

Enough is enough. It's time to end the domination of the political process by big money.

IT'S TIME TO TAKE BACK OUR GOVERNMENT. That's what Proposition 208 will do.

Prop. 208 is a carefully written, comprehensive package designed to fix the political process. It is a practical, workable solution to rampant special interest influence.

Prop. 208 reforms apply to all levels of government, from City Hall to the Governor's office. Here's what it does:

• STOPS lobbyists making or arranging campaign contributions,
• LIMITS campaign contributions,
• SLASHES campaign spending,
• BANS non-election year fundraising,
• BANS campaign cash transfers between politicians,
• REQUIRES full disclosure of those who pay for initiative ads,
• INCREASES penalties for violating campaign laws.
PROPOSITION 208 WILL GIVE CALIFORNIA THE TOUGHEST CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW IN THE NATION!

We need reform NOW!

That's exactly what Prop. 208 will deliver. It was carefully written to meet the Constitutional test so that the courts will enforce it when it passes.

Your YES vote on Prop. 208 will help CLEAN UP POLITICS and insure that our elected officials serve the public's interest rather than the special interests.

Prop. 208 is sponsored by:

- League of Women Voters of California
- American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) -- California
- Common Cause
- United We Stand America

These citizen groups put Prop. 208 on the ballot and urge you to vote YES.

Prop. 208 will make politicians accountable to the people rather than to big campaign contributors.

That's why it's supported by groups across the political spectrum, forming the broadest coalition ever assembled to clean up government. Endorsers include:

- American Lung Association of California
- Congress of California Seniors
- Consumers for Auto Reliability & Safety
- Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association
- Planning & Conservation League
- National Council of Jewish Women
- Seniors for Action
- United Anglers

PROPOSITION 208 IS THE ONLY GENUINE CAMPAIGN REFORM MEASURE ON THE BALLOT.

Please join with the League of Women Voters, American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) -- California, Common Cause, United We Stand America, and all of us who want real political reform.

LET'S MAKE THE POLITICIANS RESPONSIVE TO US, NOT BIG CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTORS.

Please Vote Yes on Proposition 208.

TONY MILLER
Executive Director, Californians for Political Reform, A Committee Sponsored by League of Women Voters of California, American Association of Retired Persons -- California (AARP), Common Cause and United We Stand America

FRAN PACKARD
President, League of Women Voters of California

JEAN CARPENTER
Co-Chair, Political Reform Task Force of the American Association of Retired Persons -- California (AARP)
20. PROPOSITION 212 (1996 General Election)

Title


Popular Vote

Yes: 4,539,403 (49.1%); No: 4,694,166 (50.9%)

Argument in Favor

Are you tired of politicians who talk so much but do so little about improving schools, cleaning up the environment, and making our streets safe?

Too many politicians say one thing, then do something else. Why? Because they serve the special interests and people who give them big campaign contributions, not the voters back home in their district.

PROPOSITION 212 WILL BREAK SPECIAL INTEREST CONTROL

Prop. 212 is the only initiative on the ballot that effectively breaks the special interest stranglehold on government. Another well-intentioned measure, Prop. 208, doesn't take the tough steps necessary to get the job done.

PROPOSITION 212 MAKES POLITICIANS ACCOUNTABLE TO ALL VOTERS, NOT SPECIAL INTERESTS

Prop. 212 requires politicians to raise at least 75% of their campaign funds inside their district. Prop. 208 has no such limit, allowing up to 100% of money from outsiders.

Prop. 212 bans money from corporations and unions. Prop. 208 allows tobacco companies, insurance companies, and other corporations to each contribute a total of $25,000 to state candidates, and unlimited total contributions to local candidates.

Prop. 212 bans corporate tax deductions for lobbying, saving taxpayers money. Prop. 208 allows corporations to keep this special tax break.

PROPOSITION 212 IMPOSES TOUGH LIMITS ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND SPENDING

Prop. 212 prohibits politicians from taking contributions over $100 from wealthy individuals ($200 for the Governor's race and other statewide elections). Prop. 208 allows five times more: $1,000 for statewide candidates, $500 for legislators.

Prop. 212 encourages average Californians who contribute $25 or less to band together, allowing them to make larger joint contributions to candidates and thereby compete with the powerful special interests. Prop. 208 discourages this, leaving politicians to raise funds from donors who can write $500 or $1,000 checks.
Prop. 212 sets tough, low, mandatory limits on campaign spending to stop rich candidates trying to buy their way into public office. Prop. 208 only offers much higher, voluntary limits.

PROPOSITION 212 IS TOUGH. PROPOSITION 208 IS A HALFWAY MEASURE

California's state legislators raise an average of 8 out of 10 campaign dollars from outside the districts they represent. Why let this continue?

Why give corporations tax breaks for lobbying for their special interests?

Why continue allowing 97% of the money donated to California politicians to come in amounts of more than $100 from the wealthiest 1% of individuals, corporations, and PACs?

Why expect politicians to voluntarily limit campaign spending? They'll just continue the flood of negative TV ads and junk mail.

Only Prop. 212 puts a stop to all this. It's a no-nonsense initiative written by citizens fed up with business as usual. 208 is a well-intentioned halfway measure that won't work.

VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 212

Only Prop. 212 strictly limits out-of-district contributions. It bans corporate and union contributions. It bans tax breaks for corporate lobbying. It sets $100 contribution limits and low, mandatory spending limits. Send a tough message to the politicians and special interests. Return our state government to its rightful owners -- the citizens of California.

WENDY WENDLANDT
Associate Director, California Public Interest Research Group, CALPIRG

DON VIAL
Former Commissioner, California Fair Political Practices Commission

ROBERT BENSON
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School

21. PROPOSITION 226 (1998 Primary)

Title

Political Contributions by Employees, Union Members, Foreign Entities. Initiative Statute.

Popular Vote

Yes: 2,688,033 (46.6%); No: 3,073,943 (53.4%)
Argument in Favor

Proposition 226 is very simple and clear. It will reform California's elections two ways:

- It stops unions and employers from taking money from members or employees paychecks for political purposes without their prior consent.
- It will prohibit contributions to state and local candidates from foreign nationals and foreign corporations.

**RANK AND FILE RIGHTS: BOSSES SHOULD NOT SPEND WORKERS' MONEY WITHOUT CONSENT**

**IT IS MORALLY WRONG--DEAD WRONG--TO TAKE MONEY FROM YOUR PAYCHECK, WITHOUT YOUR CONSENT, AND SPEND IT TO SUPPORT A POLITICAL CANDIDATE OR ISSUE THAT YOU OPPOSE.**

Thomas Jefferson, who wrote the Declaration of Independence, said, "To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."

The United States Supreme Court agrees and has ruled that it is illegal and unconstitutional to do so. But since Washington refuses to implement the court's *Beck* decision, California must act to end this outrageous violation of fundamental fairness and the rights of California union members.

**UNLESS PROPOSITION 226 PASSES, UNION BOSSES--NOT INDIVIDUAL UNION MEMBERS--WILL DECIDE HOW THE MEMBER'S MONEY IS SPENT ON POLITICS. IT'S LIKE LETTING UNION BOSSES GO INTO THE VOTING BOOTH TO MARK THE MEMBER'S BALLOT.**

For years, union members have been exploited by union leaders who took their money and spent it for political causes they opposed.

**FOR EXAMPLE, UNION MEMBERS SUPPORTED AND VOTERS OVERWHELMINGLY APPROVED THE "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT" INITIATIVE FOR HABITUAL CRIMINALS. YET UNION LEADERS SPENT MEMBERS' MONEY TO OPPOSE THREE STRIKES.**

No wonder polls show that union members--by a large majority--support Proposition 226. For some union members who don't want to make political contributions, Proposition 226 will save them about $200 a year.

**BANNING FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS**

**PROPOSITION 226 WILL ALSO BAN ALL FOREIGN POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES AND PARTIES.**

It will prevent foreign money from buying political influence, ending both the fact and appearance of its corrupting elected officials.

The special interests that oppose Proposition 226 will say and do anything to defeat it. They know it will end their ability to direct tens of millions of dollars to campaigns and candidates that their members do not support.

**IT'S BITTER IRONY THAT THE CAMPAIGN TO DEFEAT PROPOSITION 226 WILL BE PAID FOR WITH WAGES OF UNION MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES WHO, BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY, STRONGLY SUPPORT IT.**
Union bosses attempt to justify extracting these involuntary contributions, claiming they know better than individual rank and file members what's good for them. What arrogance!

Proposition 226 will end this unfair and unconstitutional shakedown of California union members, protecting their paychecks and their rights. It will end the influence of foreign money on political candidates.

BECAUSE YOU'RE A UNION MEMBER SHOULD NOT MEAN YOU HAVE TO GIVE UP YOUR RIGHTS AS A CITIZEN.
RANK AND FILE UNION MEMBERS DESERVE THE SAME POLITICAL FREEDOM OF CHOICE AS EVERY OTHER CALIFORNIAN. GIVE THEM A FAIR SHAKE INSTEAD OF A SHAKEDOWN.

Please vote yes on Proposition 226.

PETE WILSON

Governor, State of California

ELIZABETH LEE

Member, California Teachers' Association

ROBERT EISENBEISZ

Member, United Electrical Workers-- local 99

22. PROPOSITION 25 (2000 Primary Election)

Title


Popular Vote

Yes: 2,415,846 (34.7%); No: 4,541,235 (65.3%)

Argument in Favor

WHY DO WE NEED PROPOSITION 25?

- California is one of only six states with ABSOLUTELY NO LIMITS on the source or size of political contributions. Candidates can receive checks for $1 MILLION or even more! Our government has been corrupted by BIG MONEY.
- Last election, California gambling casinos and Nevada gambling casinos spent over ONE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS ($100,000,000.00) fighting for control of organized gambling in California--casinos gave millions to Democrats and millions to Republicans. Government should be of the people, by the people, and for the people, NOT OF THE GAMBLING CASINOS, BY THE GAMBLING CASINOS, and FOR THE GAMBLING CASINOS.
• Public figures get huge cash payments to endorse or oppose campaigns. Last election, a consumer advocate opposed the utility rate-cut initiative and got over $160,000 from utility companies; a former state schools official opposed the tobacco tax initiative and got $90,000 from tobacco companies. We often don't find out about such payments until after the election.

WHAT WILL PROPOSITION 25 DO?
• Prohibits paying people to vote or not vote. Requires immediate Internet disclosure of political contributions of $1,000 or more.
• Requires immediate Internet disclosure of television, radio, print, or mail advertisements.
• Provides strict contribution limits of $5000 or less, limits which will survive any legal challenge.
• Bans corporate contributions to candidates, just like federal law has for almost 100 years.
• Provides free television and radio time to statewide campaigns which agree to limit spending.
• Requires individuals in advertisements to disclose whether they are being paid by a campaign or its major donors.
• Requires statewide campaigns which exceed voluntary spending limits to disclose their spending total in all advertisements.
• Prevents endless fundraising by elected officials while they're voting on important bills--statewide candidates can't begin fundraising until one year before their primary, legislative candidates six months before their primary. Restricts "soft money," stopping its unlimited use for electronic media or candidate advertisements.

WHAT WILL PROPOSITION 25 COST?
• The initiative limits public funding to just ONE DOLLAR EACH YEAR PER CALIFORNIA TAXPAYER. It's worth spending a dollar a year to BUY BACK OUR GOVERNMENT from special interests which control it!
• Our politicians should answer to taxpayers not gambling casinos and tobacco companies.
• Political reform will SAVE taxpayers and consumers BILLIONS OF DOLLARS by limiting tax breaks and sweetheart deals for big campaign contributors.

HOW WILL PROPOSITION 25 CLOSE LOOPHOLES AND LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD?
• Under Section 85309, ALL subsidiaries of a business and ALL locals of a union are treated as one donor for contribution limit purposes; this prevents different subsidiaries and locals from EACH giving maximum contributions.
• Section 89519 forces candidates to liquidate their campaign war chests after every election, meaning all candidates start even after every vote.

WHO SUPPORTS PROPOSITION 25?
• A coalition of Democrats, Republicans, third party members, and independents who want to stop corruption, including Republican Senator John McCain and California Common Cause.

WHO OPPOSES PROPOSITION 25?
• Special interests who want to keep control of OUR government.

VOTE YES ON 25.

JAMES K. KNOX
Executive Director, California Common Cause

RON UNZ
Chairman, Voters Rights 2000—Yes on 25

TONY MILLER
Former Acting Secretary of State

23. PROPOSITION 27 (2000 Primary Election)

Title

Popular Vote
Yes: 2,737,274 (40.4%); No: 4,032,355 (59.6%)

Argument in Favor

Vote YES on Proposition 27. Term Limits.
Term limits on our state legislature are a great success-- bringing new people and new ideas to Sacramento. Gone are much of the partisan bickering and backroom deals. Legislators spend their time getting things done for the people, instead of picking fights to score political points.

A YES vote on Proposition 27 will help us bring new people and new ideas to Congress.

When those who represent us serve for short periods of time, they stay connected to their communities and serve the public interest. Term limits help block the corruption and arrogance that comes from career politicians who are more concerned with their perks and privileges than with what's best for the people.

No wonder recent Field polls show that Californians support term limits by almost 3 to 1. The lobbyists and big special interests don't like term limits, but we know our California legislature is doing a much better job now.

Californians overwhelmingly support term limits on Congress too, but career politicians in Washington have ignored our votes. That's why it's still politics-as-usual in our nation's capitol. Recently Congress gave themselves yet another pay raise even
though 80 percent of Americans opposed it. When it comes to issues we care about, Congress continues to do the bidding of the big special interests. They have refused to reform the election process, and thus 98.5 percent of incumbents won re-election in 1998.

The longer politicians spend in Washington, the less they represent us and the more they represent the special interests, the party bosses and their own career interests. But it doesn't have to be that way. The answer is to send citizen legislators—not career politicians—to represent us in Congress.

When congressional candidates ask for our vote, we deserve to know whether they're looking to spend a lifetime in Washington as professional politicians or limited terms as public servants. Proposition 27 allows candidates to tell us on the record.

A YES vote on Proposition 27 gives you important term limits information about candidates for Congress.

- Term limits are a great success for our state legislature.
- But we still have too many career politicians in Washington.
- As voters, we deserve to know whether a candidate will be a career politician or a citizen legislator. That gives us a real choice about who will represent us in the U.S. Congress.

Proposition 27 is a simple way to allow candidates to make their intentions clear. Do they want to represent us in Congress for a short period of public service or are they going to cash in on political careers? As voters, we deserve to know. Proposition 27 tells us.

VOTE YES on PROPOSITION 27. TERM LIMITS.

GEORGE E. MARTINEZ
Community Activist
SALLY REED IMPASTATO
Proponent, California Term Limit Committee
LEWIS K. UHLER
President, National Tax Limitation Committee

24. PROPOSITION 34 (2000 General Election)

Title

Campaign Contributions and Spending. Limits. Disclosure. Legislative Initiative Amendment.

Popular Vote

Yes: 5,934,103 (60.1%); No: 3,953,805 (39.9%)
Reform California political campaigns. Vote YES on Proposition 34.

- Clamp a Lid on campaign contributions
- Limit campaign spending
- Require faster disclosure of contributions via the Internet
- Does not allow taxpayer dollars to be used in campaigns
- Stop political "sneak attacks"
- Close loopholes for wealthy candidates
- Increase fines for law violators

Currently there are no limits on what politicians can collect and spend to get elected to state office. California is still the wild west when it comes to campaign fundraising. Six-figure campaign contributions are routine. Proposition 34 finally sets enforceable limits and puts voters back in charge of California's political process.

- **PROPOSITION 34 LIMITS POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS**
  Proposition 34 brings strict contribution limits to every state office. These limits are tough enough to rein in special interests and reasonable enough to be upheld by the courts. Proposition 34 bans lobbyists from making ANY contribution to any elected state officer they lobby.

- **PROPOSITION 34 CREATES CAMPAIGN SPENDING LIMITS**
  Campaign spending is out of control. Proposition 34 creates legally allowable limits to keep spending under control and includes a system so voters know who abides by the limits and who doesn't.

- **PROPOSITION 34 USES THE INTERNET TO SPEED UP DISCLOSURE**
  Proposition 34 requires candidates and initiatives to disclose contributions of $1,000 or more on the Internet within 24 hours for a full three months before the end of the campaign.

- **PROPOSITION 34 DOES NOT ALLOW TAXPAYER FUNDED CAMPAIGNS**
  Proposition 34 does not impose taxpayer dollars to be used to finance political campaigns in California. Our tax money is better spent on schools, roads and public safety.

- **PROPOSITION 34 MORE THAN DOUBLES FINES TO $5,000 PER VIOLATION**

- **PROPOSITION 34 CLOSES LOOPHOLES FOR WEALTHY CANDIDATES**
  Wealthy candidates can loan their campaigns more than $100,000, then have special interests repay their loans. Proposition 34 closes this loophole.

- **PROPOSITION 34 STOPS POLITICAL SNEAK ATTACKS**
  In no-limits California, candidates flush with cash can swoop into other races and spend hundreds of thousands of dollars at the last minute to elect their friends. Proposition 34 stops these political sneak attacks.

- **PROPOSITION 34 REFORMS WON'T BE THROWN OUT**
  Three times in the past twelve years, voters have attempted to enact limits only to have the courts strike them down.
Proposition 34 has been carefully written to fully comply with all court rulings and will set reasonable limits that can be enforced.

VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 34 if you're tired of special interests controlling our government.

VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 34 if you want real campaign reform that can and will be enforced.

VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 34 if you don't want taxpayers to pay for political campaigns.

Proposition 34 is tough, fair and enforceable. It deserves your support.

DAN STANFORD, Former Chair  
California Fair Political Practices Commission  
EILEEN PADBERG, Member  
Bipartisan Commission on the Political Reform Act  
HOWARD L. OWENS, Director of Region IX  
National Council of Senior Citizens

25. PROPOSITION 45 (2002 Primary Election)

Title

Legislative Term Limits. Local Voter Petitions. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.

Popular Vote

Yes: 2,049,348 (42.3%); No: 2,790,153 (57.7%)

Argument in Favor

Yes on 45! Protect term limits and Restore Decision Making to Local Voters.

Proposition 45 (The Term Limit Local Option Initiative) empowers the people to choose their own representative-TO THROW OUT THE SCOUNDRELS or return-for a maximum of 4 years-a single lawmaker whose ability and effectiveness benefits the people of that district.

Term limits have brought a breath of fresh air to California government. Before the introduction of term limits, entrenched incumbents, awash in campaign contributions from special interest lobbyists, and immune to the wrath of the people in their districts, clung to power-election after election. Term limits forced these career politicians out of public office.

But now, with California facing such enormous challenges, we need Proposition 45 to empower the people with the option of keeping their own representative. Proposition 45 would allow a few especially valued state lawmakers to run for an additional 4 years in office ONE TIME ONLY. This may be accomplished ONLY if constituents in the
lawmaker's district gather sufficient signatures to qualify the officeholder for the ballot. And then, ONLY if the majority of voters in that district vote to keep that individual.

*Firefighters say "Yes on 45."* Decisions made in Sacramento determine their ability to protect the public. Firefighters need at least a few legislators with enough life and legislative experience to deal with the complex and dangerous world in which we now live.

*Business leaders and Law Enforcement say "Yes on 45."* As our economy struggles to recover from the aftermath of September 11th and the terrorist assault on America, small business and law enforcement will be impacted by the difficult and complicated decisions that must be made in Sacramento. We need experienced lawmakers who are prepared to handle these complex problems.

Keep term limits in place! But allow the voters the option to return a few experienced lawmakers who have the ability to protect the public health and safety in these difficult times.

*Yes on Proposition 45—Protect Term Limits, Restore Decision-Making Power to the People.*

---

**DAN TERRY, President**
*California Professional Firefighters*

**HANK LACAYO President**
*Congress of California Seniors*

**KAY McVAY, President**
*California Nurses Association*

---


**Title**


**Popular Vote**

Yes: 5,119,155 (46.1%); No: 5,968,770 (53.9%)

**Argument in Favor**

THE VOTER CHOICE PRIMARY GIVES YOU THE POWER—NOT THE PARTY BOSSES AND POLITICIANS

Proposition 62, The Voter Choice Primary Initiative, allows every voter—*including independent voters*—to vote for the best candidate for office, regardless of party, in primary elections.

The Voter Choice Primary is similar to the method Californians have used for the past century to elect mayors, city council members, county supervisors, and district attorneys.
Proposition 62 puts power—and choice—back in your hands and takes it away from the party bosses and political insiders who’ve stacked the system in their favor—at our expense.

THE VOTER CHOICE PRIMARY ACT IS BADLY NEEDED REFORM

It will:
- open up California’s elections process
- expand voter choices
- increase voter participation
- create more competition in elections
- make more accountable our state’s elected officials, so they are responsive to all voters—not just the special interests and those at the ideological extremes

CALIFORNIA VOTERS SUPPORT PRIMARY ELECTION REFORM

California voters passed primary election reform in 1996 with almost 60% of the vote over the opposition of the party bosses. The 1998 and 2000 elections were run under these reforms and voter participation increased.

But the party bosses used the courts to block these reforms they couldn’t defeat at the ballot box.

Proposition 62 is written in a manner that addresses the concerns of the courts and restores the will of the people of California.

RESTORE COMPETITION—OPEN UP THE CURRENT PRIMARY SYSTEM THAT’S STACKED AGAINST THE VOTERS

Politicians of both major parties cut a backroom deal to protect incumbents. They created mainly “safe” legislative districts where party registration heavily favors one party or the other. The winner of the majority party’s primary election is virtually guaranteed victory in the almost meaningless general election. Meanwhile, voters in other political parties have no real voice in the selection of their representatives in Sacramento and Washington.

The politicians and party bosses like the current system because they can control it. That’s why we’re stuck with an unpopular State Legislature that’s out of touch with the will of California voters.

HOW WOULD IT WORK?

In primary elections, every voter would receive a ballot listing the name of all candidates and in most cases their party registration. Voters, including independents, can pick the candidate of their choice for each office, regardless of the candidate’s party registration. The top two vote-getters, regardless of party, would face each other in the November general election. (Presidential nominating and party central committee elections would be unaffected by the Voter Choice Primary.)

PROPOSITION 62 IS OPPOSED BY THE PARTY BOSSES

The party bosses are running a cynical scare campaign to hang on to their power by confusing voters about the Voter Choice Primary. Don’t let them get away with it.

When it comes to elections, you—the voter—should be the boss.

STEVE WESTLY, California State Controller
RICHARD J. RIORDAN, California Secretary for Education
27. PROPOSITION 75 (2005 Special Election)

Title

Popular Vote
Yes: 3,644,006 (46.5%); No: 4,190,412 (53.5%)

Argument in Favor

PROPOSITION 75 PROTECTS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FROM HAVING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TAKEN AND USED WITHOUT THEIR PERMISSION.

There’s a FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNESS IN CALIFORNIA:

• Hundreds of thousands of public employee union members are forced to contribute their hard earned money to political candidates or issues they may oppose.

• Powerful and politically connected union leaders—a small handful of people—can make unilateral decisions with these “forced contributions” to fund political campaigns without their members’ consent. The workers have no choice—money is automatically deducted from their dues.

Firefighters, police officers, teachers, and other public employees work hard for the people of California and we owe them a huge debt for the work they do on our behalf. That’s why it’s only fair that public employees give their permission before their hard earned dollars are taken and given to politicians and political campaigns.

Many public employee union members don’t support the political agenda of the union bosses and it’s not right that they are forced to contribute to political candidates and campaigns they oppose:

• Campaign finance records document that several public employee unions have spent more than $2 million to qualify a ballot measure that would raise property taxes by billions of dollars—rolling back Proposition 13 protections.

• Many members of these unions may oppose this, but the union leaders just take the money and spend it even though individual union members may disagree.

That’s not right and it’s not fair.

HERE’S WHAT ACTUAL UNION MEMBERS SAY:

“I’ve been a public school teacher for 20 years. I joined the union when I started teaching because of the benefits it provided and I’ve always been a proud member.
However, despite the many good things the union does, it…contribute[s] a portion of my dues to political…campaigns I often disagree with. That’s simply unfair. I want to be a member of the teachers union, but I don’t want to be forced to contribute my money to the union leaders’ political agenda.”

*Diane Lenning, Huntington Beach*

“I’m a member of the largest state employee union. I believe in the union and what it does. It supports me in many ways, but I don’t need it spending a portion of my dues for political purposes. If I want to make a political contribution to a candidate it should be voluntary, not mandatory.”

*Jim Prunty, Glendora*

**PROPOSITION 75—IT’S COMMON SENSE.**

Here’s what it’ll do:

- Give public employees the same choices we all have.
- Require public employee unions to obtain annual written consent from members before their dues are taken for political purposes.
- Allow government employees to decide when, how, and if their hard earned wages are spent to support political candidates or campaigns.

Proposition 75 will NOT prevent unions from collecting political contributions, but those contributions will be CLEARLY VOLUNTARY.

*Vote YES on Proposition 75.*

Give California workers the freedom and choice we all deserve and help restore union members’ political rights.

Learn more, visit www.caforpaycheckprotection.com.

*MILTON FRIEDMAN, Nobel Prize Winner*

**LEWIS UHLER, President**

National Taxpayer Limitation Committee

**ALLAN MANSOOR, Member of Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs**

---

**28. PROPOSITION 77 (2005 Special Election)**

**Title**

Redistricting. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.

**Popular Vote**

Yes: 3,130,541 (40.2%); No: 4,641,633 (59.8%)

**Argument in Favor**

THE TIME FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IS NOW!
PROPOSITION 77: “THE VOTER EMPOWERMENT ACT” WILL FINALLY MAKE POLITICIANS ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE.

- Guarantee fair election districts for Californians.
- Give voters the final say in the process.
- Reduce special interest influence and money in politics.

YES on Prop. 77: Let the Voters Decide.

The Problem: California’s flawed election system allows partisan politicians to draw the boundary lines of their own districts—splitting up towns and even neighborhoods for personal gain. The result: there is no accountability because the incumbents rig the districts to ensure they have NO serious competition, guaranteed re-election, and are NOT accountable to voters.

It used to be that voters picked their politicians—now politicians pick their voters. And that’s NOT FAIR.

“California lawmakers are so adept at designing their own districts that of the 153 seats—80 Assembly, 20 state Senate, 53 Congressional— theoretically up for grabs last November (2004), not a single one switched parties.”

Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2005

When politicians are not accountable to voters, they become accountable only to their special interest campaign contributors.

That’s why we still have record deficits, unbalanced budgets, out of control spending, and calls for higher taxes, year after year.

Wouldn’t it be better if legislators would work to improve education, cut wasteful government spending, eliminate bureaucracy, and balance the budget once and for all? But that won’t happen until our elected officials start paying attention to us. Under the current system, they only pay attention to their campaign contributors. It’s time for a change.

Prop. 77—The Bipartisan Voter Empowerment Solution

1. Voters will be able to vote on the new redistricting plan. That gives the people of California more power and the special interests less.

2. To ensure district lines that are competitive and fair, a panel of retired judges—selected through a bipartisan process with no political agenda—will draw new district lines according to strict guidelines.

3. Voters then may approve or reject the lines. That puts us, Californians, in charge of our elections.

4. Neighborhoods and communities will matter again. Incumbents will no longer be able to draw their own districts, splitting up towns and neighborhoods in an effort to guarantee their own re-election.

Prop. 77 IS A COMMON SENSE, BIPARTISAN SOLUTION THAT WILL:

- Guarantee fair, competitive elections for California voters.
- Give voters the final say in the process.
- Hold the politicians accountable.
- Reduce the influence of political money.
Now is the time. After many years of opposing reform, overspending, and gridlock, legislative leaders of both parties finally admitted, this year, that redistricting reform is necessary—that allowing politicians to draw their own districts is a conflict of interest that must be changed.

The opportunity is now. PLEASE JOIN US IN VOTING YES ON PROP. 77 TO:

- HOLD THE POLITICIANS ACCOUNTABLE!
- CLEAN UP SACRAMENTO.
- REDUCE PARTISAN POLITICS.
- RETURN ELECTORAL CONTROL TO THE PEOPLE.

EDWARD J. “TED” COSTA, CEO
People’s Advocate

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor
State of California

JOHN A. ARGUELLES
Former California Supreme Court Justice

29. PROPOSITION 89 (2006 General Election)

Title


Popular Vote

Yes: 2,124,728 (25.7%); No: 6,132,618 (74.3%)

Argument in Favor

VOTE YES TO TAKE A STAND AGAINST THE POWER OF SPECIAL INTERESTS AND LOBBYISTS IN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT.

VOTE “YES” ON PROPOSITION 89, THE CLEAN MONEY AND FAIR ELECTIONS ACT

We have a crisis of corruption in our government marked by scandal after scandal and criminal investigations of politicians from both parties. It is time for Californians to clean up this corruption and make politicians accountable to voters instead of big money campaign contributors.

THE PROBLEM

Right now, special interests like big oil companies, the drug giants, the insurance industry, and HMOs can get their way in Sacramento by donating millions to elect politicians who will owe them favors. Lobbyists and special interests use campaign
contributions to pass their pork barrel projects and create tax loopholes—costing consumers and taxpayers like you billions of dollars each year.

THE SOLUTION: PROPOSITION 89
If you’re dissatisfied with the way campaigns are funded in California and the effect of campaign contributions on state government, Vote Yes on Prop. 89.

YOUR “YES” VOTE WILL:
1. Help level the playing field and make our elections more fair and competitive—so that candidates with the best ideas have a chance to win, even if they are not rich or well connected to wealthy special interest groups and lobbyists.
2. Require candidates to adhere to strict spending limits and reject special interest contributions in order to qualify for public financing.
3. Ban contributions to candidates by lobbyists and state contractors.
4. Set limits on outside, so-called “independent” campaign committees created by big contributors to influence elections.
5. Limit to $10,000 the amount corporations can spend directly on ballot measure campaigns.
6. Restrict contributions by corporations, unions, and individuals to $500 for candidates for state Legislature, $1,000 to candidates for statewide office.
7. Establish tough penalties, including jail time and removing candidates from office who break the law.

NOT FUNDED BY INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYERS OR THE STATE BUDGET
Proposition 89 is specifically funded by a modest increase in the corporate income tax rate—raising it from 8.84% to 9.04%. The resulting corporate income tax rate would still be less than it was from 1980 until 1996. Corporations should pay their fair share in taxes.

WHEN YOU HEAR THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROPOSITION 89, REMEMBER:
• Opposition to Proposition 89 is being led and funded by the big oil companies, drug companies, the insurance industry, HMOs, and other entrenched interests.
• Proposition 89 was drafted and reviewed by experts in constitutional and election law and put on the ballot and backed by Democrats, Republicans, and independent voters.
• The opponents of Proposition 89 want to keep the system exactly the way it is, because they know it works for them, NOT for you. They are making false claims against Proposition 89 because they want to keep political power for themselves rather than having fair elections that make politicians accountable to the voters.

VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 89! RETURN ELECTIONS TO THE VOTERS AND REDUCE THE POWER OF THE SPECIAL INTERESTS.

DEBORAH BURGER, RN, President
California Nurses Association

HARVEY ROSENFIELD, Founder
Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights
SUSAN LERNER, Executive Director  
California Clean Money Campaign

30. PROPOSITION 93 (2008 Presidential Primary Election)

Title

Limits on Legislators’ Terms in Office. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.

Popular Vote

Yes: 3,961,466 (46.4%); No: 4,574,826 (53.6%)

Argument in Favor

Proposition 93 reforms California’s 17-year-old term limits law to make the Legislature more effective. This thoughtful proposition strikes a reasonable balance between the need to elect new people with fresh ideas, and the need for experienced legislators with the knowledge and expertise to solve the complex problems facing our state.

California’s current term limits law allows legislators to serve a total of 14 years: 3 two-year terms in the State Assembly and 2 four-year terms in the State Senate.

Proposition 93 reforms the law in two important ways:

- It reduces the total number of years new legislators can serve from 14 years to 12, and;
- It allows all 12 years to be served entirely in the State Assembly, State Senate, or a combination of both.

These simple but important adjustments will let legislators spend more time working for taxpayers, and less time worrying about which office to run for next.

An independent study by the nonpartisan Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) found that term limits have produced important benefits, but “have been accompanied by unintended consequences [that] diminish the Legislature’s capacity to perform its basic duties.”

The study found term limits increased the potential for “fiscal irresponsibility” in the Legislature, while providing “less incentive, experience, and leadership to correct it.” Rapid turnover in the Legislature has also reduced “expertise in many important policy areas.”

Other independent studies have reached similar conclusions. You can read these studies at www.termlimitsreform.com/studies.

The PPIC study recommends specific changes to our current term limits law to “improve the Legislature’s ability to perform its role.” These changes form the basis for the reforms in Proposition 93.
There is a real need to reform term limits:

- The Legislature takes twice as long to pass a budget now than before we had term limits.
- Freshman legislators with little or no state policy experience are now in charge of twelve important committees that decide policy for our schools, housing, jobs, public safety, transportation, and the environment.

Proposition 93 isn’t a magic cure for these problems. But it is an important and balanced step in the right direction. It will make our Legislature more effective, more accountable, and better able to solve problems you care about.

Allowing legislators to serve 12 years in either the State Assembly or State Senate will let them gain experience and expertise—essential for dealing with complicated public policy issues with long-term consequences. Committees will be led by experienced lawmakers who can better oversee state bureaucrats. And more legislators will focus on California’s long-term needs, instead of their own short-term careers.

By serving 12 years in one house, fewer politicians will be plotting their next political move as soon as they get elected—meaning fewer fundraisers, less “musical chairs” and more on-time budgets.

Proposition 93 will improve the Legislature’s ability to solve problems. Read the PPIC study at www.ppic.org.

Proposition 93 balances the benefits of term limits with the need for more lawmaking experience. Vote “yes” on Proposition 93.

BETTY JO TOCCOLI, President
California Small Business Association

RICHARD RIOR丹AN, Former California Education Secretary

SUSAN SMARTT, Executive Director
California League of Conservation Voters
APPENDIX C. Ballot Measure Theme Coding Examples

Ballot Measure Themes

1. Reduce the Influence of Special Interests
2. Reduce the Role of Money in Politics
3. Reduce Conflicts of Interest
4. Save Taxpayer Money
5. Empower Citizens
6. Increase Transparency
7. Promote Political Equality or Fairness
8. Increase Enforcement of the Law
9. Reduce Real or Perceived Corruption
10. Increase Electoral Competition
11. Enhance Representation
12. Reduce the Power of Incumbents, Parties or Leadership
13. Promote Honesty or Integrity
14. Promote More Effective Policymaking

Coding Examples

1. **Reduce the Influence of Special Interests**
   - Make elected officials serve the public, not special interests
   - Allow public money to replace special interest contributions
   - Control the overwhelming power that special interests have over our legislative process
   - Workable solution to rampant special interest influence
   - Serve the public’s interest rather than the special interests
• Break special interest control
• Make politicians accountable to all voters, not special interests
• Buy back our government from special interests which control it
• Reduce the power of special interests
• Reduce special interest influence
• Give the people of California more power and the special interests less
• Put an end to the life-time legislators who have developed cozy relationships with special interests
• Weaken the power of special interest groups
• Free state government from the influence of special interest dollars
• Guarantee that our state elected officials represent you and not the special interests
• Make state government accountable to the people and free from the influence of unethical special interests
• Prohibit the acceptance of gifts of unlimited value from special interests
• Remove the grip that vested interests have over the legislature
• Weaken the hold of special interests, lobbyists and bureaucracy
• Make more accountable our state’s elected officials so they are responsive to all voters – not just the special interests and those at the ideological extremes
• Stop dependence on special interest money
• Require candidates to reject special interest contributions to qualify for public financing
• Make politicians accountable to the people rather than to big campaign contributors
• Make politicians accountable to voters instead of big money campaign contributors
• Make the politicians responsive to us, not big campaign contributors

2. **Reduce the Role of Money in Politics**
• Reduce the cost of campaigns
• Limit campaign spending
• Force candidates to use money for the purpose for which it was raised
• Stop corrupting influence of money
• Stop dependence on special interest money
• Limit the size of campaign contributions
• Prohibit non-election-year fundraising
• Limit how much any one donor can give to a candidate
• End the domination of the political process by big money
• Limits campaign contributions and spending
• Encourages average Californians who contribute $25 or less to band together to make larger joint contributions
• Ban all foreign political contributions to candidates and parties
• Prevent foreign money from buying political influence
• End the fact and appearance of foreign money’s corrupting of elected officials
• Bans corporate contributions
• Restrict soft money
• Keep spending under control
• Requires candidates to limit spending to qualify for public financing
• Require candidates to reject special interest contributions to qualify for public financing
• Reduce money in politics
• Reduce the influence of political money
• Prohibit the acceptance of honoraria
• Prohibit the acceptance of gifts of unlimited value from special interests
• Provides free television and radio time to statewide campaigns which agree to limit spending

3. **Reduce Conflicts of Interest**
• Minimize conflicts of interest
• Prevent endless fundraising by elected officials while they’re voting on important bills
• Take reapportionment permanently out of the hands of the Legislature
• Gives power to redraw district lines to an independents districting commissions
• Require new districts to be drawn based only on population – not political – considerations
• End secret deals favoring one party or another
• Takes the job away from those who stand to benefit
• End the serious conflict of interest
• Give reapportionment to a fair and nonpartisan commission
• End self-dealing in state and congressional redistricting
• Establish independent bipartisan commission
• Correct conflict of interest when legislators design their own election districts
• End conflicts of interest
• Take away the Legislature’s power to set its own salaries and those of other elected officials
• Create and independent commission to determine salaries and benefits for legislators and other elected officials/judges
• Commission will guarantee impartiality
• Take salary and benefit decisions out of political arena and place in hands of independent commission
• Prohibit legislators from taking actions when they have a financial interests that conflict with their duties and responsibilities
• Prohibit officials from lobbying their former colleagues for 12 months after leaving office
• Restrict the types and sources of outside income
• Create a truly independent citizens commission

4. Save Taxpayer Money
• Stop wasteful spending
• Save taxpayers and consumers billions of dollars by limiting tax breaks and sweetheart deals
• Does not allow taxpayer funded campaigns
• Prohibit candidate use of tax money to campaign for office
• Save taxpayers money
• Cut the cost of redistricting
• Save taxpayer dollars
• Stop waste, save money

5. Empower Citizens
• Allow the public to tell the politicians how to spend public money
• Prevent tax money going to candidates who you disagree with
• Allow public participation
• Preserve the power of your vote
• Let the voters decide
• Give voters the final say in the process
• Protect your right to vote
• Permit voters to elect the best candidate for each office, regardless of party affiliation
• Give independent voters a chance to participate
• Allow every voter to vote for the best candidate for office, regardless of party
• Restore the will of the people of California
• Gives you more say in how laws are made
• Prevent bosses from spending workers’ money without consent
• Protect the paychecks and rights of California union members
• Give rank and file union members political freedom of choice
• Protect public employees from having political contributions taken and used without their permission
• Restore union members’ political rights
• Increase voter participation
• Take back our government
• Return our state government to its rightful owners – the citizens of California
• Put voters back in charge of California’s political process
• Return elections to the voters
• Make politicians accountable to the people
• Put Californians in charge of our elections
• Return electoral control to the people
• Put the people back in control
• Give power back to the people of California
• Make politicians responsible to the people
• Regain control of your legislature
• Give California’s legislature back to the people
• Return government to the people
• Give the people the power to set salaries
• Put power and choice back in your hands
• Make more accountable our state’s elected officials so they are responsive to all voters – not just the special interests and those at the ideological extremes
• Hold the politicians accountable
• Hold the Legislature accountable
• Force candidates to be accountable for their printed and published statements
• Make government honest and accountable
• Give the people of California more power and the special interests less
• Benefit all voters
• Benefits traditional democratic values
• Give you a real choice of candidates
• Empower the people to choose their own representative
• Give voters a choice
- Open up California’s elections process
- Expand voter choices
- Force politicians to listen to all voters in their districts, not just those registered in their own party

6. **Increase Transparency**
- Requires immediate internet disclosure of political contributions
- Requires immediate internet disclosure of advertisements
- Allow voters to know who abides by voluntary limits and who doesn’t
- Use the internet to speed up disclosure
- Ensure that legislative committees meet in public
- Ensure that no reasons for closed meetings will be permitted except those which pass a very thorough and exacting procedure for determining merit
- Make certain that the state legislature will also meet in public, not by whim, but according to the rule of law
- Open the doors of government so we may all look inside
- Require full disclosure of campaign contributors
- Allow public scrutiny of pay and benefit decisions / open hearings
- Requires all decisions on legislative spending be made in open, public meetings
- Prohibits ghost voting and vote switching…which allow members to mask their true actions
- Requires two-day public notice for conference committee bills

7. **Promote Political Equality or Fairness**
- Provides free television and radio time to statewide campaigns which agree to limit spending
- Level the playing field
- Stop political sneak attacks
- Clean money and fair elections
- Make elections more fair
- Block the forces in the Legislature from gaining unfair dominance by one political party
- Free and fair elections
- Stop the incumbents from tampering with fair elections
- Ensure fairness
- Allow nonpartisan personnel to design fair and equal legislative districts
- Put fairness before politics
• Restore fair elections
• Guarantee fair election districts
• Ensure district lines are fair
• Guarantee fair, competitive elections
• Fair, common sense reform
• Restores fairness and genuine respect for the legislature
• End the unfair and unconstitutional shakedown of California union members
• Give public employees the same choices we all have

8. Increase Enforcement of the Law
• Close loopholes
• Set enforceable limits
• Doubles fines
• Close loopholes for wealthy candidates
• Set reasonable limits that can be enforced
• Establish tough penalties
• Enforce the law
• If a candidate lies or slanders opponent, they will be thrown out of office
• Requires an annual audit of all legislative funds

9. Reduce Real or Perceived Corruption
• Stop corruption
• Clean up corruption
• Block the corruption and arrogance that comes from career politicians who are more concerned with their perks and privileges than with what’s best for the people
• End corruption in politics
• Put an end to corruption
• Clean up politics
• Clean up Sacramento
• Stop corrupting influence of money
• End the fact and appearance of foreign money’s corrupting of elected officials
• Clean money and fair elections
• Block the corruption and arrogance that comes from career politicians who are more concerned with their perks and privileges than with what’s best for the people
10. Increase Electoral Competition

- Make elections more competitive
- Allow candidates with the best ideas have a chance to win even if not wealthy
- Eradicate the kinds of political reapportionment “deals” that discourage healthy competition
- Provide real competition among candidates
- Ensure district lines are competitive
- Guarantee fair, competitive elections
- Create more competitive elections
- Open up elections to competition
- Restore healthy competition
- Create more competition in elections
- Restore competition

11. Enhance Representation

- Requires preservation of the integrity of cities, counties, and geographic regions
- Eradicate the kinds of political reapportionment “deals” that divide communities
- Provide fair and effective representation for all citizens of the state
- Allow citizens to be fairly and equally represented
- Preserve communities of interest
- Provides fair representation for all ethnic and racial groups
- Stop the unnecessary division of cities and counties
- Provide fair representation for women and minorities
- Make neighborhoods and communities matter
- Restore a government of citizens representing their fellow citizens
- Increase California’s clout in Congress
- Make politicians work hard for California
- Remind our representatives that they are public servants – not masters – who can serve for a definite time and then return home to live under the laws they made
- Return congress to the citizen legislature designed by our Founders
- Replace career politicians with citizen legislators
- Guarantee that our state elected officials represent you and not the special interests
- Allow representatives to stay connected to their communities and serve the public interest
- Force politicians to listen to all voters in their districts, not just those registered in their own party
12. Reduce the Power of Incumbents, Parties or Leadership
- Block forces in the Legislature from insuring reelection for particular incumbents
- Guarantee no political favoritism for incumbents or political parties
- Remove selfish party politics
- Weaken the power of both major political parties
- Put power and choice back in your hands and take it away from the party bosses and political insiders
- Create a process free of political influence
- Limits the extraordinary power of a few members to influence the course of legislation and punish other members
- Cut the political bosses down to size
- End a system that makes incumbents a special class of citizen and pays them a guaranteed annual wage from first election to the grave
- End the reign of the Legislature’s powerful officers
- Give you the power rather than party bosses and politicians
- Put power and choice back in your hands and take it away from the party bosses and political insiders
- Put an end to the life-time legislators who have developed cozy relationships with special interests
- Block the corruption and arrogance that comes from career politicians who are more concerned with their perks and privileges than with what’s best for the people
- Force politicians to listen to all voters in their districts, not just those registered in their own party
- Keep politicians from manipulating your vote to ensure their reelection

13. Promote Honesty or Integrity
- Restore honesty and integrity to California politics
- Reintroduce courage and honesty
- Allow candidates to make their intentions clear
- Honesty and integrity in California government
- Make candidates for political office think twice before telling a lie
- Deterrent of dishonest campaigns
- Help stop the unethical practice of lying about a political opponent
- Promote honesty and integrity over simply winning
- Make government honest and accountable
- Holds government officials to tough new ethical standards
• Promote honest government
• Make government honest and accountable

14. Promote More Effective Policymaking
• Reinvigorate congress with new blood and new ideas to tackle tough problems
• Force representatives to face facts, come clean on problems, and propose bold new solutions
• End political cronyism and reward merit
• Give us a congressional delegation that will solve problems, not add to them
• Bring new people and new ideas to Sacramento
• Force legislators to spend their time getting things done for the people, instead of picking fights to score political points
• Bring new people and new ideas to congress
• Make the legislature more effective
• Elect new people with fresh ideas
• Elect experienced legislators
• Let legislators spend more time working for taxpayers and less time worrying about which office to run for next
• Improve the legislature’s ability to perform its role
• Make legislature more effective, more accountable, and better able to solve problems you care about
• Let legislators to gain experience and expertise
• Allow committees to be led by experienced lawmakers who can better oversee state bureaucrats
• Force more legislators to focus on California’s long-term needs, instead of their own short-term careers
• Reduce the number of politicians plotting their next political move as soon as they get elected
• Improve the Legislature’s ability to solve problems
• Fix the political process
• Rebuild the state’s devastated political system
• Reform a political process that’s out of control
• End the ingrown, political nature of both houses – to the benefit of every man, woman and child in California
• End the political games
• Force legislators to spend time making laws, not money
• Weaken the hold of bureaucracy
• End partisan bickering and backroom deals
• Force candidates to focus on issues, not just partisanship
• Reduce partisan politics
## APPENDIX D. Political Reform Argument Theme Prevalence Matrix

### Political Reform Policy Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ballot Measure Themes</th>
<th>Campaign Finance</th>
<th>Redistricting / Reapportionment</th>
<th>Term Length</th>
<th>Open Primary</th>
<th>Ethics / Open Meeting</th>
<th>Compensation, Powers &amp; Funding</th>
<th>Normalized Prevalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Interests</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>65.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money in Politics</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>29.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts of Interest</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>30.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save Money</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>34.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>84.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>23.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality / Fairness</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>30.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>19.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>31.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>31.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents / Parties / Leadership</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>58.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty / Integrity</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>27.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>43.06%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### KEY

| ≥ 50% | 0% < 50% | 0% |
REFERENCES


